ML18057A630

Proposed Tech Specs Reducing Min Boron Soulution Level from 186 to 174 Inches & Increasing Max Boron Level from 198 to 200 Inches

ML18057A630
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	12/07/1990
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18057A629	List: ML18057A628 ML18057A630
References
NUDOCS 9012130052
Download: ML18057A630 (14)

Text

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ATTACHMENT I Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC NO 76806) REVISION 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE CHANGES December 7, 1990 ,

• *9012130052 901207

.p PDR ADOCK 05000255 PDC 4 Pages

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Ob.ject i ve To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core in either emergency or normal shutdown ~ituations.

Specifications Safety Injection and Shutdown

- _... **- -....: *- ~

Cooling

... ~ ' -~ ~

Systems l.3.1 The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low-temperature physics tests, unless all of the following*conditions are met:

a. The SIRW tank contains not less than 250,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm at a temperature not less than 40°F.

b. All four Safety Injection tanks are operable and pressurized to at least 200 psig with a tank lfquid level of at least 174 inches and a maximum . level of 200 inches with a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm~ *.- " *-

c. One low-pressure Safety Injection . *:- .

pump is operable on each bus .

d. One high-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

e. Both shutdown heat exchangers and both component coo 1i ng heat exchangers are operable.

f. Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow'paths from the SIRW tank to the primary c.o~.l ing system.

g. All valves, piping and interlocks* associated with the above components and required to function during"acciden~ conditi.ons are operable. *' *- -*

h. The Low-Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 shall be opened and disabled (by isolating the air supply) to prevent spurious closure.

i. The Safety Injection bottle motor-operated isolation valves shall be opened with the electric power supply to the valve motor disconnected*. ** *

j. The Safety Injection miniflow valves CV-3027 and 3056 shall be opened with HS-3027 and 3056 positions to maintain them open.

3-29 Amendment No. 7~, J~J, TSPR90~1

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)

-*---- --~--'---

Basis

_JfSp_ecificati.on-a .. and-b.- Gannot be-met, an orderly shutdown-shall be initiated and the reactor sha 11 be in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

. The norma 1 procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the primary cool ant to near operating temperature by running the primary coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical 1bl withdrawing control rods and diluting boron in the primary coolant. < With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in the primary coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and,

• therefore, all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable. During low-temperature physics tests, there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the primary coolant; therefore, an accident comparable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible and the engineered safeguards'systems are not required.

The SIRW tank contains a minimum of 250,000 gallons of water containing 1720 ppm boron. This is sufficient boron concentration to provide a 5%

shutdown margin with all control rods withdrawn and a new core at a temperature of 60°F.

Heating steam is provided to maintain the tank above 40°F to prevent freezing. The 1% boron (1720 ppm) solution will not precipitate out above 32°F. The source of steam during normal plant operation is extraction steam line in the turbine cycle.

The limits for the safety injection tank pressure and volume assure the required amount of water injection during an accident and are based on values used for the accident analy\es. The minimum 174-inch level corresponds to a volume of 1040 ft and the maximum 200-inch level corresponds to a volume of 1176 ft 3

• Pri-0r to the time the reactor is brought critical, the valving of the safety injection system must be checked for correct alignment and appropriate va 1ves 1ocked. Si nee the system is used for shutdown coo 1i ng, the valving will be changed and must be properly aligned prior to start-up of the re~ctor~ -*

The operable status of the various systems and components is to be demonstrated by per.iodic tests. A large fraction of these tests will be perfonned while the reactor is operating in the power range. If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore. the system to full operability within a relativelj~short time. For a singl~ component to be inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the 3-31 Amendment No. 117, TSPR9011

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

-~~~~j§ __{C<?_f\_t i n~~cj)_ _. _ .

demonstrate that the maximum fuel clad temperatures that could occur over the break size spectrum are well below the melting temperature of zirconium (3300.F).

Malfunction of the Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow control valve could defeat the Low Pressure Injection feature of the ECCS; therefore, it is disabled in the 'open' mode (by isolating the air supply) during plant operation. This action assures that it will not block flow during Safety Injection.

The inadvertent clo-sing of'. any one ~f. the Safety' Injection bottle isolation valves in conjunction with a LOCA has not been analyzed. To provide assurance that thi~ will not occur, these valves are electrically locked open by a key switch in the control room. In addition, prior to critical the valves are checked open, and then the 480 volt breakers are opened. Thus, a failure of a breaker and a switch are required for any of the valves to close.

• Insuring both HPSI pumps are inoperable when the PCS temperature is

<260°F or the shutdown cooling isolation valves are open eliminates PCS mass additions due to inadvertent HPSI pump starts. Both HPSI pumps

• starting in conjunction with a charging/letdown imbalance may cause 10CFRSO Appendix G 1imits to be exceeded when the PCS temperature is

<260° F. When the PCS temperature is ~ 430° F, the pressurizer safety valves ensure that the PCS pressure will not exceed 10CFRSO Appendix G.

The requirement to have both HPSI trains operable above 325°F provides added assurance that the effects of a LOCA occuring under LTOP conditions would be mitigated. If a LOCA occurs when the primary system temperature is less than or equal to 325°F, the pressure would drop to the level where low pressure safety injection can prevent core damage. Therefore, when the PCS temperature is ~260° F and s325

• F operation of the HPS I system would not cause the 10CFRSO Appendix G_ limits to be exceeded nor is HPSI system operation necessary for core cooling.

• HPSI pump testing with the HPSI p~mp ~~nual discharge valve closed is permitted since the closed valve eliminates the possibility of pump testing being the cause of a mass addition to the PCS.

References (1) FSAR, Section 9.10.3; (2) fSAR, Section 6.1, (3) FSAR, Section 14.17 (4) Letter, H.G.Shaw (ANF) to R.J.Gerling (CPCo), "Standard Review Plan Chapter 15 Disposition of Events Review for Changes to Technical Specifications Limits for Palisades Safety Injection Tank Liquid Levels", April 11, 1990.

3-33 Amendment No. t1, J1, 1~1, 117, 1,1,

• TSPR9011

TABLE 4.1.2 Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Controls (Contd)

• Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method

13. Safety Injection Tank Level a. Check s a. Verify that level and pressure indication is between and Pressure Instruments independent high high/low*alanns for level and pressure. I

b. Calibrate R b. Known pressure and different ia 1 pressure applied to pressure and leve 1 se*nsors.

c. *Check R c. Functional Check on high and low level alanns.  !

I

14. Boric Acid Tank Level Switches a. Test R a. Pump tank below low-level alann point to verify switch*~

operation.

15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing System a. Check D a. Observe temperature*recorders for proper readings.

16. Hain Steam Isolation Valve a. Check s a. Compare. four independent pressure indications.

Circuits

b. Test 131 R b. Signal to meter relay adjusted with test device to verify HSIV circuit logic. '

17. SIRW Tank Temperature a. Check H a. Compare independent temperature readouts.

Indication and Alanns b. Calibrate R b. Known resistance applied to indicating loop.

18. Low-Pressure Safety Injection a. Check p a. Observe valve is open with air supply isolated.

Flow Control Valve CV-3006 I

19. Safety Injection Bottle a. Check p a. Ensure each valve open by observing valve position indica~ion Isolation Valves and valve itself. Then lock open breakers and control power key switches.

20. Safety Injection Hiniflow a. Check p a. Verify valves open and HS-3027 and 3056 positioned to Valves Cv-3027, 3056 maintain them open.

NOTES:

--(!)Calibration of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 5(b}, Table 4.1.l.

(2)All monthly tests will be done on only one channel at a time to prevent protection system actuation.

(3)Calibration of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 7(b}, Table 4.1.1.

(4)Required when PCS is >1500 psia.

4-8 Ameridment No. $fl. SIS. lfll. 1:$fl.

TSPR9011

ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC NO. 76806) REVISION .2 '

MARKED UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES December 7, 1990

• 4 Pages

3.J E~GIHCY COil! COO~INC SYST!M

---

AQ1MMU1-cz- - ---- - ---

A,.~ co cbe operac1A1 *c*cua of cbe *.. rleACY cora coolJ.41 *Y*C***

To ***ure op*r*bll~cy of 1qulP91a1 r1qulr*' co rl90ve deca1 h1ac f roa cne core i.A *Uber ... r1uc1 or unaJ. 1twcfiov9 d.h&U.au *

• SpecU1cac1ou Saf*C% IA21CC1aa aacl Shucdovta Cool!!a Sz*c...

3.3.1 The reaccor *ball aoc be .a4e cric1cal, 1scep1 fol' low-C19f1racur1 plly1ua cue*, ul*** &U _of w followU& caMJ.cuu are aac:

a. Th* Stu cu& coaui.u aoc la** cbaa "0,000 pUou of vacer vtcta a boroa couaacracwa of ac leuc 1720 ppa nc uc *r* ma lOOO ,,. ac a c..,eranre uc l*** ~ 40*r.

/ DD 1111 AU four Sdac1 tajeccs.oa c..U ar o,.rule_ pr;:Lr1aac& co 11 Laue zoo P*1' nca a uu Uqa 1**411 of. l e u c ; 1Adla*

~ au a au.tma l***l. of - lMbu nca a bona couacrau.oa of ac lauc 17%0 ppa bac iaoc Ml'* U:.. 2000 ,,.. --

c. Ola* J.ow-pr***u* Sdecy tAjecci.Oa ,_, 1a.09erabl* oa 11cta bua *

• d.

Oa. bip*pr***ure S&facy tAjecc1n P1111f 1* operule oa ua bua.

Bou 11n&cdova tlaac 1xcbaqera alMl bou collfOGAC cooliAa !11ac 1xcaaa1era are operable.

f. P1p1q au .,ai.,ea 1Ull be operable co-pro-.1.de tvO.flow paw !roa ch* sm cull co ua pnau, coolJq .,.,**

I* All val*u. Pifilll aM iacarlocU .....s.ac9' nca ~

. c09t0-U UM& r~M co i ...ci.oa 4adq accUI&& cn41c1ou are

• b"*

operable.

b. tM Lo* fl*me W111 tajeccs.oa flow Coiicrol. ValYe CV-3006 1b&l.l lie Of***

.,..u.a aM UM.bu* (laf 1Ml.aciq cbe 11r *llfflJ) co pnveac clo~**

fte W117 lajeccua boc1l1 alo1or-of1ra114 uolacioa valve* 1b&ll.

1.

b* Of*M VS.cla u. *l*cUU ,...*

• diKouacced.

..,,1, co CM val** *COi' J. the S&lecy tajec110ta ~low val'fU C'l*3027 _. 3051 1Ull be op...t vi.ca U-3027 ... 3051 poai110u co .uacaLa cl* o,a.

Aa*deeac tlo. 7', LOl re~,..., LO, 1917

• tSf1215-0354-lll.04

3.3 FJ<!RG!NCT CCR! COOLINC STST!M (Coneinued)

Suit

!ha no'Mlal procedure for 1carcin1 che reactor i1, fir1c, co heac che primary cool&11c co near 0~1rac1n1 C*mtJ*racure by runn1n1 cha primary coolanc pump1. The reaccor 11 then made critical by Vichdrav1n1 concrol rod1 and dilucin1 boron in the primary cool&Ac. (l) Wich chi1 mode of 1carc-u,, th* en1r1y scored in ch* primary coolant durtn1 cha approach co cricicalicy 11 1ub1cancially equal co chac durtn1 power operacion and, cber1for1, all en11n1ered 1at1cy f eacur** &Ad auxiliary coolin1 1y1c ... are required co be fully operable. Durin1 lov-ttmp1racur1 phy1ic1 c11c1, char* 11 a ne,ligibl* aaounc of 1cor1d 1n1r11 in che pri&ary coolanc; ch1r1for1, &A accidenc C0111tarabl1 in 1ev1rtcy co ch* d111an b&1t1 accident ii noc po111bl1 &Ad cha en1in1er1d 1at1suard1' 1y1c1aa are noc required.

!he SilW tank contain* a minimua of 2,0,000 1alloll9 of vacar* .

concainin1 1720 PP*. boron. Thi1 i* 1ufUci1nc boron concanu*aciotl co provide a 5% shucdovn mar*in Vich all concrol rod* Vichdra'"l anct a nav core ac a C*mtJ*racure of 6o*r

• R1actn1 scaaa 1* provided co maincain che tank above 40*1 co prevent fr111in1. The l% boron (1720 Pl'8) solucion will noc pr1cipicac1 ouc above 32*r. The source of 1c11a durin1 normal plane operacion is excraccion 1u1a line in the turbine cycle.

~*

TI\1 limits for ch* ~af1cy inj1ccion can& prasaur~d volwa* assure che required aaounc of vacer injeccion durinc/an accidenc and are b***d on value* u1ect for cha accidenc anal~*** 3!he ainiaua

/1~-tet-inch level corr11,01ld1 co a volume of~ tc and' che mazimua

--~*a-inch level corr11p01ld1 co a volume of Hff h .

3 .

tr:o/ . I. 7'*!!------~

Prior co che time cbe rlaccor 1* brouabc critical, *the-valvin1 of*

cha 1alecy uajeccton 111c.. maac be checkect ~or correcc aligrmenc and apprQfriace valvea lockect. Since ch* 1ysc* 11 u1ecl for sbucdown coolinl* che valvinc vill be chana*d and mu1c be pro,arly alip9' prior co scare-up of ch* naccor.

The o,eraltle 1cacu1 of the variou* 1y*c... and C011f01l*DCI i i co be d1mOD1cracld by periodic t11c1. A l*ra* craccion of th***

c11cs vill be performed while che reaccor i i operacinc in cha paver re*** If a comp01leac 11 foud co b* iaoperaltle, ic vtll be po11ibl* in aa1c c..** co ef f ecc repair* and reacore cha sy1cea co full 01t*rabilicy vtchua a re1aciv*l1 abort ctme. For a 1in1l* COllf01l*DC co be inoperable do** noc aecace cbe abilicy of ch* 1y1c* co perfona Ua funccion, lnac ic re4uce1 che

• redundancy provided in ch* reaccor de1i.. and cbereby liaic1 ch*

Aandunc Mo. 117 Ma.....eT 14, 1911 TSI0119-0002-lll.04

J.J El'f!'RC!NCT COR! COOtING SYST!M Ba*i* (continued) de9Dtl8Crace that che mazimwa fuel clad C*llll'*rature* that could occur over the break size spectrum are well belov th* melt1n*

c..,.racure of zirconiwa (3Joo*r>.

Malfuncci01t of che Lov P?'eHure Satecy Injection Flov conC?'ol valve could defeat the Lov P?'essure Injection feacure of the ECCS; therefore, ic i1 disabled in che 'open' mode (by 11ol*tin1 the air supply) durin1 plane operaci01t. This action assure*

tbac tc vill noc block flov dur1D1 Satecy Injection.

• Th* inadv*rtn~ ~a.Uc d' _,. oaa. ot ~** Sa8'y. Injection boccl* isolation valvea in conjut1etion vitb a t.OCA haa not been analyzed. To provide a11uranc* thac chi* vtll not occur, ch*** valve* are electrically locked open by a key svitch in che c01ttrol room. In addition, prior to critical the valves are checked o~en, and chen the 480 volt breaker* are opened.

Thus, a failure of a breaker and a lvitch are required for any

.t of ch* valve* to clo***

Inaurin1 both RPSI pum,1 are inoperable vllla tbe PCS te91'*racure 11 < 26o*r or the shutdown coolinl 11olacion valv** are open eliainat** PCS _.., add1t101t1 due to 1.nadvercenc HPSI pum, stares.

Both &PSI PUll1>>* scartiDS in conjunction vith a char11D1/letdova imbalance may cau** lOCFl.50 Appendts G liait* to be ezceeded when the PCS. tamperacur* 1* < 26o*r. When the PCS cea,eracure i* > 43o*r, ch* presaurizer safety valve* ensure chat ch* PCS preimur* will noc exceed lOCFl.50 AppeD.dtz G.

The requireaenc co have bocb RPSI tt>llina operable above 32.5*r provide* added aasurance chat ch* ef f ect1 of a LOCA occurins under LTOP condition* would be *iti1aced. If a LOCA occurs when

.. .;o.. the pri&ary sy1c .. t1111t*ratur1 1* 1111 than or equal to 32.5*r, th* pr11aur* voald drop to the lev*l viler* lov pr11aur1 satety 1njec:cioa ca prnenc cor1 daaa** Th*r*fore, vtlea tb* PCS t1aperacure 1* >26o*r alMI <32,*r operactoa of th* HPSI *Y*t ..

would noc c:auae-tb* 1ocrua' Appeuts G Uaits to be esc:1ed1d nor 1* &PSI ey1c.. operat1ota c1c:111ary t~ cor* cool1D1.

8'lt ,...a t**Cinl with the HPSI PU11f 8&1lual dischar1* valve cloa.I ia peraict1d 11Dc1 th* clo1ed valve elia1Dat11 th*

po111*111cy of. pap uat1q b*inl the caue ot a ..., addit1ou co the PCS.

Ref erenc:e1

. ti- I R.:r..G~J11i<. {c.PC~ ., .f/.,,c/,,d ~~ I

• 1(!j~

' i . (

. j

.I

?nu

.,,t,~~.*

• !~

' }.; !,1 .ii:.

TABLE 4.1.2 Mlniaum Frequencies for Checks, Callbratl0na and.Testing of Engineered Safety Feature Inatru11ent~tlon Controls (Contd)

Survelllance OlanneJ. Deaci"lptlon Punctlon Frequency SurveU lance Method

13. Safety Injection Tanlt Level ** Oleclt s a. Verify that level and prea.U:re lndlcatlon la and Preaaure Inatnmenta between independent blah blp/low alarae for leve 1 and preHure. ~!, .

b. Callbrate R b. Known preHure and dlfferend-1 pressure

c. C.A4e. k .R c.

f!!ed .to pressure and. lev~i

aenaora.

µ~.,/ 4..4~ - "'~ ':tfr~/~/ 4-/o.,..,,r

14. Borlc Acld Tank Level SWltchea a. Teat R a. PU8p tant be law law*lffel a.* n point to /

verify awltch operation. '!:.:'.

15. Borlc Acld ileat Tracing Syat* a. Oaeclt D a. Observe temperature recorde*a for proper readlnga.

,i!'

16. Haln Stea Isolation Valve a. Qaeclt s a. Compare four independent pr!-~ure lndlcatlon*.

Clrculta

(.

b. Teat(l) R b. Signal to *ter relay adju**ed with teat device to verify MSIV ctn:ult logic~

17. SIRW Tank Temperature ** Oaeclt M a * ~re independent tempera~re readouts.

Indlcatlon and Alara* . ~

b. Callbrate R b. ltnoww:t realatance applied to tndlcatlng loop.

j *.

18.

• Low-Pressure Safety Injection a. Oaeclt p a. Obaer;ve valve l* open with air supply laolated.

Flow Control Valve CV-3006

'II' t*'I:\

19. Safety Injection Bottle a. Oleclt p a. Ensure each valve opeo by ~rvtna valve Isolation Valve* r:*ltlon indication and val " ltMlf. Dien ock,open brealtera and contlOl pGIMI' ltay awltchea.

20. Safety Injection Mlniflow a. Oleclt p a. Verify valvee open and 118*,.,27 and J056 poaltloned Valve* CV-3027, 3056 to .. intaln tbea open.

RODS1 (l)Callbratlon of the aenaora la perfor11ed during callbratlon of Itea 5(b), Table 4.1.1.

(2)All 110nthly teats will be done on only one channel at a tllle to prevent protection ayate11 actuation.

(l)Callbratlon of the aenaora la perforaed durlng calibration of Item 7(b), Table 4.1.1.

(4)Requlred when PCS la > 1500 pela.

4-8 Amendment No. H, U, tft, - i

• H111 eh i!~1 J.990 TSP0289-0025-NL04

.. ':i

-- - -----. ------------- --- ------~-

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ATTACHMENT 3 Consumers Power-Company Pali sades Pl ant Docket 50-255 SAFETY "INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC NO 76806) REVISION 2 A STA~DARD REVIEW PLAN CHAPTER 15 DISPOSITION OF EVENTS REVIEW FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS ON PALISADES SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVELS December 7, 1990 2 Pages

ADVANCED MJCLSAR FIJS.S CORPORATION April 11 , 1990 HGS:117:90 Mr. R. J. Gerling Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Plant 2nao Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043

Subject:

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN CHAPTER 15 DISPOSmON OF EVENTS REVIEW FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS ON PALISADES SAFETY INJECTION TANK LIOUIO LEVELS

**o.* **.;;iv

Reference:

1) ANF (H. G. Shaw) Proposal ANF;CP-2021~ to R.. .'J; Gerlin' (CPCo),

dated March 21, 1990. * -

2) CPCo Letter (R. J. Gerling) to ANF (H. G. Shaw), dated March 27, 1990.

3) ANF-88-107, Revision 1, PALISADES LARGE BREAK LOCA/ECCS ANALYSIS WITH INCREASED RADIAL PEAKING, February 1990..

An evaluation of the effects of proposed changes to Technical Specification limits on Palisades Safety Injection Tank (SIT) levels (174 and 202 inches, respectively,* for minimum arid maximum allowed SIT levels) has been completed. This work was performed per the Reference 1 proposal, as authorized by Reference 2. The evaluation included a Standard Review Plan Chapter 15 Disposition of Events Review for those changes. The results of the review demonstrate that no additional analyles are required due to the SIT levet limit changes.

The only events which are potentially affected by SIT level changes are Event Classification 15.6:

Decreases in Reactor Coolant lnv~ntory. The large break toss of coolant transient (LBLOCA) is the only Classification 15.6 Event which will completely drain the SITs, so it is the only event which could be affected by the changes in SIT levet limits.

The reference LSLOCA/ECCS analysis reported in ANF-88-107 (Ref. 3) indicates that flow from the intact loop Safety Injection Tanks, SIT lines, and cold legs keeps the downcomer full for about 30 seconds after the peak cladding temperature (PCT) is reached. Reduction of the minimum SIT levet to 174 Inches does not cause the downcomer levet to faH prior to the time that

Mr. R. J. Gertlng HGS:117:90 April 11 , 1990

__ e_a.g§t_.2 ___. - --- ----- -------------- -~ --- - ---- --

PCT is reached, so there is no impact on either downcomer head or PCT for the transient.

Increasing the maximum allowed SIT level to 202 inches has no impact on the LBLOCA analysis, because the length of SIT flow time would be extended beyond the time in the limiting analysis.

These conclusions apply to all break sizes reported in Reference 3. The PCT of 2114°F reported in Reference 3 for the limiting break size and axial power shape remains bounding for the proposed TechnicaJ Specification changes to SIT level limits.

• ~

- '.w

• Very truly yours,

~~r-H. G. Shaw Contract Administrator.

/skm

... ;i~,

• ~

..,..,,~

\

~ .

- - - --- --- - - - ---- -- - - - - - - *-- -- -- ----- -~- --- -- . -- - . - ---- - --- ------ ~ ---- --- -- - - - --- --------- ----

ATTACHMENT 4 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL (TAC NO. 76806) REVISION 2 ANF REPORT ANF 88-107, REVISION l December 7, 1990