ML18081A786
| ML18081A786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1979 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Librizzi F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912200609 | |
| Download: ML18081A786 (3) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-272 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l.Jtt,;EMBER 0 5 1979 Mr. F. P. Librizzi, General Manager Electric ~reduction Production Department Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place, Room 7221 Newark, New Jersey 07101
Dear Mr. Librizzi:
During our continuing review of the Salem Unit 1 and 2 containment vent and purge isolation systems we have identified areas for which we require additional information. These areas are listed in the enclosure to this letter.
You are requested to provide this information within 30 days of receipt.of this letter.
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc: w/enclosure See next page
/
Sincerely,
/
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/
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-~-LJ Yl, 0 L lA. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
// 1 7 91220060~
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Mr. F. P. Librizzi Public Service Electric and Gas Company cc:
Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Conner, Moore and Corber Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D. c.
20006 Richard Fryling, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Solicitor Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gene Fisher, Bureau of Chief Bureau of Radiation Protection 380 Scotch Road Trenton, New Jersey 08628 Mr. Hank Midura, Manager Salem Nuclear Generating Station Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plate Newark, New Jersey 07101 Mr. R. L. Mittl, General Manager Licensing and Environment Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Salem Free Library 112 West Broadway Salem, New Jersey 08079 Leif J. Norrholm u.. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer I Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
- ' e REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFO?-'*'.,.c;,;ror; SALEM NUCLE.AR GENERATING STATION U\\
- 75
& 2 CONTAINMENT PURGE OVERRID~
DOCKET NOS. 50-272, 50-311
- 1.
Our review indicates that the switch used to override the automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) also defeats the manual isolation signal.
It is our position that the overriding of one type of safety actuation signal should not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal to the isolation valves.
Furthermore, the bypassing of manual initiation is a violation of IEEE Std. 279-1971.
Therefore, justify the present design or propose an alternative design that satisfies our concern.
- 2.
We require that instrumentation and controls used for the protection of public health and safety satisfy the requirements for reactor protection systems.
Therefore, justify the present design or propose an alternative design for the radiation monitors that initiate containment isolation that satisfies our requirements.
- 3.
Our review also indicates that the safety injection (SI) signal can be manually reset and blocked such that a subsequent containment pressure high signal or radiation high signal will not activate (VI) retentive memory.
The staff 1s position in this regard is presented in request 1 above.
Justify your present design or modify the circuitry so that appropriate safety signals will actuate CVI whenever the protective function is required.
- 4.
We require that sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.
Describe and justify the features provided or state your intentions for a modified design.
- 5.
We require that system level annunciation of the override status be provided for any safety system impacted when any override is active.
Your design does not satisfy this requirement.
Describe and justify the features provided or state your intention for a modified design.
- 6.
The Salem plants will monitor (1) the containment atmosphere and (2) the plant stack, for airborne particle iodine and gas activity.
In that these two sets of radiation monitors are not fully redundant backups to each other, we consider each set to be a different source of a required isolation actuation signal.
We require that, should one safety actuation signal be overridden, the other radiation monitoring. system should be capable of actuating containment isolation and alerting the operators to the cause of isolation when a trip level is reached.
Describe and justify the features provided or state your intention for a modified design.