ML18082A431

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Forwards IE Circular 80-09, Problems W/Plant Internal Communications Sys. No Written Response Required
ML18082A431
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1980
From: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Schneider F
Public Service Enterprise Group
References
NUDOCS 8005210362
Download: ML18082A431 (4)


Text

UNITED STATES

  • NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN:

Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:

April 28, 1980 The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-09, 11Problems with Plant Internal Communi-cations System, 11 is forward~d to you for i'nformation.

No written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Enclosures:

1.

IE Circular No. 80-09

2.

List of Recently Issued CONTACT:

D. L. Caphton (215-337-5254).

cc w/encls:

Sincerely, IE Circulars

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F. P. Librizzi, General Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance R. L. Mittl, General Manager - Licensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station 0

~005210362-

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SSINS No.:

6830 Accession No.:

8002280663 OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 IE Circular No. 80-09 Apri 1 28, 1980.

Page 1 of 2 PROBLEMS WITH PLANT INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Description of Circumstances at the Kewaunee Power Plant:

On January 17, 1980, the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant lost offsite power to its 4160V non-safeguards buses.

Since the system used for internal communica-tions, paging and evacuation alarm purposes (Gai-tronics) was powered from a non-safeguards bus, plant communications were degraded during the outage.

This degraded condition persisted until power was restored to the affected bus thru an emergency safeguards bus.

While in the degraded mode, the licensee used two-way portable radios for internal communications.

The radios performed satisfactorily, per se; however, when transmitting in the vicinity of certain electronic equipment, they induced false signals into the electronic equipment.

Description of Circumstances at the Davis-Besse Power Station:

On October 15, 1979, the Davis-Besse Power Station lost all offsite power.

During the period when offsite power was not available, the licensee noted

  • that the internal three digit telephones (GTE) would not function.

In addition, the NRC 11 Red Phone" was subsequently reported to have been out of ser~ice. Other licensee phone systems *(Gai-tronics and the outside four digit Ohio Bell phones) did work.

Following this event, the licensee provided emergency power to its phones and the NRC took action through AT&T to provide emergency power to all Red Phones.

(Note:

Although the comm_unications system at Davis-Besse was not designed to meet the single failure criterion, its FSAR states that the main internal communications system is supplied by two redundant power feeders from the uninterruptable instrumentation distribution panels.)

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR LICENSEES AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS All licensees of nuclear power reactors and holders of construction permits should be aware of the potential problems described above.

Because of the generic implications of the above problems, it is recommended that the following actions be considered:

1.

Determine the source of power for plant internal communications systems;

2.

Upgrade the internal communications systems to assure operability during the loss of offsite power or other foreseeable events;

IE Circular No. 80-09 April 28, 1980 Page 2 of 2

3.

Determine whether any plant electronic equipment may be adversely affected by portable radio transmissions.

This determination should include, but not be limited to, the computer system, electro-hydraulic system, and nuclear instrumentation system; and

4.

Instruct employees on the use of radios in areas susceptible to electro-magnetic interference.

No written response to this Circular is required; however, if additional information regarding these matters is required, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Circular No.

79-24 79-25 79-25 Supplement A 80-01 80-02 80-03 80-04 80-05 8o~os 80-07 80-08 ENCLOSURE 2

  • IE Circular No. 80-09 Date:

April 28, 1980 Page 1 of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Subject First Date Issued To of Issue Proper Installation and 11/26/79 All Power Reactor Calibration of Core Licensees with an Operating Spray Pipe Break License (OL) or Construe-Detection Equipment on tion Permit (CP)

BWRs Shock Arrestor Strut 12/20/79 All Power Reactor Facil-Assembly Interference ities*with an OL or CP Shock Arrestor Strut 1/31/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Assembly Interference ities with an OL or CP Service Advice for GE 1/17/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Induction Disc Relays ities with an OL or CP Nuclear Power Plant 2/1/80 All Power and Research Staff Work Hours Reactors with an OL or CP Protection from Toxic 3/6/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Gas Hazards ities with an OL Securing Threaded Lack-3/14/80 All Power Reactor Facil-ing Devices on Safety-ities with an OL or CP Related Equipment Emergency Diesel Gen-4/1/80 All Power Reactor Facil-e rato r Lub'ri cat i ng 0 i l ities with an OL or CP Addition and Onsite Supply Control and Account-4/14/80 Medical Licensees in ability Systems for Categories G and Gl Implant Therapy Sources Problems with HPCI 4/3/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Turbine Oil System ities with an OL or CP BWR Technical Speci-4/18/80 All General Electric fication Inconsis-BWRs holding a power tency - RPS Response reactor Qt Time