ML18051B029

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Forwards Rev 3 to Fire Protection Exemption Requests & Modified Commitments.List of Equipment Necessary for Safe Shutdown & Exemption Request Re Local Tending of Diesel Generators Included
ML18051B029
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/10/1984
From: Johnson B
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8408170364
Download: ML18051B029 (61)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:** consumers Power company General Offices: 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-0550. August 10, 1984 Dennis M Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No 5 Nuclear Reactor Regulation / US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - FIRE PROTECTION - EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND MODIFIED COMMITMENTS - REVISION 3 Consumers Power Company letter dated July 16, 1984 advised the NRC that the following fire protection information would be provided: a concise list of equipment necessary for safe shutdown and an exemption request concerning local tending of the diesel generators. This submittal provides the informa-tion and additional information as outlined below (Attachments are numbered consistent with the attached index): 0 0 0 c c, "Appendix R Review Process", has been revised to address separation criteria for cold shutdown equipment. Attachment lA, "Essential Equipment for Safe Shutdown Post-Fire," is hereby submitted. Attachment lB, "Fire Area Identification, Automatic Fire Suppression Coverage, and Fire Detection Coverage" is revised to include auto-matic fire suppression coverage and fire detection coverage., "Modifications to Previous Fire Protection Commit-ments" is revised to address PORV breakers will be open instead of the PORV block valve breakers. 3, "Exemption Request - Section III.L.4 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Local Tending of Diesel Generators" is hereby submitted. 3 provides an exemption request from Section III.L.4 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent that personnel must be available on-site at all times to implement procedures concerning local tending of a diesel generator. In accordance with 10 CFR S0.48C(4), Attachment 13 must be resolved prior to startup from the next appropriate outage (planned outage that lasts for at least 60

~-------- ""'

r-94.08170364 84081 O OC0784-0006-NL02 l PDR ADOCK 05000255 F PDR

DMCrutchfield, Chief Palisades Plant FIRE PROTECTION EXEMPTION REQUESTS - REV 3 August 10, 1984 days, unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days, or refueling outage). This submittal and other information referenced in the Attachment Index supplement the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated May 26, 1983. Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment OC0784-0006-NL02 2

FIRE PROTECTION - EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND MODIFIED COMMITMENTS - REVISION 3

  • INDEX FOR ATTACHMENTS NRC APPROVAL ATTACHMENT STATUS 6

OPEN 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN Approved 2/8/83 Withdrawn 4/23/84 OPEN FP0484-0001L-NL02 NEW INFORMATION THIS SUBMITTAL YES/NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES August 10, 1984 TITLE EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ROOM (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 AND III.G.3 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 - CHARGING PUMPS P-55B AND P-55C (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984)

SUMMARY

, PLANT MODIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM "APPENDIX R SELF-AUDIT" (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.3 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS PANEL ROOM (Original Submitt.al July 25, 1983 - Revision 1 July 16, EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.3 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 CORRIDOR BETWEEN CHARGING PUMP ROOM AND SWITCHGEAR ROOM lC (Original Submittal July 25, 1983 - Revision 1 July EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.3 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 CONTROL ROOM 16, 1984) 1984) (Original Submittal July 1, 1982 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.l.a OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 REPAIR PROCEDURE HOT SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION (Original Submittal December 6, 1982 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.L.4 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 LOCAL TENDING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (Original Submittal August 10, 1984)

L FIRE PROTECTION - EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND MODIFIED COMMITMENTS - REVISION 3 INDEX FOR ATTACHMENTS NRC APPROVAL ATTACHMENT STATUS 14 OPEN 15 OPEN T.'nn1.01._()()()1T-l\\lT ()? NEW INFORMATION . THIS SUBMITTAL YES/NO NO NO August 10, 1984 TITLE EXE!'IPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 INSTRUMENT SEPARATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT (Original Submittal July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 CABLE SEPARATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT (Original Submittal July 20, 1984)

FP0484-0001C-NL02 ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 APPENDIX R REVIEW PROCESS Original Submittal - April 23, 1984 Revision 1 - July 16, 1984 Revision 2 - August 10, 1984 10 Pages.

FIRE PROTECTION - EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND MODIFIED COMMITMENTS - REVISION 3 INDEX FOR ATTACHMENTS NRC APPROVAL ATTACHMENT STATUS 1 N/A lA OPEN 1B N/A lC N/A 2 N/A 3 OPEN 4 OPEN 5 - OPEN Appendix A N/A Of Attach 5 FP0484-0001L-NL02 NEW INFORMATION THIS SUBMITTAL (YES/NO)

  • YES YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO August 10, 1984 _

TITLE APPENDIX R_ REVIEW PROCESS (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Rev 1 July 16, 1984 ~ _ Rev 2 August 10, 1984) ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN POST-FIRE (Original Submittal August 10, 1984) FIRE AREA IDENTIFICATION, AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION COVERAGE, AND FIRE DETECTOR COVERAGE (Original Submittal July 16, 1984 - Rev 1 August 10, 1984) EMERGENCY LIGHTING (Original Submittal, July 16, 1984) MODIFICATIONS TO PREV~OUS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984 Rev 2 August 10, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G. 2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 SERVICE WATER PUMP SEPARATION IN INTAKE STRUCTURE (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS AREA (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, 1984) EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.G.2 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50

  • RATED BARRIERS (Original Submittal April 23, 1984 - Revision 1 July 16, i.984)

TEST REPORTS WHICH SUBSTANTIATE ATTACHMENT 5 - ITEMS a,b,c and (Original Submittal July 16, 1984) l d

REVIEW PROCESS ATTACHMENT 1 APPENDIX R REVIEW PROCESS The review pro*cess included the following steps:

a.

Develop a comprehensive understanding of Appendix R to 10 CFR SO. Our understanding of Appendix R requirements is illustrated by of our January 18, 1984 submittal. This understanding is supplemented by the following: Consumers Power Company letter dated January 18, 1984 requested that the NRC Staff provide a formal review as to the completeness and accuracy of the iogic diagrams which illustrate our understanding of 10 CFR S0.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR SO. Consumers Power Company has been advised by NRC Staff that their review is not complete. At an April 24, 1984 meeting between NRC and Consumers Power Company representatives, the NRC staff noted that one Consumers Power Company interpretation of Appendix R was conservative but overly restrictive in applying Section III.G.2 separation criteria to cold shutdown equipment. Engineering judgement and analysis may be used to demonstrate that one train of cold shutdown equipment is free of fire damage.

b.

Identify rooms, barriers and penetrations in the plant. This process is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents a hypotheti-cal floor plan identifying rooms, barriers and penetrations.

c.

Define fire areas ~per Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983). This process is illustrated by Figure 2. Rooms which are not separated by adequate fire barriers are considered to be "connected." A fire area is defined to be the set of interconnected rooms.

d.

Identify systems/trains/equipment necessary to perform each safety function described in Section III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR SO. (The safety functions are: reactivity control, inventory control, heat removal, and process monitoring.) This process is illustrated by Figure 3. Figure 3 identifies a hypothetical functional group of equipment required to borate the primary coolant system. Each functional group of equipment belongs to a given "train."

e.

Document the location and cable route for each piece of equipment considered in the review~ This process is.illustrated by Figures 4A and.4B. Figure 4A is a hypothetical equipment location and cable route drawing. Figure 4B presents the Figure 4A information in tabular form.

f.

Evaluate cable separation. This process is illustrated by Figures S, SA and SB. Figure S demonstrates a flow chart for identifying potential common mode failures of redundant trains of equipment. Figures SA and SB illustrate how to determine if a train of equipment is potentially subject to fire damage. FPOS84-0001E-NL02

ATTACHMENT 1 2 APPENDIX R REVIEW PROCESS DIFFERENCES FROM APPENDIX R Differences exist between the protec~ive measures prescribed by Appendix R and the protective measures available at Palisades Plant. Resolution is sought for each such difference. The methods used to resolve differences are:

a.

Modify the plant to ensure strict compliance with Appendix R. Submit schedule exemption request where justified.

b.

Modify the plant to the extent necessary to ensure adequate protection is provided which meets the intent of Appendix R. Submit technical exemption request and, where justified, submit schedule exemption request.

c.

Demonstrate that adequate protection is available which meets the intent of Appendix R. Submit technical exemption request. Plant modifications which are a direct result of Appendix R compliance are described in Attachment 8. Technical exemption requests are provided in Attachments as identified in the attachment index. FP0584-0001E-NL02

CON~MERS POWER CO~ANY FIGURE 1

ROOM, BARRIER AND PENETRATION IDENTIFICATION LEGEND (HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE>

..,__...,.RB r----*---- RB t-----t CD a: ~ ROOM IDENTIFICATION RB RATED BARRIER UB UNRATED BARRIER ~ UNSEALED PENETRATION ( 40, 100] SK031084. 001

,~- CON,UMERS POWER CO~ANY FIGURE 2 FIRE AREA DEFINITION ~YPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE> LEGEND RESULTS DEFINES SCOPE OF REVIEW. <ALL ROOMS IDENTIFIED WITHIN ARE EVALUATED FOR

  • ROOM CONNECTORS' >

0 ROOM IDENTIFICATION ROOM CONNECTOR (S> <INCLUDES UNRATED BARRIERS AND UNSEALED PENETRATIONS> FIRE ROOM AREA NUMBER CS> A 1, 2. 3. 4 8 5.6 [ 40, !00J SK031084. 00 ! :

r e CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY FIGURE 3 SYSTEM/TRAIN/EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION CHYPOTHET I CAL EXAMPLE> ~ l!l.ECTR !CAI.. CABLE OF CONCERN EXAMPLE (HYPOTHETICAL) --PIPING SYSTEM A. TRAIN I !'\\.US SUPPORT EOUIPMENT SUBJECT TO ~LO~AT!ON CUE TO ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS. HOT sHORrs. O~EN CIRCUITS. OR SHORTS TO GROUND. r-------------- SUPPORT SYSTEM _T_R~_1_N_*_1_P_aw_E_R__,0 0 IESEL JACKET COOL I NO PUHP

  • I 1

I I a IESEL ~ENEAATOR SUPPORT SYST!H TRAIN "I SEAL COOL ING PUMP *1 SYSTEM A, TRAIN 2, PLUS SUPPORT REPEAT FIGURE, CHAN IC: EQUIPMENT LABEL TO 8 2 EQUIPMEINT LIST TRAIN 1 r- - -EY-- DrESEL l~KET COOLING PUMP 0 1 I DIESEL ~iERATOR ~ --Y-- SEAL C:IJLINO PUHF' *t ~ --{;:~TOR* BORA.TION PUMF'

  • L I HO IDR *'

OPER1ATDR* - I - r* BCRATION PUMP

  • l EQUIPMENT LIST TRAIN 2 r- -

-Er DIESEL JACKET COOL IND PUMP *z I I DIESEL.~NEAATOR

  • z SEAL COOLING P'UHP *2 I MOTOR OPER~TOR*

1 ~ --f&-- BORATION PUMP *2 ~ C40, 100JSK031084. 001

-* e CONSUMERS POWER *COMPANY FIGURE 4A ROUTE ANO EQUIPMENT LOCATION CABLE <FLOOR PLAN SAME AS FIGURE 1> LEGEND r-1 CHYPOTHET ICAL !EXAMPLE> SEAL COOL !NG PUMP *t (?) SEAL COOL !NG PUMP *2 BORATION PUMP *2 I I I / / l_ / ' ' I l - I I I ,-------------I I I ~ !EN£RATOR I_: cg6E7~~ ~~~~Er I 01 _ ,-------------I 0 I ESEL JACKET COOLING PUMP "2 I I .___I I CJ 0 IESEL GENERATOR

  • 2 ROOM IDENTIFICATION DESIGNATED ROOM BOUNDARY ELECTRIC CABLE

CON MERS POWER COM ANY FIGURE 48 CABLE ROUTE ANO EQUIPMENT LOCATION

SUMMARY

CHYPOTHET !CAL EXAMPLE> TRAIN EQUIP EQUIP/CABLE LOCATION BY ROOM r- - 1 -Er DIESEL JACKET COOLING PUHP *1 I 1 I DIESEL O~NERATOR 1 -EY-SEAL COOLl NO PUMP *t l I MOTOR.1 1 OPERATOR,. l - ~ 1 BORAT!ON PUMP *1 l I MOTOR,j 1 OPERATOR* _I - ~ ~ r- - 2

  • -Er 0 IESEL JACKET COOL!NO PUHP *2 I

2 I 0 I ESEL ~NERATOR 2 -er SEAL COOLJ NG PUHP *2 l I MOTOR ,1 2 OPERATOR" J 2 BOAAT!ON PUHi' *2 l I MOTOR.1 2 OPERATOR" - ~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x I I I I I I I I I I . I ""* ""'"' ""* '" I

e e CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY FIGURE 5 EVALUATE SEPARATION OF TRAINS 1 ANO 2 START COMP~~RE TRAIN ONE EQUIPMENT TO FIRE AREA A <SEE FIGURE 5A> NO NEXT FIRE COMP~~RE TRAIN TWO TO FIRE: AREA A <SEE F I GURE 58> NO ENSURE ONE TRAIN FREE OF FIRE DAMAGE .USING 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS AREA [ 40, 100] SK031084. 001

CON~MERS POWER COM,ANY FIGURE 5A COMPARISON, TRAIN 1 TO FIRE AREA A AREA A I I I I I I I DEFINITION x x x x CF IGURE 2) ROOM 1 2 3 4 5 6 TRAIN 1 ~ LOCATION x CF IGURE 48) 0 IESEL JACKET COOLING PUMP 0 1 TRAIN 1 I LOCATION I 0 IES£L G~N£RATOR x

  • I CF I GURE 48)

TRAIN 1 LOCATION x x x CF IGURE 48) ' SEAL COOLINO PUHP *1 I TRAIN 1 I MOTOR ,J LOCATION OPERATOR* x x x ~- <FIGURE 48) v ~ TRAIN 1 LOCATION x x x CF IGURE 48) BORAT!ON PUMP 'I TRAIN 1 1 I MOTOR I LOCATION OPERATORw x x x J (_FI.DURE 48) v ~ RESL.ILTS OF COMPARISON 1 I MOTOR ,J 1 OPERATOR11 I MOTOR I

l:

OPERATOR11 SEAL COOL !NO BORATION ~l~ PUMP

  • 1 PUMP *!

v ~ \\ y EQUIP/CABLE IN FIRE AREA A [ 40, Hl0)SK031084. 001 ' i I

coNs!MERS POWER COM~NY FIGURE 58 COMPARISON, TRAIN 2 TO FIRE AREA A TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF IGURE 48) TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF I GURE 48) TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF IGURE 48) TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF I GURE 48) TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF IGURE 48) TRAIN 2 LOCATION CF IGURE 48) SEAL COOLING PUMP *2 ~~~~~~~~gr I x I x I x I x I I I ROOM 1 2 3 4 5 6 r- - -Er DIESEL JACKET COOLING PUMP *2 I I OIESEL G~NERAfOR x SEAL COOLINO PUMP *2 l x l MOTOR ~I OPERArDRtt _[ - V"".J x --©--- BORAT!ON PUMP *2 L x I "OTOR.I OPERATORtt

1..:

RESULTS OF COMPARISON BORATION PUMP *:z EQUIP /C~~BLE IN FIRE AREA A x x x x x x x x x x [ 40, 100] SK03 ! 084. 001

FP0484-0001C-Ni02 ATTACHMENT lA Consumers Power Company

  • palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN POST-FIRE Original Submittal August 10, 1984 4 Pages

~ ATTACHMENT lA ~ _ ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN POS~IRE The Fire Protection Compliance Program is based on this information. Pages 3 and 4 are the list of essential equipment. The_ essential equipment list has been determined using the following scenario and assumptions. Scenario: A fire has occurred in the cable spreading room. The worst case results of this fire envelop the worst case results of a fire in any other room in the plant; therefore, if a fire occurs anywhere in the plant, it is possible, using the method described herein, to meet the criteria of the appropriate -sections of Appendix R. Concurrent with this fire, outside power (including the electrical grid) is unavailable for 72 hours. No additional non-fire related accidents are postulated to occur at this time. Requirement:

1.

The plant must be taken to the hot shutdown condition (HSD) and be capable of remaining in that condition for a period as long as conditions require.

2.

No repairs are allowed on equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown.

3.

The equipment which permits transition to the cold shutdown (CSD) condi-tion must be operable in order to have the ability to achieve cold shut-down within 72 hours of reactor trip.

  • 4.

Repairs using onsite materials are allowed on equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown * . Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 states that electrical wiring and cabling to equipment necessary to meet the requirement be in at least 2 redundant paths, and that those paths be separated by conditions* which meet certain criteria. (The definition of essential equipment is that equipment absolutely necessary to meet the requirement.) Assumptions:

1.

Any electrical wires or cables which are not separated by Appendix R criteria conforming conditions or exemptions thereto, and are located in the same area as the fire, can cause an open or a short circuit.

2.

Any wire can become charged with a voltage which will cause spurious operation of the equipment to which it is-attached. Exception - All three phases of the power supply to a motor will not "hot" short and cause spurious operation.

3.

Three phased motorized -valves will fail in the "as is" position if the control circuit is not affected.

4.

Valves in essential flow paths which are accessible and can be manually actuated within the required time limits are not classified essential. FP0884-0001A-NL02

ATTACHMENT lA ~ssential Equip for Safe Shutdown Post-Fire Assumptions: (Continued) 2

5.

Air operated valves which fail or can be made to fail in the desired position by disconnecting or shutting off the air supply are not classi-fied as essential.

6.

Passive type equipment is not listed. Passive equipment is defined as equipment that requires no outside actuation or movement of parts in order to accomplish its purpose, ie, a heat exchanger. Method and Theory: The reactor is tripped and decay heat is removed from the core by natural circulation. As the primary coolant goes through the Steam Generator it transfers the heat to secondary water. The secondary water turns to steam, increases secondary system pressure and opens the secondary code safety valves to allow the steam to enter the atmosphere. Water is supplied to the secon-dary side of the steam generators by the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. AFW pump P-8B is driven by Turbine K-8 which is powered by steam from Steam Generator A after it passes through CV-0522B and PCV-0521A. CV-0522B is either electro-pnuematically controlled or manually controlled; PCV-0521A maintains turbine inlet pressure by pneumatic balance with line pressure, fails closed, and can be by-passed by operating a manual valve. Both valves, CV-0522B and PCV-0521A have a 12 hour emergency supply of air (N2). Flow of water from P-8B to SG-A and SG-B is controlled electro-pnuematically with a hand indicating controller using CV-0749 and CV-0727 or, after disconnecting the air supply and causing CV-0749 and CV-0727 to fail open, manually operating the FOGG valves. (M0-0753, M0-0760, M0-0743, M0-0798) The PCS stays 25° sub-cooled for 2.9 hours (Ref Enclosure 2) without the addition of any coolant. During this 2.9 hours, local control of the diesel generator is established, a charging pump started and the charging pump to PCS flowpath established. In order to cool the diesel, a Service Water pump must be started within 30 minutes after starting the diesel. By manually starting and stopping the charging pumps at their power supply breaker and regulating the flow of AFW, the critical safety functions (Reference pages 5 and 6 of this analysis) are kept within acceptable parameters. Indications of PZR1 l' PZR , SG-A1* l' SG-B1 l' Condensate Storage Tank Level, AFW 1 eve press eve eve F ow~ *:H* TC, ana SG pressure enable tne operator to maintain the hot shutdown condition. Transition to the cold shutdown condition is initiated by manually opening the main steam isolation valve bypass, the flowpath to the high volume air ejec-tor, and a l" vent. The charging pumps, being gravity fed by the concentrated boric acid tank are in operation. When the PCS is cooled to the 325° the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) is initiated to continue the transition to the cold shutdown condition. FP0884-0001A-NL02

REACTIVITY Hot After 24 hours and Shutdown before cooldown (HSD)

1. Service Water Pump**
2. Diesel Generator
3. 2400 VAC BUS
4. 480 VAC BUS
5. Charging Pump Essential Equipment RCS PRESSURE After 2.9* hours, to maintain 25°F Subcooling
1. Service Water Pump**
2. Diesel Generator
3. 2400 VAC BUS
4. 480 VAC BUS
5. Charging Pump RCS INVENTORY After 2.9* hours,
1. Service Water Pump**
2. Diesel Generator
3. 2400 VAC BUS
4. 480 VAC BUS
5. Charging Pump RCS HEAT REMOVAL
1. Secondary System Code Safety Valves
2. P-8B
3. CV-0522B Essential Flowpaths and their included valves - Items No. 1, 2, 3, 4; 4a, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11 of Enclosure No 1.

3 ESSENTIAL INDICATORS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

TH Tse G Pressure PZR Level PZR Pressure SG-A Level SG-B Level AFW Flow t'9 SG-A AFW Flow to SG-B

10. AFWP Suction Pressure
  • The requirement after 2.9 hours is considered very conservative.

It is the result of an analysis, the results of which are summarized in Enclose No 2 to this report. It assumes a 10 gpm PCS water leak and a 1 gpm steam leak. Tech specs allow 10 gpm of known water leakage and 1 gpm of unidentified leakage. Known water leakage at Palisades is historically less than 1 gpm and unidentified leakage may not be steam as postulated in the analysis. Having less than 10 gpm of identified water leakage and less than 1 gpm of steam leakage will lengthen the time before 25°F sub-cooling is lost.

    • Or Diesel Driven Fire Pump Transition 525°F to 325°F
1. SW Pump or Diesel Driven Fire Pump
2. Diesel Generator
3. 2400 VAC BUS
4. 480 VAC BUS
5. Charging Pump Same as for Reactivity Control Same as for Reactivity Control
1. Hogger
2. l" Steam Line

.to ATMS

3. AFWPTD (K-8)
4. P-8B
5. CV-0522B Same as Hot Shutdown Essential Flowpaths and their included valves - Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Enclosure No 1.

FP0884-0001A-NL02

325°F to and including Cold Shutdown REACTIVITY Same Equipment as required for 525° - 325°F transition, plus LPSI Pump. Air supply is needed if a Diesel Driven Fire Pump is being used to 1 supply SW to the CCW RX RCS PRESSURE Same as Reactivity RCS INVENTORY Same as Reactivity RCS HEAT REMOVAL Same as Reactivity Essential Flowpaths and their included valves - Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of Enclosure No 1. NOTES 4 ESSENTIAL INDICATORS TH or TC PZR Level PZR Pressure

1.

This is acceptab~e since a Turbine Room Fire is the only postulated fire which can disable the air supply, and a Traveling Screen Room Fire is the only fire postulated which could disable all three SW pumps.

2.

The Diesel Day Tanks may be filled by tank truck if the diesel fuel transfer pumps are. disabled. FP0884-0001A-NL02

e.

FP0484-0001C-NL02 ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTACHMENT lA Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN POST-FIRE Original Submitt~l August 10, 1984 7 pages

ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTACHMENT lA INDEX FOR LIST OF VALVES IN ESSENTIAL FLOWPATHS A = Necessary For Hot Shutdown B = Necessary For Transition From Hot Shutdown To Cold Shutdown C = Necessary For Cold Shutdown Item No Flowpath

1.

Service Water To Diesel Generators Heat Exchangers

2.

Boric Acid Tanks To Charging Pumps

3.

Charging Pumps To Primary Coolant System

4.

Diesel Fire Pump To Critical Service Water Headers 4.*a Diesel Fire Pump Cooling

5.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow - Condensate* Storage Tank To Steam Generators Via P-8B

6.

Diesel Fire Pump To Auxiliary Feedwater Suction (P-8B)

7.

Primary Coolant System To Shutdown Cooling To Primary Coolant System

8.

Service Water To Component Cooling Water And

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Return Diesel Fuel Tank (T-40) To Fire Pump Diesel Driver (K-10) Steam Generator E-50A To Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Driver (K-8) Safety Injection And Refueling Water Tank To Charging Pumps Steam Generator E-SOA To Hogging Air Ejector Steam Generator E-SOB To Atmosphere Via l" Drain Line Function A,* B, c A, B, C, A, ;s' c A, B, c A, B, c A~ B A, B c c A, B, C A, B A*, B, C B B

  • Not required if Cold Shutdown is to be achieved within 72 hours.

FP0884-0002-NL02

ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTACHMENT lA LIST OF VALVES IN ESSENTIAL FLOWPATHS AC = Air to Close ND = Normally De-energized AO Air to Open NE = Normally Energized LO = Locked Open LC = Locked Closed NO = Normally Open NC = Normally Closed ELC = Electrically Locked Closed ELO = Electrically Locked Open Manual Over-Ride Capability = A valve that has a handwheel to manually operate the valve. Fail Open = Valve opens upon a loss of air. Fail Close = Valve closes upon a loss of air. Fail As Is = Valve fails as is upon a loss of air.

1.

Service Water To Diesel Generators Heat Exchangers: 16"-428-102SW Service Water Pump P-7A LO 16"-42S-103SW Service Water Pump P-7B LO 16"-428-104SW Service Water Pump P-7C LO CV1319 Crossover Valves Between AC CV1318 Service Water Pumps AC CV1359 Non-Critical Service Water NO Shutoff CV0845 Header A AC CV0844 Header B AC CV0846 Crossover Between Service AC CV0857 Water Headers AC CV0876 Header A

  • AC CV0877 Header B AC CV0885 Header A (To Diesel AC Generator K-6B)

CV0884 Header B (To Diesel AC Generator K-6B) 6"-MV..:.279-SWS Header A (From Diesel NO Generator K-6B) 611-29.:..132sw Header A (From Diesel LO Generator K-6B) FP0884-0002-NL02 Manual Manual Manual NO Fail Open NO Fail Open AO Fail Close NO Fail Open NO Fail Open NO Fail Open NO Fail Open NO Fail Open NO Fail Open Fail Open Fail Open Manual Manual 2

ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTACHMENT lA 6"-29-131SW 6"-MV-278-SWS Header B (From Diesel Generator K-6A) Header B (From Diesel Generator K-6A) LO NO

2.

Boric Acid Tanks To Charging Pumps: M02170 M02169 3"-N29M2DR-2089 3"-N29M2DR-2095 3"-N29M2DR-2101 Tank T-53B Tank T-53A To Charging Pump P-SSA To Charging Pump P-SSB To Charging Pump P-55C NC NC LO LO LO

3.

Charging Pumps To Primary Coolant System: 2"-N7M3-2094 l~"-N7M3-2100 l~"-N7M3-2106 2"-N7M3-2195 2"-108 CV2111 CV2113 CV2115 M03072 Charging Pump P-55A Charging Pump P-55B Charging Pump P-55C Charging Pump P-55C Charging Pumps P-55B&C To Regenerative Heat Exchangers E-56 To Charging Line Loop lA To Charging Line Loop 2A LO LO LO LO LO NO NO NO HPSI Train 2 SI Tank Test NC Line To Charging Pumps AC AC AC

4.

Diesel Fire Pump P-41 To Critical Service Water Headers 10"-700FPS 12"-42-114FP 12"-29-130FP 12"-29-131FP CV1359 FP0884-0002-NL02 Non-Critical Service Water Shut-off LO LO LC LC NO AO 3 Manual Manual Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Fail Open, Also Manual Over-Ride Capability Fail Open, Also Manual Over-Ride Capability Fail Open, Also Manual Over-Ride

  • Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Manual Manual Manual Fail Close

ENCLOSURE 1 TO e 4 ATTACHMENT lA 4a. Diesel Fire Pump Cooling l"-702FPS LO Manual PCV-5351 NO SV-5351 NC l"-703FPS LO Manual l"-704FPS Bypass For Four Previous NC Manual Valves.

5.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow - Condensate Storage Tank To Steam, Generators Via P-SB: 6"MV-133FW LO Manual 6"MV-270FW Redundant To 6"MV-133FW LO Manual 6"-29-0771-FW LO

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6.

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  • LO Manual 12"-42-114FP LO Manual 4"-29-0775FW LC Manual FP0884-0002-NL02

ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTAGHMENT lA 4"-29-0774FW 6"-29-132FW To Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8B 5 LC Manual LO Manual

7.

Primary Coolant System To Shutdown Cooling To Primary Coolant System: M03015 M03016 M03190 10"-N26M3DR-3193 M03199 10"-N26M3DR-3202 CV3055 CV3212 CV3213 CV3223 CV3224 CV3025 M03008 M03010 M03012 M03014 FP0884-0002-NL02 To LPSI Pump P-67B From. LPSI Pump P-q7B To LPSI Pump P~67A From.LPSI Pump P-67A To Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers To E-60B From E-60B To E-60A From E-60A To PCS Loop lA To PCS Loop lB To PCS Loop 2A To PCS Loop 2B ELC ELC NC LO LC LO ELC ELO. ELO ELO ELO ELC AO NC NC NC NC Manual Over-Ride Capabiiity Manual Over-Ride

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  • Fail As Is Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability Manual Over-Ride Capability

ENCLOSURE 1 TO e

e.

6 ATTACHMENT lA CV3006 To Low Pressure Safety ELO AC Fail Open, Manual Injection Over-Ride Capa-bility CV3001 To Containment Spray NC AC Fail Open CV3002 To Containment Spray NC AC Fail Open

8.

Service Water To CCW And Return: CV0879 AO NC Fail Close CV0949 AC NO Fail Open CV0913 AC NC Fail Open CV0937 To Shutdown Cooling NC AC Fail Open Heat Exchangers E-60A & B CV0938 Redundant To CV0937 NC AC Fail Open 12"-428F-101CC

  • To E-60A LO Manual 12"-428F-102CC To E-60B LO Manual 12"-C428F-103CC From E-60A LO Manual 12"-C428F-104CC From E-60B LO Manual CV0951 AO NC Fail Close CV0950 AC NC Fail Open
9.

Diesel Fuel Day Tank (T-40) To Fire Pump Diesel Driver (K-10): 707-FOS LO Manual l"-703FOS LO Manual

10.

Steam Gene.rato'r E-50A To Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Driver (K-8): 4"-153MS NO Manual 4"-153AMS NO Manual CV0522B NC AO Manual Over-Ride Capability PCV0521A Controls Inlet Pressure NC -For K-8 150FW Bypass For PCV0521A NC Manual FP0884-0002-NL02

ENCLOSURE 1 TO ATTACHMENT lA 7

11.

Safety Injection And Refueling Water Tank To Charging Pumps 3"-N29M2DR-3242 LO Manual M02160 NC Manual Over-Ride Capability 3"-N29M2DR-2089 To Charging Pump P55A LO Manual 3"-N29M2DR-2095 To Charging Pump P55B LO Manual 3"-N29M2DR-2101 To Charging Pump P55C LO Manual

12.

Steam Generator E-SOA To Hogging Air Ejector: CV0510 NO M0510 Redundant To CV0510 NC Manual Over-Ride Capability 6"-14-lOOAE NO Manual CV0633 AC NO Fail Open CV0634 Redundant To CV0633 AC NO Fail Open

13.

Steam Generator E-50B To Atmosphere Via l" Drain Line: 4"-152MS NO Manual 4"-152AMS NO Manual CV0522A AO NC Manual Over-Ride Capability 714 FW NO Manual CV0525 AO NC Manual Over-Ride Capability FP0884-0002-NL02

FP0484-0001C-NL02 ENCLOSURE 2 TO ATTACHMENT lA Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN *POST-FIRE Original Submittal August 10, 1984 1 Page

~LOSURE 2 TO ATTACHMENT fA I ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN POS1-IRE This enclosure summarizes an analysis which determines the limiting time for initiating charging to maintain PCS pressure and inventory *in an appropriate operating range. Calculation assumptions are summarized below. With no AC power available the flow in the PCS will be by natural circulation. No pressurizer heaters are available to control pressure and charging is not available to provide make up. Heat removal will be via the steam generators. Previous calculations have determined that adequate steam removal from the steam generators will be available even without AC power. Assuming that the reactor is maintained at hot standby, the PCS pressure will decay due to ambient heat losses through the Pressurizer and also coolant leakage out of the PCS. The PCS pressure decay was calculated using the RETRAN computer code. Three cases were calculated. All three cases assumed an initial pressure of 1760 psia (2010 psia less 250 psia drop following trip (1)). The three cases differed in the assumed PCS leakage: Case 1 - 15 gpm water leak Case 2 - 14 gpm water leak, 1 gpm steam leak Case 3 - 10 gpm water leak, 1 gpm steam leak The Palisades Technical Spec1fications allow 1 gpm unidentified leakage from the PCS and 10 gpm identified leakage (sec 3.1.5). Also, the PCS flow through the PCP seals is a total of 4 gpm. This flow is to the Volume Control Tank. With no charging, this is the same as a leak from the PCS. Thus, the maximum allowed loss from the PCS will be 15 gpm. Case 1 above assumed that the total 15 gpm leakage is water leakage; whereas, Case 2 assumed that 1 gpm is steam leakage (safety valve leakage). Case 3 is the same as Case 2 except the PCP seal leakage was assumed isolated. Assuming that T hot for natural circulation is 560 degrees (1) the PCS will be 25 degrees subcooled when the pressure is 1378 psia (saturation pressure for 560 + 25 = 585 degrees). Thus, the time to re~ch the 25 degrees subcooling is: Reference Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 3.5 hours 2.45 hours 2.9 hours

1.

CEN-125, Input for Response to NRC Lessons Learned Requirements for Combustion Engineering Steam Supply Systems, December 1979. FP0884-0003-NL02

ATTACHMENT lB Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 FIRE AREA IDENTIFICATION, AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION COVERAGE, AND FIRE DETECTOR COVERAGE FP0484-0001C-NL02 Original Submittal - July 9, 1984 Revision 1 - August 10, 1984 16 Pages

ATTACHMENT lB FIRE AREA IDENTIFICATION, AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION COVERAGE, AND FIRE DETECTOR COVERAGE The attached equipment location drawings have been marked-up to identify fire areas, automatic fire suppression coverage and fire detector coverage in the Palisades Plant. Portions of the fire area are defined by unrated barriers. Exemption requests have been provided in Attachments 4, 5 and 6 for the unrated barriers which serve as fire area boundaries. The attached drawings cross-reference the appropriate exemption request. FP0584-0001F-NL02

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ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS FP0484-0001C-NL02 Original Submittal - April 23, 1984 Revision 1 - July 16, 1984 Revision 2 - August 10, 1984 3 Pages

ATTACHMENT 2 MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS The following changes to previous fire protection commitments provide acceptable alternatives to the original commitments. Item: 1 Submittal Date: May 19, 1981 (Refer to Attachment 1, Item 8(c)) Original Commitment: Revised Commitment: FP0484-0001J-NL02 In order to demonstrate that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety systems the connection of the charging pumps to their normal safety grade sources was to be assured by administrative control and by padlocks. This commitment was made in response to the following NRC concern: "Demonstrate that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety systems, (e.g., new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards in FSAR for elect~ical equipment in the system that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in should also meet the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, the isolation switches should be keylocked, or alarmed in the control room if in the "local" or "isolated" position; periodic checks should be made to verify switch is in the proper position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source for a single failure to cause loss of redundant safety systems." The connection of the charging pumps to their normal safety grade sources is assured by proper administrative control. A system checklist is performed to verify the position of the breakers prior to plant heatups and is controlled by a system operating procedure. The Operations Superintendent may waive completion of the system checklist if a short time.has elapsed since the previous completed checklist and there is sufficient reason to believe that equipment alignment, etc., has not been altered. MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS Item: 2 2 The equipment design prevents the connection of more than one pump to the alternate feed and more than one source of power to a charging pump. In addition, the use of padlocks is considered detrimental should the need arise to realign power sources and is inconsistent with the present plant practice of not locking breakers of safety related equipment. Submittal Date: March 31, 1977 (Page VII-51) Original Commitment: Modified Corrnnitment: Item: 3 Functional diversity is provided for Charging Pumps P-55A, B and C by the three High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps. Adequate protection shall be provided in rooms 104, 104A, and 104B, as described in Attachment 7, to ensure operability of Charging Pump P-55B or P-55C. The High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps are not essential for post-fire safe shutdown. Submittal Date: December 6, 1982 (Response II) Original Commitment: Revised Commitment: FP0484-0001J-NL02 Action for "hot short" causing PORV-1042B, PORV-1043B, M0-1042A and M0-1043A to fail open: Two valves in series must open due to hot shorts in order to result in an impact on the plant. In order to preclude spurious opening of PORV-1042B and M0-1042A, or PORV-1043B and M0-1043A, administrative controls will be revised to require that associated breakers be locked open during power operation. Prior to startup from refueling outage which began August 1983 address hot short as follows: MODIFICATIONS TO PREVIOUS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS FP0484-0001J-NL02 3 PORV valves (PRV-1042B and PRV 1043B) are normally closed. The power circuit breakers will be open but unlocke9. A readily visible placard will be on the MCC cubicle doors and shall state why the breakers must be "Normally Open." The power circuit breakers for PORV block valves (M0-1042A and M0-1043A) will be closed.

ATTACHMENT 13 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III. L. 4 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 LOCAL TENDING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS Original Submittal.;.. August 10, _1984 8 Pages FP0484-0001C-NL02

~ ATTACHMENT 13 ~ EXEMPTION REQUEST - SECTION III.L.4 OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 LOCAL TENDING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS Approval Status NRC review in progress. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4), this exemption request must be resolved prior to startup from the next appropriate outage (60 day planned, 120 day unplanned, or refueling). Equipment Under Consideration Emergency Diesel Generators K-6A and K-6B. Safety Function(s) of Equipment If offsite power is unavailable, the diesel generators are the electric power supply for certain equipment required for safe shutdown. Exemption Request Section III.L.4 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent that personnel must be availabe on-site at all times to implement procedures concerning local tending of a diesel generator. N~cessary Plant Modifications

  • None Implementation Schedule for Modifications None Justification for Exemption Request of this Attachment is the functional description of the procedures to be used to gain local control of the Diesel Generators and selectively load the 2~4 kV buses.

Plant Procedures EOP-10.2, EPS-E-7, and EPS-E-8, are involved. When the Shift Supervisor has decided, in performance of EOP-10.2, that conditions (a Cable Spreading Room fire or Control Room fire at the same time as a loss of outside power) have removed the ability to start a Diesel Generator and keep either the lC or lD 2.4 kV bus energized, he will instruct an electrician (who is available on site or has been called on site upon actuation of the Emergency Plan) to perform either or both Pro~edures EPS-E-7 and/or EPS-E-8. In compliance with those procedures, the electrician will proceed to the Diesel Generator Room where he will open the control cabinet and find instruc-tions, tools, and diagrams necessary to open certain States Terminal Block slide links and close other States Terminal Block slide links. He will then proceed to the 1-C or 1-D Switchgear Room where he will close some States Blocks and open others. (Those States Blocks to be opened are color coded orange and those to be closed are color coded violet.) Then he goes back to the Diesel Generator Room and closes States Blocks as required and opens other States Blocks as required. FP0884-0001-NL02

rAttachment 13 Palisades Plant EXEMPTION REQUEST - August 10, 1984 2 After completing the movement of States Blocks slide links as required, and thus removing the possibility of remote (Control Room) control and marking (designating) the effected breakers (see Enclosure 1), the electrician will report back to the Shift Supervisor that he (the Shift Supervisor) can now start the diesel using local control and selectively load the buses with essential equipment using local control, The Shift Supervisor will then have an operator start the diesel(s), pull the control fuses from the non-designated breakers and rack them out, and then put designated loads on the bus using local control. The aforementioned procedures requiring the movement of slide links are not considered a repair because a repair would cause a condition or state which will allow an apparatus to function. The closing and opening of slide links as described above prevents an apparatus from functioning and is analogous to removing a fuse or tripping a breaker. The NRC has approved the use of slide links at Palisades and has given specific consideration as to whether the use of slide links constitutes a repair. The NRC staff concurred with Consumers Power Company's position that the use of slide links does not consti.tute a repair. (

References:

Consumers Power Company letter dated February 16, 1982 sent to the NRC entitled, "Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Review: Additional Information in Response to NRC Questions" and Part IV of the NRC April 7, 1982response to that letter.) Existence of the procedure described (above) is made necessary by the follow-ing assumptions:

1.

A Cable Spreading Room fire or Control Room fire has destroyed the se-quence loading circuits for both the 1-C and 1-D buses.

2.

Offsite power is not available.

3.

.As the fire propagates, it has caused the remote (Control Room) control wiring to provide a signal (by hot short) to the breakers supplying power to loads connected to the 2.4 kV bus to close, thus causing a simultane-ous starting current of greater value than that required to trip the breaker between the diesel generator and the bus. In addition, the breaker between the Diesel and 2.4 kV bus may have been closed by a "hot short" signal. Conversely, a hot short in the remote control circuit of the Diesel Generator bus supply breaker may produce a trip signa.l and thus prevent the Diesel Generator from energizing the bus. Therefore, one hot short must occur to effect the start of each Diesel; or, multiplied by two, (2 Diesels) two hot shorts must occur before the described procedure is used. From the time a fire is reported and it is determined that the fire threatens safety related equipment, using very conservative time estimates, a maximum of 15 minutes could.have elapsed before the Shift Supervisor declares an FP0884-0001-NL02

'1.Attachment 13 Palisades Plant EXEMPTION REQUEST - August 10, 1984 3 emergency, an electrician will be at the Plant within one hour after the emergency is declared per procedural requirements and EPS-E-7 or EPS-E-8 will be completed one hour later. This is acceptable since very conservative calculation and analysis indicate that use of a charging pump to maintain 25°F subcooling is the most limiting time constraint and will not be required until 2.9 hours after reactor trip. (Refer to Attachment lA.) FP0884-0001-NL02

I 7/30/84 6/22/84 I 5/16/841 4/27/84 Date

  • Page 1 of 5 LAWRENCE ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES Procedure No. 1026-013-LEA Functional Description of Rev. 2 Local Tending of Diesel Generators and Switchgear lC and lD for The Fire Protection.Modification

.for the PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Unit No. 1 Consumers Power Company Changes EOP13 to EOPTO. 2 !.&s. for record per FC407/14E r"'T T ("\\ C: ') ') 1 ~ - Issued for Record Per FC407/14E GW05221 Inc. CPCo Comments *FC407-14E, GW05221 Issued for Review and Comment per FC407-14E, GWO 5221 Description 2 1 0 A Rev. ~.;* ~ t R.£:U t?.Rd R.fi(,tt "t.:££it Eng. {)tp I eµ ~(? Re- !Viewed (J(r> ~p {'~ 1 Project Engr.

1.0 PURPOSE To define and describe the: Page 2 of 5 1026-013-LEA A. Equipment to be locally tended that is required to bring the plant from hot shutdown to cold shutdown condition following a control room or cable spreading room fire that would force a control room evacuation. B. Equipment required to be isolated to allow the equip-ment in Item A to function p:i;operly. C. Methods and procedures to be used for preparing equipment for local tending. 2.0 EQUIPMENT AND METHODS

2. 1 The plant sh al 1 be taken to cold shutdown by locally tending the Diesel Generators and selected 2.4kV breakers on Busses lC and lD.

Breakers on busses lC and lD that are not required to be locally tended will be isolated from their respective Bus and isolated from the control power sourc~ to prevent spurious operation. 2.2 Equipment required to be isolated from its respective 2.4kV Bus is listed in Table 1. This equipment will be isolated in accordance with emergency operating A\\ I -procedure EOP-10. 2 I.D. 152-102 152-105 152-112 152-113 152-114 152-116 152-203 152-205 152-207 152-210 152-211 TABLE 1 Equipment To Be Isolated From Busses ic and lD Service 2.4kV Bus lC Breakers Dilution Water Pump P40A Incoming Breaker Station Power Trans. No. 1-2 Containment Spray Pump P54B High Pressure Safety Inje~tion Pump P66B Containment Spray Pump P54C Component Cooling Pump P52C 2.4kV Bus lD Breakers Incoming Breaker Station Power Trans. No. 1-2 Service Water Pump P7C High Pressure Safety Injection Pump P66A Containment Spray Pump P54A Pressurizer Heater Trans. No. 16

Page 3 of 5 1026*-0l 3-LEA ~I 2.3 Equipment required to be locally tended is listed in Table 2. This equipment will be set up for local tending in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-10.2 and electrical maintenance procedures EPS-E-7 for DGl-1 and Bus lC and EPS-E-8 for DGl-2 I.D. DGl-1 152-103 152-104 152-106 "152-107 152-108 152-109 152-110 152-111 152-115 DG 1-2 152-201 152-202 152-204 152-206 152-208 152-209 152-213 Bus lD. .TABLE 2 Equipment To Be Tendered Locally Service Diesel Generator 1-1, Emergency Power Supply To 2.4kV Bus lC 2.4kV Bus lC Breakers Service Water Pump P7B Aux. Feed Pump P8A Incoming Breaker Start Up Trans. 1-2 Incoming Breaker Diesel Generator 1-1 Swyd. Sta. Power Trans. No. 2 Component Cooling Pp P52A Sta. Power Trans. #13 and #77 Low Pressure Safety Injection Pp P67B Sta. Power Trans. No. 11 and 19 Diesel Generator 1-2, Emergency Power Supply to 2.4kV Bus lD 2.4kV Bus lD Breakers Sta. Power Trans. No. 12 and 20 Incoming Breaker Start Up Trans. 1-2 Service Water Pump P]A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pp P67A Component Cooling Pp P52B Aux. Feedwater Pump P8C Incoming Breaker Diesel Generator 1-2 2.4' The breakers in Table 1 will be isolated from its respective Bus and control power by opening the breaker electrically and removing the 2 sets of DC control fuses for each breaker. If the breaker electric trip is not functiq,nal, the breaker can be tripped mechanically by depressing the mechanical trip device on the front of the breaker. A magnetic caution tag will be placed on the breaker door after isolation to advise personnel of the equipment status. j

~ ~ Page 5 of 5 . 1026-013-LEA 3.4.2 Remove DC control power to DG 1-1 and DG 1-2 by openining the following breakers: 3.4.2.1 72-301 and 72-302 in DllA panel for DG 1-1. 3.4.2.2 72-401 and 72-407 in D21A panel for DG 1-2. 3.4.3 Open and close the color coded states terminal block links in accordance with EPS-E-7 for DGl-1 and Bus lC breakers and EPS-8 for DGl-2 and Bus lD to prepare for local control of equipment. 3.4.4 Install magnetic caution nameplates on breaker and panel doors to notify personnel of the chanEes that have been performed. 3.4.5 Close breakers 72-301 and 72-302 in DllA panel for DGl-1 and 72-401 and 72-407 in D21A panel for DGl-2. 3.4.6 Install DC control fuses in breaker cubicles for all breakers listed in Table 2. NOTE: If control fuses have been blown, replace with spare fuses stored at the switchgear. 3.5 Locally operate equipment as required to achieve cold shutdown in accordance with applicable emergency operating procedures.

r1e 4 of 5 6-013-LEA 2.5 The equipment listed in Table 2 will be prepared for local tending by modifying the control scheme to allow only local control in accordance with maintenance procedures EPS-E-7 and EPS-E-8. Generally the control schemes are modLfied as follows: A. At each piece of equipment states terminal block links, that have been colored orange, will be opened to isolate and cables that enter the control room or cable spreading ~oom. This action will prevent spurious equipment operation if the cables had not been isolated and the fire caused open circuits or hot shorts on these cables. B. At each piece, where applicable, states terminal block links, that have been colored violet, will be closed to short out current transformer circuits or provide continuity through necessary control schemes to provide local control of the respective equipment. This action will provide the necessary control functions and prevent hazardous current transformer failures due.. to an open secondary circuit. A, magnetic nameplate will be attached to the breaker or electical panel door after the modifications to advise personnel of the equipment status. 3.0 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 3.1. Control room or cable spreading room fire. 3.2. As conditions dictate,the Control Room is evacuated. 3.3. The plant is in hot shutdown condition or is to be taken to the hot shutdown condition through the use of the ClSO panel. 3.4. Setup for local tending of equipment listed in Table 2. 3.4.1 Open all breakers on Bus lC and lD and remove the DC control fuses. NOTE: If breakers do not open electrically by using the local control switch, the DC fuses should be pulled and the mechanical trip device located on the breaker should be used to trip the breaker.}}

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