ML18082A490
| ML18082A490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005290380 | |
| Download: ML18082A490 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN:
Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
May 16, 1980 The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-21, "Anchorage and Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, 11 is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~-~f:lfJZ-f-=--
01 rector
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 80-21
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
S. D. Ebneter (215-337-5296) cc w/encls:
F. P. Librizzi, General Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance R. L. Mittl, General Manager - Licensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station
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ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No.:
8005050050 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON. D.C.
20555 IE Information Notice No. 80-21 Date:
May 16t 1980 Page 1 of 2 ANCHORAGE AND SUPPORT OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Description of Circumstances:
Seismic design evaluations in connection with the NRC Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) have indicated a potential safety deficiency in the* anchorage and support of safety-related electrical equipment.
This subject was high-lighted for more in-depth evaluation after site visits to several facilities.
The site reviews indicated that equipment was supported in a non-uniform manner.
In some cases, design modifications were required to render acceptable seismic design margins.
The deficiencies in anchorage and support may be due to the fact that earlier engineering design criteria did not require rigorous analyses.
Letters were issued in January 1980 to the SEP plants which requested a review of the anchorage of safety-related electrical equipment.
The findings from the reviews at Haddam Neck, Big Rock Point, Dresden 2, Oyster Creek, and Palisades identified various safety-related electrical equipment that did not have pos1tive anchorage.
The reviews at other SEP plants are continuing.
A summary is provided below of those items so far identified.
Station Service Transformers (4160 V - 480V)
Emergency Diesel Generator Room Heater Batteries - Emergency Diesel Generator
- Diesel Fire Pump
- Station Station Battery Rack Motor Control Centers Cable Trays Computer Control Panels - MG Set
- Air Compressor
- Control Room Instrument Rack Battery Room Main Breaker and Distribution Panel A related item has been identified at Comanche Peak (under construction) in which the welds to the floor supports for the main control panels were found to be undersized and improperly spaced.
Also, the SEP reviewers observed that non-seismic Category I ancillary items (dolleys, gas bottles, block and tackle gear, ductwork, etc.) may be located such that they could potentially dislodge, impact, and damage safety related equipment during an earthquake.
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IE Information Notice No. 80-21 Date:
May 16, 1980 Page 2 of 2 The type of anchorage systems utilized in the SEP plants and their expected capacities vary widely.
For example, high uncertainty exists relative to the capacity of non-engineered tack welds and attachments that rely on frictional clamping forces.
In some cases, equipment has been found free standing with no means of positive lateral support.
(Friction being the only lateral load carrying mechanism).
Most often, heavier equipment is anchored using (1) tack welds to steel angles embedded in concrete; (2) clips that rely on frictional resistance; (3) concrete embedded anchor bolts; or (4) external braced frames.
Lighter equipment housed in cabinets or attached to panels or racks has been anchored us-ing (1) bolts; (2) sheet metal screws; (3) tack welds; and (4) braced racks.
The potential concern is that certain pieces of equipment may_ not have adequate levels of seismic resistance capability due to limited anchorage capacity.
The potential problems relate to overturning and/or sliding of large equipment and gross movement or unacceptable forces on smaller attached equipment that may render it inoperable during an earthquake.
For certain large battery racks, this judgment is supported by analysis that predict unacceptable seismie behavior.
Section 3.10 of the Standard Review Plan provides acceptance criteria for the seismic qualification of Category I electrical equipment.
These criteria include IEEE Std.
- 344, 11Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations",. first issued in 1971.
Facilities designed before about 1971 without benefit of such design and testing criteria may have some anchorage deficiencies.
The NRC staff is continuing to evaluate this issue on the SEP plants as part of the seismic review in the SEP. Remedial actions have been planned for the affected pl ants.
This Information Notice is provided as notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected t_hat recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
Nb specific action or response is requested at this time.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, additional actions may be requested or required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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Information Notice No. 80-13 80-14 80-15 80-16 80-17 80-18 80-19 80-20 ENCLOSURE 2 IE Information Notice No. 80-21 Date:
May 16, 1980 Pagel of I RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Subject Date Issued General Electric Type SBM 4/2/80 Control Switches - Defective CAM Followers Safety Suggestions from 4/2/80 Employees Axial (Longitudinal) 4/21/80 Oriented Cracking in Piping Shaft Seal Packing 5/5/80 Causes Binding in Main Steam Swing Check and Isolation Valves Potential Hazards 5/5/80 Associated With Interchangeable Parts On Radiographic Equipment Possible Weapons 5/5/80 Smuggling Pouch NIOSH Recall of Recir-5/6/80 culation-Mode (Closed-Circuit) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
{Rebreathers)
Loss of Decay Heat Re-5/8/80 moval Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in Refueling Mode Issued to All Power Reactor Facil-ities with an Operating Lic~nse (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
All Power Reactor Facil-ities with an OL or CP, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities and Materials Priority 1 Licensees All Power Reactor Facil-ities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facil-ities with an OL or CP All Radiographic Licensees All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities and Materials Priority I Licensees All Power Re~ctors with an OL, Research Reactors, Fuel Facilities and Priority I Material Licensees All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP