ML18046B297
| ML18046B297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1982 |
| From: | Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.A, TASK-3-5.A, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-078, LSO5-82-2-78, NUDOCS 8202240105 | |
| Download: ML18046B297 (11) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-255 LS05 02-078 Mr. David J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W. Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. VandeWalle:
j' February 19, 1982 fJ(
SUBJECT:
PALISADES - SEP TOPIC III-5.ll, PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT On December 23, 1981~ we transmitted the draft safety evaluation for this topic based on your safety assessment report of August 25, 1981.
By let-ter dated December 30, 1981, you provided Revision 1 to your assessment~
~our letter of February 9, 1982 provided additional information.
Based on the information provided by the above references, we have is-sued the enclosed final topic evaluation. This topic is now complete.
Enclosure-:
Ass Stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page
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PYChen/SEPB 2117 /82 Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL R !:CORD COPY USGP0:19S1-335-960
- Mr. David J. VandeWalle
. cc.
M. *I. Miller, Esquire
- Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secre.tary Cons,umers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company
~~12 West Mic~igan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza
- Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms* Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance
- 5711 Summers~t Drive Mtdland, Michigan 48640
~alamazoo Public Library 315* South Rose Street
~alamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Townshi Route. 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor-(2)
Rooin 1 - CaP.itol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 palisades* Plant ATTN:
Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 Docket No. 50-255 Rev. 2/8/82,.
U. s: Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities*Branch Region V Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 6060' Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195.
Dr~ M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC Pali sades Pl ant Route 2, P. 0 *. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043 James G. Keppier, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illiryojs 60137
SEP EVAtUATION OF PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TOPIC III-5.B FOR PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT..
FEBRUARY 1 982
TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION II.
REVIEW CRITERIA
- III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES
. IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES V.
EVALUATION A. *BACKGROUND B.
COMPARISON OF THE CRITERIA USED IN SPECIAL REPORT-6 WITH CURRENT REVIEW CRITERIA C.
THE EFFECT OF 1979-1981 PIPING REANALYSIS ON POSTULATED BREAK EVALUATION VI.
. CONCLUSION
- 9
I.
INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Systematic Evaluat'ion Program (SEP) Topic III-5.B, "PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT", is to assure that pipe.
breaks would no.t cause the loss of required function of "safety-.
re 1 ated" systems, structu.res and components and to assure that* the plant can be safely shut down in the event of such breaks.
The re-quired functions of safety-re 1 ated systems are those functions re-
-- qui red to mitigate the effects of the pipe break and safely shut *-* --
- down the reactor plant.
Ii: REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criteria 4 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50) requires in part that structures, systems and components imp*ortant to safety be_ appropriately protected against dynamic effects, such as pi,pe whip
~and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures.
""*v The current criteria for review of pipe breaks outside.containment are contained in Standard Review Plan 3.6.1, "Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Sy~tems Outside of Containment",
inc~uding its.
attached Branch Technical Position, Auxiliary System Branch 3-1 (BTP ASB 3-1) and Standard Review __ Plan 3.6.2, "Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulate~
Rupture of Piping", including its attached Branch Technical Position, Mechanical Engineering Branch 3-1 (BTP MEB 3-1 ).
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES 1.-
This revie\\*/ complements tbat of SEP Topic VII-3, "Systems Required for Safe Shutdown".
- 2.
The environmental effects of pressure, temperature, humidity and flooding due to postulated pipe breaks are evaluated under Unresolved Safety Issue A-24, "Qualification of Class IE-Safety-Related Equipment 11
- 3.
The effects o*f potential missi.les generated by fluid Sl)'st*em ruptures
.*and r.otating machinery where also considered and are evaluated under SEP Tcip-ic II!-4.C, "Internally Generated Missiles".
- 4.
The original plant design in the areas of seismic input, analysis and design criteria are evaluated under SEP Topic III-6, "Seismic Design Considerations".
- 5.
NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, "SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR AS-BUILT SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS".
- 6.
NUREG-9737 Item I_I.E.1.1, "AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM EVALUATION"
.*7.
Multi-plant* Issue B-11, "SUSCEPTIBILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED s*YSTEMS TO FLOODING FROM FAILURE OF NON-CATEGORY: I SYST£.MS".
.J IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The licensee's break locition criteria and methods of analysi' for evaluating postulated breaks in high energy piping systems outside containment* have been compared with the currently accepted review criteria as described in Section II above.
The review relied upon information submitted by the licensee* Consumers Power Company (CPCo), in References 1-, 2, 3, 4., 5, 11 and 12.
The scope of review under this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the topic were previously reviewed by the staff or are included under other SEP topics (s~e III above) *
.,When deviations from the review criteria are identified, engineering v~udgement is.utilized to evaloate the consequences of postulated pipe
. breaks to*assure that the pipe break would not cause the loss of the re qui red functions of "safety-re 1 ated" systems, structures and compon-ents and to assure that the plant can be safely shutdown in the event of such a break.
V.
EVALUATION A. BACKGROUND In December 1972, the staff sent letters (Reference 6) to all power reactor licensees requesting an analysis of the effects of postulated failures of high energy lines outside of containment.
In response to our letter, the *licensee submitted earlier revisions of Special Report No. 6 (SR-6) dated*May 1, 1973, July 13, 1973 and July 27, 1973 (Reference 1, 2 and 3).
The staff letters of August* 7, 1973 (Reference 7) and October 9, 1973 (Reference 8) to CPCo approved the licensee's program including facility modifications and the augmented inservice *inspection programs of selected locations for which modifications were impractical.
Since that time, a final revis~on (Reference 4) has been made to the SR-6 report.which summarized the work performed-.between 1973 and 1975.
In the licensee's respons*e to IE Bulletin 79-14 (Reference 9)', all safety piping putside containment of the Palisades nuclear plant was reanalyzed (as-built) and modifications (mainly to pipe supports) were made from 1979 through 1981.
The licensee's SEP reevaluation of pipe bfeak outside containment (Reference 5), therefore, includes the f o 1 1 ow i n g :
- a.
A comparisDn of the criteria used in SR-6 with current HELB criteria.
- b.
The effect of piping reanalysis on post~lated break point~ arid an evaluatio~ of break points ~hich differ from SR-6.
- ... ~'
e**._. B.
COMPARISON OF THE CRITERIA USED IN SPECIAL REPORT-6 WITH CURRENT REVIEW CRITERIA A review of the criteria used in SR-6 versus the currently accepted review crit~ria described in Section JI shows that the criteria used by SR-6 is the same as current criteria except as follows:-***
In SR-6, the licensee has classified high energy fluid systems *as
- those that are maintained under conditions where both the inaxirrum o_perating temperature and pressure exceed 200°F. and 275 psig respect-ively.*. Current criteria define a**line as a high energy system if either the pressure or the temperature value is exceeded.
The licen-see's SEP reevaluation identified two systems wh*ich were excluded from consider~tion by the earlier criteria that would now be considered as high energy systems by* current criteria. These systems* are the 2" reactor coolant letdown piping (normal temperature 120°, pres-sure 470 psig) and two branches (10" and 8"} of the heating steam and condensate pi_ping, wh.ich is designed for maximum service con-ditions of steam at 15 psig and 250°F.
The licensee's assessment.
of the effects of postulated pipe breaks in these two systems con-e 1 uded that the effects were -not significant.
The licensee's assessment of the effects of a break in the letdown piping is provided in reference 11.
Conduits running to some containment isolation valves are located in the vicinity of this line. The valves fail-safe (closed) on
- .loss of power.
Fa'ilure of any piping located in this area that could be a target for th*e*letdownpiping would not impair the plant's ability to shutdown.
Therefore, the effects of a letdown line break are not considered to be.significant.
Wi.th respect to the heating steam system, a discussion of pipe break effects was provided in attachment I of Reference 11.
The licensee has concluded that breaks in the heating steam line will not prevent ~afe shutdown. "This was based on a revie~.of the
. potent.ial consequences of flooding, jet impingement, compartment "
press~rization and environmental conditions.
The effect of heat-ing steam line failure on ventilation equipment was also consid-ered.
Based on a review of the i nforma ti on submitted, we.. have determined that the licensee has provided a valid basis for their conclusion.
2.* In SR-6, the licen~ee did not evaluate the effect of postulat~d breaks in the auxiliary feedwater system because of l6w usage of -
the system.
However, SRP 3.6.2 specifically notes that this piping system is~a ~igh: energy system.
As addressed in Reference 5, sig~
nificant modifications are being made to the.system in the.licensee's response *to. NUREG-0737, items II.~.l.}.. A high:...energy line break (HELB) analysis of this system will be included*as p~rt ~f the de-sign.and analysis effort associated with these modifications.
- 3.
4* -
In SR-6, the-.licensee's pipe whip and jet impingement analyses were based on Bechtel Topical Report, BN-TOP~2 Revision 1, dated Septem-ber 1973.
However,* it should be noted that the jet expansion model for calculating the impingement forces as described in BN-TOP~2 Revision 1 is only applicable to steam or water-steam blowdown.
For water or sub-cooled water blowdown, the current acceptable criteria for jet expansion model is a half angle not exceeding 10 d_egrees.
_This difference of jet expansion model may result in a non-cpnser-
- vative calculation of the jet impingement force from water or sub-cooled water blowdown on a nearby-target.
Further discussion with the licensee, as indicated in Reference 12, found that.the model actl:lally used by the licensee in their analysis* used a half angle.of 10 degrees for sub-cooled. water blowdown, which is in conformance with current criteria. Therefore, this item is resolved.
Current criteria.:al~o require that through-wall leakage cr~cks be postulated in moderate*e~ergy line piping (<200°F and <275 psig).
The effects of failure in non-Category I moderate energy 1 i nes* (MEL) were reviewed by the staff under Multiplant Issue B-11 in Reference 1 0.
The effects of moderate-energy Seismic Category I pipe failures are addressed in Reference 11.
The service water and component cooling.
systems were evaluated to determine whether safety-related equipment could be affected by flooding qr spray from failures in these lines.
The only area where wetting of equipment could affect redundant equipment is in the* intake structure. Although the three service water pumps would not be flooded by pipe failure, they have open dripproof enclosures that would not protect them from direct spray.
It should be noted that the effect of failures of the circulating water system on servic*e-\\'/ater pumps wilf be-addressed under Topic IX-3, "Station Service and Cooling* Water Systems".
The need for design
~hanges to protect the.service water pumps from spray will be evaluated in the integrated plant safety assessment.
In.sumrna.ry, based on the information submitted in References A, 5, 11 and 12, we have.d~termined that the criteria used in the licensee's SEP reeval-uation~are in accordance with currently accepted standards.
e**... C.
THE EFFECT OF 1979-1981 PIPING REANALYSIS ON POSTULATED BREAK EVALUATION Subsequent to complet1on o.f SR-6, large bore safety piping at Palisades was re-analyzed based on "as built" data collected in 1978 an*d 1980.
As a result of this reanalysis performed in the 1979-1981 period, some points of highest combined stresses changed from those points considered by SR-6.
The high stress.,
point relocations have been reviewed by the licensee on a sample
- -basis and found not to be significant, i.e., the reanalyses do n_ot invalidate SR-6 results.
Our:. comparison of the recalculated stress* values as listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 of Reference 5 with those of SR-6, indicates significant difference? in four points of high stress in the feedwater piping system, i.e., node points 35, 40, 56 and 47 (Table 2 of Reference 5). These four node points, which were not considered as break locations by SR-6, would now be co11"sidered as postulated break locations.
However, it is noted that all of the four locations are in the turbine building, which is of sufficient size to--dissipate any energy release without significant pressurization or other adverse environmental effects~
In addition, there are no critical structures or components in the proximity of these locati6ns and, consequeritly, no further analysis is required.
In summary, based on the information '
submitted, we have determined that the effect of, piping reanalyses on postulated break evaluations is not significant and the re-analyses do not invalidate SR-6 results.
VI..
CON CL US ION
-In References 7 and 8, the staff previously approved the information submitted in References l, 2 and 3.
As part of the topi_c evaluation, we have reviewed References 4, 5, 11 and 12, in which the licensee com-pares the criteria in the above references with current ctiteria.
In*
addition,.*we have reviewed the effects of postulated pipe breaks in two systems, i.e~, reactor coolant letdown and heating steam systems which were exclud~d from high ene~gy system. consideratio~ by the li-cerisee' s.criteria used in SR-6.
We have also reviewed the effect of piping reanalyses on postulated break evaluations.
. We have concluded that the licensee's criteria for postulating pipe
- breaks and its method for evaluating postulated breaks in high energy piping outside containment are, in general, in accordance with cur-rently accepted standards.
f'
e**.
6 It should be noted that the licensee has* not addressed the effect of postulated breaks in the auxiliary feedwater system in its SEP eval-uation.
A high energy line break analysis of this system will be included in the licensee's r,esponse to NUREG-0737, item II.E."J.l, 11 Auxil iary Feedwater System Evaluation".
The effects of we.tting or flooding of ser~ice water pumps from failures in piping in the intake structure* are being addressed under Topic I X-3.
The need for additional protection for the service water pumps from sprqy effects will be addressed in the integrated assessment.
I.>
e**...
REFERENCES
- 1.
Special Report-6, "ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE.BREAK t.t' l.i OUTSIDE-CONTAINMENT", Consumer P,ower Company, dated May 1, 1973.
2 *. Revision 1 to Report above, July 13, 1973.
- 3. *Revisfon 2 to Report above, July.. 27, 1973...
- 4.
Revision 3 to Report above, June 30, 1975 *
- 5.
Report*, "PALISADES PLANT SEP TOPIC III-5.B HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONT AI N.MENT", Ccinsumer Power Company, dated August 25, 1 ~81.
- 6.
Letter, A. Giambusso (NRC) to CPCo, "GENERAL INFORMATION REQU.IRED OF THE EFFECTS OF A PIPING SYSTEM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT", dated December 15, 1972.
- 7.
Letter, o. Skovholt (NRC). to R. Youngdahl (CPCo) on* Review of CPCo Special Report-5, dated August 7, 1973.
- 8.
Lett~r~ o. Skovbolt (NRC) to R. Haueter (CPCo) on Augmented Inservice Inspection P.rogram fer High._Energy Lines Outside of Containment, I
I dc::*e_d.Oc.tober 9, 1973.
- 9.
NRC IE B'uJletin 79-14, "SEISMIC ANALYSES FOR AS-BUILT SAFETY-.
RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS", July 2, 1979.
10 *.
Letter, O.M. Crutchfield (NRC) to O.P. Hoffman (CPCo), dated Apri1}0_, 1981.
- 11.
Letter, R.A. Vincent ( CPCo) to D. Crutchfield (NRC), date*d.
December*30, l 981.
12,.
Letter? R.A. Vincent ( CPCo) to D. Crutchfield.(NRC),.dated February 9,, 982.