ML18081B081
| ML18081B081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002210282 | |
| Download: ML18081B081 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket Nos. 50-354 50-355 50-311 Public Service Electric & Gas Company ATTN:
Mr. T. J. Martin Vice President Engineering and Construction 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
F'E'B 0 6 1980 Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-03 which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility(ies) with an operating license or a construction permit.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~~M-fC:- Di rector
Enclosures:
- 1.
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:
G. H. Smith (215-337-5200) cc w/encls:
E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance, Engineering and Construction Department
ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.: 6820 UNITED STATES Accessions N*o.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7912190669 OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENi.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Bulletin No. 80-03 Date: February 6, 1980 Page 1 of 2 LOSS OF CHARCOAL FROM STANDARD TYPE II, 2 INCH, TRAY ADSORBER CELLS Description of Circumstances:
- During preliminary leak tests of charcoal adsorber cells in certain ventilation systems at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, it was determined that on certain adsorber cells the spacing between rivets securing the perforated screen to the casing was too great to ensure adequate contact. between the casing and the screen, thus a 11 awing charcoal to escape.
- The problem was discovered when a visual inspection detected loose charcoal on the floor of the filter housings and on the outside horizontal surfaces of the adsorber cells. Loss of charcoal was also indicated by observation of light penetrating through the cells. Additional inspection revealed that the rivets securing the perforated screens to the cell casing were approximately six inches apart and the screen appeared to be sagging away from the casing between rivets.
The particular adsorber cells being tested at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant were Flanders Type II pre-1974 fabrication.
There is a possibility that design of adsorber cells with wide spacing between screen rivets may pass initial freon leak tests but degrade significantly during operation thus reducing the margin of* safety during postulated accidents.
The* responses from this Bul 1 eti n will be used by the NRC to evaluate need for more frequent inspection/testing.
For all power reactor facilities with an Operating License:
- 1.
Determine if charcoal adsorber cells in use, or proposed for use, have the potential for a loss of charcoal ineidental to handling, storage or use (as appropriate).
Particular attention shoul.d be directed to exam-ination of a) rivet spacing resulting in separation of screen and cell housing and b) adsorber cell or filter housing deformation causing las~
of charcoal and/or channeling.
Either of these items could result in a degraded filtration system i ncapab 1 e of performing its
- intended fun ct ion.
The preferred method of this determination is a visual inspection of the filter housing and adsorber cells as described in Section 5 of ANSI NSI0-1975.
If this method is not feasible, state in the report required by Paragraph 4 how the determination was made.
IE Bulletin No. 80-03 Date: February 6, 1980 Page 2 of 2
- 2.
For ESF filtration systems, any identified defective cells shall be replaced and the operability of the system (after cell replacement) demonstrated by.leak testing within 7 days.
Preferred method of leak testing is as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52 and Section 12 of ANSI NSl0-1975.
- 3.
For normal ventilation exhaust filtration systems which eniploy charcoal adsorber cells and for which radioactive removal efficiency has been assumed in determining compliance with the 11as low as reasonably achievable" design criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, any identified defective cells shall be replaced*as soon as possible but at least within 30 days.
After replacement, the system should be demonstrated operable by le.ak testing within an additional 30 days.
Preferred method of testing is as described in Regulatory Guide 1.140 and s.ection 12 of.ANSI NSl0-1975.
- 4.
Report in writing within 45 days of the date of this Bulletin the results of the determination required by Paragraph l. The report shall include the type of cells employed (manufacturer and cell design), system containing the cells, observed cell condition (degradation/sagging) and a discussion of visual inspection procedure and results.
For all Power Reactor Facilities with a Construction Permit:
- l.
Visual inspection shall be co~ducted only if the cha~coal adsorber cells have been.purchased and shipment received.
A representative number (approximately 5) of each type of cell design/manufacturer shall be visually inspected for such.defici~ncies as rivet spacing and screen/casing~
separation which could lead to lOss of charcoal incidental to handling, storage, or use.. *
- 2.
Report in writing within 45 days of the date of this Bulletin the results of the inspectfon required by Paragraph 1.
The report shall include the type of cells (manufacturer and cell design), observed cell condition (degradation/sagging) and a discussion of the inspection procedure and results.
Reports shall be s~nt to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D of 10 CFR 20 with a copy to the Director, Division of Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment, USNRC, Washington, D.C.
20555.
Approved by GAO, Bl80225(R0072); clearance expires, 7/31/80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Bulletin No.
79-25 79-02 (Rev. 2) 79-26 79-27 79-28 79-0lB 80-01 80-02 ENCLOSURE 2 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Subject Date Issued Failures of Westinghouse 11/2/79 BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems Pipe Base Plate Designs 11/8/79 Using Concrete Expansion Bolts Boron Loss From BWR 11/20/79 Control Blades Loss of Non-Class-1-E 11/30/79 Instrumentation and Con-trol Power System Bus During Operation Possible Malfunction 12/7/79 of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures Environmental Quali-1/14/80 fication of Class IE Equipment Operability of ADS' Valve 1/14/80 Pneumatic Supply Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipment 1/21/80 IE Bulletin No. 80-03 Date: February 6, 1980 Page 1 of 1 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) (for Action)
All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and those nearing Licensing (for Action):
All Power Reactor Facilities with a CP (for Information).
All Power Reactor Facilities with an, OL or CP All Power Reactors with an OL except SEP Plants All BWRs with an OL All BWRs with an OL or CP