ML18058A570
| ML18058A570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1992 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18058A571 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-92-16, NUDOCS 9206300166 | |
| Download: ML18058A570 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1992016
Text
- -
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
Report No. 50-255/92016(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255
'
-
'
'
Licensee: Consumers Power Company
, 212 West Michigan .Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
REGION II I
License No. DPR-20
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:* Palisades Site, Covert, MI
Inspection Conducted:
April 21 through June*a, 1992
. lnsp~ctors:
J~ K; Heller
J. R. Roton
Approved By:
Inspecti6n Summary.
2A
Inspection from April 21 through June 8. 1992
(Report No. 50-255/92016(0RP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced i nspe'ct ion* by the resident inspectors of
plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance and licensee.
p-lans for coping* with a stHke. No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items
were reviewed.
Result~: No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
The strengths, *weaknesses and Open Items are discussed fo paragraph.*
9,
- "Management Interview."
In summary:
Strengths were noted in event response.
Weaknesses were noted in equipment response to an event and in a surveillan~e
procedure's acceptance criteria.
9206300166*920623
ADOCK 05000255
G
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manager *
- P. M. Donnelly, Safety & licensing Director
K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager *
J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent
~R. B. Kasper, Mairitenance Manager
.
- K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
W. L. Roberts,' Senior Licensing Engineer
R. W. Smedley, Staff licensing Engineer
T. J. Palmisano, Administrative & Planning Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
W; D.
Shafe~, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
B~ L. Jorgerisen, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A
- J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector
J. R. Roton, Resident Inspecto~
- Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview on
- June 17, 1992.
Other members of the pl ant staff, and several members of the
contract . security force, were al so contacted during the
inspection period.
2i
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in.the.
plant and from the main ~ontrol room.
Plant steady power *operation was
observed a.s app 1 i cab.l ~.
-
The performance of reactor operators -and senior reactor operato~s, shift
engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated.
Included in the review were procedure*use and adherence, records and logs,
communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of
control room activities.
- *
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders ~ere.
made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring
systems, and nuclear reactor protection systems. Reviews of surveillance;
equipment condition, and tagout logs w~re conducted.
Proper return to
. service of selected components was verified.
2
a.
General
The plant operated at essentially full power during this r~porting:
period, except as discussed below.
b.
Power Reduction
c.
On May 10, 1992, a rapid power reduction, to 70 percent, was
performed in response tQ a loss of condenser vacuum .. The loss of
condenser vacuum was caused by air in leakage through a Feedwater
Pump drain. trap which. was subsequently repaired.
The inspector
reviewed the following:
(1)
The licensee used the Post Trip Administrativ_e
Review
procedure to capture and evaluate -the pertinent information
for this event.*
(2)
The report documented, by graph and written statements, that
the recently implemented feedwater control modifications had
(3)
(4)
worked well.
. The onshift reactor operators responded effectively,* even
- *though they were not in their normal a~signmen~s. The Reactor
Operator-I was a temporary upgrade from the Reactor Operator-2
position and the Reactor Operator-2 was a temporary upgrade
from * a 1 i censed Auxiliary Operator.
The upgraded * Reactor
Operator-2 had recently obtained his license and had only seen
feedwater and condenser vacuum transients on the simulator.
- The response of this crew demonstrated the strength of the
operators training, both in hardware response and teamwork ..
Du~ing the power redOction, .two control rods were slow;
requiring . operator intervention to prevent
~ rod-to-group
deviation.
The problem was di_scussed with the System
Engineer.* A similar problem (but different _rod) occurred
during a power reduction in the previous fuel cycle.
That
problem was traced to a circuit card and resolved. The system
engineer evaluation continued.
Safety Injection Tank Partial Depre~surization
On May* 13, 1992, one of four Safety* Injection Tanks (SIT) rapidly
depressurized, * froni approximately 220 psig to approximately 170
psig.
This was 30 psig below the minimum Technical Specification
. limit for SIT cover gas pressure .. The operators declared the "B"
SIT inoperable and returned the cover gas p~essure to the Technical
Specification limit within the time limit of the limiting condition
for operation (LCO). During the recovery, the "B" SIT depressurized
a second time to approximately 170 psig.
The "B" SIT was declared
3
i noperab 1 e and recovery . operations comp 1 eted within the LCO ti me*.
limits.
The operators concluded that the tank would depressurize
. if the cover gas was increased above 210 psig {approximately).
During meetings condu~ted over the next several days, the licensee
considered several failure mechanisms and concluded that the most
likely cause was "B" SIT relief valve premature actuation. A.test
and outage pl~n was formulated~
- *
The SITs are located in the top of the containment, such that the
p 1 ant must* be subcri ti ca 1 * to permit testing * and repair.
The
inspector discussed this event with the system engineer and several
reactor operator~~
- *
. The system engineer provided a brief maintenance history of the SITS
and_ stated that engin~ering, maintenance and operations ~ersonnel
have implemented s~veral unsuccessful attempts to find and resolve
a slight cover gas pressure leak from the SITs. * Leak detection
activities had ruled out an external leak. One of these activities
included removal of "B" SIT relief valve tri confirm the leak tight .
integrity and. verify the relief valve set point. The integrity was
confirmed and the re 1 i ef setpoi nt was . verified . at the correct
setting of approximately.260 pounds.*
Pri~r tti this event the op~rators were adding cover gas to the SITs
about *every two and one half days.
After the event, the
118
11 SIT
required cover gas addition every* ~hift, ~hich indicated that.the
relief valve did not fully reseat.
The othef SITs remained on the
previous schedule.
The upper administrative p~essure limit for the "B" SIT wai reduced
from 250 pound to 207 pounds.
- This assured {during cover gas
addition} that the upper _pressure alarmed before the relief valve.
actuated.
The 1 ower admi ni strati ve limit o*f 203 pounds a.ssured
that at least on~ shift of cover gas pressure was available before
the Technical Specification limit was violated.
Several operatots were interviewed.
They stated*that adding cover
gas eacb shift was not time consuming or difficult and was already.
addressed in a System Operating Procedure,
- *
The plant manager did not implement the planned outage schedule
because the operators were able to maintain the "8
11 SIT pressure
within the required band without reproducing the May 13 event.
Additionally, there were sufficient controls in effect to as.sure
that. the pressure would not inadvertently be reduced below the
Technical Specification limit.
d.
Head/Pressurizer Vents
During the post* refueling outage plant
h~atup,
~he ind*cated
pressure on PIA-1066, " Gaseous Vent Pressure Gauge,
11 increased as
the primary coolant system was pressurized.
The pr_essure increase
4
lagged the primary coolant system pressurization by several minutes.
When steady state primary coolant system conditions were achieved,*
the
down
stream
isolation valves
were
cycled.
The* line
depressuriz~d~ but was tepressurized in several minutes~
Th~' vent system is conn~cted to both the reactor vessel h~ad and.
press.urizer.
The line. relieves to either the pressurizer quench
tank or directly to
th~ containment atmosphere.
The system
configuration p~ovides for dual isolation from either the head or
the pressurizer to the containment atmospher*e.
PIA'.'" 1066 is
ins ta 11 ed on the common piping between the first and second
isolation valves.
The increase of pressure at PIA-1066 indicated
that the second set of isolation valves were holding pressure. This
was confirmed by the stable pressurizer quench tank readings and by
stable containment atmospheric temperature/humidity readings.*
Inspection Reports 50-255/89012(DRP), 50-255/90015(DRP) and 50-
255/91009(DRP) documented that this problem has occurred* in the
three previous operating cycles.
The work order history for this
system indicated that system engineering, operations and maintenance
groups have made ~everal attempts to resolve the problem.
It was
unclear if the problem r~sults from misapplication of th~ valves,
the system configuration; maint~nance problems, or some combination.
The inspector reviewed the work order history and discussed the
problem with engineering, operations and maintenance personnel. The
re so l.ut ion of this problem is. considered an open i tern.
Si nee the
. re solution of the open item was not *cl ear, the inspector* has
requested a written response to this open item (Open Item 255/92016~
Ol(DRP)). *
.
.
e.
- Zebra Mussels
/
.
.
.
-
The licensee successfully treated the firewater system with Betz
CJ amTro l.
This addressed a conc~rn that the inspector raised in
Inspection Report 50-255/92006(DRP) -paragraph 7 .d. In that reportt
the inspector expressed concern that previous attempts to treat the*
system were unsutce~sful and that a failure to treat this system,
could result in a Zebra Muss~l infestation of the emergency makeup
lines to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
f.
Diesel Generator Inoperabil ity
During the performance of a monttlly *diesel generator operability
surveillance test, the 1-1 di~~el generator was declared inoperable
on May 7, 1992, because of vo.ltage control problems that resulted in
. the current exceeding the maxi mu*m al low able l i m_it.
Th is occurred
while. the diesel generator was loaded and paralleled to the
associated safeguards bus. The voltage regulator was replaced. The
cause of the voltage regulator pr~blem was still being evaluated.
The shift supervisor started and loaded the 1-2 diesel generator to
5
...
g.
confirm that the voltage control problem was not common to that-*
diesel generator. When lOading a diesel generator by paralleling it
to the associated safeguards bus, the licensee considers the diesel
generator inoperable because the diesel generator voltage regulator
cannot compe~sate for certain grid voltage swings. With two diesel
generators inoperable, the licensee applied Technical Spe~ification
3.0.3. This was exited
appro~imately 50 minutes later when the
- diesel generator was shut down.and placed in *automatic. Entry into
Technical Specification 3.0.3 is a condition that wa~ reported per*
10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Reports." Additional reviews will be
performed when the Licensee event report is evaluated. -
The "inoperability" of the diesel generator when.it is paralleled to
the grid was ideritifiedduring licensee evaluatioris completed within
the last six months. Because the probability for this type of event
is very low, the licensee i_s continuing to evaluate whether a fix is
warranted or justified. This was discussed at the exit interview.
Plant Personnel Changes
-
.
The Operations Manager assumes the NPAD Director position on July 1,
1992.
The Administrative and Planning Manger will become the
Operations Manager
on June
22,
1992,
and will . retain his
responsibilities for
outage
management
1nd. planning.
The
Administrative and
Faciliti~s Superintendent
~ill become the
Adminfstrative Manager, assuming responsibility fo~ the remainder of
the Administrative and Planning Department except several areas that_
were assigned to the fl ant Controller~
No violations, deviations~ or unresolved items were identified. One open
item was identified relating to chronic alarming of a pressurizer/head *
head vent pressure monitor.
3.
Radiological Controls (71707)
During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or
areas, the inspector observed occupational .radiation safety practices by
.the radiation protection staff and other workers. Effluent releases were
routinely_ checked, including examination of on-line record~r traces ~nd
proper oper~tion of automatic monitoring equipment.
a.
Access Control Computer
b .
The licensee has enhanced the radiological area access control
compute~ to quiz individuals pertaining to pertinent information on
the RWP.
A question i~ randomly selected from a bank of questions *
associated with the RWP.
These questions can range from stay time
to dos.e entry limits.
The quiz is p~rformed while the individual
el~ctronically signs onto an RWP.
Plant Personnel Changes
6
The Radiological Services Department (RSD} was reorganized on June
1, 1992.
The department now has four major support areas.
These
are
radiological
services,
radiologiC:al
internal
support,
radiological technical support and radiation safety oversight. This
information was
pro~ided to Region Ill radiation * protection
.specialists for review during a future inspection.
No violations, deviations, unresol~ed or open items were identified.*
4.
Ma1nteriance (62703, 42700}
Mainten~nce activities in the plant were routinely inspected~ including.
both
corrective maintenance
(tepairs} * and
preventive maintenance.
Mechani~al, *electrical,. and instrµment* and contfol group
mai~ten~nce
activities were included as available.
The foc*us of the* inspection was to assure the mai'ntenance activities
reviewed were conducted. in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory* *
guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical
Specifications. The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or ~ystems
were removed .fro~ servtce; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post .
maintenahce testing was performed as applicable. *
The following work rirder (WO) activities were inipected:
a.
WO 24200601, "Heater Drain Pump P-lOB,*Repack Pump and Rebuild
Stuffing Box~" *
b.
WO 24001183, "Electro Hydro/Gov Control Cabinet Installation and
Checkout."
c.
WO 24104858, "Steam Generator Feedwater Pump P-lA, Coupling and
Overspeed Trip Test."
-
.
d.
WO 24104859, "Steam Generator Feedwater Pump P-lB, Coupling and
Overspeed Trip Test."
e..
WO 24202199, "Replace Diesel Generator l~l voltage regLllatoi.
11
f.
WO 24201756, "Repair Steam Leak at Stuffihg Box for CV-0501."
.
.
. .
'
This stea~ leak occurred during the plant heatup and appeared on a
. valve that had been disassembled during the outage. The iteam leak
was rep~ired by injection of a sealant into the leaking gasket area.
The energy from the steam then hardens the material.
The inspector reviewed the administrative .program for repairing
steam lea ks.
The repair was performed by a contractor using p 1 ant *
7
procedures and the work. order system.
Since the repair. was
- temporary, a second work order was writteri to implement permanent .
repairs when plant conditions permit.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were
identified.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
5~
- Surveillance (61726, 42700)
. The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications. required surveillance
testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in
accordance with adequate procedures. Additionally, test inst~umentation
was calibrated, Limiting Conditio~s for Operation were met, removal and
~estoration of the affected components were properly accomplis~ed, and
test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure
requirements.
The results were* reviewed by personnel. other than the
individual directing the test and deficiencies identified during the
testing were properly reviewed and resolved. by appropriate management
personnel.
The follbwing activities were irisp~cted:
a.
RT-SD, "Engineered Safeguards* System - Right Channel.
11
The inspector obse~ved the pre-surveillance briefing and performance
- of the test~ The briefing was thorough and demonstrated a complete
understanding of the sequence of events expected to occur.
Personnel involved in the surveillance ~onducted a dry run prior to
actual performance of the surve.i 11 a nee.
The surveill.ance *was
completed satisfactorilyi
b.
R0~32-10, "LLRT - Locai Leak *R~te Test Procedure for Penetratibn
MZ-10."
.
The inspector performed a review of R0-32-10, using Technical.
- Specification 4.5, "Containment Tests," Technical Spedfication 3.6,
"Containment Systems," Pi~ing ~nd Instrument Drawing 214, "Service
Air," .and R0~32-10 Basis Document as references.
The
i~spectdr's .
. observations are discussed below.
( 1)
(2)
(3)
The inspector performed a dimerisional check of the installed
piping configuration and calculated the volume between the
test boundary.
The results were in agreement with tho~e of
the licensee.
The inspector found a . typographical i neons i st ency between
Table 5.1.3 and Attachment 3. The table names the down stream
vent valve as MV-CA 655 and Attachment 3 contains a schematic
of the penetration and misidentifies the vent valve as MV-CA
555.
This was identified to the System Engineer.
Tables 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 verified the "as-found" test and "as-
.left" positions of the valves and pipe caps affected by the
8
test.
Steps 5.4.4.a and_ 5.4.6.a -require the positioner to
return _the valves and pipe caps to the "as found" position or
as directed by the Shift Supervisor. -The inspector recognized
the general rieed for flexibility but questioned if this should
-apply to the test tap, which must be closed and the pipe cap
i_nstalled whenever containment integrity is required. If the
"as found" position was open rir the vent ca~ not install~d,
returning to the "as found" position could result in an
inoperable containment penetration during heat-up.
The--
inspector was informed that containment integrity checklist
3.3, which is performed prior to post outage heat-up, assures
the proper position of the cap and vent valve. The inspector
considered it more appropriate* to maintain control of -the
valves during the test by restoring the valve and pipe cap to
the required position at the completfon of the test.
This
would make checklist 3.3 an independent verification to ensure
- containment integrity.
c.
R0-119, "lnservice Testing of Engineeted Safeguards Valves CV-3027
and CV-3056 (lri se~ie~ recirculation valves to the Safety Injection
and Refueling Water (SIRW) storage tank)."
(1) - During the previous fuel cycle, the _licensee identified
potential leak paths which may exist for post accident primary
cool ant. - One path was by valve seat 1 eakage past two valves -
(CV-3027 and CV-3056) in ~eri~s to the SIRW tank.
The SIRW
tank .has-
an
unfiltered vent.
- This
was_ a previously
unidentified source term to the control room.
During a lo~s
of-cool ant accident with the maximum hypothetical core damage
and total leakage past these valves of greater than .0.1 gpm~
the_ Iodine design dose 1 imit to the control room _would be
exceeded.
This leak path would not result in unacceptable
- dose at the site boundary.
The _leak path was documented in
correspondence from Consumers Power Company dated J_une 14,
_ 1991, July 17, 1991, and January 10,
1992~
The licensee
committed to perform seat leakage testing of CV--3027 and CV-
3056 during thel992 refueling outage.* R0-119 performed this
testing. The results of R0-119 calculated the most restricted
leakage at .01 gpm.
Based on this information,-the integrity
of ~his leak path was confirmed.
(2)
The inspector reviewed R0-119 -and the accompanying basis
document.
The inspector confirmed that the va 1 ve 1 i neup _
proviqed an appropriate test boundary, the isolation valves
were tested individually and a vent path was established down
stream of CV-3027 and CV-3056.
(3)
The procedure trended performance to predict future results.
Step 5~4.5.6 required corrective action if a prdjecticin based
on three or more tests indicated that the next leakrate wduld
exceed the acceptance by 10 percent. The inspector questioned
this statement, since any leakage above O.l gpm would place
9
- . ...
- ,
..
the plant in ~n unacceptable condition. This was identified**
to the Inservice Inspection Supervisor who
revie~ed the
comments and agreed* to revise the acceptance criteria. This
was discussed at the exit interview.
No violations, de~iations, unresolved, or open items were identified.
7.
- Licensee Plans For Coping With Strikes (92709)
The
company-wide union
contract with maintenance
(mechanical
and
. ~lectrical) and operation personnel* expired. on May 3I, I992. *
Th~
inspector, a Region III Branch Chief and a Region III Section Chief met
with the licensee on April 27, I992, to discuss the strike contingency
plans. The meeting fulfilled a verbal commitment from the licensee which
was documented in paragraph.II of Inspection Report 50-255/92006(DRP). On
May 3I, 1992, at IO:OO p~m., the inspector observed onshift activities by
nonunion and union members, as the midnight deadline approached ... The
II:30 p.m. shift turnover, between union* me~bers, was orderly and
routinely performed.
At II:45 p.m., the utility and union reached a
tentative agreement.
The shift meeting conducted by the shift supervisor,
(a non-union position) at I2:30 a.m. on June 2, I992, was orderly and
routine. At the completion of this reporting period, the contract had not
been approved by the uni on membership.
Unt i 1 this is accomplished~ the *
- strike contingency remains in effect.
No violations~ deviations, unresolVed, or open items w~re identified.
~.
Open Items
Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, ~nd
wil 1 be reviewed further by the inspector.
These involve some action on
the part of the NRC or licensee or both .. An Open Item was disclosed
during* the inspection and is discussed in Paragraph 2.d.
9.
Management Interview (7I707)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives - denoted in Paragraph I
- on June I7, I992, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection~
In addition, the likely informational content of the inspection report*
with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors~during
the inspection was also discussed. The licensee did not identify any such
documents or processes as proprietary.*
Highlights of the exit interview are discussed below:
a.
Strengths noted:
( l)
Use of the Post Trip procedure to eva 1 uate the 1 oss of
condenser vacuum
event (pa~agraph 2.b, "Operations - Power *
Reduction").
y
. "
(2)
The response of the crew - which had not normally worked
together - to the. loss of condenser vacuum event demonstrated
strong team work and training (paragraph 2.b,* "Operations -
Power Reduction").
b.*
Weaknesses noted:
. (1)
(2)
During a power reduct(on, two control. rods
~ere slow,
. requiring operator intervention to prevent a rod-to-group
deviation.
The problem has occurred during previous power .*
reductions. (paragraph 2.b, "Operatioos -_Power Reduction").*
A surveillance procedure contained nonconservative acceptance
criteria (paragraph 5.c, "Surveillance").
c.
The SIT depressurization was discussed, *s was the decision not to
shut down to facilitate repairs. * The inspector did not identify a
saf~ty concern with continued power operation but cautioned the
d.
1 icensee *to be proactive to changing conditions (paragraph 2.c,
"Operations - Safety Injection Tank Depressurization").
The open i tern was* discussed.
response
on
the
docket
Head/Pressurizer Vents").
.
.
This inc 1 uded the request for a
(paragraph
2.d,
"Operations
e.
Plant* pers6nnel * chan~es in the Operations
and
Radiol~gical
Protection areas were* discussed .(paragraph 2.g, "Operations" and
paragraph 3.b, "Radiological Controls").
f..
Steam leaks were discussed, along with the heightened ~RC awareness
for problems
that* result from
steam leaks
(paragraph 4.f,
"Maintenance").
11