ML18046B180

Forwards Safety Evaluation for SEP Topic V-11 B,Rhr Interlock Requirements.Suction Valve Control Circuit Design Satisfies General Criteria But Not Btr Rsb 5-1

ML18046B180
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	12/24/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-05-11.B, TASK-5-11.B, TASK-RR LSO5-81-12-073, LSO5-81-12-73, NUDOCS 8112310247
Download: ML18046B180 (13)

Text

... i December 24, 1981 Docket No. 50-255 LS05 12-073 Mr. David P. Moffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201

SUBJECT:

PALISADES - S2P TOPIC V-11.B~ RHR INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS The attached staff safety evaluation report has been revised to reflect the staff's conclusion that the design of the suction valve control circuits does not satisfy BTP RSB 5-1, but does satisfy the General Desi-gn Criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.

We now,consider the safe shutdown system evaluation to be completed satisfactorily. This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment_ is completed.

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page

( 8112310247 8112'"'4 ~.

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PDR, SEPB* Dlb SEPB:D Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGP0:1981-335-960

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UNITED STATES

• • e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No, 50~255 LS05....Sl ~ 12-073 Mr, D~vtd p, Hoffm~n WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 24, 1981 Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company

. 1945 W Parnall Road Jatkson, Michigan 49201

SUBJECT:

PALISADES~ SEP TOPIC V~ll,B, RHR INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS The attached staff safety evaluation report has been revised to reflect the* staff"s conclusion that the desi*gn of the suction valve control circuits does not satisfy BTP RSB S-1, but does satisfy the General Design Criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.

We now consider the safe shutdown system evaluation to be completed sattsfa,ctorily. This evaluation will be a basic input to the "integrated safety asses*sment for your fac*n ity. This assessment may be revi*sed in the future if Your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is* completed..

~ncl os*ure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next p.a,~e-Sincerely,

~1(??'~

f' Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operati_ng Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

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Mr *. David P. Hoffman cc M. 1. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite* 4200 '.:

one Fi.rst National Pla.za

. Chicago, *11Hnois

• 60670 :*

Mr.. Paul A.. Perry, Secretary

• Consumers Power Coinpany 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49~01 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M*. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois* 60611 Ms. Mary P. Sinclair G.reat Lakes* Energy Al 1 i ance 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public Library 315 South R~se Street Ka 1 amazoo, Mi chi gan 49006.

Township Supervisor Covert Township Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren Cou.nty, Michigan. 49043 Office of the Governor (2)

Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michjgan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Pa1i sades Pl ant ATTN:

Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043

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Charles Bechhoefer. Esq~;; Chairman:*<.*-~** *.....

• Atomic Safety-and Licensing Board_.":..-.-*_.* :~

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Dro M. *stanley Living$ton-_".., *_ -

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Resident Inspector

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Palisades Plan't-Route 2, P. O. Box 155 Covert, Michi~an 49043

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I.* INTRODUCTION

• e ENCLOSURE FINAL E&C EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC V-11.B RHR INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS PALISADES Docket # 50-255 The purpose of this.evaluation is to ascertain the degree to which the Palisades design complies with review criteria that deal ttith the interface between the high pressure primary cool ant system and the low pressure shutdown cooling system (RHR system): Review criteria, review guidelines. and review areas, to be covered in this evaluation, are defined in section* II and IV.

Review areas. that are not covered, b.ut are related and essential to the _

completion of this topic, are covered by other SEP topics defined in Section III.

SEP topics are defined in the Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Operating Facilities, dated November 25, 1977.

This topic evaluation report is limited to identification of compliance to review criteria, identification of deviations from review criteria, and identification of any viable corrective measures for each. deviati~n identified.

An integrated system assessment of the identified.

deviation's significance and recommendations as to the imposition of corrective measures are outside the set>pe of this rep~rt and will be the subject of a subsequent report~ The implementation of corrective

• design measures will be evaluated and reported by others.

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II.

REVIEW CRITERIA

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Review criteria that govern the* subject safety topic are identified in section*

7.6 (Rart II) of NRC standard review plan.

I II.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Related.Safety Topics*

• The following listed review areas are not covered in this report, but are rel~ted

~nd essenti-al to the cor:ipletion of this topic. These review areas are covered by other SEP topics as indicated below:

1.

The capability of the isolation components (motor operator, interlock, sensor -for friterl ock, and associated cables) to function during and after design ba_si s events, such as earthquakes and anticipated 'operational occurrences, are addressed by SEP topics III-6 and III-12;

2.

The capacity and reliability of the isolation components to perform their intended safety function on demand is addressed by_SEP topics XVII, XVI, and VI-lOA;

3.

Capabi"lity of the containment heat removal and pr~ssure control system to maintain a controlled environment for safety related instrumentatiQn and electrical equipment located inside containment is covered by topic VI-3;

4.

• Technical specification requirements are covered by topic XVI;

5.

System testing and surveil 1 ance requirements* are covered by-top'ic VI-lOA~

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6. The adcqu~cy of the quality assurance program 1s cover£d by topic XVII;

7. The ECCS actuation "system is covered by topic VI-7A3. and VI-1-2; and

8.

Protection of the Class lE components from design basis events such.as flooding, missiles, pipe breaks, and fires are covered by topics II-3, III-4, III-5, and IX-6.

Interfaces The following SEP to pi cs interface with and are dependent on this topic's information for their completion:

Topic II-3.B, II-4, IIl-1, III-3.B, III-4, III-5, III-6, IU-12, V-10.B,. VI-7.C, Vl-10, VII-3, XVI, and. XVII.

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES*

The purpose pf this evaluation is to ascertain the degree to which the Palisades design complies with review criteria.that deal with the interface between the high pressure primary cool ant system and the-_ low pressur*e_ shut-down cooling system (RHR system).

The review area to be covered in this report includes the eva 1 uat ion of electrical i sol at ion components (motor-oper_ated valve controls, interlocks, sensors* for interlocks. position indicators, power sources, and associated cables}.

The review establishes. 1} that the sensors for the interlocks are suitably._ independent and diverse, 2) that a trip sign~l.

closes the motor-operated valves when the pressure is _too_.high, 3) tha~ the interlocks prevent the motor-operated valves from opening *unless the high pressure system pressure ;s below the low pressure system's design pressure. 4) that the valves_.**

a re powered from redundant power sources, 5) that the A£ and DC power source for

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- 4 each va*lve',s associated interlock. controls, position *i~~H~ation~* ancf'~oto~

are powered from the same Cl ass I division, and 6) that. tiae* associated. *.

• redundant control power, instrument, and-interlock cables* have adequ~te physical separation.

Revi'ew guidelines that address this topic's defined review area are delineated ~in the following sections of lt'RC. Standard Review Plan:* Sections 5.4.7 (Branch Technical Position RSB 5-li). 7.6 (pa.rt Ill),

and Appendix 7A (Branch Technical Position ICSB-3).

I Review gui del in es that address physical separation of po~. instrumentation, and control cables are defined in Reg1:1latory Guide 1.75, amid IEEE standard.*

384.

These physical *separation guideli.nes are included~ vrit.h this topic review.

Additional review guidelines.for cable separation are defined in section 9.5.1, Appendix A, positions D.1.(a).(2) and D~l.(c) of the NRC Standard Revi'ew Plan.

Deviations from 9.5.1 position guidel_ines have been judged significant.

The NRC staff requires backfit to correct the deviations

• for a*l 1 operating pl ants. *!dent i fi cat ion Of de vi at ions SOO implementation of corrective design measures are being done by others. Refer to the Palisades fire hazards analysis, the NRC Fire Protectiom Safety Evaluation Report, and any supplements thereto for i dent i fi cation of compliance to and deviations from 9.5.1 guidelines~

V.

EVALUATION The Palisades-shutdown cooling system is a low pressure* residual heat.removal system loca:ted outside of containment.

The system is is;ll!'>'llated from the high*. *

• pressure system by two motor-operated valves on the suction side and. by two check valves in series with a motor operated valve on the-discharge side of the system..

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• e e.. A simplified.diagram of the shutdown cooling system is ~~esented* in'~igure *

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The diagram is based on Palisades piping and iristrument diagrams M-201,

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M-203,. and M-204.

The follo\\1ing evaluation is based on this *simplified diagram and information presented in the Palisades FSAR.

S~ction Side Isolation To isolate the suction side of the low pressure system from the high pressure system, two motor-operated valves lMO 3015 and MO 3016) are provided in series.

Valve position is indicated in the control room.

Power is provided from re-dundant divisions.

Failure o"f the power supply will not cause any valve to change position.

Two administratively controlled key locked hand switches are provided in the control room.

The *review guidelines also require independent and diverse interlocks to prevent these valves-.from being opened unless the high pressure system pressure is below the low pressure system design pressure.

For Palisades the interlock function is provided by a single pressure switch for both valves.* The pressure switch

{PS 0.104) senses the pressu.re in the primary system pressurizer and is normally open so that control power is disconnected when pressurizer pressure is greater than the desig~ pressure of the low pressure system.

Control powe*r is required to energize the main contact6r and thus open the valve. The Palisades design,*

therefore, has only a single pressure switch interlock. Th1s is a deviatjon. **

from review guidelines. *This deviation, could be corrected by the installation o~ an additio~al pressure switch interl~ck t~at is independent and diverse from the existing pressure switch interlock.

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The review g_uidelines also require that both valves receive-a signal to close'-

automatically \\1hcnever primary system pressure exceeds the.1ow p.ressure system's* * * ;

d~sign.pressure. The Palisades design does not provide th,is automatfc close*

signal anct therefore, devi_ates from the review guidelin~s defined *~n'Section IV.

However, as a result of our review of )"opics V-3-and V--10.B,".

the st?ff finds that the overpressurization protection system provides an alternate and acceptable design.

The review guidelines also require that the cables (power, instrumentation, and control) associated with these redundant isolation valves be separated by a three-

. hour fire rated barrier or equivalent.

The Palisades ~able ra:eway design routes*

cables in a two raceway system separated by only one_ foot vertical air space separation.* The one foot separation is a deviation from review guidelines defined in section IV.

The NRC staff has judged this deviation significant and has required corrective design measures.

The implementation of corrective measures is being evaluated by others as part *of our generic fi-re protection review.

Refer to Palisades fire hazards analysis, the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, and any supplements thereto.for identification *of compliance to, deviation from, and corrective design measures required for this deviation.

Discharge Side Isolation To isolate the discharge side of the low pressure shutdown cooling system Jrom the high pressure primary coolant system, the Palisades design provides two check valves in series with a normally closed motor-operated valve. *The position of the:*,,*

motor operated valve is indicated in the control room.

This-meets review guidelines-defi ned in section IV.

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An interlock is currently required on opening.upon pressure.is above the de~ i gn pressure ~f° the 1 ow pre~~u~; sy~~~~--:~ ~?p~-1-~~a*d~'.~~~:'.:;_}'{'

design does not. provide the subject interlock.*. This i~ a. deviation--n,;~~~r~~~,~~-/--:}.;:_

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• gui.del'ines defined in section* IV.

This deviation. could be correc~ed.,y_ installa-

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tion of a pressure switch sens~r and interlock.

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It is also currently required that the motor-operated valve rece.ive a signal to.

.. close _automatically whenever -the high pressure systein press~re ~~- t~ *10\\ll

• pres's'ure system's design pressure~ The staff, for the* reasons stated in our,

discussion of the suction side;* find the *present design acceptable~-.~ In addition, the Palisades design includes two check valves whith are periodically tested_ to assure isolation.** However, the check valves do not have po~ition indication.

VI.*. CONCLUSION

.. l. The Pali sades design currently depends on a single-- pr.. essure interlock and two key switch.*interlocks tQ. maintain isolation on.the ~uction side of 'the low pressure shutdown cooling (SOC) system.

This *iS a deviation from re-

_ view _gui del ~ nes but need not be correcte*d because the,Present design sat-isfies the criteria prese~ted in Appe~dix A to 10 CFR 50.

2 *. The discharge valves are evaluated in SEP Topic VI-11.A.~: *.-

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3.

The Palisades design currently routes cable associated with the two su~tion side isolation valves in a two raceway system separated by only *one foot separation~ This one foot separation is a deviation from review guidelines.. Thisr.concern will be considered as a part of the staff 1 s review of compliance with Appendix R.

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