ML18046B197
| ML18046B197 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1981 |
| From: | Vincent R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.B, TASK-3-5.B, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8201070079 | |
| Download: ML18046B197 (15) | |
Text
consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-0S50 December 30, 1981 Dennis M Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 5 Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - SEP TOPIC III~5.B, PIPE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT By letter dated August 25, 1981, Consumers Power Company submitted its evaluation of SEP Topic III-5.B for the Palisades Plant.
Subsequently, Eileen McKenna of the NRC staff has raised several questions concerning the evaluation, and our consultant has completed some additional work on the subject.
The purpose of this letter is to.respond to the staff questions as well as update the CPCo evaluation of this topic. provides revision 1 of the evaluation of topic III-5.B.
This revised topic evaluation supersedes the document provided in the CPCo letter of August 24, 1981.
As you will note, the most significant changes have been made in the discussion of the heating steam system. provides a listing of staff questions on the topic evaluation and the CPCo responses.
We trust that this information will satisfy the staff's needs, Robert A Vincent Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades ATTACHMENTS
PALISADES PLANT SEP TOPIC III-5.B HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ATTACHMENT 1 I.
INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)
Topic III-5.B, "Pipe Break Outside Containment", is to ensure that pipe breaks would not cause the loss of needed functions of safety-related systems, structures, and components and to ensure that the plant can be safely shutdown in the event of such breaks.
The ~eeded functions of safety-related systems are those functions required to mitigate the effects of the pipe break and safely shutdown the reactor plant.
High energy line break (HELB) analysis for piping systems outside containment at the Palisades nuclear plant was furnished in Special Report.-6 ( SR-6 )', "Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Break Outside Containment", Revision 3, dated June 30, 1975.
The high energy lines were identified therein, and the postulated breaks were assumed based on the mechanistic approach outlined in Standard Review Plans (SRPs) 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and their attached Branch Technical Positions (BTPs) APCSB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, dated.November 24, 1975.
Subsequent to the 1975 HELB analysis report, all safety piping outside containment of the Palisades nuclear plant was reanalyzed and modifications (mainly to pipe supports) were made from 1979 through 1981.
This evaluation includes the following:
~.
A review of the analytical results recorded in SR-6.
- b.
A comparison of the criteria used in SR-6 with cur-rent HELB criteria.
- c.
The effect of reanalysis on break points selected by the mechanistic stress criteria and an evaluation of break points determined by stresses if the break points differ from SR-6.
- d.
Safety evaluation of HELB pertaining to the plant heating system outside containment.
II.
CURRENT REVIEW CRITERIA
- a.
US NRC, SRP 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 and their companion BTPs, APCSB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, dated November 24, 1975.
II-I. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES
- a.
SEP Topic III-4.C, "Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment)"
.b.
SEP Topic III-12, "Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment" Page 1 of 5 Revision 1, December 1981
- c.
Palisades FSAR Volume III, Appendix A, (revised October 24, 1980)
- d.
Palisades Plant Special Report-6, "Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Break Outside Containment", Rev 3, June 30, 1975
- e.
NRC IE Bulletin 79-14.
- f.
NUREG 0737 IV.
EVALUATION
- a.
Analytical results recorded in SR-6.
The criteria used in SR-6 is given on page 1-2 of the report.
Based on the criteria, the report defines safety systems {see page 5-1) and evaluates the results of high energy line breaks outside con~ainment with respect to plant safety.
The report (page 9-1) con-cluded that modifications to the plant were desirable, and these modifications were incorporated in the 1975 time frame.
In general; the safety equipment required for safe shutdown listed by SR-6 {table 4-1) is still valid, i.e., no significant modifications have been made to the plant in this area since 1975.
Also, the lines evaluated in SR-6 appears valid for the criteria used at the time.
- b.
Crite::r:"ia A review of the criteria used in SR-6 versus the criteria given by SRP 3.6.1 shows that the criteria used by SR-6 is the same as current criteria except as follows:
- i.
SR-6 (page 1-2) considered that temperature must exceed 200°F and pressure must exceed 275 psig if a line is to be classified as high energy."
SRP 3.6.1 defines a line as high energy if either the pressure or the temperature values are exceeded.
The onlylligh energy *system involved is the reactor coolant letdown system (see page 6-3 of SR-6).
While the effects of a line break in this 2" line were not evaluated because it was not considered high energy, the break would not have been considered significant by the size and/or location criteria per page 7-1 of SR-6.
Page 2 of 5
- Revision 1, December 1981
- c.
ii.
iii.
Breaks in portions of the auxiliary feedwater system were deemed not credible because of low usage {see page 7-3 of SR-6) whereas foot note 6, page 14 of SRP 3.6.2 specifically notes that the auxiliary feedwater system is a high energy system.
Significant modifications are being made to the system in response to NUREG 0737 commitments.
These modifications will resolve HELB aspects.
Br~aks selected on stress points Certain high energy line breaks were postulated by SR-6 based on calculated stresses.
Breaks were assumed in a pipe run at two intermediate locations of highest combined stresses.
Breaks were also assumed when calculated stresses exceeded 0.8 (Sh+ SA) or the expansion stresses exceeded 0.8 SA.
Subsequent to completion of SR-6; large bore safety piping at P,~lisades was re-analyzed based on "as-built" data collected in 1979 and 1980.
As a result of this reanalysis, some points of highest combined stresses changed from those points considered by SR-6.
The high stress point relocations have been reviewed on a sample basis.
The relocations are small and are not significant with respect to installed restraints, i.e., the relocations do not invalidate SR-6 results.
SR-6 postulated no breaks based on the 0.8 (Sh + SA) or 0.8 SA criteria "(see tables 7-1, 7-2 and* 7-3 of SR-6).
Reanalysis of the postulated line breaks performed in 1979-1981 period resulted in changes in the calculated pipe stress values as summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3, which may be substituted for those of SR-6.
None of these recalculated pipe stress values exceeded the threshold of stress, 0.8 (Sh + SA) for mandatory break location under current review criteria.
Plant Heating System HELB Evaluation The plant heating system is designed for a maximum steam service condition of 15 psig and 250°F and is, therefore, a high energy fluid system according to the criteria of SRP 3.6.1.
A low pressure forced draft boiler with a capacity of 23,830 lbs/hr of steam at 212°F supplies plant heating steam to the auxiliary building, turbine building, and containment as well as Page 3 of 5 Revision 1, December 1981
process heat to safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) heat exchanger, condensate tank heat exchanger, primary makeup storage tank heat exchanger, and domestic water storage tank heat exchanger.
The boiler is equipped with. operating and combustion safety controls to turn the boiler on and off in response to steam pres-sure, water temperature, or water level, and modulate firing rate in response to heat demand.
An additional source of heating steam is LP turbine steam extraction whic.h supplements the boiler.
Piping carrying the heating steam is designed and fabricated in accordance with USAS B31.l.O, 1967 Power Piping Code.
An "effects oriented" approach was utilized to determine susceptibility to plant heating system line breaks.
Break effects considered were compartment pressurization, jet impingement, flooding and environmental conditions of temperature, pressure, and humidity in safety-related areas only.
Heating in the switchgear area (el 625'-0") in the auxiliary building is provided by heating coil VHX-33, located in an adjacent turbine building fan room.
A 4-inch plant heating steam line supplies steam to VHX-33.
This line does not run through the switchgear area and a fuli circumferential double ended break would not create adverse pressurization in the switchgear or cable spreading rooms.
Jet impingement impact on the
!/'-
safety-related equipment is not considered credible
~
because of their physical separation and location.
Flooding in the area would be controlled by existing drainage facilities.
In case of failure of ventilating fan V-33, due to pipe break effects, ventilating fan v~47 could be used to provide ventilation to enable plant shutdown.
A 6-inch heating steam line is currently routed to provide steam to heating reheat coils VHX-17 and VHX-34 (el 639'-0 11
)
for control room heating.
However, proposed HVAC modifica-tions will delete the existing air handling units V-17 and V-34 and the heating coils.
The two new HVAC units will be located in a safety-related area and will not utilize steam for heating.
The existing units and their current heating coils are not located in the control room, and a heating steam line break would not directly affect the control room.
If a break were to prevent operation of the air handling units, safe shutdown could still be achieved as described in the second paragraph of the response to FSAR question 7.8 (FSAR Amendment 15).
Page 4 of 5 Revision 1, December 1981
The fuel handling area (el 649'-0") is heated by heating coils VHX-7A and VHX-7B (El. 651'-0") extracting steam through a 4-inch plant heating steam line.
A break in the heating line would not produce significant pressuri-zation or short-term temperature rise because of the large room volume combined with low steam line pressure.
The line is physically separated from other equipment and structure and jet impingement impact due to a low pressure heating steam line break would not affect the function of any safety-related equipment.
Flooding. in the area would be controlled by existing drainage facilities.
The containment purge supply temperature coil VHX-5 and air room purge supply heating coil VHX-48 extract steam from a 4-inch plant heating_ steam line.
Also, The safety injection 1'-
and refueling water {SIRW) tank heat exchanger draws steam
~
from another 4-inch plant heating steam line branch.
These are in a safety-related area for which main steam line break analyses have been provided in SR-6.
Any break of the low pressure heating steam lines in the area would not create conditions as severe as those already analyzed in SR-6 for main steam or feedwater line breaks.
Thus, the integrity of safety equipment would not be threatened by plant heating steam line breaks.
V.
CONCLUSION Based on the evaluation performed per SR-6 and the above
.discussions, reasonable certainty exists that the Palis_ades plant meets the intent of SRP 3.6.1 and SRP 3.6.2, with the single exception of the auxiliary feedwater system which is being modified per NUREG 0737.
It is also concluded that the low pressure plant heating steam line breaks outside containment would not prevent safe shutdown of this plant.
Since the auxiliary feedwater modifications include HELB considerations, no additional modifications are required with respect to SEP III-5.B.
Revision 1, December 1981
TAlll,F. l CONSUHl\\RS POWl~R COMPANY PALISAIJES NUCLEAR PLANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINHENT -
SUMMARY
OF OPERATING STRESSES (Calculated. 1979-1991)
System:
HAIN STEAH (EB-1-36", EB-1-26")
Point No.
1 2
]
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 ll 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2]
24 25 26 27 28 29 JO Jl 32 33 34 35 Pressure Stress, P 6,459 6,459 6,459 6,459 6,459 6,459 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 8,210 5,1151 8,210 11,210 R,210 0,210 8,210 8,210 5,457 6,459 6,459 6,1159 6,459 6,1159 6,459 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 Weight Stress, W 1,325 3,399 2,992 748 875 1,099 l, 111 1,089 321 321 228 l,459 2,.557 J,372 3,459 1,016 1, 717 911 l 2,25) l,211) 2,973 2, 9119.
912 1, 981 4,532 4,072 l,Olt9 1,007 883 911 424 424 865 1,591 1,288 p + w
- 7. 78" 9,858 9,451 7,207 7,334 7,558 9,321 9,299 8,531 8,531 8,438 9,669 10,767 11, 582 11,669 6,473 9,927 9, l.51 10,1163 ll,'153 ll, 103 ll, 159 6,369 8,4110 10,991 11,331 7,500 7,466 7,342 9,123 8,6]6 8,636 9,077 9,803 9,500 s
(1) h 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500
- 17. 500 17,500 17,500 17,500 l7,500 f7,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,~00 l7,.500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500
- 17,500
.17,500
- 17. 500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 Seismic Stress, S 6,660 3,913 3,865 3,873 J,479 3,425 7,261 5,785 5,831 5,831 5,31]
5,320 5,lt81 7,353 9,872 3,372 10,1179 9,5'>7 5,655 5,2211 6,520 9,429 3,ll3 J,326 3,509 11,020 3,3114 l,795 2,309 4,4111 4,539 4,539 4,108 4,641 3,643 r+w+s 14,41t4 13, 771 13,316 ll,080 10,813 10,903 16,582 1.5,0114 111,362 llt1362 13,751 14,989 16,246 111,935 21,'>4 l 9,Rlt5 20,ft0(1 111,7111 16, 118 1<1,677 17,703 20,588 9,702 ll,766 1'i. 500 15,351 10,852 11,261 9,651 1J,561t 13, 17.5 13,175 13,185 14,444 13,311]
21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,ooo 21,000 21,000 21,000.
21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 Exp11neion StreBB, T 2,9911 6,115 5,336 3,7112 4,592 2,876 5,903 7,519 6,754 6,7.54 5,975 6,026 7,084 7,590 9,901 J,lt50 7,091 6,602 11,509 3,812 7,866 11,016 3,600 2,5116 4,941 5,561 4,0117 3,458 1,133 6,266 7,005 7,005 6,291 6,807 5,822 s
(J) 26,2'>0 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,UO 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 P+W+S+T 17,1130 19,886 18,652 14,862 15,405
- 1),859 22,485 22,063 21,116 21,116 19,726 21,015 23,332 26,525 31,11112 ll,295 27,1197 2'.'i,J20 20,(17.7 20,1109 25,509 31,604 13,302 14,312 19,Mil 20,912 14,899 111,719 10, 78'1 19,8JO 20,1110 20, 180 19,~76 21,251 19,165 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 H,000 35,000 n,ooo 35,000 35,000 35,000 J5,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 Page 1 of 2
I.
TABLE *l (Continued)
HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURF.S OUTSIDE CONTAINHF.NT -
SUMMARY
OF OPERATING STRESSES (Calculated 1979-1981)
System:
MAIN STEAH (ER-1-36*, ER-1-26")
Point No.
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Pree sure Strees, P 8,212 11,212 5,457 5,457 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 8,212 5,457 5,457 NOTES:
Weight Stress, W 1,519 2,472 2,432 1,041 1,124 623 2,765 2,321 809 1,476 3,223 1,469 p + w 9,731 10, 6811 7,8119 6,498 9,336 8,835 10,977 10,533 9,021 9,688 11,435 9,681 s
(1) 17,500 1:7,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,500 17,.'>00 17,500 17,500 Selemlc Strens, S 5,8111 6,373 8,292 4,305 7,476 6,1116 4,968 3,995 3,299 4,605 8,136 3,982
- l. Sh
- A.llownhlo l.lmlt or r + II rr.r Appllr.nhle Code P+W+S 15,612.
17,057 16, 1111 10,803 16,812 15,651 15,945 14,528 12,320 14,293 211,212 13,663 2,
l,2Sh
- Allownblo Limit or P + W + S per Appllcnhlc Code J,
- Allownble Limit of T per Applicable Code 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 F.xpRnAion Stress, T 2,325 4,403 8, 5118 4,320 1,,519 3,976 1,736 1,621 2,609 3,899 5,555 2,687
- 4. 0.8(Sh + SA)
- Threshold of Streee for Hnndntory Drcnk Locntlon in thle Study, AEC s
(3)
_A __
26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 26,250 coNsumrns rowrm COMPANY PALISADES NUCLF.AR PLANT P+w+s+r 17,937 21,460 24,729 15,123 21,331 19,627 17,681 16,149 14,929 18, 192 29,767 16,JSO 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 J5,000 Page 2 of 2
TABLE 2 CONSUMl~RS POW~:R COMPANY HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -
SUMMARY
OF OPERATING STRESSES (Calculated 1979-1981)
Systein:
FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18", DB-1-12")*
POINT PRESSURE
~
STRESS, P l
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 JOA 31 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,707 5,707 5,707 5,707 5,707 51096 5,896 51096 5,896 5,787 5 I 707 5, 787 5,787 51991 5,991 5,787 5,787
.51787
.5,787
.5,787 5,787 WEIGHT STRESS, W 247 12.5 250 200 769 516 71t0 5 71 337 273 25 5(17 1,065 7115 377 903 1,009 302 218 '
773 632 387 126 1,01 3115 1,395 1,459 1,375 1,056 1,087 1,167 P+W 6,034 5,912 6,037 61067 6,556 61303 61527 61358 6,124 6,060 5,812 6,354 6,052 61532 6,164 6,690 6,905 6, 198 6, 114 61560 6,119 6, 174 5,913 6,470 6,336 7, 182
- 7. 2116 7, 162 6 1 8/iJ 6,874 6,9.54 s
(1)
_h __
15,000 15,000 15,000 1.5,000 151000.
15;000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 1.5,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 151000 15,000 15,000 l'5,ooo 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 SEISMIC STRESS, S J, 194 710 172 2,215 21585 1,800 I, 533
.1,648 2,072 2 I 171 1,937 I, 9211 3,603 2,907 l,llli4 21011 3,1123 I 1115 l,013 31255 2,278 31800 1,897 31.512 1,713 5, 165.
J, 9(10 J,828 31892 1,490 J,208 P+w+S 9,228 6,622 6,209 8,282 9, lid 8, 103
. 0,060 8,006 8, 196 0,231
- 7. 71,9 0,211l 10,535 9,439 8,000 81701 10,320 7 1313 7' 127 9,015 8,697 10,0511 7,010 9,990 8,0li9 12 I 3"7 11,206 10,990 10, 73.5 8,364 I 0, 162 l.2Sh{2) 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 181000 I0,000 18,000 18,000 18,000
~
181000 181000 18,000 10,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 161000 18,000 18,000 18,000 EXPANSION STR~:ss, T
. 6, 123 801 493 10,523 10,093 10,191 8,305 41182 3, 123 4,060 2,733 I 15011 61841 51112 J,222 2,6011 z, 1.511 MI 856 842 21J23 J,950 1,682 2,516 806 4,477 3,272 2,651 2, 114 1,364 J,952 s
(3)
A 22,500 22,.500 22,.500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22 1 :mo 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500.
22,500 22,500 22,500 PALISADES PLANT P-fi.l+S+T 15,351 7,423 6,702 181805 20,034 18,294 1614/15 121188 111319 12,291 1011.02
- 9. 7116 17,376 llt,551 11,230 11,305 12,1182
- 7. 951, 7,903 10,657 11,020 14,0011 9,1192 12,506 8,855 16,824 14,1,70 13,641 12,849 9,728 14,114 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 J0,000 30,000 30,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 30,000 30,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 J0,000 Page 1 of 4
_J
TABLE 2 (Continued)
HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT - SUMtlARY OF OPERATING STRESSES (Calculated System:
FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18", DB-1-12")
POINT PRESSURE WEIGllT sh (1).
SEISMIC l.2Sh (2)
EXPANSION
~
STRESS 1 p STRESS 1 W p + w STRF.SS 1 S PtW+S STRESS 1 T 32 5,787 808 6,595 15,000.
3, 19.5 9,790 18,000 4,756 32A 5,787 7.59 6,.546 1.5,000 3,893 10,439 18,000 4,900 33
.5,787
. 6'14 6,431 15,000 4,465
.10,1196 18,000 5,783 34 5,787 557 6,344 15,000 4,720 11,064 18,000 4,995 34A 5,787 1,132 6,919 15,000 6,663 13,.582 18,000 6,399 35 5,787 2,401 B, 188 15,000 7,3115 15,533 18,000 7,R98 36 4,587 490 5,077 15,000 1,635 6,712 10,000 I /150 37 4,567 855 5,442 15,000 3,660 9, 102 18,000 2,679 38
.5,660 I, 128 6,808 15,000 J,695 10,503 10,000 J,695 39
.5,680 l, 170 6,8.50 15,000 4,2114 11,094 18,000 5,916 40 5,680 3,8't3 9,523 15,000
. 8,123 17,6lt6 J0,000 10,622 41 4,587 858 5,445 15,000 2,616 8,061 18,000 4, 114 42 4,567 632 5,219 15,000 3,1168 8,667 16,000 4,325 43 4,587 613 5,200 15,000 3,603 0,110) 18,000 4,317 44 4,567 391 11 '978 15,000 I, 9112 (1,920 rn,ooo 2,26'1 45 4,507 69 11,6.56 1.5' 000 3,012 8,11(16 18,000 5,780 46 5,699 1,302 7,001 15,000 10,205 17,21\\(1 18,000 I0,7<10 0
.5,6110 088 6,.560 1.5,000
.5, I Of1 11,672 10,000 2, 9(11 48
.5,680 768 6,11118 15,000 11, 187 10,63.5 18,000 2.* 010 49 5,680 785 6,1165 15,000
.5,393 11,ll51l 18,000 2,376 50
.5,680
.509 6, 189 1.5,000
.5,396 11,.505 18,000 2,861 1,
51 5,600 220 5,900 1.5,000 4,398 10,209 18,000 2,712 52 5,660 795 6,475 15,000 5,074 11,549 18,000 l,OJ7 53 5,660 188 '
.5,866 15,000 6,155 12,023 18,000.:-
1,695 54 5,680 196 51016 15,000 6,872 12,748 10,000.
1,224 55 5,680 140 5,820 15,000 6,380 12,200 18,000 337 56 5,600 212 5,692 15,000 9,705 15,597.
16,000 J,JIO 57 5,600 1101 6,001 15,000 9,2118 15, 329 10,000 3,919 58 5,600 549 6,229
- 1.5,000 4,916 II,'14 5 18,000 J,503 59 5,680 509 6, 189 15,000 9,023 15,212 18,000 2,723 60 5,680 348 6,028 1.5,000 6,801 12,829 18,000 3,81.5 1979-1981)
SA (J) 22,500 22,500 22,.500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22.~oo 22,.500 22,.500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,.500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 CONS UHF.RS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT 0.8(S 11+sA) (4)
P+W+S+T 14,546 30,000 1.5,339 30,000 16,679 30,000 16,059 30,000 19,981 30,000 23,431 30,000 8, 170 30,000
- 11. 781 30,000 I fo, 190 J0,000 17,010 J0,000 26,268 30,000 12, 175 30,000 13,012 30,000 13, 120 30,000
- 9. Ill'*
30,000 111,2118 30,000 26,0116 30,000 I f1,6J1 30,000 12,6.53 30,000 111,2311 30,000 14,'1116 30,000 13,001 30,000 12,566 J0,000 13, 710 30,000 13, 972 30,000 12,537 J0,000 16,907 J0,000 19,2118
- 10,000 l4,61o8 30,000 J7. 935 J0,000 16,61o4 30,000 Page 2 of 4 e
e
__J
TABLE 2 (Continued)
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT lllGll ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -
SUMMARY
OF OPERATING STRESSl~S (Calculated 1979-1901)
System:
FEEDl./ATER (DB-l-18" & ED-9-18", DD-1-12")
POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT sh (1)
SEISMIC J.2Sh (2)
EXPANSION (l) 0.8(Sh+SA) (4)
~
STRESS 1 p
~~ p + w STRESS 1 S r+w+s STRESS 1 T SA P-+W+S+T 61 S,680 271 S,9.51 1.5,000 7,3.57 JJ,308 18,000 4,333 22,SOO 17,641 30,000 62 63
.5,680 472 6,IS2 1.5,000 8,01.5 14,167
. 18,000 6,236 22,.500 20,403 J0,000 64 S,680 162 S,842 1.5,000 4,2.59 I0, 101.
18,000 3,078 22,.500 13,179 30,000 6S 4,.587 12'*
4, 711 15,000 I, 119
.5,830 18,000 1,218 22,.500 7,048 30,000 66 4,587 268 4,8.5.5 1.5,000 J,9119 8~804 18,000 I, 967 22,500 IO, 771 30,000 67
.5,699 1,4 75 7, 174 15,000.
8,302 15,H6 18,000 4 1386 22,500 19,862 30,000 68 5,680 538 6,218 15,000 3,774 9,992 18,000 3, 91,7 22,500 IJ,939 30,000 69 5,680 333 6,0IJ 15,000 1,865
. 7,878 18,000 2,020 22,.500 9,898 J0,000 70 5,680 332 6,012 15,000
.I, 765
- 7. 777 18,000
.I,516 22,500 9,293 J0,000 71 4,587 2,077 6,664 15,000
.5,363 12,027 18,000 2, 171 22,500 Jlo,190 30,000 72 4,.587 683 5,270 15,000.
930
(>,200 IR,000 (179 22,500 6,1179 30,000 7J S,781 1,1o1 6,228 15,000 147 (o,375 IR,000
.5J5 27.. 500 f1, 111 0
- io,noo 74 S,7117 1,291 7,ono I.~ '000 5, 111 12, 191
. 111, 0110
"* 914 22,.500 17, 105 J0,000 n
s, 707 I, IOJ 6,890 15,000
.5,624
- 12. 5111 111,000
.5,JOO 22,.500 17,1122 J0,000 76 5,707 399 6, 106 15,000 J,012 9, 1911 111, 000 3,52~
22,500
- 12. 723 30,000 77 5,787 6(05 6,452 15,000 3,0111 9,'193 18,000 4,577 22,500 14,070 30,000 78 5,787 620 6,407 15,000 2,840 9, 247 18,000 4,693 22,500 13,9110 J0,000 79 S,787 663 6,450 15,000 2, 191 8,641 18,000 3,ffli5 22,500 12,486 30,000 80 S,787 3111 6, 128 15,000 1,860 7,988 IR,000 H9 22,.500 8,307 J0,000 81 S,187 310 6,097 lS,000 1,500 7,597 18,000 336 22,500 7,93) 30,000 e
82 5,787 626 6,413 15,000 1,209 1,c.22 IR,000 I, 110 22,500 8,732 J0,000 OJ 5,787 1,700 7,487 15,000 5,0J.5 12,522 10,000..
.'1, 2110 22,500 16,802 30,000 83A 5,787 2,JM 8, 151 1.5,ooo 6,817 14,966 10,000 5,51,1 22,500 20,511 J0,000 84 5,787 2 /167 8,254 IS,000 7,077 15,JJl 18,000 4,876 22,500 20,207 J0,000 8.5
- 5. 991 1,056 12,'104 lS,000 3,321 IS,725 18,000 1,363 22,500 17,0118 30,000 86 5,991 8011 6, 1.95 J.5,000 2,212 9,007 18,000 952 22,500 9,959 J0,000 87 5,896 1153 6,349 15,000 1.010 7,359 18,000 1,047 22,.500 8,406
.30,000 88 S,896 334 6,230 lS,000 523 6,7S3 18,000 474 22,500 7,227 J0,000 89 5,896 l,497 7,393 15,000 4,707 12,100 18,000 1,734 22.soo 13,834 30,000 Page J of 4
TABLE 2 (Continued)
CONSUMF.RS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINHF.NT -
SUHHARY OF OPERATING STRESSES (Calculated 1979-1981)
System:
FEEDWATER (DB-1-18" & EB-9-18", DD-1-12")
POINT PRESSURE WEIGllT sh (1)
SEISMIC 1.2sh<2>
EXPANSION SA (3) o.ecsh+sA) (4)
NO.
STRESS 1 P STRESS 1 W p + w STRESS 1 S P+w+s STRESS 1 T P+w+S+T 90 S,896 1,077 6,973 lS,000 11,720 11,693 18,000 2,819 22,500 14,512 30,000 e
91 S,767 900 6,687 IS,000 4, 129 10,016 18,000 S,967 22,500 16,783 30,000 92 S,787 1, 721,
- 7. 511 15,000 3,523 11,034 18,000 6,410 22,500 17,4li4 30,000 93 5,787 l,78fi 7,571 15,000 2,593 10,1611 111,000 2,988 22,500 lJ, 152 30,000 94 S,787 1,801 7,588 15,000 2,950 10,538 18,000 2,387 22,500 12,925 J0,000 95 S,767 2,467 8,2511 15,000 2,935 ll, 189 10,000 6,255 22,500 17,1144 30,000 96 5,787 759 6, 5116 15,000 2,429 8,975 18,000 8,353 22,500 17,328 30,000 97 5,787 1,365 7, 152 15,000 2,515 9,667 10,000 7,197 22,500 l 6,li61t J0,000 98 5,787 1, 431 7,218 15,000 2,585 9,803 18,000 6,398 22,500 16,201 J0,000 99 S,767 1,081 6,868
. 15,000
,2, 955 9,823 18,000 5,212 22,500 15,035 30,000 100 4,475 576 5,051 15,000 1,188 6,239 18,000 1,'130 22,500 7,669 30,000 101 4,475 7311 5,209 15,000.
7,007 12,216 18,000 8,fi311 22,500 20,650 30,000 102 5,707 1,393 7, 100 IS,000 2,728 9,908 10,000 2,056 22,500 11, 9611 30,000 103 5,787 l, 1,2 ~
7,212 15,000 2,0llJ 9,29'.i 10,000 I, 7116 22,500 11,001 J0,000 1011 5,787 I, 275 7,062 15,000 2, 171 9,233 Ill,ooo 835 22,500 I O,Ololl 30,000 105 5,7117 l, 155 6, 9112 15,000 2' 176 9, I IR 10,000 l, 116 22,500 10,2311 J0,000 106 5, 787 I, 996 7,7113 15,000 2,873 10,656 111,000 1,11(15 22.~oo l2, 121 J0,000 107 5, 787 362 6, 149 15,000 942 7,091 18,000 li02 22,500 7,493 30,000 100 5,707 825 6,612 15,000 8,121 14,733 18,000 2,597 22,500 17,330 30,000 109 5,787 825 6,612 15,000 8,121 llo,73J 111,000 2,597 22,500 17,330 30,000 110 5,787 283 6,070 IS,000 4,92/i 10,994 18,000 1,3'12 22,500 12,336 30,000 NOTES:
- l. Sh
- Allowable Limit of P + W*per Applicable*code
- 2.
1.zsh
- Allowable Limit of P + W + S per Applicable Code
- 3.
~A
- Allowable 1.imit of T per Applicable Code
- 4.
o.ecsh + sA>
- Threshol_d of Stres11 for Hondatory Break Location ln this study, AEC Pago 4 of 4
TARI.I~ 3 CONSUNlmS l'OWlrn COMPANY PALISADES PLANT HIGH ENERGY PIPE FAILURE~ OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT -
SUMMARY
- OF OPERATING STRESSES System:
MAIN STEAM DUMP (EB-1-8", GB-19-8")
POINT PRESSURE WEIGHT sh (1)
SEISMIC l.2Sh(2)
EXPANSION SA (3) 0.8(Sh+SA) (4)
NO.
STRESS 1 P STRESS, W P+W STRESS, S P+W+S STRESS, T P+W+S+T 1
2,680 9
2,689 15,000 1,639 4,328 18,000 833 22,500 5,161 30,000 2
2,680 927 3,607 15.,ooo 2,110 5,717 18,000 1,130 22,500 6,847 30,000 3
5,956 225 6,181 15,000 1,091 7,272 18,000 2,610 22,500 9,882 30,000 4
5,956 1,577 7,533 15,000 2,377 9,910 18,000 5,397 22,500 15,307 30,000 5
5,956 932 6,888 15,000 1,113 8,001 18,000 15,565 22,500 23,566 30,000 6
5,956 1,204 7,160 15,000 1,159 8,319 18,000 15,559 22,500 23,878 30,000 7
5,956 l,705 7,661 15,000 1,679 9,340 18,000 9,157 22,500 18,497 30,000 e
8 5,956 1,868 7,824 15,000 1,784 "9,608 18,000 9,687 22,500
- 19,295 30,000 ILt 9
5,956 1,857 7,813 15,000 1,848 9,661 18,000 13,441 22,500 23,102 30,000 NOTES:
- 1)
Sh a Allowable limit of P+W per Applicable Code
- 2) l.2S 11., Allowable limit of P+W+S per Applicable Code
- 3)
- Allowable limit of T per Applicable Code
- 4) 0.8(S 11+SA) *Threshold of Stress for Mandatory Break Locnt.lon in thla Study, Al*:C GrHt~rln
NRC Question 1
Response
NRC Question 2
Response
NRC Question 3
Response
A'ITACHMENT 2 Responses to NRC Questions Palisades Plant - SEP Topic III-5.B Consumers Power Company's letter of August 25, 1981 on Sep Topic III-5.B, contains some inconsistencies in Table 3.
These errors have been corrected and the correct values for points 8 and 9 for the Main Steam Dump line combined stresses P+W and P+W+S+T are in the attached Revision 1 of the topic evaluation.
The August 25 submittal also states a pipe break in the 2 inch letdown line outside containment is not significant because of the size and location criteria discussed on page 7-1 of SR-6.
Provide a discussion.
A reanalysis has verified the statement.
Review of the electrical drawings shows no electrical cable trays in the penetration area.
However, where the 2 inch letdown line is located, conduits running to several containment isolation valves for power and position indicators enter the area.
The isolation valves of interest are solenoid operated control valves which close on loss of power and loss of air.
Loss of the circuits or air supply lines is therefore in the fail safe direction.
The piping and containment penetrations for the isolation valves are also located in this area (602' elv pipeway).
The valves and piping from these adjacent systems might be a target for an interaction with the letdown pipe should it fail.
The letdown system outside containment contains less energy than the primary system since.this portion of the line is downstream of the letdown orifices and the letdown heat exchanger.
Any highly improbable failures of the piping associated with adjacent systems due to interactions with the letdown system would not be significant and would not inhibit the plant's ability to shutdown or maintain a shutdown condition.
The adjacent systems in the area are; the drain line from the primary system drain tank, primary coolant controlled bleed off, inlet to waste gas surge tank, discharge line from degassifer pumps, and the discharge receiver tank line.
Topic III-5.B, Pipe Break Outside Containment, is to include all pipe breaks, high energy and moderate energy lines.
The August 25, 1981 submittal by CPCo only addresses*high energy line breaks.
Previous information has been supplied covering moderate energy non-seismic systems outside containment but an analysis including moderate energy line breaks of seismic catagory I systems has not been included.
What is the effect of such breaks and are they bounded by the information already supplied?
There are two systems outside containment which are moderate energy seismic catagory I systems.
They are the Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Service Water System (SWS).
The CCW pumps are rated at 8000 gpm at 140 feet 01' head (.-61 psig) and the SWS pumps are rated at 6000 gpm at 164 feet of heat (........ 72 psig).
The systems have piping runs in several areas, some areas of which are common to both systems.
Flooding consequences f'or the safeguards rooms and areas which communicate with the safeguards room, via floor drains to the radwaste sumps or through grating from areas above
ATTACHMENT 2 Palisades Plant 2
December 30,.1981 the west safeguards room, are no more severe than the flooding effects of the analyzed fire system breaks.
Analyses of fire system breaks has been previously supplied to the NRC.
Either safe-guards rooms (east or west) could be flooded above the level where*
equipment could become inoperable, but redundant equipment would remain available in the adjacent safeguards room which is sealed with a water tight door.
An indication of flooding or excessive drainage to the Toom sumps would be provided by the sump high level alarm.
The largest break in either the SWS or CCW system will result in a flow rate of approximately 700 gpm, based on a slot break for a 24 inch line with the slot size area equa.J_ to a circular opening with an area 1/2 dia of pipe by 1/2 wall thickness of pipe.
Moderate energy line breaks in the CCW room are considered less severe than a feedwater line break (SR-6, Section 8.6 & 8.7).
Therefore the flooding and wetting effects in the CCW room were not analyzed for these moderate energy line breaks.
Breaks of the SWS in the intake structure will not result in equipment flooding.
However BTP MEB3-l requires assuming all unprotected components are wetted within the compartment.
This could affect all three service water pumps.
The SWS pumps have open dripproof enclosures that will not protect the motors from direct water spray.
Wetting of equipment in other areas will not cause failure of redundant equipment as is the case with the SWS pumps.
Because of the large flow rates for the.SWS (8000 gpm per pump with two pumps in.normal operation) and CCW, (6000 gpm per pump with one pump in normal operation with one in standby), it is unlikely the cooling functions of either system would be affected significantly by slot breaks unless the postulated break occurs on a branch connection supplying specific equipment.
For example a break in a 2 inch service water line to the control room air conditioning unit may cuase some loss of cooling (break flow rates would be about 35 gpm).
'I'he second control rGom cooler, however, is supplied by the redundant SWS line; therefore the cooling function is not lost.
Wetting of both control room air conditioning units is again possible, but loss of function of both units will not inhibit safe shutdown of the plant.