ML18051B033

Rept to Acrs,Cpc of Michigan Palisades Plant

ML18051B033
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	08/26/1969
From:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML18051B032	List: ML18051B031 ML18051B033
References
NUDOCS 8408200184
Download: ML18051B033 (25)

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Docket No. 50-255 August ?-6, 1969 Report to ACRS CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY OF MICHIGAN PALISADES PLANT U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Division of Reactor Ltcensing 8408200184 840808 PDR ADOCK 05000255 P

PDR

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t ABSTRACT The applicant has proposed to omit the reactor thermal shield from the Palisades facility. After reviewing all factors which could be in-

~;--fluenced by omission of the thermal shield, we have concluded that we have no objection to the applicant's proposal.

The decision on whether post-accident iodine cleanup equipment is required in the Palisades Plant was deferred during the construction permit review to enable collection of onsite meteorology data.

We and our consultants have reviewed the meteorology data obtained.

Using the atmospheric diffusion factor which we think is justified by these data, we calculate off site doses in excess of Part 100 guideline values and have concluded that some form of iodine cleanup equipment must be provided in the Palisades Plant.

• (Q)JFIFilCilAlL 1UJ§IE <O>WlL V

INTRODUCTION This report on the Consumers Power Company of Michigan, Palisades Plant presents to the Committee a discussion of two subjects to be resolved in connection with the Committee's operating license review of this facility.

The first subject pertains to the applicant's proposed omission of the* reactor thermal shield.

An early indication of whether or not the thermal shield can be omitted is desired since the reactor internals are scheduled to be installed in the very near future.

The second subject per-tains to the. need for a post-accident iodine cleanup system.

A final d*ecision on this matter is desired as soon as possible so that the applicant 1can make firm plans to order long lead-time equipment, should this be necessary.

(Q)JFIFilCilAIL lUJ§IE (Q)MIL 1f

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1.0 PROPOSED OMISSION OF THE REACTOR THERMAL SHIELD The applicant's proposal to omit the reactor thermal shield from the

--Pa*lisades facility is set forth in Amendment No. 13 to the application, along with a discussion of each of the~~faci:ors which could be influenced by omission of the thermal shield.

Additional information on this subject was obtained at an ACRS Subcommittee meeting at the plant site on July 31, 1969, and at a meeting with the applicant on August 15, 1969.

Certain critical information* obtained at the latter meeting _*will be submitted in an amend-ment to the application prior to the September ACRS meeting.

The applicant's decision to omit the thermal shield from the Palisades design is an outgrow.th of a Combustion Engineering (CE) study to determine what could be' done if difficulties due to excessive vibration should be experienced ~n the Palisades reactor.

Although difficulty_ was not expected, advance consideration was given because thermal shield vibration has been experienced in several operating PWRs.

If vibration were experienced, the preferred solution identified by the applicant for the Palisades reactor, as was the case for two PWRs which actually experienced such problems* w~uld be to remove the reactor thermal shield.

This naturally raised the question of whether 'it is advisable to install the thermal shield in the first place.

On the basis of this analysis, the applicant concluded that the thermal shield is not a necessary component in the Palisades reactor and that not installing it actually leads to a more satisfactory overall reactor design.

AEC Safety Review (and Supplements I, II and III, thereto) of the Proposed Repair and Modification of the SENA and SELNI Reactor Internals, February 28, 1969.

(Q)JFJFilCCilAIL lU§JE (Q)JNIL Y The words "not installing" are used deliberately because the thermal shield for the Palisades reactor has been completely fabricated and is cur-rently located on the reactor floor within the containment building, awaiting a final decision on whether it is to be installed or not.

If not, it will have to be cut up in order to remove it from the containment building *

(Q)JFIFilCilAlL UJ§IE <<JJNIL 1f

(Q)~CCilAlL UJ§IE (Q)NJL Y

• A.

Reactor Vessel Irradiation Effects The term "thermal shield" as used today is a misnomer.

It was originally used because this shield was p~ovided primarily for the purpose of reducing thermal stresses in'.the walls of the reactor vessel due to gamma heating.

Thermal stresses due to gamma heating are relatively unimportant in current large water power reactors, and the principal function of the thermal shield is to minimize damage to the reactor vessel material due to fast neutron irrad,iation.

The reactor vendor for the Palisades Plant, Combustion Engineering (CE) has calculated the in~egrated fast neutron flux (E> 1 Mev) over the 40 year design life of the vessel without the thermal ~hield to be 3.64 x 10 19 nvt.

It is interesting to note that the comparable value calculated by Westinghouse for the recently approved Ginna plant with a thermal shield is 3.7 x 1019 nvt.

We have reviewed in considerable detail the calculational technique used by CE, which utilizes the P3MG1 code in cylindrical geometry, using 55 neutron energy groups, followed by a point-kernel integration to correct for power distribution and non-cylindrical geometric effects (e.g. corner elements).

The calculational technique appears to us to be at least as good as that currently being used by the other major reactor vendors.

The mesh spacing used 'for the point-kernel computation is quite fine (.--' 1 cm) in the important regions near the core boundary.

CE has checked the calculation technique against experimental fluence measurements in the Dresden, Shippingport

'(Q)lFJFilCCilAlL lU§IE (Q)NlL Y

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and Yankee-Rowe reactors, (page II-I of Amendment 13).

The calculations show good agreement with these experimental results and indications are that the calculational technique gives conservative results (higher than measured fluence) by from 4 to 10%.

It is our present opinion that the CE calculational technique provides results within + 30% of the true fluence.

To determine the increase in the nil ductility transition temperature (NDTT) associated with this fluence, CE uses a design curve which appears to be an envelope of "all available." data for ASTM type A302B, A302B Modified and A533B steels irradiated at 550°F.

Most of the experimental data were obtained by NRL.

The Palisades vessel materi~l.is A302B - Modified, which is the termi-nology that was used for A533B material before the ASTM issued the A533B specification.

Essentially the only difference between A302B and A302B -

Modified or A533B material is** the addition of 0.40 to 0,70% nickel to improve the impact properties of the material.

There are, however, data that indicate "that the impact properties of irradiated A302B Modified or A533B material can be either better or worse than A302B material, depending upon the amount of residual copper in the material.

For the amount of copper in the Palisades vessel (0.25% max), t;hese data indicate that the impact properties of the material will be close to, but still within.the envelope of the CE design curve.

The unirradiated NDTT of the plate material used in the beltline region of the Palisades vessel was determined by drop weight tests to be a maximum of -30°F.

The applicant maintains that this value for the plate material is also representative of weld metal and the heat-affected-zone (RAZ).

This is A

CO>~IlCCilAJL lU§IE COJNIL Y f based on comparision of Charpy impact test results at +10°F on plate, weld and HAZ materials, obtained when the welds used in the Palisades vessel were qualified.

This comparision shows that the unirradiated impact properties of weld and HAZ metal *are at least as good,_as.those of plate material.

This deduction may not be valid in all cases.

The potential variance should not, however be a significant consideration in this case because the Pal.isades materials surveillance progr.am includes specimens of each of these materials, so that the item of real interest, the irradiated impact properties of each type, will be determined periodically.

In addition, the applicant informed us that unirradiated Charpy specimens of each type of material (plate, weld and HAZ) are being stored and will be tested along with the first irra-diated specimens.

The following.table presents a summary of the initial NDTT, NDTT shift and NDTT at end-of-life (EOL)*predicted by the applicant with and without the thermal shield in place.

Note that because of the 70°F difference between the initial NDTT assumed in the PSAR and subsequently measured values on Palisades vessel material, the EOL NDTT with the thermal shield indicated in.

the PSAR is higher than the current value without the shield.

With Thermal With Thermal Without Thermal

• Shield Shield Shield (PSAR Values)

(current values)

(current values)

Max Fluence 1.9 x lo-19n.vt 1.9 x lo-19nvt 3.64 x lo-19nvt Initial NDTT

• +40°F *

-30°F

-30°F NDTT Shift 212°F **

220°F 262°F NDTT (EOL) 252°F 190°F 232°F

• An assumed, conservative value for early design (PSAR) purposes.

• • From an earlier design curve, The current curve is based on additional experimental data obtained since the PSAR.

(Q)JFFilCCilAIL lU§IE (())NIL Y The initial NDTT +60°F and the predicted NDTT shift curve di_scussed above are used to establish the initial pressure-temperature limits for pri-mary coolant system operation.

These limits will be revised, as necessary, when data from the materials surveillance program become available. It is these pressure-temperature operating limits and the minimum allowable impact properties to preclude failure of the vessel due to thermal shock that will determine if and when the vessel must be annealed.

This consideration is discussed further below.

B.

Surveillance Program The materials surveillance program proposed for the Palisades Plant as described in the FSAR (pages 4-39), will not be changed whether the thermal shield is** omitted or *not.

We have reviewed this program and found that it meets or exceeds all our current requirements.

The program includes 6 vessel capsules (we-currently require a minimum of *5 for this type of plant) plus 2 accelerated exposure and 2 thermal-exposure-only capsules (we have no require-ments for such specimens).

The entire program is in. accordance with ASTM E-185-66, "Recommended Practice For Surveillance Tests on-Structural Materials in Nuclear Reactors".

The exposure locat~ons and number and type of specimens in each capsule are, in our opinion, satisfactory.

The vessel capsul~s are retained within baskets. which are welded directly to the vessel wall.

We have determined that sufficient "archive" material (extra material from which the vessel was

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fabricated) is being retained to enable preparing sufficient speci~ens to load at least two additional capsules.

The proposed specimen withdrawal schedule appears reasonable, and the six capsules provide sufficient specimens for at least one, and possibly two annealings.

C.

Vessel Annealing

. Based on the properties of the reactor vessel material (type 302-B Modified steel) and the calculated *neutron fluence at the vessel wall, the applicant b~lieves that the reactor vessel material will perform adequately for the life of the plant (40 years) with the thermal shield removed, How-ever, if irradiation damage (em~rittlement) should reach a level which would inhibit or prevent continued operation of the reactor, the applicant considers in-place annealing.of the Palisades reactor vessel as a possible means of restoring ductility.

Although a step-by-step procedure has not been developed, the logistics and general mechanical problems related to in-place annealing have been con-sidered.

Based on these considerations, the results from the in-place anneal of the SM-lA vessel, and the results from experiments conducted by the U.S.

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL-M-1753), the applicant has concluded that th"e Palisades reactor vessel could be annealed in plac~ using pump heat, at a temperature of about 650°F.

Experimental data from tests using type A-302-B Modified steel, irradiated at 550°F to a fast fluence of 1 x 1019 and annealed at 640° to 650°F for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br />, show that a recovery of 30% to 50% of the original properties is possible. (NRL-M-1753)

. (Q)lFlFilCCilAIL UJ§IE (Q)NIL Y

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The applicant would use the surveillance specimens to determine in advance when damage to the vessel material would reach a level requiring t~e vessel to be annealed.

Surveillance specimens would also be used to establish the correct annealing time and temperature as well as the effectiveness of the actual anneal of the vessel.

We agree with th~ appli6ant that an in-place anneal of the reactor vessel could be performed if this should ever become necessary.

D.

Effect on Reactor Vessel Stress and Primary Shield Heating Radiatioh heating in the reactor..vessel wall, with and without the thermal shield, has been reviewed.

The applicant calculates a maximum temperature difference; radially.thorugh the wall or axially along the wall in the core region, of less than 5°F with the thermal shield and less than 20°F without the thermal shield. *The effect of this temperature gradient on reactor vessel stresses has been evaluated and the combined effects including cyclic stresses are well within stress intensity and fatigue limits with or without the ther-mal shield installed.

Removal of the thermal shield increases the heat deposited in the primary concrete shield walls su.rrounding the reactor* vessel.

The applicant calcu-lates a heat load to the primary s~ield of *120,000 Btufhr for normal plant operation with the thermal shield, and 126,000Btu/hr without the thermal shield.

Ample capacity (180, 000 Btu/hr) has been provided.in the primary shield cooling system to accommodate the relatively small increase in heat load associated with onissiori of the thermal shield.

(Q)lFIFil<CilAlL UJ§IE (Q)NlL Y

. E.

Hydraulic Effects and Vibration Monitoring The removal of the thermal shield from the reactor vessel results in an increase in the free flow area in the annular downcomer formed by the vessel wall and the core support barrel.

This:_J:~s.i:ease in flow area Cr-' 44%_) will result in a corresponding decrease in flow velocity.

Based on the results fron a number of flow model test configurations, the applicant states that the flow distribution skirt previously added to the Palisades design tends to correct any flow maldistribution in the annular flow region. ~Tests are scheduled, using an air flow model of the Palisades design with the flow distribution skirt, to confirm that removing the thermal shield will not adversely affect core flow distribution.

The appl'icant's analysis shows that removal of the thermal shield has a negligible ~ffect on the. natural frequency of the core support barrel system, and consequently, the system with or without the thermal shield should have similar response to similar excitations.

The removal of the thermal shield, however, should reduce the magnitude of the excitation by-reducing the flow velocity and should eliminate the possibility of additional forces beini trans-mitted to the core barrel by the thermal shield as the result of either forced or self-excited vibratory motions.

A preoperational test p~ogram ~s planned to detect possible vibration of the reactor vessel internals prior to reactor startup.

The proposed vibra-tion measurement program without the thermal shield installed is a modification (Q)IFJFilCCilAIL UJ§lE (Q)JMIL Y of the applicant's original program and is not a result of removing the thermal shield.

Eight uniaxial accelerometers will be located on the core support barrel (5 at the inlet nozzle elevation and 3 at the lower snubber elevation) to detect "ringn and cantilever motion of the barrel and to provide information on dominant excitation and natural frequencies of the core barrel structure.

Test runs will be made with the plant under hot and cold conditions both before and after fuel loading.

The data will be analyzed and a correlation between experimental and analytica~ results will be determined.

The proposed instrumentation will not be available following the start of normal plant operation.

The proposed vibration mo~~toring program lacks one significant element ~

the ability to monitor for changes which might occur during the life of the

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plant.

We have concluded that the vibration monitoring program is essentially independent of the present question on removing the thermat shield and need not be resolved now.

Howevert we do plan to determine to what extent the applicant's program should be augmented to include provisions for Jl!.Onitoring the prima-ry coolant system for changes in its characteristic vibra-tions during the life of the plant.

F.

Effect on Potential *consequences of Accidents In reviewing the possible effects that removing the thermal shield might have on the potential consequences of accidentst the loss-of-coolant accident was identified as' the only one in which there might be significant effects.

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As previously discussed,'. removing the thermal shield will increase the irradiation damage to the material of the reactor vessel wall.

The effect of this damage as related to the operation of the emergency core cooling system

....: ~-,;...--- -... _ -

must be considered.

The applicant has r:~jEe.~~~- this effect and based on the Combustion Engineering thermal transient--fracture mechanics analysis, con-cludes that for a fast fluence in the range of 3.5 to 4.0 x l019n/cm2, a crack depth of 30% to 40% of the wall thickness can be tolerated, concurrent with ECCS operation, without propagation of the crack through ~he vessel wall.

Our review.of this thermal transient and its effect on the reactor vessel wall is still in progress.

Developments in this area, as presented by all reactor manufacturers, are still being evaluated.

We have determined, however,

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that since means have been provided for early detection of irradiation damage to the reactor vessel material, the-effect of removing the thermal shield as related to the potential consequences of the LOCA is acceptable.

The applicant has also reviewed the maximum pressure differences and resulting stresses on critical reactor internals which are _a_ssociated with the LOCA.

Calculations show a slight increase in the pressure differentials (O to<. 20%) as a result of removing the thermal shield.

We have concluded that_ the slight increase in pressure differential calculated for the reactor vessel internals will not have a significant effect on the potential conse-quences associated with this accident.

(Q)JFJFilCCilAJL U§JE (Q)NJL 11' G.

Summary - Conclusion Analytical predictions indicate that the Palisades vessel can ~perate for the full plant lifetime without the thermal shield in place and not experi-ence irradiation effects that would be likely to jeopardize its safety.

A satisfactory material surveillance program will provide experimental data on actual vessel material which will confirm or deny this prediction.

In the event.results from this surveillance program indicate irradiation effects are more severe than those predicted, the vessel can be annealed to correct materials properties sufficiently to enable continued safe operation. Omi$Sion of the thermal shield has the beneficial effect of reducing the possibility of excessive vibration of reactor vessel internals.

On the basis of these cons.iderations, we have concluded that we have no objection to the applicant's I

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proposal to omit the reactor thermal shield from the Palisades Plant.

The applicant has indicated to us that he only want~ "oral assurance from the Committee that it has no objections to omission of*the thermal*shield.

.. 2.0 NEED FOR POST ACCIDENT IODINE CLE.ANU? EQUIPMENT The question of whether or not the Palisades Plant needs post-accident iodine cleanup equipment goes back to the construction permit review of this J?}:~~t: _ At the construction permit review, the applicant proposed that meteorology data taken at its Big Rock ~~~nt ___ demonstrated that diffusion

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climatology on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan was so favorable that part*lOO guidelines would be met in the event of an accident without iodine cleanup equipment.

Neither we nor our meteorological consultants,

ESSA, believed that. the Big Rock data supported this proposition.

At the time, we calculated* potential two-hour doses at the exclusion area boundary due to a DBA. of about 1050 rem to the thyroid, 'whereas the applicant calculated less than 300 rem.

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The applicant agreed to make provisions for installation of iodine cleanup equipment. late in construction and to obtain onsite meteorological data of suffiCient extent to either prove or J.isprove their* claims about lake shore ~iffusion climatology, and therefore the need for iodine cleanup equipment.

On this basis, we and the ACRS agreed that the decision could be deferred until the operating license review.

These agreements were made a matter of record in the ACRS letter, the staff Safety Evaluation and Consumers Summary of Application to the Hearing Board.

• Amendment No*. 9, consisting of Consumer's application for an operating license and the FSAR for the Palisades Plant, includes a very brief summary of the onsite meteorology data obtained and i~dicates that these da~a support Consumers' original claims about lake shore diffusion CO>IFFilCCilAJL llJ§IE (Q)JMJL Y

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climatology.

After review of the information contained in this amend-ment, we informed the applicant that the meteorology data presented were not sufficiently detailed nor adequately analyzed for us to determine whether we could agree with this proposition.

The applicant therefore submitted additional detailed meteorology data in Amendment No. 12 to his application.

In Amendment 12 the applicant also reduced the containment design leak rate from 0.2%/da.y to 0.1%/day.

As a result of this change the potential accident doses, as calculated by the applicant, were reduced to 122 rem (vs 285 rem in*Amendment 9).

The meteorology data submitted in Amendment 12 include two months (September 1967 and February 1968) of joint frequency of occurence of

• • wind-direction and the.sta~dard deviation of wind direction ( ~

).

These data were collected at two locations onsite, one on the shore-line, the other inland behind the sand dunes.

Neither w~* no*r our consultant, ESSA (see Appendix A) consider the inland data station to be representative of inland diffusion or transport from the shoreline plant loqation because of the sheltered location of the data station.

The applicant calculated standard deviations of wind directions (cs;) from the wind-d~recti?n range data, using the relationship that the standard deviation is equal to the range.divided by 4.3.

He bases this on an interpretation of a statement in Meteorology and Atomic

( 1' Energy".

) As acknowledged by this same reference, there are differing opinions as to what the correct value of this factor should be.

Measured (Q)IFJFilCilAlL lU§IE (Q)NJL Y values for this factor range from about 4 to 9, and the 4.3 value used by the applicant is close to the lowest, least conservative extreme.

A specific study of the relationship between wind-direction range a~~~-~- based upon measurements at a.number of different sites using a (2) variety of meteorological instruments wa§__~!3-d~_by E. H. Markee We and our consultant, ESSA, (see Appendix B) have reviewed this document d

b f

th h. h t

• to th' b'

t (3, 4, 5 & 6) d an a-num er o o

ers w ic per ain is su Jec an have_concluded that the ratio of 4.3 proposed by the applicant is not adequately con_servati ve and that the-more generally accepted value of 6.0 should be used.

The effect of using a higher value 'for this factor is that poorer conditions for atmospheric diffusion are predicted to occur at the site

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a larger fraction of the time.

The significance of this is discussed further below.

Another problem with the applicant's analysis of his-meteorology data has to ~o with his categorization of Pasquill stability conditions.

On page D-lOb of Amendment 12 the applicant indicates the generally accepted ranges of o:e. values associated with each Pasquill. stability category (Type).

However, when he attempts to quantify the probability of each Pasquill stability category, wind speed and wind direction at the ?alisades site-, (-page D-lOc of Amendment 12), he changes the values of o_;. associated with each Pasquill stability category._ Pasquill Type F is generally represented by 0

~..::::: 3.7, however, in his joint frequency sUIT1~aries, (Tables 11 & 12 of Amendment 12) the applicant uses a value of o:; c:::: 2. 5°

• (Q)JFIFilCilAlL UJ§JE (Q)JNJL Y to identify Pasquill Type F.

Based upon this latter categorization, and a factor of 4.3 relationship between wind-direction range and ~

, the applicant estimates that Type F stability conditions with 2 m/sec or less onshore winds ~ill occur less than 3.2 percent of the time at the site and Type E stability conditions and 2 m/sec diffusion conditions or poorer, approximately 4.7 percent of the time.

We generally take the position that the meteorological conditions used in calculating the two-hour exclusion-boundary doses should have a probability of occurring at the site no more than about 5 percent of the time, that is, b~tter meteorological diffusion conditions than those used for the dose calculations should occur at least 95 percent of the time.

The applica~t, therefore, proposes. that meteorogical conditions for

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Pasquill Type E and 2 m/sec wind speed are appropriate for the Palisades facility.

Using the generally accepted categorization for Type* F conditions of a:8. <::: 3. 7 ° and the 6. 0 relationship betwe.en the wind-dire ct ion range and o_e., we and our consultants estimate that Type F and 2 m/sec or les~

wind speed condi t.ions will occur at the Palisades site as much as 6.6 per-,

cent of the time.

Even if we use the 4.3 relationship between wind-direction range and ~ proposed by"the applicant but the genera~ly accepted

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0 3,7 categorization for Type F conditions, we estimate that Type F and 2 m/sec or less wind speed conditions still occur about 4.7 percent of the time.

It is significant tonote that the meteorological parameters which are used on most power reactor facilities are those for Pasquill Type F conditions and 1 m/sec wind speed.

Less conservative conditions than Type F and 1 m/sec

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conditions have been justified and approved in only a few cases (e.g.,

Turkey Point, Cook and San Onofre).

For the D.C. Cook plant, in particular, which is located on Lake Michigan only a few miles from Palisades, Type F and--2 *-m/ sec conditions were proposed* and accepted.

In summary, we and ESSA believe tha:t=-"'th8::* applicant 1 s ons i te *meteorology data justify the use of Type F meteorology with a wind speed of 2 m/sec rather than Type E and 2 m/sec as interpreted by the applicant.

We have attempted to reconcile the difference in interpretation of the meteorology data by telephone conversations and meetings between our*meteorology specialists ancJ: consultants and the applicant's but have not been success-ful.

Using.the __ diffusion factor associated with Type F meteorology and 2 m/sec (X/Q = 2~6 x 10-4 ), and our standard containment pressure decay

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model, we calculate a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exclusion boundary dose of 340 rem.

The applicant calculates a corresponding dose of 122 rem, (Amendment 12, page

14. 22-6).

We have* reached the conclusion that some form of iodine cleanup equipment should be installed in the Palisades Plant in order t0 reduce the potential accident dose significantly below the 10 CFR 100 guideline value.

Since the applicant has not been responsive to our informal suggestions on this, we plan to inform him of our conclusion in writing.

Prior to doing so, however, we would like to consider any comments the Committee may have on this matter:

In connection with this problem, it is significant to note that all plants since Connecticut Yankee, with the exception of Palisades, have provisions for iodine cleanup of one form or another.

(Q)IrlFilCilAl UJ§IE <O>NIL Y

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({J)Il9CCilA~ U~IE (Q)WIL Y 9 References Slade, David H. "Meteorology and Atomic Energy," USAEC of Tuh. Info,

p. 275, July, 1968.

Markee, E. H., Jr. "On the Relationships of Range to Standard Deviation of Wind Fluctuations," Monthly Weather Rev. 91(2) pp. 83-87, 1963 (J. Z. Holland), U. S. Weather Bureau, A Meteorological Survey of the Oak Ridge Area, OR0-99, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, Tenn., p. 584, November, 1953*

Bowne, N. E., and R. R. Soller. '.

1 A Meteorological Survey of t,he CANEL Site at Middletown, Connecticut", U.S. Weather Bureau, Washington, D. C., p. 27, July, 1958.

Pack, D. H., C. R. Hoseler; and T. B. Harris. "A Meteorological Survey of the PWR Site at Shippingport, Pennsylvania", U.S. Weather Bureau, Washington, D. C., p. 62, December, 1957*

(G. A. McMarrais and N. F. Islitzer), U. S. Weather Bureau, Diffusion Climatology of the National Reactor Testing Station, ID0-12015, U. S.

Atomi.c Energy Commission, Idaho Falls, Idaho, p. 149, April, 1960.

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/!.PFFNffi:X A Pali sadL!S Plant Cnn:-;u1?1eri; P1 1v.*1 1 1.* Company l*'inal Safety /\\nal:vsis Report

• Volum<'S I. If, and J.[I datl'd Novc?111bf?r 1, 1 1J61-:

Preparl?d by 1\\i r Rt* ::;.iur.:(*s Envi. r11nuH!ntal Lahoratury Envi ninuwntul Scit*nvc** S1*1*vic('S Administration F~bruary 3, 196~

In additi.nn to Cl1111nwnts l1n th1* Final Safety Analysis Report, cor.1m<~nts as a rr*sult of a visit to tlw *site hy ESS/\\ p<!rsonm~l on January JO, l'16lJ acl'ompani1*d by /\\EC p<*r:-;nnrn*l an<i r1*pr1*sl*ntativcs l*f the applicant fire*

incll1dc*d 0

()l" parliL'Ular int1*rl'St WGS tlH! expnSUrt~ of tl1" shun*lim* and tlw i nlarid wind 1111*asuri ng sitt*s*.

Tl1n.shnreU 11<' ('XPl*Sun* is on 11 tt*l1*pll1>11c* poll' flt a livigh~ of L.00 lc!Pl abuv1* lake* l1*v1!l dnuul 7th) ft't!t lr\\°Hn tiH* sh!1r<*li1w :ind ahuut 300 IP<~t

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2 1*nnt11i rnn"nt lwj ldi ng.di a1111*tt*r.s) li1*l1i nd th<' rc*rtct1>1" chime.

/\\ lthough th.is was u gpocl"c*xp'l1su1*c* hl'f11n! til<' dnille ~vas cunstr.uct~~d, it is.now in tht! lee l'f the' building for di rcct on~ 1 1orc~ winds.

Th(' inland exposur0.

(s, in f~*wt. as stcltt.*'d in till*' rl'pnrt 11.lt a shi>ltered location in the le0 l'f a sanci dune"**

Lt*ss than a f<~w hundn*d fe0.t away trees and vegetation tower nver the s*s-ft height of t_ht*

ane1:101;!e~ter.*

On th*-:! day of c>ur visit, a pronounced onshore fl~'"" was felt and 111*.'asured at the shoreline, but calm conditions exi.stPd* at thl' inland location.

In contrast, smoke from a nearby inland r'i r1/lwas rising vertically arid at a height pf about 100 feet abov~ the ground W~[> <..:Arri.e:*d vignn>usl:v* inland hy the upp~r onshore flow.

In <'Ur opinion, thl~; i nlanu expnsur" 111<'i'lsures an extremely. localized L't>ndi ti on anu 0

<..:ann11t lit* US:Jd "to estiruate either di rrus'i.*on or transport pi..u*a111C'tc*ri; c1t the shorclim* or at tlw inland si.t1! boundary beyond the dunes.

l n g<'nl'ntl, a si t1* 11n Llt1'

.;hon~ of a 1 n rg" body 11 f water sud1 as tlw Great Lakt'S is uniqu*.' f11r s<'V<!nll rc*n.s1111s.

l:irst, for the* purpose 11.L saf*?ty t~v.'ll11ali1>n, th1' 1>nsl1<11"<* wi.nd dirc*cti11rn. a1*1*,,f primacy cnncern.

Secon*d, in L'11mp;:iri i'llll Lt) 1>!'Csh11J."<' fluw tlw l<>ng fc~tclt,,f s1i111l1tll water surfacl~ wi 11 t1*nd tu int-rense the Pnslwn! wind. :-;p<'**ds at tlw sli11rr*linc followed by a '

d1:t.'.l"t':-l.S(' in thl' \\vinds inlanc.l becaus1* ul. increaSt'U s111-[ace friction.

Third, on<:lwn* flmv is genernlly c.*xp1*Ctl'd '" *h,.* 11:ss turhulvnt than oifshon* flow but as th~~ fl.<)W mcwc*s inland turbull'!JC(' is acldt.'d in the lowPr few hundred feet becau:.;l' 'cif surfnl:e r0ughness.

Thus one W1)uld t'XP<'Ct the aver.age annual *on~lwrc wind sp1~c~d of H>.t~ mph CIS measured at tlw sho1*elinc location to he about 25% less at tli1~ inland sit(~ buundary.

The inland measuring site discussed ahove rc?i."1,rded an avertig*.~ annual wind sperd of 10.2 mph but

r..

r.

.(

bE*caust* <'f e!Xj)<'~urv \\~'l' l"<'nsicl~~r th<* lncation* to ht* m'n-n"pr1*s1'ntntiv1*

nf j n lane: t ran.spP rt: *

. ht' co111binatinn of unshon' and inversion conditi<'n:~ lH:curs 20'7.. ni tl11* tillll' al't'<11:ding tn t:h*.' shlirt'lirn* *:1<..asurc1nents.

If this c01abinati.*n is restricted further to winds bvlt1w'l1 niph thl' (requt?ncy is about 1%.

Thus one can concludL' that.:tn rttmnsplH ric diffusinn rnte c(jual to or lr:ss than that equiv,"\\ll'l1t ti' l1ll'd"1*a1*,, i1iv1*rsi1*11 cu..-iditi.11ns CPasciuill Type F) and a L rn/sec wind sp1'1'd <H'l*urs <iht1l1t l'i., nl. the* tirnt* i I li111it1*d tn 1111.sliurP flow.

The*

r<'sulti.ng n*lati "" gn1un(I n1 r c<11w1*nl rali**n nt ti11' 1wnn*st: site* boundary l"/tlO m) is (J x lll-11 Se'l" 111-J.

LI.sing Liu* npplica11t 1 s di I ru.sion par.q111c.~tr.. rs fl'l" tlw l i 1*st :.! ih*u1*;; \\png" 11.* ;U-J), tl11* rC'sulti ng sit:1* hllundary 1.'.l1n1*e*11Lrat.i1111 \\,11111\\d J.1* 3 :.;, JU_/,

S**l' 1:1-J, il [nctur of :!. 11*:-;s tJwn llUl" c11111putntj1111.

N1'itl1t*1* ccw:pulali11n al'l'11Unlr*d f11[' Lil** r*I lr*l'L nf Lhc* building w.1k<.'.

Sin1*,* Lill.'.1pplil'nnl. 1 :-; l':*qn*1*.ssi1111 l1*r the vi1*L1.1;1l s11u1T1* Lii::.tanc1*

\\111icldl1*,,f p;1~t* i: *. :!.~-:n 1::-; in l'rrnr -

cli1111*11::-;ionA.ll:v irn*11n*t*l*L and lJhVillusly gi\\'i*s ctn insigni l"it'i:lnt JYJ111lit*r -

Wl*! arc* unnlil:* to as::or:::-; tlw dilutitin*f~1cLn1* l'L"1*dit1'd t*n Llw building v.'<lkt! <"fi't>ct tlint wns usc~d.

Using a shapv fact11r 111 l/~ anJ l.'nnli.li nnwnt hui lding cross-sectional an!a nl L210 m, t'ut* nssessml'nt l*1° t:lw adde*d \\vc'.ll(1* dilution i.s n factor of L.3 a~ the sitf' bnunde:u*y undl*r i1wl'1*si1111 l'1)11ditions.

Fur the Pl'l'L\\ld frum.2 t11

~I, h1>>urs, th1* llll't.e11rnlt1gical statistjcs [ro111 the site shnw that* wind s1H~l'd::-; l1*ss than L m/sr<.: pr*rsi sted for llJ hours lln one*

p'-*casi1)n during thf' y~ar.

Wind di.r0ctiun P'-'rsist<'n<:c! [or tile: rc:ginn [.lj sll\\>wi:; that on tlw has~s iii S yvars of Jata, tlw maxi111u111 t:irnc~* that tbP wind rL'mainc**d in a L!.-1/~0 ::-;c*l"l*'r was a singlt!

• oc.:asi nn of about 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Hm.;i*pv<'r, tlw 11111rt' pl.'rsistl'nl: \\vinds, din*ct:ionally spr~aking, tr.?nd to oc:**ur

• iith higllt>r \\,rind sp1*,*ds.

Thu:-;_, in nur vi1*w, it would he>. r1!asn1whly const>rvativt* l:l1 assu111(~ th."1L t"or the! 2 t11 L4 hour pet*iod at this si ti~ rh1*

conCl!l1tnllion wL1uld b1~* avc*1;ag1:<l ovPr n LL.-1/2° se;.:tor with inV<!rs:i1.1n conditions (l'a:::quiil Typl' In and a 4 111/:-;c'-l' wi.nd.

-Th1*sc* panu,1.1**t1_!rH a1*1*

aµprnxim.'l.t<'ly Pquival~>nt t11.thc~ ::q;µliutnt's Sutton paramr.:t1.:r~ listPd "11

µnge 14. 22-4 i r tl11* rE,Jfl****t ion tl'rm is usr*d in Suttun1 s di [ ru::;i l1n l'<Jllntil'n.

fn su1111n:n*:v. \\,,_,. havr* hnd di ff1l'ultv j n ass:*ssing the.* diffusion rates used bv the clpµl11.*;1nt t11 l'l'111putc; d1*wnwind rndioactivt~ dosc*s bc*i.:aus(? 1) nll listing 1*1 rl*lativt* l't'111..'l'lll't*aLi"n

(\\fl~) w.:is giVl'n.L) tlw djf(usion f'qun.tjons listccf in Sl'1..'t-il*n l-'.. ttnd /\\pp1*11d1x* D dn ntit ngn~c and, 3) tiw virtual snurc1.* distance

<'.xprl*ss1,)n nppc':11*:, l;:t°i lw in r.*rror.

llur c11mr*utation of the sit1:~ he*unc!Hrv relatiVL' L'Pnl*r*ntrati11n 1l*I" th1*first 2 llll11r pl'ri:id i.s 2.6 x io-4 SC'l' 111-'.°)

.ta'~; ng i nC*' a1.*l*nunt hu i l ding wai:"'

t" I' I e1.*t.

For t:h1~. 2 to 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> pc rind the vRlUl' \\*ms *:11111put1*cl t11. he i} x lli.-5 sc*c 1;1-3 nn tlw basis that it is highly in_1pn1b<'1hl1' Lk\\l th1* t*1*ipl1* n*stril'U1111 1if low wi_nd spec.>.ds, inversion comli tinns and wind din*1*t illn const<1nt in a L2-l/2° iwctor could occur simultan1*11u:-;ly 11vi*r n ll1-h11ur p('l"ind.

Rn fr* r*<*n1.,,

UJ Vnn d.*r llPVl'n. J. ( 11.lb'i),

41\\-Jind P<*rsi :;tPnce Prob.:1hi lity".

T1** lw puhltslwd ns ES~i,\\ Re.s1*arcli LHl>11r;1tnric~i:; '1"1*cl111i.1.*al Mem1~rrn1d11111.

(

\\

Comments on Palisades Plant Consumers Power Company Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment No. 12 dated May 14, 1969

_,:.*_~-..

Prepared by Air Resources Environmental Laboratory Environmental Science Serv*:fces'**Administration June 13, 1969 1he additional meteorological data presented in.AniEncl.~ent 12 consists of a* two-month (September 1967 and February 1968) analysis of the

• wind direction standard deviation as derived from the w:ind direction range 0 We find no e:>...-perimental evidence for the applicant rs assumption of a 4.3 value for the range. to standar~ deviation ratio (R/.i"G )

• Markee i.JJ found from an analysis* of 1-to 15-sec *wind direction readings at* a nu.mber of locations that the average R/::r:..

value ranged from 5.0 to 8.6.

Th~s, apparently, is the basis f~r the crnmnonly-used value of 6.0 which would decrease the applicant 1 s

• re values _by a factor of O. 7.

In the cgse of Table 11, where four categories of:J(j u ~.re shm-m c.sswning a u of 4.47 mph, the upper limits of the *::J~. value of the Jirst three categories would then be LB0,

2.7~, and 3~6°, respectively, and only the last category could be classified as a diffusion rate greater than Pasquill Type Fo Thus, for* the two rnonths shown in Table 11, _gnshor~ *winds with diffuci.01.i rates equivalent to Typo F and 2 m7sec or. less occur 6.6 percent of the time.

As pointed out in our comments of February 3, 1969, we consider the inland anemometer site to be non*-representative of inland transport because of the extreme sheltering effect of the sand dunes and dense vegetation.

To what extent the Gf; iI values are_ affected by the opposite fact.ors of decreased wind speed and increased wind variability.

at the inland site boundro"'Y. is not knovm.

Doubtless,, wind speeds will decrease and tttrbulc-:nt fluctuations of wind direction *will increase as the flow over a relatively smooth water surface becomes heated over the rougher. land surface. It is interesting to note that for onshore 1'.dnds and stable conditions as represented by the first three cate5ories in table 12, the inland station show~; a frequency of 9. 5 percent.

This compares to the previously rn0ntioned 6.6 percent for the shorelir"e station.

In summary, we hc.ve not seen ony evidence to change our conc::.usions as expressed in the February COli!ii.cnL~;.

0ur* computation at the site boundary (700* m) for the first two-hour period is a relative concent.ration of 2.6 x io-1+ sec m*-3) assuming. Type F diffusion a 2 m/sec \\*::;_;-id SIJeed) o.

r.

~. -.. *.'

I. --

~

_(

I buildir~g ~:hci.pe f c:~ctor oi' ~ 2Jid a c:eoss-ssctioj*1a1 e.rea of 2210 :m; l.Je clo not feel thc.t the j_nl2ncl stat.ion e.s presG!!tly locc.ted is 1-e.preseIJ"C.ative of the c::.ir. flc..-d at the :i11l an9-site bm.mdar;r o Reference

[l] Harkee, E. H ~, 1963: "On the relationships of range to sta.-rida:cd deviati"on of \\-rind fluctuations"~ Mono Weao Revie1*r, 91(2).~

PPo BJ-67.