ML18078A532
| ML18078A532 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1978 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812220143 | |
| Download: ML18078A532 (26) | |
Text
Public Sorvico Electric ancJ Gas Cornrxmy 80 Pork Place Now<1rk, N.J. 07101 Pl1or10201 /'1'.30-7000 December 21, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c.
20555 Attention:
Gentlemen:
Mr. Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 3 Division of Project Management RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby transmits 40 copies of its revised responses to your requests for additional information numbered 1.41, 5.108, 7.29, 12.23, 14.26 and re-vised portions of FSAR section 12.9.
The information con-tained herein will be incorporated into the Salem FSAR in an amendment to our application.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to con-tact us.
Enclosure r;;;;;;;urs, R. L. Mittl General Manager -
Licensing and Environment Engineering and Construction REGULATORY DOCKET FILE CQpir
?8122~( '-l3_
QUJ::r.;*J'IOl*I 5. J Of3 r-n r cg u c ::; t [ o r il d cl i d o n.1 l
- i. n f: o rm a tJ. o n 5
- 9 7 we r e q u c ~; t c d t b a t you ~;tate yotH criteria tor floor rer>pu1rnc spcctru bruc':ldcninCJ of the C;1tcrJory I structures loc.:1tccl on the ::;oil mcdta.
We pointed out thzit the cf:fect of: parc-unctcr vnri;:1tion on floor r cspun~:;c s pee t rum f:o r the soi 1 s i tc f> arc no rmn l ly accuun ted f o r by i n c r c as i n g th c i n d.i. v i du a 1 p e a !-;: w i d th ~; by + l 5 ~(~
- Yo u stated tht:1t in cl previous ~;ubmit:ti'lJ, you propo~:;cd + 10% increase.
However, you did not attempt to justify the ad()quacy of the proposed criteria in relation with the regulatory staf:f position provided in request for additional inforrnution 5.9*/.
We reqnirc that you address the discrepcJncy bet\\'1een the two criteria and justify the + 10% value proposed.
ANS\\*!ER See response to'Question 5.97.
The containment floor response spectra were broadened by +/- 10%.
The prominent spike, however, is at l cps, a very flexible frequency. *None of the eguiprn~*nt falls in this area.
In the other Category I buildings, there is more than one sharp spike in the floor response spectra.
In order to avoid undesirable resonance effects, components were stiffened and frequencies shifted ~utside the sharp spiked areas, thereby eliminating the broadening considerations.
In other flat areas of the response spectra, a 10% shifting of frequency coordinates was applied to obtain the equipment re-sponse.
Since these areas are flat, an additional 5% s1tifting, would not c,91:1-se an appreciable change to equipment response.
Q5.l00**1 P7B l3ll 7.1
QUESTION 7.29 Seisraic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment and
- Instrumentation.
Identify and provide the method of seismic qualification for electrical equipment and instrumentation for BOP scope of supply required to reach the hot stand-by and cold shutdown condition from full power operation under a postulated SSE event.
A review of this equipment will be perf6rmed by the Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT).
A site visit at some future date will be necessary to inspect and otherwise evaluate selected equipment after our review of the equipment list.
The attachment describes SQRT and its procedures.
Provide your response in accordance with these SQRT r~quirements.
ANSWER Refer to the response to Question Q7.18.
Table Q7.18-l has been updated to include the information requested concerning type of test/analysis and appropriate natural frequencies where available.
No distinction is made between hot standby or cold shutdown for the equipment listed in the table.
For the.most part, the equipraent is utilized for maintaining/achieving both of the conditions specified.
Q7.29-l P78 139 01
Equipment Control Console Nuclear Instrument-ation System Process Control Equipment Cabinets Solid State Protection Actuation Racks Vital Instrument Bus Static Inverters Auxiliary Control System Terminal and Relay Cabinets Relay Racks Location Aux. Bldg.
El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 122 I Aux. Bldg.
El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 100 I Aux. Bldg.
El. 100' Aux. Bldg.
TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Seismicl Design Basis 0.36 g 0.36 g 0.36 g 0.36 g 0.25 g 0.25 g
- o. 25 g Table Q7.18-l Sheet 1 Type of Qualification Test Biaxial Test Single Axis Test Single Axis Test Single Axis Test Single Axis Test Single Axis Dynamic Analys Multiple Axis Remarks Simultaneous Time History Test2 producing accelerations greater than design basis earthquake (DBE).
Test results were accept-able.
Sine Beat Test with peak accel-eration of 0.7g.
Test results were acceptable.
Sine Beat Test with peak accel-eration of 0.7g.
Test results were acceptable.
Sine Beat Test with peak accel-eration of 0.7g.
Test results were acceptable.
Uniaxis Time History Test2 with peak acceleration of 0.7g.
Test results were acceptable.
Uniaxis Time History Test2 peak acceleration of 0.7g.
results were acceptable.
with Test A finite element computer analysis was performed.
Results of the analysis were acceptable.
There were 10 natural frequencies under 40 Hz with the first mode at 5.41 Hz.
Manufacturer/
Model #
PSE&G Control Consoles 2CC1 and 2CC2 Westinghouse Nuclear/Instrum-entation System Cabinet 3 Hagan Process Control & Prot-ection Cabinets Westinghouse Solid State Protection System Cabinets Garrett Static Inverter and Power Supply Bailey Meter Co.
System 660 PSE&G Report ii/Date Wyle Laboratories Test Report i.'42441-1 4/9/73 WCAP-7817 WCAP-7817 ement -
2 WCAP-7817, Supplerr.ent 12/71 Suppl-12/.
WCAP-7817 Supplement 3 12/71
.. :ri..iresearch Nanufacturin:; Cc.
Report i;71-S040 12/10/71 Battelle Sur..:r.ary Reports 5/6/71 -
5/25/71 Battelle Sum.marv Report 12/21/73
Equipment l25V and 28V DC Distribution Cabinets Terminal Racks Diesel Control Cabinets Control Room Recorder Panels Solid State Protection Output Test and Interface Cabinets Location Aux. Bldg.
El. 84 I and 100 1 Aux. Bldg.
El. 100 I Aux. Bldg.
El. 100' Auic. Bldg.
El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 12 2 I Seismicl Design Basis 0.25 g 0.25 g 0.25 g 0.36 g 0.36 g Table Q7.18-l Sheet 2 TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFE'rY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Type of Qualification Test Biaxial Static Analysi Multiple Ax_is Test Biaxial Dynamic Analys Multiple Axis Test Biaxial Remarks Simultaneous Time History Test2 producing accelerations greater than DBE, Test results were acceptable.
Calculated (46HH) resonant frequency and detennined stresses using maximum g level at this frequency from response spectra.
Results of the analysis were acceptable.
Simultaneous Time History Test2 producing accele~
rations greater than DBE.
Test results were accept-able.
A finite element computer analysis was performed.
Results of the analysis were acceptable.
All panels exhibited canti-lever mode resonances above 40hz, Various panel subassemblies/selected exhibited resonances below
- 40hz, Simu~taneous Time History Test producing accele~.
rations greater than DBE.
Test results were accept-able.
Manufacturer/Model #
B-K Electrical Products,
- Inc, l25V DC Distribution Cabinets 28V DC Distribution Cabinets 28V DC Load Centers (Switchgear) llSV DC Instrument susses Falstrom Company Tenninal Cabinets Shaf tway Cabinets Diesel Gen. Control Panels:
Engine Control Panel, Gen. Control Panel, Exciter Regul-ator Panel Recorder Panels-RP 2 &
RP 5 Fascia Annunciator (Structural Only), RP!,
RP3,RP4,RP6,RP7,RP8,RP9 Panel Control Inc.
SSPS Test Cabinets Reoort#/Date Wyle Laboratories Test Report
- 42367-1 12/18/72 PSE&G Engineering Dept. Report 11/7/73 Wyle Laboratories Test Report
- 42551-1 11/8/73 Battelle Summary Repor'-~
5/16/74, 12/24/75, 12/1/75 Wyle Laboratories Test Report ~42780-1 7/26/74
Radiation Monitoring Cabinets and Components Safeguards Equipment Control Control Centers Location Aux. Bldg.
El, 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 100' Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122' Seismicl Design Basis 0.36 g 0.25 g 0.36 g TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Type of Qualification Test Biaxial Test Sinqle Axis Dynamic Analysis Multiple Axis Test Single Axis Table Q7.18-l Sheet 3 Remarks Random multifrequency tc,st producing accelerations gre~ter'than DBE.
Test results were acceptable.
- '11 analysis was performed on the entire assembly to dem-C*:.-.~trate its capability to i.. *i'~hstand the specified se.'.smic forces supported by sine sweep, sine dwell and shock testing of cabinet.
Electronic subassemblies and components were vibration tested at natural frequencies as determined by sine sweep and compared to data from the analysis.
Results of the analysis and tests were accept-able.
Sine sweep test in the three orthogonal axes.
0.5g main-tained from 10-500 Hz.
Low frequency (5-lOHz region) justified by combination test and analysis.
The test results were acceptable.
(
Manufacturer/
Model #
Unit l:
Tracexlab/Trapelo Cantrel Cabinets Area Monitors TA62/AX22VI, TA62/AX22 Particulate & Gas Sampler Housing Par"iculate Detector Ga~ Detector ND-12C Filter Sampler MQ-228 Unit 2:
Victoreen Inc.
Digital Radiation Monitoring System Process and Area Monitors Vitro Laboratories Safeguards Equip-ment Control System Cabinets Report#/Date Wyle Laboratories Test Report 143166-1
- 4/1/76 MD-58 Wyle Laboratories Test Report H43870-l
- !44040-i Vitro Laboratories Analysis Report 4/74 General Electric 7700 Line Motor Control Centers
- 70ICS100 8/21/70
Equipment Unit Substations and DC S*"i tchge3; 5 kV Switchgear Diesel Generator and.>-.ccessories Tray and Hangers attery Charger 125V Battery Charger 2BV Location Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
El. 100' Aux. Bldg.
El. 100' Aux. Bldg.
El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122 1 Seismicl Design Basis 0.36 g 0.25 g 0.25 g 0.36 g 0.36 g 0.36 g TABLE Q7.1B-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Type of Qualification Test Sin,le Axis Static Analysi Multiple Axis Static Analysi Single Axis Dynamic Analys Multiple Axis Test Biaxial Test Single Axis The un2.t was shock tested at resultant accelerations greater than the design basis earth-quake (DBE) at the natural frequencies.
Test results acceptable.
Calculated resonant frequ-ency (17.2Hz) and determined stresses using maximum g level at this frequency from the response spectra.
Results of the analysis were acceptable.
Calculated stresses on all vital components using peak acceleration of*l.Og horizon-tally and 0.67g vertically.
Results of the analysis were acceptable.
Analysis performed by comp-uting the dynamic response
- . <* 1 parameters utilizing the
- 'response spectra. *Results of the analysis were accept-able.
A resonant search was perf-ormed.
The unit was then subjected to a resultant acceleration greater than the design basis earthquake (DBE) at the determined natural frequencies.
Test results were acceptable.
Resonance search from l-35Hz and a time history test with peak accelerations of 0.75g horizontal and o.sg vertical three-axis Table Q7.18-l Sheet 4 Manufacturer/
Model #
I.T.E. Imperial Corp.
600V Switchgear I.T.E. Dwg. No's 837082, 249096 General Electric M62H Metalclad Switchgear White Industrial Power Alco Engine Division DE-35245 T. J. Cope Exide USF-130-3-250 C&D Batteries ARR 28H/Kl50F3 Report# /Da t~*
- R-8792 7/18/69 Seismic Analysis Report dated 2/2/71 Seismic Calculations 10/2/70 Cabletray Hanger Calculations 7/71 NPS Report #0~01-1 1/18/74 Report #QCC-10 2/4/72 Battelle 1-16000 1/11/72
Equipment Batteries 28V & 125V 3attary Racks C:lactrical
!?cr.et:cations
.;ux. Bldg. Vent.
Fa:-i Motors Location Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122' Aux. Bldg.
- El. 122 1 Containment El. 78 I Aux. Bldg.
El. 122' Seismicl Design Basis 0.36 g 0.36 g 0.23 g 0.36 g TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Type of Qualification Test Biaxial Static Analysis Pseudo-Dynamic Analysis Multiple Axis STATIC AliALYSIS Remarks Simultaneous horizontal and vertical components applied with peak accelerations greater than the desigri basis earthquake (DBE) at the natural frequencies.
Test results were accept-able~
Calculated resonant freque-ncy and determined stresses using maximum g level at this frequency from the response spectra.
Results of the analysis were accept-able.
Calculated resonant frequency of unit and components.
s Stresses were then determined at these frequencies using maximum g level obtained from response spectra.
Results of the analrsis were accepta.ble, Calculated stresses using maximum g level from response spectra.
The analysis sub-stantiates that the motor will function both mechanically and electrically under DBE conditions.
Table Q7.18-l Sheet 5 Manufacturer/
Model JI C&D Batteries LCU-19 C&D Batteries E.P.-60-LCU-27 E.P.-120-LCU-17 Con ax SubAssembly Jl2325-797l-03 Reoort#/Date Report li42074-l 3/29/71 Seismic De:sign Calculations 5/21/70 ER1104 9/23/70 ER1104 Rev.A 7/6/71 ER1093 3/12/70 Allis Chalmers Stress Calculations RG-364TS:60HP,l800RPM ~ Seismic Shock RG~324T:40HP,l800RPM 8/11/70
Equipment Service Water PL!m? Motors Aux. Feedwater Pump Motors
- ngineered Safeguards Motors Location Service Water Intake Structure El. 90.9' Aux. Bldg.
El. 84 I Aux. Bldg.
El. 84' and 45' Seismicl Design Basis 0.25 g 0.24 g 0.24 g TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Type of Qualification Static Analysi Static Analysi Analysis Table Q7.18-l Sheet 6 Hemarks Calculated stresses using naximum g level from response spectra.
The analysis sub-stantiates that the motor will function both mech-anically and electrically und~r DBE conditions.
Calculated stresses using maximum g level from response spectra.
The analysis sub-stantiates that the motor will function both mechanically and electrically under DBE conditions.
Pump Motors Supplied by Westinghouse with Seismic Qualification.
Manufacturer/
Model #
-~His-Chalmers A-COl-0500-42471 1000 HP, l200RPM Allis-Chalmers 588US-RG-3600RPM 600HP RE:port?/Date Calculations for Seismic Acceleratio~s 5/22/70 Rotor Shaft Deflections, stress ca1culations9 seismic Shock 8/7/70
TABLE Q7,18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Safety-related instiuments, instrument panels and enclosures used in various Locations of the plant were qualified by various test procedures selected to meet or exceed the requirements oE IEEE 344-1971.
Techniques used included uniaxial sine beat testing performed on orthogonal axes, resonant search, multiaxis time histroy, and ~ultiaxis ranjom multifrequency.
Test results were acceptable.
- !.:?".~:[acturer/Nodel II Foxboro, Fischer & Porter, Barton Pressure & Differential Pressure Transmitters ASCO Solenoid Valves, various models Col~"bus Metal Products Co.
N:::;*L". 12 Wall Mounted Cabinets/Panels Honeywell Pneumatic Controller 604PS nonevwell Pneumatic Thermostats r.;:*p97Q Moore 33 Pneumatic Transmitter H.:iore 55 Pneumatic Controller Asco Soe.noid Valves, Various
~lode ls Barton Differential Pressure s-.*itc'1.
Fischer E/P Converter Fischer & Porter Level Transmitter Fischer & Porter Flow Controller Fischer & Porter Setpoint Station
, ATC Timer Leeds & Northrup Pressure Transmitter & Power Supply United Electric Pressure Switch
- SEE NOTES ON NEXT PAGE Report#/Date WCAP-7817 12/71 ASCO Report #5 2/8/72 ASCO Report 113 3/22/72 ASCO Report 114 7/20/72 ASCO Report 11103 PSE&G Engineering Dept. Report PSE&G Engineering Report 1/30/74 Wyle Laboratories Test Report
- 42987-1 2/7 /75 Wyle Laboratories Test Report 1143166-1 4/1/76 Manufacturer/Model #
Fischer & Porter, Leeds & Northrup Pressure & Temp. Transmitters Fischer & Porter, Leeds & Northrup E/P Converters Fischer & Porter Indicating Stations Mercoid & United Electric Pre-sure Switches Fischer & Porter Power Supply & Squareroot Extractor-ASCO Solenoid Valves Moore Auctioneer Masoneilan Pres.sure Regulator Imperial Valve Manifolds Instrument Panel (Including tubing, fittings, terminal blocks, wire, lugs, etc~) as constructed per PSE&g Spec. 72-8007 Falstrom/Westinghouse 230V Motor Control Centers (Aux. Equipment Cabinets)
Buchanan Terminal Blocks Cinch-Jones Terminal Blocks CMC Switches and Indicators NEMA 12 Enclosure Various ASCO Solenoid Valves Moore SSS High Select, 52l12, 173S, 91F60 Panel Control-Panel 740Y, 740BB, 740-HH,445,740B Foxboro llDM-BSI, l3A-MSI, 13A-51, l3A-HSI Fischer & Porter Diff. Press Transmitter 10B2496 Panel Control -
NEMA 12 Enclosure Fischer & Porter lOB2496 Diff. Press. Transmitter Nupro Metering Valve -
B"4MG 1/4" Panel Control -
NEMA 12 Enclosure Fischer & Porter lOB2496 Diff. Press. Transmitter Panel Control -
NEMA 12 Enclosure Various ASCO Solenoid Valves Fischer Type 546 E/P Converter Masoneilan 77-1 Regulator, 77-4 Regulator F&P 10B2496 Diff. Press. Transmitter Barton 386 Diff. Press. Transmitter Table Q7ol8-l Sheet 7 Report~/Date Battelle Summary Report 4/27/73 9*
Wyle Test Labo~atories Report #12595-1 11/12/73 Wyle Laboratories Test Report #44215-1 9/16/78 Wyle Laboratories Test Reoort #43932~1 3/17/78° Wyle Laboratories Test Report #43932-2 3/22/78 Wyle Laboratories a
Test Report #43728-1 ~
¥/77
TABLE Q7.18-l
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION FOR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT lpeak horizontal acceleration of the floor as a result of the Design Basis Earthquake.
2All time history tests were performed using the time history response spectra of floor elevation 122 1 in the Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building.
xEquipment was qualified for this elevation ~!though actually located at a lower elevation in the aux~liary building.
Table Q7.18-l Sheet 8 e**
'l'J'!e states of Deluw<HC: an-cw Jersey c;:ich h<~~e lcgi,ation ~ettlng forth an agrecrnerit providing for an Inter.state Civ1l Defense and Disaster Com*-
pact cont~ined in the respective State PIPAG's whereby the exchange of r.esou~ces and services by the two stat~s will take place in the event of emergency (Figure 12.9-10).
PSE&G has entered into an agreement with the. State of New Jersey in the "Memorandum of Understanding" (Figure 12.9-3).
This memorandum establishes that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection will implement the New Jersey emergency plan, "Procedures for Implementing Protective Action Guides" (PIPAG), in the event of a major radiological release for which State protective action guides could be exceedBd, on the clear and imminent threat thereof.
Immediate notification of the States of New New Jersey and Delaware by PSE&G would be required in the event of any exposure or release ~equiring immediate notification of the USNRC per 10 CFR Part 20.403(a)~
Table 12.9-1 also lists other notification cri-teria.
At its discretion, PSE&G may also provide immediate notifications to the States of any other incidents that may be of interest or import to the States.
The PSE&G Procedures to be followed in the ev~nt of an incident requiring notification or assistance of State and/or local agencies are set forth in the station Emergency (Implementation) Procedures.
In particular, these procedures provide instructions to the station Senior Shift Supervisor or Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) to immediately alert and recommend to the downwind State that they initiate immediate protective actions in the low population zone in the event of the declaration of a Case I LOCA (see P.
12.9-40), based on observations in the Control Room.
Modifications of such recommendations would be based on subsequent data obtained by PSE&G and/or State emergency monitoring tests.
12.9-20 P78 108 1.l
Contingencies have been made in the Salem Emergency Imp16mentation Procedu*res to cover a spec.urn of nccident.s in which 9rmal raclial:ion monitoring is unavailable (e.g., out of service or off scale high).
Th~ following accidents are considered as part of the Salem Emergency Implementation Procedures:
Case I LOCA A LOCA assumin9 severe core damage -
fuel melting (Regulatory Guide 1.4 assumptions) 100% of the noble gases and 25% 6f the iodines contained in the core are assumed released to the containment.
The containment initially leaks at the maximum design leak rate.
\\ As predetermined, this hypothetical case would correspond to a State Condition Code 4 emergency.
Indication of the following conditions, sustained for a 5 minute period, in the Control Room, would result in declaration of a Condition tode 4 emergency:
Containment dose rate of 750 R/hr or greater and any two of the following conditions: 1) Containment pressure equal to 6r greater than 25 psig, 2)
Containment temperature equal to or greater than 2000F, and 3) ECCS injection signal.
Case II LOCA Primary coolant leaks at a rate fast enough to increase the temperature of the core to the point where there is damage to the fuel rods.
For this case, it is assumed that all the gap activity (the gaseous contained between the fuel and fuel rod) is released to the containment.
The containment is assumed to initially leak at the maximum design leak rate.
In this accident, it is u~ the Senior Shift Supervisor or Emergency_ Duty Officer to a s s u r e th a t th e r e ha s been no f u c 1 me 1 t i n q
- I f the r e i s a n y g_u e ~--; t i o n, a Case I LOCA should be as!rnmed.
12.9-'10 P7B lOB
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l or 2 or 3 S?-<:=...,3R.0 (NJ 5?.. cr:cc {Doll Ccr.r.:'....'"'iications tests & in-fo!:".at.ion releases, drills, s:.irveilla:1ce by utility Countv none B:;\\P (!:J) direct cro:: (Del) direct S?-..3R? (NJ)
S?_.cz::x: (Del) or County CD
)..::t.ive su_'Veilla.'1.ce may be needed 3?? f:'J)
~irect
=
(:::>?l) dir£-ct SP~5~ (NJ) 5?-4-CrD: (Del)
'n"at.~r :R8l ease (O:>de 2) or Airborne t<elease (Code 3)
S:;!."'Veilla.-..ce required for a possi::ile C::>de 0:.
(assistance may be needed) (Activate BF9licable county EOC's)
County CD_..
STATS OF NJ (a) OR DEL (c) NOCLF.J>.R !NC!DENT ALERT CATEGORIES local none none none none Local CD (if none local assistance is nooded Actions In vol-NOCLF.AR UTILITY CONSECXJEN:ES PERSONNEL or ALERT or
~
UNIT or PLANT (single (building)
SIT£ or STATION Fully in Control Possibility of some rel ease (Possibility of some on-site evacllations)
Knov.n releases (Consequences probably confined to site. Fcssible site evacllations)
Kno""1 off-site EP ;JI-1, 16, 22 E?i II-1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 El? iI-2, 3, 9, 15, 16, 18, 22 El? U-2, 3, a, 13, 15, lfi, 17.
18, 21, EP tl-2, s, 4,
REF~.XtS ':"O NJ E~S~::?-CT
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7, 8, 14 11 I A;;?. l, 2, 3, 4,
~ 6, J,
ving Citizens consaquences 8,
- p. 6 v
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A, C,
- .;op. I 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, SR.? C\\J) direct or Property (LOO.)
c= {~l) direct o::
Comty CD-+
Local CD-+
(assistance
~ (Prompt ini tia-S?--4'-E::@ (NJ) w::>uld be nwded ti on of pro tee-S?- C"1X: (!).al inmediately tive actions (g h) in L?Z ""uld oo' Pro:.ective 3Ct.ion req..iired necessary)
(CoCe 4)
I *2~ 5:.o""" 'r'ele+/-o::e l-'.\\J::\\-~:-s:
(609) S32-2COO (ca.* also use dedicated re:l eroergency phone between SNGS Control Room and NJ State Felice Comnunicat.ions Center)
(3~2) 673-:437 (ca.* als::> cse ~'AS dooicated line between SN3S Control Room and Del sc,te Police Comnunications Center and Del CIHX:)
la)
~:J
- i !lJ
!-'..3..-:ual entitled ");.ow Jersey ?IPJ..G Manual:
Ni E:nergency R2sponse l?lan for Major Nuclear Facilities*, as amended.
(c) D::-l
~c:'..e.:!::- :.=ciCe..'1.t. or !.r1cide.~t:. Con:.rol Pla.'i, as a.~eOOed
(.'.5) s~ ~*.e:g~cy ?1~'1, Se~tion 12.9 of Fs;.J~., as a.~cd 11
- .~')* ~
E::-.e:.;~.~Y ?::'octdures, as _a.';lcn..:!cd X.J C,,ui.:.y ~..::ca:- "~e:-gcncy Pla.'1.s, as ar.i.endcl '
1
- ~~ !:?>~ -
K.:..-....,,1 of Prot.iict.ive J<:t.ion Qlid~s ar.:l Prot£X:tive k:tions for NJclear !nc:idcnts, Latest. J\\mendmenr.
~ **1 E:A, Fe\\ - The R>dio..:t.ive Cont.ar.iination of Food and 11:11:.al Feeds, Latest J\\mernlr:ient
\\?78 66 33.139 I
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY GENERATING STATION SALEM NUCLEAR 13, 14,
- p. 7 VI a
D, H, 14 15, lSa,
""'** fl, VII I, J, I 16, 17, p
- l i(
18, 21, 22 State of N.J./Delaware Nulcear Incident Ale~t Cat~qories FIG. 12.'.J-L**
-The response levels equivalent to the EMERGENCY PAG are presented for both infants arid adults, in order to permit use of either level and thus, i"nsure a flexible approach to taking action in cases where exposure of the most sensitive portion of the population (infants and pregnant women) can be prevented.
Peak li.ctivity 13lr 137cs 90sr 89sr Infant Adult Infant Adult Infant Adult Infant Adult Milk, or Water 0.08 uci per liter Pasture, uCi per 0.6 square meter
- 1. 3 9
.mR/hr at 3 ft above pasture*
0.008** 0.12 1.8 3.6 6
12 0.18 0.48 0.05 0.18
- 1. 2 40 2
8 60 2000 0.15 0.55 8.0 267.0 The states of New Jersey and Delaware have developed detailed PIPAGs which include field m6nitoring and condemnation procedures.
Ex-cerpts from these plans are included as Figures 12.9-3, 12.9-10 and 12.9-12..
In order to keep this discussion in proper perspective, the levels of radioiodine concentrations in milk requiring notification of the NRC are 3.5 pCi/l as per current technical specifications.
The sampling frequency required by these technical specifications is one or two weeks based on last analysis.
012.23-5 P78 62 11'1
'l'liq ai;:rnmption u~;;ed to cJetcrminc tho bigll energy lines in Se'ction 14. 5 tllat both te::wperaturc and present conditions be met is incorrect.
liigh energy lines detincd in the A. Giambusso letter 1972, as any 1.:iiping system whose service te1111_;eraturc is greater than ~00°1" or design J?rcssure is greater than 275 psig.
Hevise your analysisto include all those systems whose service ternperature is greater than 200°F or whose design pressure is greater than 275 psig.
Jl.NS\\!JEH R~vised high en~rgy pipe break anaysis has been made to include those systems whose service temperature is greater than 200°F or whose design pressure is greater than 275 psig.
This anslysis includes the following system in addition to tl1ose specified in Section 14.5.1.6:
- 1.
Chemical and Volume Control (Charging and reactor coolant pump seal supply)
- 2.
Heating Steam
- 3.
Heating \\\\later Piping for the above systems is located in the following Auxiliary Building areas:
- 1.
Primary, Aux. Feed and Refueling Water Tank Heater Area (elevation 84)
- 2.
South Penetration Area (elevation 78)
- 3.
Pipe Alley (elevation 84)
- 4.
Safety Injection Pump Room (elevation 84) 5 e
}\\cc es s c 0 r r id 0 r ( e 1 e vat i 0 n 8 4 )
G.
Aisle No. 2 (elevation 8'1)
- 7.
l\\cccss Corridor (elevation 100)
Ql4. ~2G*-l
- 8.
Boric Acid Evilporator Room (elevation 100)
- 9.
Waste Evaporator Room (elevation 100)
- 10.
Refueling Wi:lter Purif.i.cation Filter Hoom (elevation 100)
- 11.
Boric Acid Transfer Pump Room (elevation 100)
- 12.
Emergency Diesel Rooms (elevation 100-)
- 13. *control Hoom Air Conditioning Equipment Room (elevation 122)
- 14.
Control Equipment Room (elevation 122)
- 15.
Auxiliary Building A/C Room (elevation 122)
- 16.
Boric Acid Batch Tank Area (elevation 122) chemical and Volume Control Charging and Reactor Coolant Pump Seal lnJect1on The Chemical and volume control system is described in Section 9.2.
Normal pressure for the charging and seal injection por-tion of *the system is approximately 2520 psig at 127F.
Design pressure for the piping is 2735 psig.
The system is constructed to Nuclear Class II, Seismic Class I standards with austenitic type 316, schedule 160 material.
In the unlikely event of a postulated failure of the piping, water jet impingement or pipe whip could adversely affect some safety related components in the elevation 84 pipe alley and south penetration area at elevation 78. _Damage potential from jet impingement will be eliminated by use of pipe shrouds or impingement baffles at required points along the path of tlw Ql<1.2G-2 P7U 135 S~
piping.
Darnoge potential from pipe whip will be re::;olved by the u~c of pi~e restraints.
Heating Steam System Steam for the heating steam system is supplied from an auxiliary boiler in the yard or from main turbine extractions.
Its pur-pose. in t~e Auxiliary Building is to supply a heating medium for the following equipment.
- 1.
Boric Acid Evaporator and Feed Preheater
- 2.
Waste Evaporator
- 3.
Boric Acid Batching Tank Normal pressure in this system varies between 150 psig and 50 psig at saturated or slightly superheated conditions.
Design pressure for the piping is 190 psig.
Heating steam piping is constructed in accordance with the ANS~ 831.l Power Piping Code.
Material used is schedule 40 carbon steel which provides a main header safety margin of approximately 400 to 500% over the Code required 4:1 minimum safety factor.
In the unlikely event of a postulated failure of this piping, ambient temperatures above normal, caused by steam escape, could possibly adversely affect controls and electrical equipment in the vicinity of the break.
To preclude this possibility, tl1e following modifications will be implemented:
Ql-1.2G-3 P7ll 13 ~)
~iCi
- 1.
Encapsulation of the piping at required points of postulated failure in order to restrict steam escape floh' ratec 2~
Provision for a remotely actuated isolation and/or a Venting system to eliminate steam from the space.
Heating Water S~stem Heating water system in the auxiliary building provides the heating medium for the following purposes:
- 1.
Room space.heating
- 2.
Primary, Auxiliry Feedwater and Refueling Water Storage Tank Heating
- 3.
Control Room and Auxiliary Building Vent Duct Heating This system operates as a pumped closed loop with each of the users having both a supply and return line.
The heat source comes from-three steam heated coverters located on the Unit 2 side turbine deck.
The normal pressure for this system supply is 125 psig at 300F.
Design pressure for this system is 200 psig.
Piping is constructed in accordance with ANSI 831.l Power Piping Code.
Material used is schedule 40 carbon steel which provides a safety margin of approximately 400 to 500%
over the Code required 4:1 minimum safefy factor.
Ql'1.2G***'1 p*;g 13 ~)
fj'/
Unlikely postulated failures of this piping present conditions s *i m i 1 a r t o t b o s e s p e c i f i e d f o r th e he a t i n g st ca rn sys t em r ex c c pt th~t the quantities of steam involved are less.
To preclude the.possibility of adverse effects of failures in this piping, encapsulation at required points of postulated failure will be provided.
It is our intent to complete the above described modification prior to startup after the first refueling outage.
~/
e Supplcmbnt tl1c discus~ion in the FSAR response to Quc~tion 5.lG concerninq tornr.iclo protcct5on.
Dcr.;cri.be the capability and p r o cc d ll r e s [ o r b r i n q i n q th c p l a n t to.:1 s a f e s Ii u l: down co n d.l.t i o n i n. th e eve n t o I: u ck f::i ~I n b i1 ~d s to r n n cl o.
W Cl t: c r t a n k !3 n n d Ely s t em!~
- not* Gpecifically designed t.o withr:t<111d tornado induced missiles cnnnot bu asr.rnmccl to be civullublc for use.
Include in your a (~ s c r i pt ion such th i n gs as auto ma t i. c w at. c r sup r l y md t ch o v e r and technical specifications on manual switchover hardware.
The response to Question 5.16 describes in detail the various primary and backup water sources available to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the Chemical and Volume Control System for use in attaining and maintaining safe shutdown.
The backup water sources from the eves holdup tanks, the spent fuel pool and the Service Water System are located in buil~ings/strtictures designed to withstand tornado induced missiles.
The water storage tanks described in the response to Question 5.16 are located in different areas of the station site (refer to FSAR Figure 1.2-1).
Although not specifically designed to withstand tornado induced missiles, the separated locations of the various tanks precludes the possibility that all tanks would be rendered unavailable due to tornado induced missiles.
The systems which are required to bring the unit to a safe shutdown are enclosed in tornado protected buildings/structures and capable of being powered by the Standby AC Power System.
In the unlikely event that a breach of any of the primary water sources were to occur (RefU(!ling *W<iter Storage 'l'ank, 1'\\uxiliary
- --*~-~.
..,-~,,,,..,..,,...... ""'" *-n... ~** ******..,..,..
,..-~**>.\\'<"'>~*4'-"*.---..., *.*..,..., **.,.... ~... *-*-*.,~~..,............... *... -1"'-
,~........ -,
'\\:t>...
Feed w a t L~ r st or a qt> *r.:ink o r Pr i nm r y w a t. c r s tor a 9 c 'I' n n k), s ta t ion operating personn~l would i~1itiate procedures to bring the unjL
- to a* h o t s hut t1 own co n c] i t i o n
- Ho t
!.~ h ll t down cu n be ma i n t C:l i n e c1 with ~uxiliary Feedwater System operation and main steam atmospheric relief valves.
Boration can be accomplisho~ via the charging pumps, boric acid tanks and boric acid transfer pumps.
The backup water source for the Auxiliary Fecdwater System is dependent on which storage tank is rendered unavail-able.
Transfer t6 a backup water source is accomplished with remote manual valves (operable from the Control Roorn) except for the service water backup source, which requires installation of a spool piece as described in the response to Question S.l~.
No automatic watir supply switchover is provided.
The backup water sources for the Auxiliary Feedwater System water sources are address~d in the Technical Specifications for No. 1 Unit (except for the service water backup source).
The unit would be maintained in a hot shutdown condition until station operating personnel have addressed operating conditions, damage and availability of water sources to attain cold shutdown.
They would effect necessary repairs and provide alternate water supplies as nece~sary for the eves to maintain Reactor Coolant System inventory and proceed to bring the unit to a c6ld shut-d.own condition.
I~].41-2 P 7 ll G 2 C1'1
- ,.~,*..,._,..,._¥*~***--.*"******.,..
- l*~**'*"'*~---*... "'>**.,,, _ ___, __.,..~**r-,**-""*~"'-....,-_._...,.,,..,, '"'"""~'"*** '-
Shutdown procedures would be accomplished in as normal a fashion as operating conditions permit utilizing alternate water sources as necessary.
The methodology would be dependent upon the ex-tent of tornado missile damage as determined by operating personnel in their assessment of plant conditions.
The attaphed figures illustrate the arrangement of the Service Water Intake Structure; Service Water pumps and piping.
The Service Water Pumps are located within the Service Intake Struc~ure, which is seismic Category I and designed to be tornado missiie proof.
The piping is buried below grade, thereby pro-teated from tornado missiles.
As discussed in the response to Question 5.16, a spool piece connection in the Auxiliary Building to the Auxiliary Feedwater System is available and can be connected in less than 15 minutes.
Sufficient water sources are available as described above and in the response to Question 5.16, illustrating the capability to bring the unit to a safe shutdown condition in the event of a breach of a primary water source due to a tornado induced missile.
- 01. 41-3 P78 62 05