ML18057A432

Proposed Tech Specs Allowing Use of Both Anfp DNB Correlation & Xnb DNB Correction to Establish New Reactor Protective Sys Setpoints & New Limiting Conditions for Operation of Cycle 9 Fuel

ML18057A432
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	08/31/1990
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18057A433	List: ML18057A432 ML18066A738
References
NUDOCS 9009060047
Download: ML18057A432 (12)

Text

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OC0890-0403-NL02 ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE CHANGES August 31, 1990 3 Pages

2.0

-2.1-SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS SAFETY LIMITS- - REACTOR.CORE Applicability This specification applies when the reactor is in hot standby condition and power operation condition.

Objective To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and prevent the release of significant amounts of fission products to the primary coolant.

Specifications The MDNBR of the reactor core shall be maintained greater than or equal to the DNB correlation safety limit.

Basis To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and prevent fission product release, it is necessary to prevent overheating of the cladding under normal operating conditions.

This is accomplished by operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, wherein the heat transfer coefficient is large enough so that the clad surface temperature is only slightly greater than the coolant temperature.

The upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime il? termed "departure from nucleate boiling" (DNB).

At this point, there is a sharp reduction of the heat transfer coefficient, which would result in high-cladding temperatures and the possibility of cladding failure.

Although DNB is not an observable parameter during reactor operation, the observable parameters of thermal power, primary coolant flow, temperature and I

pressure, can be related to DNB through the use of a DNB I

Correlation.

DNB Correlations have been developed to predict I

DNB and the location of DNB for axially uniform and nonuniform heat flux distributions.

The local DNB ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the actual heat flux, is indicative of the margin to DNB.

The minimum value of the DNBR, during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to the DNB correlation safety limit.

A DNBR equal to the DNB correlation safety limit I

corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level that I

2-1 Amendment No. ttS TSP0890-0403-NL02

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

- REACTOR CORE (Contd)

DNB will not occur which is considered an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

I The reactor protective system is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions for primary'coolant system temperature, pressure and thermal power level that would result in a DNBR of less than the DNB correlation safety limit.

The DNB correlations I used in the Palisades safety analysis are listed in the following table.

I References Name Safety Limit Correlation Applicability XNB ANFP 1.17 1.154 References (1)

XN-NF-62l(P)(A), Rev 1 (2)

XN-NF-709 (3)

Updated FSAR, Section 14.1.

(4)

ANF-1224 (P) (A), May 1989 (5)

ANF-89-192 (P), January 1990 2-2 TSP0890-0403-NL02 1

2 4

5 Amendment No. it, ai, 11S I

I I

I I

I I

I

e 3.1 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM (contd)

Basis (Contd)

The FSAR-safety analysis was performed assuming four primary coolant pumps were operating for accidents that occur during reactor operation.

Therefore, reactor startup above hot shutdown is not permitted unless all four primary coolant pumps are operating.

Operation with three primary coolant pumps is permitted for a limited time to allow the restart of a stopped pump or for reactor internals vibration monitoring and testing.

Requiring the plant to be in hot shutdown with the reactor tripped from the C-06 panel, opening the 42-01 and 42-02 circuit breakers, assures an inadvertent rod bank withdrawal will not be initiated by the control room operator.

Both steam generators are required to be operable whenever the temperature of the primary coolant is greater than the design temperature of the shutdown cooling system to assure a redundant h~ar removal system for the reactor.

Calculations have been performed to demonstrate that a pressure differential of 1380 psi(3) can be withstood by a tube uniformily thinned to 36% of its original nominal wall thickness (64% degradation), while maintaining:

(1)

A factor of safety of three between the actual pressure differential and the pressure differential required to cause bursting.

(2)

Stresses within the yield stress for Inconel 600 at operating temperature.

(3)

Acceptable stresses during accident conditions.

Secondary side hydrostatic and leak testing requirements are consistent with ASME BPV Section XI (1971).

The differential maintains stresses in the steam generator tube walls within code allowable stresses.

The minimum temperature of 100°F for pressurizing the steam generator secondary side is set by the NDTT of the manway cover of+ 40°F.

The transient analyses were perfortneg assuming a vessel flow at hot zero power (532°F) of 124.3 x 10 lb/hr minus 6% of account

,for flow measurement uncertainty and core flow bypass.

A DNB analysis was performed in a parametric fashion to determine the core inlet temperature as a function of pressure and flow for which the minimum DNBR is equal to the DNB correlation safety limit.

I This analysis includes the following uncertainties and allowances:

2% of rated power for power 3-2 Amendment No Z0, jt, ttS, tit TSP0890-0403-NL02

OC0890-0403-NL02 ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 MARKED UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE CHANGES August 31, 1990 3 Pages

0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS~ REACTOR CORE Applicability This specification applies when the reactor is in hot standby condition and power operation condition.

Objective To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and prevent the release of significant amounts of fission products to the primary coolant.

Specifications The MDNBR of the reactor core shall be maintained greater than or equal to\\ l. 17.

-rAe.. DNB C.or1~/a7/o'N.SQ.A~ AMJ~T Basis

'cl' 7 To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and prevent fission product release, it is necessary to prevent overheating of the

~

cladding under normal operating conditions.

This is accomplished by.

operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, whereitr the heat transfer coefficient is large enough so that the clad surface temperature is/only slightly greater than the coolant temperature.

/

The upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime is termed "departure from nucleate boiling" iDNB).

At this point, there is a sharp reduction of the heat transfer coefficient, which would result in high-cladding temperatures and the possibility of cladding failure.

Although DNB is not an observable parameter during reactor operation, the observable parameters of thermal power, primary coolant flow, temperature and

~

I pressure, can be related to DNB through the use of th* JalB1DNB I

Correlation *.iil!FS

?hi XNI PNB Correl~tio~~~'ien develo';ed to predict I

DNB and the location of DNB for axially uniform and nonuniform heat flux distributions~ The local DNB ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the actual heat flux, is indicative of the margin to DNB.

The minimum value of the DNBI, during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited tod:::;::t:l..

AD of:

I

..:b:r1 corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% conf i ence I

TSP1088-0181-NL04 T-Ae DNB C.oJ-;-11/07/t)N s ti(} ht //:n,/r,

~ivo/ /o -1"/J~

.7}/Y.8 ~o;u/4-;;,.,, s'flelf h~,-r 2-1 Amendment No. -H -1ievember 15, 1988

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

- REACTOR CORE (Contd)

DNB will not-occur which is considered an appropriate margin to DNB

f' for all operating conditions.~

/

The reactor protective system is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions for primary coolant system temperature, pressure and thermal power level that would result in a DNBR of less than

~

'th* nm BNB c:oz relation has been ene'W!l ta References (1)

XN-NF-62l(P)(A), Rev 1 (2)

XN-NF-709 (3)

Updated FSAR, Section 14.1.

{'I) A/VF-1-2 :J. ~ {P )/!I}, />IQ&! 19"9

(.5) A.NF-i9 - _1qz (!='),, ;ro.n~7 1990 I

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Amendment No. Jt, , -H-8--

-November lS, 1988 I

I

3. 1

?RIMARY CO~T SYSTEM (contd)

. 3.SiS (Contd)

The FSAR safety analysis was performed assuming fo.ur primary coolant pumps were operating for accidents that occur during reactor operation.

Therefore, reactor startup above hot shutdown is not permitted unless all four primary coolant pumps are operating.

Operation with three primary coolant pumps is permitted for a limited time to allow the restart of a stopped pump or for reactor i:

~rnals vibration monitoring and testing.

Requiring :~e plant to be in hot shutdown with the reactor tripped from the C-06 panel, opening the 42-01 and 42-02 circuit breakers, assures an inadvertent rod bank withdrawal will not be initiated by the control room operator.

Both steam generators are required to be operable whenever the temperature of the primary coolant is greater than the design temperature of the shutdown cooling system to assure a redundant hear removal system for the reactor.

Calculations have been performed to demonstrate that a pressure differential of 1380 psi(3) can be withstood by a tube uniformily thinned to 36% of its original nominal wall thickness (64% degradation), while maintaining:

(1)

A factor of safety of three between the actual pressure differential and the pressure differential required to cause bursting.

(2)

Stresses within the yield stress for Inconel 600 at operating temperature.

(3)

Acceptable stiesses during accident conditions.

Secondary side hydrostatic and leak testing requirements are consistent with ASME BPV Section XI (1971).

The differential maintains stresses in the steam generator tube walls within code allowable stresses.

The minimum temperature of 100°F for pressurizing the steam generator secondary side is set by the ND'IT of the manway cover

~

of+ 40°F.

The transient analyses were perf ormeg assuming a vessel flow at hot zero power (532°F) of 124.3 x 10 lb/hr minus 6% of account for flow measurement uncertainty and core flow bypass.

A DNB analysis was performed in a parametric fashion to determine the core inlet temperature as* a function of pressure and flow for which the minimum DNBR is equal to ~. This analvsis includes the

/

following uncertainties au'd allowa~~s: 2% of rated. power for power

\\-1-Ae D/Y 8 c. orr~l°'TiV:.,

so/ e l'f ;,;;,,, /r.

3-2 Amendment No 2~. $1, 111,..+3-+-

A.p I' 11 2 6 * -tt'16 TSP0889-0101-MD01-NL04

OC0890-0403-NL02 ATTACHMENT 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PROPRIETARY ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUELS CORPORATION REPORT ANF-192(P), JANUARY 1990 August 31, 1990 1-3 page Affidavit 1-36 Page Report

STATE OF WASHINGTON COUNTY OF BENTON SS.

AFFIDAVIT I, R. A. Copeland being duly sworn, hereby say and depose:

1. I am Manager, Reload Licensing, for Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, ("ANF"),

and as such I am authorized to execute this Affidavit.

2. I am familiar with ANF's detailed document control system and policies which govern the protection and control of information.

3. I am familiar with the topical report ANF-89-192(P) entitled "Justification of the ANFP DNB Correlation for High Thermal Performance Fuel in the Palisades Reactor," referred to as "Document." lnforniation contained in this Document has been classified by ANF as proprietary in accordance with the control system and policies established by ANF for the control and protection of information.

4. The Document contains information of a proprietary and confidential nature and is of the type customarily held in confidence by ANF an.d not made available to the public. Based on my experience, I am aware that other companies regard information of the kind contained in the Document as proprietary and confidential.

5. The Document has been made available to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in confidence, with the request that the information contained in the Document will not be disclosed or divulged.

6. The Document contains information which is vital to a competitive advantage of ANF and would be helpfui to competitors of ANF when competing with ANF..

AFFIDAVIT Page 2

7. The information contained in the Document is considered to be proprietary by ANF because it reveals certain distinguishing aspects of ANF thermal hydraulic analysis methodology which secure competitive advantage to ANF for fuel design optimization and marketability, and includes information utilized by ANF in its business which affords ANF an opportunity to obtain a competitive advantage over its competitors who do not or may not know or use the information contained in the Document.

8. The disclosure of the proprietary information contained in the Document to a competitor would permit the competitor to reduce its expenditure of money and manpower and to improve its competitive position by giving it valuable insights into ANF thermal hydraulic analysis methodology and would result in substantial harm to the competitive position of ANF.

9. The Document contains proprietary information which is held in confidence by ANF and is not available in public sources.

10. In accordance with AN F's policies governing the protection and control of information, proprietary information contained in the Document has been made available, on a limited basis, to others outside ANF only as required and under suitable agreement providing for nondisclosure and limited use of the information.

11. ANF policy requires that proprietary information be kept in a secured file or area and distributed on a need-to-know basis.

12. Information in this Document provides insight into ANF thermal hydraulic analysis methodology developed by ANF. ANF has invested significant resources in developing the methodology as well as the strategy for this application. Assuming a competitor had available

AFFIDAVIT Page 3 the same background data and incentives as ANF, the competitor might, at a minimum, develop the information for the same expenditure of manpower and money as ANF.

THAT the statements made hereinabove are, to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, truthful and complete.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

SUBSCRIBED before me this ~ o 'fA-_.

day of August

'1990.

Susan K. McCoy NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF WASHINGTO MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 1/10/92