ML18067A782
| ML18067A782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1997 |
| From: | Smith N SEISMIC QUALIFICATION UTILITY GROUP |
| To: | Stolz J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18067A780 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR NUDOCS 9711210116 | |
| Download: ML18067A782 (48) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:SQUG --<= -~ June 30, 1997 Mr. John F. Stolz U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations 11555 Rockville Pike"" Mail Stop 0-14007 Rockville, MD 20555
Subject:
Generic Issue Included in NRC's Requests for Additional Information on Use of GIP Method A
Dear Mr. Stolz:
By letter dated August 6, 1996, the NRC staff provided a safety evaluation (SE) of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group's (SQUG's) Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 3 (GIP-3), for seismic verification of nuclear power plant equipment. SQUG responded _to the concerns expressed by the NRC staff in the SE in a letter dated May 16, 1997. However, in the letter which forwarded this SE, the staff expressed1 a concern that licensees might use Method Ain Section 4.2 ~nd Table 4-1 of GIP-2 for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment even though use of that method may appear to be less conseivative than that specified in the plant's licensing basis documents. The staff took the
- position that use of Method A is only appropriate fo:r facilities that do not have in-structure response spectra in tile respective licensing basis documents; and use of Method A for
. other applications may lead to potep.tial nonconformance. SQUG disagrees with this NRC position. Use of GIP Method A will not resul~ in nonconformance with licensing requirements. Enclosure 1 provides the basis for our position.
By letter dated December 5, 1996, the NRC staff provided an evaluation of SQUG's August 19, 1996, response to six potential generic issues which had been identified in Requests for Additional Information (RAis) sent to SQUG member utilities on their USI A-46 programs. SQUG provided responses to the NRC staff's evaluation of four of these generic issues (#2, #3, #4, and.#6) in a letter sent to the NRC on April 18, 1997. SQUG's
- response to one of the other generic issues, use of Method A in Section 4.2 and Table 4-1 of GIP-2 for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment (Issue #1), is included in Enclosure 2. SQUG's response to generic issue #5 (Lateral Load Ductility Evaluation of Cable Trays) will be submitted separately.
Mr. Jo.hn F. Stolz June 30, 1997
- Enclosure 2 reiterates that GIP Method A has been previously reviewed and accepted by recognized experts, including the NRC staff, as an acceptable method to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment installed in operating nuclear plants. The only issue SQUG is aware of that the NRC has identified in the application of Method A is the proper consideration of the location of the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground response spectra. In Enclosure 2, SQUG clarifies the issue regarding the location of the SSE ground response spectra and where it is typically defined for most USI A-46 plants., Also a set of screens has been suggested by SQUG for its members to use when responding to the subject RAI question. These screens help members respond to the area where the NRC believes GIP Method A may be misapplied, i.e., for sites where a structure is founded in.
shallow soil with ~he location of the SSE ground response spectra defined below the top of the ground surface. Other than this clarification, SQUG is not aware of any other NRC concerns relating to the proper application of GIP Method A for resolving USI A-46. Ifthe NRC has any new info*rmation that could bring into question the use of GIP Method A, please provide the information to us so SQUG can evaluate whether the GIP should be revised. Otherwise SQUG considers GIP Method A an approved method for evaluating seismic capacity compared to demand when the restrictions provided in Enclosure 2 are met. Sincerely, Neil P. Smith, Chairman Seismic Qualification Utility Group . Enclosures* (2) cc: D. H: Dorman, NRC, MS: 0-14C7 R. Wessman, NRC, MS: 0-7E23 K. Manoly, NRC, MS: 0- 7E23 P.Y. Chen, NRC, MS: 0-7E23
. .. R. P. Kassawara, EPRI SQUG Steering Group SQUG Representatives and Alternates ltAsauGLI!
Enclosure 1 to SQUG Letter Dated June 30, 1997 Use of GIP Method "A" Instead of Licensing Basis In-Structure Response Spectra for
- Evaluating Equipment Seismic Adequ~cy By letter dated August 6, 1996, (Reference 1) the NRC staff provided a safety evaluation (SE) of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group's (SQUG's) Generic Implementation Procedure, Revisfon J (GIP-3), for seismic verification of nuclear power plant equipment.
SQUG. responded to the concerns expressed by the NRC staff in. the SE in a letter dated May 16, 1997 (Reference 2). However, in the NRC letter which forwarded the SE, the staff expressed a concern that licensees* might use Method A from Section 4.2 and Table 4-1 of GIP-2 for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment even though use of that method may appear to be less conservative than that specified in the plant's licensing basis documents. The staff took the position that use of Method A is only appropriate for facilities that do not have in-structur~ response spectra in the respective licensing basis documents, and use of Method A for other applications may lead to potential nonconformance. The NRC statement from their letter is reproduced below. SQUG's response follows. NRC Statement in August 6, 1996 Letter In consideration of re~ising the GIP; the staff has identified an area of concern regarding the criteria provided in GIP. Revision 2 CGIP-2). dated February 14. 1992. The. issue in. question is that Section 4.2 of GIP-2 provides alternative criteria for the comparison of seismic demand with the seismic capacity. ~hich may lead to a licensee's use of a demand *spectrum less conservative than that specifiecf Tn--the
- plant's licensing basis documents. The staff contends that the use of Method A in Section 4.2 of GIP-2 is' only appropriate for facilities that do not have in-structure response spectra in their respective licensing basis. documents. The staff believes that the lack of specificity in GIP-2 with regard to the selection of the appropriate method*for determining equipment seismic adequacy may lead to potential nonconformance. The staff requests that SQUG respond to the staff's concerns and provide appropriate guideli_hes for the future revision to the GIP.
SQUG Response to NRC Statement in August 6, 1996 Letter The basis for requiring affect~d licensees to review the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment is contained in Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 (February 19, 1987) and its supporting references NUREG-1030 and NUREG-1211. In GL 87-02, the NRC concluded that -
... the seismic adequacy of certain equipment in operating nuclear power plants must be reviewed against seismic criteria not in~~
these plants 'de.J:f licensed. [Emphasis added] The NRC also recognized that Direct. application of current seismic criteria to older plants would require extensive. and probably impractical. modification of these facilities. Therefore the NRC endorsed an* alternate resolution of this problem in the enclosure to the Generic Letter which is based upon use of earthquake experience data supplemented by testresults. The enclosure to GL 87-02 explicitly allows licensees to use the "bounding spectra" defined by the Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP) as the basis for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment rather than require equipment capacity
- to be compared to floor response spectra:
The purpose of.these bounding spectra is to compare potential seismic exposure of equipment in a nuclear power plant with the estimated
'. ground motion that similar equipment actually resisted in earthquakes described in the [earthquake experience] data base. For convenience.
the bounding spectra are exptessed in terms of ground response at *the nuclear *site rather than floor response or equipment response.
* [GL 87-02. Enclosure. Page 8] - *As a result of additional work completed by SQUG and SSRAJ> after GL 87-02 was published, a refined "Bounding Spectrum;, and procedure for comparing the Bounding Spectrum to a plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) was defined and included in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) as Method A. The technical justification for using this Bounding Spectrum and. the associated procedure for evaluating equipment seismic adequacy is documented in the SSRAP report (Reference 3) .
The NRC staff reviewed Revision 2 of the GIP and concluded that
- The information contained in GIP-2 is generally acceptable to the staff for a plant-specific implementation of US! A-46.
[SSER #2. Pages 4 and 5] In addition, the GIP Method A for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment, based on comparing the Bounding Spectrum (i.e., equipment seismic capacity) to the SSE ground motion response spectrum (i.e., seismic demand), is one of the fundamental elements of the procedure upon which the NRC based its backfit analysis in its acceptance of the use of earthquake experience data for resolution of USI A-46. The NRC recognized, in GL 87-02, that Because affected plants are being asked to carry out this evaluation against criteri~ not used to establish the design basis of the facility. this resolution is a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109.
- The backfit analysis and findings are in the Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of USI A-46 (NUREG-1211 ). This analysis describes the procedure to be used by tne licensee in order to complete the backfit. This procedure is based on the SSRAP report, including an evaluation of the seismic adequacy of equipment by comparing the Bounding Spectrum from earthquake experi.ence data to the SSE ground motion response spectrum defined at the ground surface.
Therefore, based on the above considerations, the USI A-46 program, as defined in Generic l.etter 87-02, is an activity which is based on seismic criteria which are outside the design basis of the plant.* Therefore performing the evaluations required by the USI ~-46 program, including use of GIP Method A instead of more conservative licensing basis in-* structure response spectra, will not result in nonconformance with licensing requirements. SQUG recognizes that use. of GIP Method .A requires .consideration of the location at which each plant's SSE is defined. Our position in this regard is discussed in Enclosure 2 in response to the NRC letter dated December 5, 1996 (Reference 4). Accordingly, SQUG has advised its members that Method A of the. GIP remains a valid option (as approved by in the NRC SSER #2) subject to the clarifications discussed in Enclosure 2.
References:
- 1. NRC (J. Stolz) Letter to SQUG (N. Smith), dated August 6, 1996, Evaluation of Revision 3 to the Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment (TAC No. M93624)"
- 2. SQUG (N. Smith) Letter to NRC (J. Stolz), dated May 16, 1997, "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equiment, Revision 3, Updated 5/16/97, and Procedure for Revising the GIP, Revision 3."
- 3. SSRAP Report, "Use of Seismic Experience and Test Data to Show Ruggedness of Equipment in Nuclear Power Plant~, Senior Seismic review and Advisory Panel, Revision 4.0, February 28, 1991: *
- 4. NRC (J. Stolz) Letter to SQUG (N. Smith), dated. December 5, 1996, "Evaiu.ation of Seismic Qualification Utility Group's Response to Generic Issues Included in NRC's Request for Additional Information (TAC No. M40580)"
dsauG~ Enclosure 2 to SQUG Letter Dated June 30, 1997 SQUG Comments on NRC's Evaluation of Use of GIP Method "A" for Evaluating Equipment Seismic Adequacy . By letter dated August 19, 1996 (Reference 1), the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) provide~ a response to six potential generic issues included in Requests for Additional Information (RAls) sent to SQUG member utilities on their plant-specific USI A-46 programs. A meeting was held between SQUG representatives and the staff on August 28, 1996, to discuss and clarify the NRC's questions and SQUG responses. By letter dated December 5, 1996 (Reference 2), the NRC staff proviµed an evaluation of . SQUG's comments on these issues. By letter dated April 18, 1997 (Reference 3), SQUG provided responses to the NRC staffs evaluation of four of these generic issues. This enclosure provides SQUG's response to one of the other tWo generic issues: use of Method A from Section 4.2 and Table 4-1 of GIP-2 for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment. The NRC statement from their evaluation is reproduced below. SQUG's .
- response follows.
- NRC Evaluation in December 5, 1996 Letter SQUG's response did not provide the requested information. During the August 28. 1996. SQUG/NRC meeting. the staff elaborated its concern .
and the primary focus of the request for additional information (RA!) question. As a result of considerable discussions on the subject. the staff agreed to clarify the question.* The following revised RAI will be forwarded to affected USI A-46 1icensees for their response: Referring to the in-structure resoonse soectra orovjded in your 120-cla v-resoonse to the NRC's reauest in Suoolernent No. 1 to Generic Letter CGL J 87-02 dated Mav 22 1992 the followjag information js reauested:
- a. Identify.structure(s) which have in-structure response spectra (5%
- critical damping) for elevations within 40-feet above the effective grade. which are higher in amplitude than 1.5 times the SQUG
- Bounding Spectrum .
- b. With respect to the comparison of equipment seismic capacity and seismic demand. indicate which method in Table 4-1 of GIP-2 was
- used to evaluate the seismic adequacy for equipment installed on the corresponding floors in the structure(s) identified in Item (a) above. If you have elected to use Method A in Table 4-1 of the GIP-2. provide a technical justification for not using the in-~
. structure response spectra provided in you~ 120-day response. It appears that some A-46 licensees are making an incorrect comparison between their plant's safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground motion response spectrum and the SQUG Bounding Spectrum. The .SSE ground motion Tesponse spectrum for most nuclear power plants is defined at the plant foundation level. The SQUG Bounding Spectrum is defined at the free field ground surface. For plants located at deep soil or rock sites. there may not be a significant difference between the grciUnd motion amplit~des at the foundation level and those at the ground surface. However. for sites where a structure is founded on sha 11 ow soil . the amp l if i cation of the ground motion from the foundation level to the ground surface may be signifiqmt.
- c. For the structure(s) identified in Item Ca) above. provide the in-structure response spectra designated according to the height above the effective grade. If the in-struct8re response spectra i dent i fi ed *in the 120-day- response to Supplement No. 1 to GL 87.,. 02 was not used'. provide the response spectra that were actually used
*to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment within the structures .*
*identified in Item Ca) above. Also. provide a comparison of these spectra to 1,5 times the Bounding Spectrum.
The staff does not consider a generic* response to this question acceptable. and affected l i c.ensees should address this que.sti on on a plant~specific basis. SQUG Response to December S, 1996 NRC Letter Despite the positfon taken by the staff that a generic response to this RAI is not considered
- acceptable, there are generic overtones to some of the elements of this RAI question that SQUG believes warrant a generic response. Therefore, SQUG's coniments on the staff's evaluation and revised generic respanses to this generic issue
~ .
are provided below. A comparison of the design GRS to the SQUG bounding spectrum as a method for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment is included as Method A in Table 4-1 of GIP-2. The GIP allows this method to be used under the restriction that the equipment must be located at an elevation below about 40 feet above the effective grade of the building, .and the equipment fundamental frequencies must be above about 8 Hz. One of the ~vantages of GIP Method A is that the various effects associated with in-structure responses are inherently included in the method. The GIP approach differs from current seismic licensing criteria in that in GIP Method A the seismic capacity of equipment and the seismic demand on this equipment are anchored to ground response. spectra. Further, the GIP method is not based on the performance of a single item of equipment subjected to an artificial time history on a shake table. Instead the GIP method is based on successful performance of numerous items of equipment subjected to several real earthquakes. For these reasons, the GIP method, based on comparing ground response spectra at data base sites to SSE ground motion response spectra at nuclear plants, was accepted by recognized independent experts (e.g., SSRAP report), including the NRC staff (e.g., SSER
#2), as an accept.able method to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment installed in operating nuclear power plants, Generic Technical Justification for Using GIP Method A. In subsection "b" of the RAJ, the NRC requests licensees to provide a technical justification for using Method A in Table 4-1 of GIP-2 to evaluat_e the seismic adequacy of equipment instead of the in-structure response spectra provided in the 120-day response. We have suggested to the SQUG members that if they receive the subject generic question in a plant-specific RAJ that they use the following generic technical justification in their response.
Method A of GIP Table 4-1 provides a methodology to evaluate the seismic adequacy of equipment by comparing equipment capacity based on earthquake experience ground response spectra at database sites with the plant's SSE ground response spectrum (GRS). The composite earthquake experience ground response spectrum from the database sites (reference spectrum) is reduced by a factor of 1/1.5 to account for possible additional amplification of motion in nuclear plants compared to database plants and is referred to as the "Bounding Spectrum" in the GIP. *
- The seismic capacity of equipment defined by the Bounding Spectrum is compared to the seismic demand at the effective g~de using the plant licensing basis SSE GRS. The GIP-metliocrconservatively limits use of this approach to equipmeni which has natural frequencies above about 8 Hz and is located lower than about 40 feet above the effective grade of the building. These restrictions prohibit the use of GIP Method A for those equipment natural frequencies and for those
*higher elevations in buildings where equipment amplified responses are typically higher.
Additional details justifying the use of GIP Method A may be found in the report "Use of Seismic Experience in Nuclear Power Plants," prepared by the Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP), February 28, 1991. This report, included as Reference 5 in GIP-2, summarizes SSRAP's judgment on this subject
- by stating on pages 102 .and 103 that:
. . . the use of very conservative floor response spectra should be avoided when assessing the seismic ruggedness of floor-mounted equipment . . . . Only for cases of equipment mounted more than 40 feet above grade or equipment with as*
anchored-frequencies less than about 8 Hz is it necessary to use floor spectra. Location Where SSE ORS Are Defined. Another issue raised in subsection "b" of the
- subject RAI is where the SSE ground*motion response spectrum is defined. The RAJ states that:
The SSE ground motion response spectrum for most nuclear power plants is defined at the plant foundation level. From a licensing basis perspective*~ this statement is not accurate. Our review of the licensing bases for a number of older nuclear power plants found that the SSE ground response spectrum (ORS) *typically is defined at either the ground surface, or the licensing . basis documents are silent on this topic. Although it has been common practice to "apply" the SSE ORS of the site to the base of building models, this was typically done to* conform to the existing state-of-the-art soil structure interaction analysis techniques of that time frame. This is a simplified bounding assumption in which the SSE ORS is conservatively applied at th~ base of each building analyzed at a site, regardless of the depth of the building embedment. For example, our review of analyses performed at several SQUG plants shows that the SSE ORS defined at the ground surface* (or not defined) was applied to the base of the models of re*actor buildings (typically embedded about 50 feet) and also to the base of the models of diesel generator buildings (typically embedded less than about. 15 feet). We do not believe it is sorrect to state that the SSE ground motion response spectrum is "defined" at the plant foundation level simply because the analytical methods used to generate in-structure response spectra conservatively applied the input motion at . the base of the building mod~ls. Proper Application for GIP Method A. As previously stated, GIP Method A was accepted by recognized experts, including the NRC Staff, ~s an acceptable method to verify the
*seismic adequacy of equipment installed in operating nuclear power plants. Also as previously stated above, SQUG does not agree that the SSE ORS are "defined" at the plant foundation level simply because the analytical methods used to generate in-structure response spectra conservatively applied the input motion at that location. But SQUG
- agrees that for plants with the SSE GRS clearly defined below the' ground surface, any significant soil amplification effects between the defined location of the SSE GRS and the effective grade elevation needs to be considered when applying GIP Method A SQUG also concurs that soil amplification of SSE GRS defined below the grourid surface may be
- significant for shallow soil situations. We concur with the NRC that this same amplification
*issue does not typically exist for rock and deep soil sites. SQUG utility representatives and all Seismic Capability Engineers, who have taken the "SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course" will be notified of this fact.
Recommendation Pri>yided to SOUG Members. In subsection "b" of the subject RAI, the NRC staff noted there may be significant amplification between the defined location of the SSE ground response spectrum and the free field ground surface, especially for shallow soil sites. Therefore SQUG has suggested to its members that they should provide a response based on the screening method listed below if they receive the subject three-part RAI. For those plants which used GIP Method A for equipment .and the plant licensing basi§-defines the SSE G RS to be below the free field ground surface, then they should provide information as described in the final SQUG Screen #3 described below. For all other situations where GIP Method A is used instead of.the 120-day iri-strudure response spectra, we have recommended to SQUG members that they reference the generic technical justification provided above .
.We have suggested to SQUG members that they use the following three-part screening method as the basis for responding to the NRC if they receive the subje_ct generic three-part RAI. These screens are intended to focus SQUG member responses on the primary .
issue ide.ntified by the NRC (shallow soil amplification for buildings with the location of the SSE G RS defined below the free field ground surface). SOUG Screen #1: Was Method A used for comparing equipment seismic capacity to seismic demand?*
- Licensee response is "No" -. Li'censee should inform the NRC that this RAI question does not apply to them since GIP Method A was not used. No further action is required .
. Licensee response is "Yes" - Licensee should proceed to SQUG Screen #2.
SOUG Screen #2: *Does the plant licensing basis define the SSE ground response spectrum at some location below the ground surface (i.e., below the top of the soil profile)?
- Licensee response is "No" - Licensee should respond to the subje_ct generic RAI by informing the NRC that any applications o( GIP Method A for the site have been completed in accordance with the requirement that the SSE ground response spectrum is defined at the ground surface (thus, the amplification effects of any existing soil
. layers would have implicitly been accounted for) and that no further response.to this generic RAI is necessary. The generic technical justification for. using GIP Method A given above should also be provided.
Licensee response is "Yes" - Licensee should proceed to SQUG Screen #3 . SOUG Screen #3: For those structures which house SSEL components, did you account for potential amplification effects between the location where the SSE ground response spectrum 'is defined and the effective grade elevation
*from which the 40-foot rule is measured in GIP Method A?.
Licensees that accounted for the soil amplification in their use of Method A should (1) explain the rationale for the amount of amplification and/or (2) respond to the NRC's requested spectra comparison questions "a," "b" and "c" in the subject generic RAL The generic technical justification for using GIP Method A provided above should also be cited as a part of the plant-specific response. Licensees that have not specifically accounted for the amplification of the soil layer between the. location of the SSE ground response spectra and the effective grade , should provide a technical justification *for not doing so and respond to questions "a,"
"b" and "c" in the subject generic RAI. The generic technical ju~tification for using GIP Method A provided above should also be cited as a part <;Jf the plant-specif~c response.
References:
- 1. SQUG (N. Smith) Letter to NRC (0. Dorman), dated August 19, 1996, "SQUG.
Respo_µse to Certain Issues Included in RAl's Sent to SQUG Member Utilities
- 2.
Implementing USI A.:46"
- NRC (J. Stolz) Letter to SQUG (N. Smith), dated December 5, 1996, "Evaluation of Seismic Qualification Utility Group's Response to Generic Issues Included in NRC's Request for Additional Information (TAC No. M40580)"
J. 3: SQUG (N. Smith) Letter to NRC (J.Stolz), dated April,18, 1997, Response to NRC
- Comments on Generic* Issues in RAis;'
SQUG Response to NRC's RAI on Use or Method A June 30, 1997 Tell NRC RAI on Method A No Doesn't Apply Ve* Tell NRC that Method A Has Been Applied Correctly with the SSE GRS Defined at the No Ground Surface and Provide Generic Justification for Method A Vea J: Provide to the NRC a Justification
. for Not Considering No Soll Amplification and Respond to RAI Questions A, B, and C Vea i
Explain to NRC How Soll Amplification was Accounted For and/or Respond to RAI Questtoris A, B, and C
-.7 -
- ENCLOSURE 2 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (SECTION 2.4) 2 Pages
t"'*.
* .. ~. 2.4.2 SEISMIC HISTORY A study of available seismic data indicates that the Palisades Plant area should be considered slightly active seismically as shown on Figure 2-14.
This is confirmed by its location in earthquake Zone I of the UBC 1964 Edition. Figure 2-14 is a map of the area within a radius of about 200 miles around the Palisades Plant showing earthquake epicenters, date of occurrence and intensity at the epicenter. These include all earthquakes which have been reported since 1804. Only one epicenter has been reported within SO miles of the site since 1804.
- Following are descriptions of the historic earthquakes which have occurred within 100 miles from the site:
August 20, 1804 (2:10 PM) - Fort Dearborn (present site of Chicago) was reported shaken by this earthquake. It was also felt at Fort Wayne, Indiana, located about 200 miles away, and.at other points about the south end of Lake Michigan. The estimated felt area was 30,000 square miles. February 4, 1883 (5:00 AM) - This earthquake was felt in northern Indiana and southern Michigan. At Kalamazoo, Michigan, windows were cracked and buildings were shaken. It was also felt at St Louis, Missouri and Bloomington, Illinois, and the estimated felt area for this earthquake was 8,000 square miles . /* ... f. August 9, 1947 (8:47 PM) - This earthquake was strongly felt throughout
**** southern-central Michigan.* *chimneys were damaged and plaster cracked at Athens, Coldwater, Colon, Matteson Lake, Sherwood and Union City. It was also felt in parts of Indiana, Ohio, Illinois and Wisconsin, and the esti-mated felt area was 50,000 square miles.
A review of seismic data relaiing to the Palisades Plant provides the basis for Table 2-13, which is a summarization of earthquake intensity versus. distance to reported epicenters. Table 2-13 is not intended as a prediction of seismic activity at the site or epicentral location, but, rather as a summary of the available informa-tion, data and *records which were useful as a basis of judgment in the selection of appropriat~ design. factors. 2.4.3 DISCUSSION Figure 2-16 shows a seismic regionalization map of the United States based on the map prepared by CF Richter (see Reference 14). This map is his evaluation of probable maximum intensity which may be expected in any given area in the United States. The Palisades Plant area is located in Zone VIII on this map in which the maximum probable seismic intensity is rated VIII on the Modified Mercalli (MM) scale. However, a detailed evaluation of historic epicenters, the regional geology and a study of actual foundation conditions at the site indicate that a Zone VIII assignment is too conser-vative for the Palisades Plant. Correlations made in the course of the .
- recent investigations suggest a concentration of the major epicenters fs1281-1291a-09-72 2.4-2 Rev 0
(Maximum Intensity VIII) about 200 miles southeast from the site focused on the ancient regional structures termed the Cincinnati and Findlay Arches (see Figure 2-14). These structural features are considered the foci of the historic earthquakes experienced along the arch lineation. As pointed out by Richter (see Reference 14), the occurre.nce of a major earthquake (Intensity IX) along the western end of the St Lawrence rift would result in the assignment of Intensity VIII to areas of thick deposits of soft unconsolidated foundation materials. However, foundation.condi~ tions such as reported above at the Palisades site warrant a reduction: in probable maximum intensity to between VI and VII (MM). The lower intensity earthquakes (Intensity V to VI) recorded within IOa miles of the site have no known correlation with tectonic or structural features. These earthquakes probably can be considered as related to the marginal seismicity surrounding the Canadian shield or attributed to the lesser-known phenomenon termed "post-glacial rebound." The compacted glacial material underlying the sand dunes would not be expected to significantly amplify seismic tremors transferred to it from the underlying bedrock. In fact,. the tendency for amplification of seismic accelerations can be relatively discounted due to the relationship between
- the shallow depth of overburden (material over bedrock) at the site and the length of seismic waves.
Thus, the licensee considers that th~ site area is beyond the significant influence of the major seismic activity associated with the arch zone (because of distance and foundation conditions) but within .the area where minor earthquakes r~sulting from Canadian shield marginal seismicity or "post-glacial rebound" are generally geographically distributed. Based on the above, a maximum intensity a.t the site of between VI and VII
- (MM) is anticipated~ This intensity corresponds to a surface acceleration value of O.as g.
2.
4.4 CONCLUSION
S
- 1. Anticipated maximum earthquake intensi~y at the Palisades Plant site is between VI and VII (MM).
- 2. Recommended surface acceleration value was a.as g; however_, 0.1 g was used for the Plant design earthquake (OBE) and 0.2 g as the hypothet-ical earthquake (SSE).
fsl281-129la-a9-72 2.4-3 Rev 0
- ENCLOSURE 3 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SEISMIC DESIGN (SECTION 5. 7) 11 Pages
. .. -....... *1'
- 5.7 SEISMIC DESIGN This section deals with the seismic analysis, testing and design of CP Co Design Class 1 structures, systems and components at the Palisades Nuclea*r Power Plant. The term "CP Co Design Class 1 Structure," as used herein, is equivalent to the term "Category I Structure," which is current practice. Computer programs used in the original design 1*
cnalysis of CP Co Design Class 1 structures, systems and components are listed in Table 5.7-1. Subsection 5.7.1 deals with the seismic input of all the original CP Co Design Class 1 structures, systems and components. Revised seismic input criteria for CP Co Design Class 1 piping is discussed in Subsection 5.7.4. The seismic input discussed in Subse_ction 5.7.4 apply to all reevaluation$ and modifications to CP Co Design Class 1 piping being reviewed after July 1986.
- 5. 7.1 SEISMIC INPUT
- 5. 7. 1. 1 Design Bases Based on the conclusions described in Subsection: 2.4.4 on seismicity, the CP Co Design Class 1 structures, systems and components.have been d~sighed to resist two seismic events:
- 1. Design Earthquake (E) == 0.1 g. This event is equivalent ~o the Operating Basis Earthquake (QBE). The Plant must remain operational with no loss of function up to this level.
- 2. =
*Maximum Credible Earthquake (E') 0.2 g. This event is also known as the Hypothetical Earthquake and it is e,quiv(31ent to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). All structures, systems and components required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the Plant are required to remain operational with no loss of function up to this level.
- The vertical ground acceleration for each event is taken as two-thirds (2/3) of the corresponding horizontal ground acceleration.* This assumption has been supported as being conservative by Dr George W Housner of the California Institute of Technology, a noted expert in this area.
The current' terminology, QBE and SSE, will be used throughout th~ remainder of this section and elsewhere in the FSAR Update. * * **' 5.7-1 Rev 19
- 5.7.1.2 Ground Design Response Spectra
. The ground design spectrum used in the analysis of ground-supported structures is shown in Figure 5.7-1, normalized to a maximum ground acceleration of 0.1 g (QBE).
The horizontal ground design spectrum for the SSE is obtained by multiplying values from the OBE spectrum by a factor of two. This spectrum was generated by averaging many acceleration spectra from actual earthquake recoros, normalized to the same maximum ground accel.erati_on, principally El Centro 1934 and 1940, Olympia 1949 and Taft 1952. The average response spectrum thus obtained covers a variety of foundation conditions ranging from rock to deep alluvium. This spectrum is commonly referred to as the "Housner" spectrum. Since the ground surface acceleration values used in the design are twice those recommended in Subsection 2.4.4, it is felt that any unconservatism resulting from the spectrum-averaging process has been adequately covered.
- 5. 7.1.3 Floor Design Response Spectra Floor design response spectra for the analysis of structurally-supported systems and components were developed from a modal time history analysis of the containment building, the auxiliary buildings and other CP Co Design Class 1 structures for which spectra were produced, using the Taft 1952 earthquake acceleration record normalized to the OBE. The time history record was digitized to 0.01 second intervals and had a duration of 24 seconds. The building models used in the analysis are described in Subsections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3.
Comparisons of the Taft 1952 and Palisades smooth ground design spectra are shown iri Figures 5.7-2 and 5.7-3_ for 4% and 7-1/2% of critical damping, respectively. Floor response spectra were produced only for the OBE case and doubled for SSE analyses. This is considered conservative since structural damping is higher for the SSE level. Where no vertical structural dynamic analyses were performed, the ground design spectra, normalized to the vertical OBE, were used for vertical analyses of in-structure systems and components. The modal time history analysis produced acceleration time histories at dynamic degrees of freedom of the building model. These time histories were then filtered through a family of single degree of freedom systems with various natural frequencies and damping values to produce rough floor response spectra. These rough plots were then smoothed using straight-line segments which generally envelope the data. The spectra converge to the maximum floor accelerations from the building response spectrum analyses at 33 Hz. Floor response spectra for the containment building, the auxiliary building and the auxiliary building radwaste addition w.ere produced usin*g Bechtel Computer Code CE611. Spectra were only produced for horizontal directions. They were computed for 5.7-2 Rev 19
- frequencies ranging from 0.1 to 33.0 Hz, and peaks at building natural frequencies were widened+/- 10% to account for variations in soil and structural material properties.
Containment building and auxiliary building and floor spectra were produced for 0.5%, 2.0% and 5.0% of critical damping. Auxiliary building radwaste addition spectra were produced for 0.5% of critical damping. Floor response spectra for the auxiliary building TSC/EER addition were produced using Bechtel Computer Codes CE800 (BSAP) and CE802 (SPECTRA). Spectra were generated in accordance with the recommendations of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.122 (see Reference 1) with respect to frequency intervals (0.2 to 34. 0 Hz), peak broadening (+/- 15%) and combination of three directions of earthquake motion (SRSS). The spectra were made to envelope the ground design spectra in all cases. Spectra were produced for 0.5%, 1.0%; 2.0%, 3.0%, 4.0%, 5.0%, 7.0% and 10.0% of critical damping. Typical floor response spectra are shown in Figures 5. 7-22 and 5: 7-25. 5.7.1.4 Damping Values The damping values expressed as a percent of critical for various materials and types of eonstruction are shown in Table 5.7-2 for the OBE and SSE. The damping values for various CP Co Design Class 1 structures are shown in Table 5.7-3.* The analysis of composite structures, such as the containment and auxiliary buildings, used the various
- techniques described in Subsections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3 to incorporate different damping values for soil, concrete and steel.
5.7.2 SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF MAJOR CP CO DESIGN CLASS 1 STRUCTURES
. The horizontal dynamic analysis of major CP Co Design Class 1 structur~s was accomplished in a series of steps as follows:
- 1. A mathematical model of the structure and soil was constructed in terms of .
lumped masses, interconnected by massless beam elements. At appropriate locations within the structure, such as floor levels, points were chosen to lump the weights of the structure and major equipment. Between these locations, values were calculated for beam element moments of inertia, cross-sectional areas, effective shear areas and lengths. The member properties were used in Bechtel Computer Program CE309 (Stress) to obtain flexibility coefficients referenced to the lumped mass locations in the mathematical model. Since all major structures are separated by a minimum of two inches above grade and one inch below grade, they were analyzed separately with no dynamic coupling. 5.7-3 Rev 19
- 2. The natural frequencies and mode shapes of the structure were obtained using Bechtel Computer Program CE617. The flexibility coefficients were formulated into a matrix and inverted to form a stiffness matrix. The lumped weights were formulated into a diagonal mass matrix. The program used the technique of diagonalization by successive rotations to obtain eigenvalues (natural frequencies) and eigenvectors (mode shapes). *
- 3. The response of the structure to the earthquake was obtained using Bechtel Computer Code CE641 which utilizes the modal response spectrum analysis technique. The ground design response spectra described in Subsection 5. 7. 1.2 were used in the analysis. *Using a weighting technique, the modal damping values were established based upon the mode shapes and the damping values presented in Subsection 5.7.1.4.
For each mode, based on the natural frequency and the damping value, a spectral acceleration was obtained from the *ground design spectrum. This acceleration was multiplied by the modal participation factor, mode shape vector and lumped mass to obtain inertial forces at the lumped mass points. .Shears and moments were then computed from the inertial forces. Mass point displacements were computed by multiplying the spectral acceleration by the participation factor. and mode shape vector and dividing by the square of the circular (radians) natural frequency. All modes with natural frequencies less than 33 Hz were combined by the square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares (SRSS) method to obtain inertial forces, shears, moments and displacements at lumped mass points throughout the structure.
- 4. The results from each horizontal analysis were combined separately with the vertical results. The worst case from these combinations was used in the structural analysis and design.
The soil-supported structures were checked for dynamic stability against overturning and sliding, and compared with the minimum allowable factors of safety which are 1.5 for the OBE and 1.1 for the SSE.
- 5. 7 .2. 1 Contajnment Building Three separate horizontal dynamic analyses of the containment building have been pertormed. -
In early 1967 a fixed-base, single-stick, dynamic model of the containment shell was analyzed for the OBE only, using 2% damping in all modes. The modal responses were combined by the sum-of-absolute-values (SAV) technique. The forces generated by this analysis were used in the structural design. Later, a second dynamic model incorporating soil-structure interaction was analyzed for both the QBE and SSE. *The soil springs were based on formulas by P A Parmelee (see Reference 2) for translation (swaying) and rotation (rocking). The rotational soil 5.7-4 Rev 19
- spring was replaced by two equipollent vertical springs. The mass of the internal structure was lumped at the base of the containment along with the basemat mass.
Local rotational inertia was neglected; however, the overall rotational degree of freedom at the basemat elevation was included. The analysis used 4% damping for all modes in the QBE analysis and 7.5% damping for all modes inthe SSE analysis. The modal responses were combined by the SRSS method.
- The final dynamic model was analyzed in June 1969 and incorporated both soil-structure interaction and the coupling effect between containment shell and internal structures. The internal structures were modeled as a separate stick with zero offset from the containment stick and coupled at the basemat elevation only. The dynamic model is shown in Figure 5. 7-4. Damping was determined for each mode based on a .
weighting technique which considered the mode shapes and material damping values
- shown in Table 5. 7-3. Damping in the QBE analysis was 5% in the first and second modes and 2% in the third and fourth modes. Damping in the SSE analysis was 7.5%.
for all 4 modes. See Reference 16 for additional information. The modal responses for the first four modes were combined by the SRSS method. This final dynamic model was also used in the generation of QBE floor design response spectra as described in Subsection 5.7.1.3. A comparison of containment shell shears and moments obtained from the first and final (third) dynamic analyses is shown in Figure 5. 7-6. The values from the original dynamic analysis are consistently higher than those from the final analysis and since the original values were used in the structural design, the design loads were conservatively estimated. See References 16 and 17 for additional information. None of the dynamic analyses considered torsional behavior. This approach is considered reasonable due to the axisymmetric nature of the structure. The factors of safety against overturning were computed as 4.9 for the QBE and 2.2 for the SSE, and against sliding as 4.3 for the QBE and 1'.9 for the SSE. These values
. meet the criteria set forth in Subsec.tion 5.7.2 for CP Co Design Class 1 structures on soil. .5.7.2.2 Auxiliarv Building Separate horizontal seismic dynamic analyses of the CP Co Design Class 1 portion of the auxiliary building were performed for the north-south and east-west directions. The mathematical models used in this analysis are shown in Figures 5.7-11 and 5.7-12, and consist of basically three parts:
- 1. Above elevation 649 feet 0 inch, a lumped. mass and beam representation of the structural steel framing.
- 2. Between elevations 589 feet 0 inch and 649 feet 0 inch, a lumped mass and beam representation of the reinforced concrete walls and floors.
5.7-5 Rev 19
- 3. Below elevation 649 feet 0 inch, translational and equipollent offset vertical springs to represent soil-structure interaction. The soil springs were computed using formulas for rectangular basemats assuming an effective area of 100 by 158 feet.
For mode shapes and frequencies see Table 5.7-17. Damping was determined for each mode based on a weighting technique which considered the mode shapes and material damping values shown in Table 5. 7-3. Although modal damping values were computed for both QBE and SSE analyses, only an OBE analysis was performed. The results were doubled for. the SSE which is conservative due to the higher SSE damping. The QBE damping values for the north-south analysis were 0.5% in the first mode and 5% in the second and third modes. The OBE damping values for the east-west analysis were 0.5% in the first and third modes, and 5% in the second and fourth modes. The modal responses for each analysis were combined by the SRSS method and the two sets of results were enveloped to form a single set of results for design. The results of the combined analyses are shown in Reference 17 for the QBE. The SSE results are twice the QBE values. Torsional effects, which arise from the asymmetry of the building, were considered in the design by distributing the horizontal loadings obtained from the 'decoupled analyses in accordance with the actual shear wall rigidity distribution. No dynamic coupling was considered between the auxiliary and turbine buildings. Typical Floor response spectra are shown in Reference 16. The factors of safety against overturning wer~ computed as 8.5 for the QBE and 3.8 for the SSE, and against sliding as 2.7 for the OBE and 1.2 for the SSE. These values meet the criteria set forth in Subsection 5.7.2 for CP Co Design Class 1 structures on soil. 5.7.3 SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF OTHER CP CO DESIGN CLASS 1 STRUCTURES
- 5. 7 .3.1 Turbine Building Only those portions of the turbine building listed in Section 5.2 are designated CP Co Design Class 1. The remainder of the turbine building is CP Co Design Class 3.
5.7.3.1.1 CP Co Design Class 1 Portion The auxiliary feedwater pump room, which is completely below ground level, was analyzed for seismic accelerations equal to the ground accelerations. Separate horizontal dynamic analyses of the electrical penetration enclosure were performed for the north-south and east-west directions. The basic methodology was the same as for the major CP Co Design Class 1 strucstures as described in Subsection 5.7.2. Ttie effects of soil-structure interaction were not considered in the analyses, and fixed-base, single-stick models were used. Only OBE analyses were 5.7-6 Rev 19
--* performed with 5% damping assumed in all modes.* Only one mode in each direction has a natural frequency less than 33 Hz. The dynamic models, natural frequencies and shear envelopes for both analyses are shown in Figure 5.7-17.
5.7.3.1.2 CP Co Design Class 3 Portion The CP Co Design Class 3 portion of the turbine building was initially connected to the auxiliary building. Also, it is adjacent to the CP Co Design Class 1 portion of the intake structure. Therefore, a dynamic analysis of the turbine building was performed to assess the effect of the seismic activity of this structure upon the adjacent structures. This analysis was performed for the SSE using a model of the less rigid east-west direction. The basic methodology described in Subsection 5.7.2 was used. The effects of soil-structural interaction were not included in the analysis. Three cases were analyzed:
- 1. The turbine. building frame was considered to be restrained laterally by its ties to the auxiliary building (original configuration). This occurred along Column Row J between Column Rows 16 and 22. In this area the roof girders of the turbine building auxiliary bay (roof elevation 625 feet 0 inch) were connected to secondary columns of the frame which are encased by the auxiliary building wall.
The fundamental frequency was found to be 1.17 Hz.. ( It was concluded that this connection will not cause failure of the auxiliary building
. wall or the roof over the turbine building auxiliary bay. However, it was also concluded that the auxiliary building floor slab at elevation 625 feet 0 inch was overstressed. This overstress condition was eliminated prior to the completion of construction by providing a 3-inch gap between the turbine building girders and.
the auxiliary building wall. Vertical supports with sliding surfaces were attached to this wall. In the east-west direction, flexible slotted bolt connections with a +/- 3-inch range were employed. *
- 2. The turbine building was considered to be a rigid frame, supported at the ground
- floor level and unrestrained at the operating floor level (elevation 625 feet O.inch).
The fundamental frequency was found to be 0.66 Hz. The maximum frame deflection at this elevation was calculated to be 3.*44 inches. This deflection will close the 0.75-inch gap between the turbine generator pedestal and the operating floor, thus causing the pedestal to act as a restraint. This gap closure necessitated the Case 3 analysis.
- 3. The turbine generator pedestal was treated as a restraint to the building frame at the operating floor level. A dynamic analysis of this final case was not performed.
Instead, the accelerations from Case 2 were applied directly to the Case 3 model to produce nodal forces, and then a static analysis was performed. This approach is quite conservative since the accelerations for the restrained case
** should be considerably lower. The maximum deflection at elevation 625 feet O inch was reduced to 1.32 inches. It was concluded that the resulting lateral force would not affect the turbine pedestal.
5.7-7 Rev 19
The dynamic models for the three cases are shown together in Figure 5.7-18. Fundamental mode shapes for the first two cases are shown in Figure 5.7-19. Acceleration and displacement responses for all three cases are shown in. Figure 5.7-20. In all three cases covered above, the crane was assumed unloaded and located at any bay of the turbine building. The mode shapes indicate that the crane support columns move in the same direction. Based on the uniform column movement and the fact that column stresses were determined to be within allowable limits, it was concluded that the turbine building will not collapse and the crane bridge and trolley will remain in place during a seismic event. The maximum seismic deflection of the turbine building roof at elevation 676 feet 9 inches(+/- 2.75 inches) is more than sufficient to close the gaps along Column Row M of the auxiliary building and along the intake structure. In the auxiliary building, these additional forces will be carried by concrete shear walls whose overall stress level will not exceed 85% of yield. Because the calculated deflection at the roof level of the intake structure is less, the additional forces will be less and the intake structure walls will be stressed to less than 85% of yield.
- 5.7.3.2 Intake Structure Only that portion of the intake structure listed in Section 5.2 is designated CP Co Design Class 1. Th*e .remainder of the intake structure is .CP Co Design Class 3. The intake structure is mainly below ground and was analyzed for seismic accelerations equal to the ground accelerations. ..
5.7.3.3 Auxiliary Building Radwaste Addition A structure was added adjacent to the north end of the auxiliary building in 1972 to ..,,. house a radwaste addition and to extend the fuel handling crane into this area. The structure is isolated by expansion joints from the auxiliary building to the south, service building to the north, and technical support center addition to the west, and it is
- supported by its own basemat. The radwaste addition consists of a reinforced concrete structure from its base at elevation 590 feet to elevation 665 feet, and a steel braced frame from elevation 665 feet to elevation 696 feet where a steel roof truss supports a lightweight roof. The fuel handling crane rails extend into this structure at elevation 676 feet.
Separate horizontal dynamic models were developed for the north-south and east-west . directions. The effects of soil-structure interaction were incorporated using translational and equipollent offset vertical springs computed using formulas for rectangular basemats, assuming an effective area of 38.5 feet by 125 feet The mass of the steel superstructure and crane was lumped at the top stick model mass point . (elevation 665 feet). The dynamic model is shown in Figure 5.7-21. 5.7-8 Rev 19
A modal analysis was performed as described in Subsection 5. 7 .2 for the north-south and east-west directions. The fundamental natural frequencies .from this analysis were 3.4 Hz for the north-south direction and 5.3 Hz for the east-west direction. A response spectrum analysis was performed as described in Subsection 5.7.2 for the north-south and east-west directions. The 0.1 g QBE Palisades ground design . spectrum with 5% structural damping was used to obtain acceleration, shear and moment responses. - Floor response spectra were generated for the north-South and east-west directions as described in Subsection 5.7.1.3. Typical floor response spectra are shown in Figure 5.7-22. SSE values 'A(ere obtained by doubling OBE values. 5.7.3.4 Auxiliary Building TSC/EER Addition (Portion Founded on WGDTRl The technical support center (TSC) and electrical equipment room (EER) were added to the auxiliary building in 1983. A major portion of this reinforced concrete addition was built on top of the existing waste gas decay tank room (WGDTR) between elevations 607 feet 6 inch.es and 639 feet. The combined* structure, consisting of WGDTR, EER and TSC, is isolated by expansion joints from the auxiliary building radwaste addition to the east and the remainder of the TSC/EER addition to the south. Two separate three-dimensional dynamic stick models were used to analyze the structure. The first analysis assumed that the torsional stiffness of the .stick model elements was the sum of the individual rectangular wall section torsional stiffnesses. The second analysis assumed that the floor slabs were rigid, causing the individual wall sections to act together, providing increased stiffness. Flexible vertical elements in the dynamic model were located at the centers of horizontal stiffness of the wall systems between floors and were connected by rigid . horizontal elements at floor elevations to lumped masses located _at their respective centers of gravity. Additional rigid horizontal members were included at each floor level to obtain responses at the corners of the structure. The effects of vertical floor flexibility on vertical response were included in the dynamic model through the addition of single-degree-of-freedom vertical spring-mass systems at each lumped mass point (except the basemat). The effective mass and stiffness were based on the floor's vertical (transverse) first mode of vibration. THe effective mass was subtracted from the total vertical floor lumped mass. The effects of soil-structure interaction were simulated using tra.nslational and rotational soil springs for a rectangular basemat. The dynamic model is shown in Figure 5. 7-23. For each model a fixed base, modal free vibration analysis, neglecting soil-structure interaction, was first performed to obtain structural mode shapes and frequencies. Soil spring and radiation damping values were computed and input along with the modal data *into the DAMPS I (CE207) module of Bechtel Computer Program BSAP-DYNAM to 5.7-9 Rev 19
t,
- compute composite modal damping, using a method described in Bechtel Topical BC-TOP-4-A (see Reference 3). Structural (reinforced concrete) hysteretic damping was input as 5% of critical damping, and soil material damping was input as 3% of critical damping. In no case, however, was the composite .modal damping for any mode allowed to exceed 10% of critical damping in the analysis. A flexible base, modal free vibration analysis, including soil-structure interaction springs was then performed, for each model, to obtain system natural frequencies, mode shapes and participation factors. The results of this second modal free vibration analysis are summarized in Table 5. 7-4. Mode shapes were plotted using Bechtel Computer Program BSAP-POST (CE201 ).
An OBE modal response spectrum analysis.was performed.*for both torsional models
- using the Palisades ground design spectra normalized to 0.10 g horizontal and 0.067 g vertical maximum ground accelerations. Bechtel Computer Program BSAP-DYNAM was used to compute accelerations and displacements and element stresses. The modal responses were combined by the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.92 "Grouping" method (see Reference 4), and the results for each direction of motion were combined by the SRSS method. The horizontal displacements were computed at the four corners of each floor and the results were enveloped .. The results of the response spectrum analysis are summarized in Figure 5. 7-24.
Floor response spectra were produced as described in Subsection 5. 7 .1.3. The
- horizontal floor response spectra from both torsional models and for two directions were enveloped to form a single plot for each floor elevation. The vertical floor spectra included the.effects' of vertical floor flexibility .. Typical floor response spectra are shown in Figure S.7-25.
- In all cases, SSE values were obtained by doubling the QBE values.
The response spectrum and time history analyses used a sufficient number of modes to include 99.9% of the modal mass and all the modes with natural frequencies less than . 33 Hz. . . The facfors of safety against sliding were computed as 2.85 for the OBE and 2.20 for the SSE. The factors of safety against overturning were computed using an energy . method described in Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A (see Reference 3). The *
- minimum factors of safety for tipping about the east edge were 88.8 for the QBE and 1.1.2 for the SSE. *Soil pressure under the building basemat was checked against bearing capacity using Bechtel Computer Program CE705.
5.7.3.5 Other Auxiliarv Building Additions A reinforced concrete structure housing HVAC area was added in the north-west corner. of the auxiliary building in 1983. This structure rests on top of the enclosure for the diesel generator exhaust mufflers at elevation 629 feet 2 inches and extends vertically
- to elevation 659 feet 2 inches.
5.7-10 Rev 19
A portion of the reinforced concrete auxiliary building TSC/EER addition was built on top of the existing baler room between elevations 607 feet 6 inches and 639 feet. This portion is isolated from the remainder of the TSC/EER addition by expansion joints. The effect of these additions on the seismic response of the auxiliary building was considered to be_ negligible due to their relatively small mass. 5.7.3.6 CP Co Design Class 1 Tank Foundations Foundations for the condensate storage tank; primary system makeup tank and utility water storage tank were designed for Dead, Snow, Wind, OBE and SSE loads. In. additicm, sloshing of liquids inside the tanks was considered. An equivalent static* analysis was used to determine required reinforcing. The design of the condensate storage tank valve pit was based on 0.1 g horizontal and 0.07 g vertical accelerations acting on the condensate storage tan~ foundation. The foundation for the fuel oil storage tank T-10A was designed for Dead, Snow, Wind, a Tornado, OBE, SSE and Blast Loads. The foundation is below grade housing which serves to protect the fuel oil storage tank. 5.7.3.7 Miscellaneous Frames and Trusses As part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Systematic Evaluation Program, the containment dome trusses which support the safety injection tanks were evaluated for adequacy during an SSE. The stress resultants from the EDS analysis (see Reference
- 5) of the safety injection tanks for GRAVITY+ SSE were applied as loads on the trusses in a static analysis. The results for the vertical and two horizontal directions of
- earthquake were combined simultaneously by. the SRSS method. All combined
- stresses were found to be within ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code allowables.
5.7.4 SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF CP CO DESIGN CLASS 1 PIPING CP Co Design Class 1 piping, except the primary coolant piping, was originally analyzed by one of three possible methods:
- 1. Piping with a fundamental natural frequency below 20 Hz was classified as flexible and a three-dimensional response spectrum OBE analysis was performed using either EDS Corporation Computer Program PISOL or Bechtel Computer Program ME632 or ME101. This was the method generally used for large pipes, 3 inches and over. The piping system was modeled with lumped masses located at valves, pipe supports, elbows, tees and other appropriate locations connected by straight and curved prismatic elastic members. The model was bounded by anchors and equipment. Insulation and content weight were included in the analysis. The effect of flexible equipment to which the piping was attached was included in the analysis. The effect of small equipment, where equipment-piping interaction was significant, was also c:onsidered. The three-dimensional stiffness 5.7-11 Rev 19
ENCLOSURE4 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA COMPARISON TO REFERENCE SPECTRUM (1.5 x BOUNDING SPECTRUM)
- 7 Pages
Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant
- BUILDING: Auxiliary ELEVATION: 590'
- In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5%
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Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant BUILDING: Auxiliary ELEVATION: 601' In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE . DAMPING: 5% Note: Height above grade-11 1 2.0 I I
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- Consumers Power Company BUILDING: Auxiliary Palisades Nuclear Plant ELEVATION: 610' In-Structure.Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5%
Note: Height above grade-20 1 2.0
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** BUILDING: Auxiliary Palisades Nuclear Plant ELEVATION: 625' In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5%
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- Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant
- BUILDING: Reactor Internal ELEVATION: 590' In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5%
Note: Height above gra*de- 0 1 2.0 I *I I
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Consumers Power Company BUILDING: Ractor Internal Palisades Nuclear Plant ELEVATION: 606' In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5% Note: Height above grade-16' 2.0 .I I *I
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Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant BUILDING: Reactor Shell ELEVATION: 608.75' In-Structure Response Spectra - SSE DAMPING: 5% Note: Height above grade-19 1 2.0 ,_ I
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- ENCLOSURE 5 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT SQUG PROGRAM PROJECT PLAN ATTACHMENT 1 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION PROGRAM OUTLIERS
- 3 Pages
TITLE: IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION PROGRAM OUTLIERS AlTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 3 1.0 PURPOSE To provide a standard method to document, evaluate, report and track outliers identified during the conduct of the SQUG walkdown activities. 2.0 SCOPE This Attachment applies to outliers identified during the conduct of the SQUG Program.
3.0 REFERENCES
- 3. 1 . SOURCE DOCUMENT 3.1.1 . Seismic Qualification Users Group (SQUG) Generic Implementation Procedure Rev 2.
3.1.2 Management Guidelines for Seismic Verification of Nu cl ear Plant Equipment. Dated.August 1991. 3.2 REFERENCE DOCUMEHTS 3.2.l Palisades Administration Procedure 13.01, "Identification and Tracking of Configuration Control Project Discrepancies."
- 4.0 DEFINITIONS 4.1 OUTLIER An outlier is an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guidelines provided in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). The GIP screening guidelines are intended to be used as a generic basis for evaluating the Seismic adequacy of equipment.
If an item of equipment fails to pass these generic screens, it may st i 11 be shown tcr* be adequat~ for Seismic 1oadi ng by add it i onc. 1 evaluations. 5.0 IDENTIFICATION OF OUTLIERS 5.1 IDENTIFICATION OF OUTLIERS When performing the screening evaluations as set forth in sections 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the GIP, the. evaluator will classify an item of identified safe shutdown equipment as an outlier if the screening guidelines, defined in those sections specified above, cannot be met.
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2. of 3 DOCUMENTING OF OUTLIERS - * . 5.2 Outliers shall be documented using the Outliers Seismic Verification Sheet (OSVS) as described in chapter 5 of the GIP. Each component determined to be an outlier shall have an OSVS form completed. 5.3 RESOLUTION OF OUTLIERS Outlier resolution will be assigned to a suitably - qualified person as determined by the Project Manager. The re so1ut ion of an outlier maybe comp 1eted by use of one of the techniques listed below, or by other suitable means;
- a. Additional evaluation
- b. *More rigorous calculations
- c. Engineering judgement *
- d. Component replacement
- e. In-situ testing
- f. Shake table testing
- g. Modify existing component
- If engineering judgement is used to resolve outliers based on the guidelines in the GIP~ assigned persons shall have the qualifications as set forth in Section 2 of the GIP .
5.4 REPORTABILITY OF OUTLIERS The discovery of an outlier does not, of itself, require the Palisades Plant to consider reportability or operability implications nor justification for continued operation or reporting under applicable reporting requirements, unless the equipment does not meet the existing plant licensing or design bases, including specific plant commitments. If existing plant licensing or design bases are not met correct.ive action shall be initiated in accordance with Administrative Procedure AP 3.03. 5.5 CLOSURE An outlier is considered closed when one of the outlier techniques described section 5.3 above has been reviewed and approved by the appropriate individual (Seismic Capability Engineer for Seismic concern and/ or the Lead Relay reviewer for relay or el ectri ca 1 concern as described in part II of_ section 2 of the GIP.) 5.6 REPORTING The status of outliers shall be maintained by the Project Manager for SQUG. Safeguards.shall be provided to ensure prevention of data loss. These safeguards may include but not limited to a backup copy of the program and Data stored in a separate location.
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 3 of 3
- Periodic Reports may be made by the Project Manager to Pl ant Management concerning the status of the Outliers. **
- Reporting to the NRC shall be in accordance with Part II section 9 of the .GIP.
5.7 DOCUMENTATION Documentation associated with SQUG Outliers shall be in accordance with Part II section. 9 of the GIP *
- ENCLOSURE 6 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT RESOLUTION OF USI A OPERABILITY STATUS OF OUTLIERS DATED JULY 7, 1995 2 Pages
To: DPFadel From: DEEngle J'S & f; Date: July 7, 1995
Subject:
Palisades Plant- Resolution of USI A-46, Operability Status of Outliers The purpose of USI A-46 was to verify the adequacy of components needed for safe shut down of the plant following a seismic event. In older plants like Palisades the seismic requirements was not well understood or did not exist. In many cases the seismic qualification was left up to the supplier of the component without using uniform industrial standards. The resolution ofUSI A-46 can be satisfactorily resolved by the use of the NRC approved methodology described in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). Described in the GIP, amoung other things, is the reportability requirements and the need for JCO's relating to outliers. Outliers are defined as those components which did not meet the generic screening criteria defined within the GIP.
- The Palisades outliers consist of 17 relays and 64 equipment items. The attached table shows the specific components which are outliers.
Following is a discussion of the operability impact on these outliers. Per the GIP, A-46 resolution methodologies do not impose any additional reporting . requirements other than to submit the inspection report upon completion of the walkdowns which Palisades has done with the submittal to the NRC dated May 23, 1995 (PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT RESOLUTION OF USI A-46). Resolution of A-46. also does not require preparation of justification for continued operation (JCO's) for outliers unless necessary to meet existing regulatory requirements applicable to Palisades. In other words when an outlier is discovered by the SQUG Program, this outlier is not considered**iuopcrable unless the outlier is* in violation of an existing pl.~11t licensing or
- design basis or other regulatory requirements.
Once an item was determined to be a outlier, the plant requirements were reviewed to determine if the plant licensing basis was violated. This review included review of the FSAR, Tech Specs, System Design Basis Documents (DBD) and equipment vendor files. Upon review of the relay outliers, table 5.2-4 of the FSAR stated that all items related to the Diesel Generators are safety class 1E, however 1E is defined in chapter 8 of the FSAR to mean that any replacements or modifications of these components shall be done to meet 1E requirements and not that originally installed equipment was class 1E.
Because of the era in which the Diesel Generator System was designed (IEEE standards for seismic requirements did not exist) there were no class IE designation. Therefore the seismic requirements for relays in the Diesel Generator system is very vague and therefore these relays [outliers] are not outside our current licensing basis. All relays currently considered outliers in the SQUG Program may be determined adequate if the proper documentation can be located to show the seismic adequacy of these particular relays. If necessary however these relays will be replaced to bring the systems up to the acceptable seismic standards. References; System Design Basis Documents Technical Specifications [sections 3.7: 4.7] FSAR [sections 5.2: 8.1 and table 5.2-4] Equipment Vendor Files Generic Implemenation Procedure (GIP) [section 1 pg.6; section 6 pg25] Management Guidelines for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment [sections 5 and 3.3]
- ENCLOSURE 7 CONSUMERSENERGYCOMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 PALISADES PLANT SQUG PROGRAM GENERAL DISCUSSION ON REPORTABILITY/OPERABILITY of SQUG OUTLIERS 2 Pages
Reportability/Operability of SQUG Outliers If a component was determined to be an outlier during the completion of the SQUG walkdowns, how was operability/reportability determined for that outlier? An outlier is defined in the SQUG Program as an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guidelines provided in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). The GIP screening guidelines are intended to be used as a generic basis for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment. [
Reference:
GIP, rev 2, Part II, Section 5.] Per the GIP, if a determination is made that equipment failing to meet the GIP initial
- screening or outlier resolution guidelines does not meet the existing plant licensing or design bases, including specific plant commitments and requirements, the licensee must consider reportability and operability implications. [
Reference:
GIP, Rev 2, Part I, Section 2.2.5.]
- 1. If a component is determined to be an outlier for reasons related only to SQUG criteria, operability and reportability requirements are described within the GIP.
The GIP states that USI A-46 methodologies do not impose any additional reporting requirements beyond the submittal requirements of the GIP, Section 2.2.8 nor do they require preparation of Justifications for Continued Operation (JCO's). [
Reference:
GIP Part I, Section 2.2.5.]
- 2. If a component is determined to be an outlier for reasons other than SQUG criteria, corrective action documents are initiated. The operability/reportability requirements are handled as required by Palisades administrative procedures
. and Technical Specifications, the same as any equipment in question at Palisades.
For the SQUG project at Palisades, a project plan was developed which describes how the SQUG effort was to be accomplished. The SQUG Project Plan dated June 4, 1993, Rev. 2 includes Attachment 1 - "Identification and Control of Seismic Verification Program Outliers." This attachment states that, during all walkdowns any component determined to be an outlier is documented on a form called "Outlier Seismic Verification Sheet," (OSVS). The OSVS form is completed in accordance with GIP, rev. 2, Part II, Section 5.2. During the walkdown process a review of all OSVS forms generated that day were reviewed by the SQUG team to determine the reason for the component being declared page 1 of 2
an outlier. The reason for the outlier was then compared to the FSAR, Technical Specifications, Design Bases Documents and appropriate vendor manuals to determine if the outlier status placed the component outside its design bases. If a component was found to be in disagreement with any of the documents listed above, a corrective action document was generated. The reportability and operability determination was then controlled by the corrective action document per the Palisades administrative procedure requirements. page 2 of 2
- ENCLOSURE 8 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 BECHTEL CORPORATION LETTER DATED JULY 14, 1969 TO CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY Entitled SEISMIC ANALYSIS (Auxiliary Building)
Bechtel Corporation Inter-office Memorandum To A. M. Appleford Date July 14, 1969 Subject Consumers Power Company From R. J. Mccaffery Palisades Plant, Auiiliary Bldg. Job No~ 5935 *~ Power & Industrial Seismic Analy~is Copies to D. w. Halligan At 62 *First Street, Rm. 124
. A. Bingaman Enclosed are the results of 'the seismic analysis conducted on the Consumers Power Palisades Plant for the auxiliary model building. Unless significant changes occur in the provided data of the structure, the results are final and are.to be used for aseismic design.
The seismic analysis presented in this report was performed by o. Koski'.
.fic,ff/Ji CIlr~:/
Bob McCaf ~ (/ - i-
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