Text

Forwards Safety Evaluation & Final Draft Technical Evaluation for SEP Topic VIII-4 Re Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment.Util Commitments Are Acceptable
	ML18046A845
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/31/1981
From:	Crutchfield D; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Hoffman D; CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
	TASK-08-04, TASK-8-4, TASK-RR LSO5-81-07-101, LSO5-81-7-101, NUDOCS 8108050306
	Download: ML18046A845 (19)
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July 31, 1981 Docket No. 50-255 LS05 07-1 01 Mr.David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Pow.er Company 1945 W Parna:ll Road Jackson~ Michigan 49201

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VUI-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER STATION)

Enclosure l is the staff's safety evaluation report for SEP Topic VIII-4.

The basis for Enclosure l f s given in Enclosure 2.

Enclosure' 2 is our con.tractor's technical evaluation that has been revised by the additional 1nfonnat1on and comments provided in your letter of June 15, 1981.

Enclosure l is the staff's position with regard to the acceptability of the electrical penetrations for your facility. The staff has concluded that your co1TUTI1tments to assure that your facility meets current licensing criteria is an acceptable basis for-considering this topic complete.

Enclosure:

As*stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page

-~ -

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 -

Division of Licensing

. ~-1 I

8108050306 810731

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PDR ADOCK 05000255 E_ _________ PDR

Mr. David P. Hoffman cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Co~any 212 west Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan.49201 Judd l. Ba~on, Esquire Consumers Power Co~any 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 0 n e I BM P 1 a z a Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms. Mary P. Si nc 1 air Great lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive

Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Township Route 1, Box 10

Van Buren County, Mich'igan 49043 Office of the Governor (2)

Room 1 ~ Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Palisades Plant ATTN:

Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 I

u. S. Environrrenta1 Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch*

Region V Office ATTN:

EIS COORDINATOR 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604.*

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrrnission Washington, D. c.

20555 Dr. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Qr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

. Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box 87 South Haven, Michigan 49090

ENCLOSURE 1 SEP TOPIC VIII-4

~~* ft.E\\:TRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REAGTOR CONTAIN:v\\ENT J.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Topic VIII-4, "Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment, is to assure that all eletrical penetrations in the contain-ment structure are designed not to fail from electrical faults during a high energy line break.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) the NRC staff performed an audit, comparing sample containment electrical penetrations in SEP facilities with Current licensing criteria for protection against fault and overload currents following a postulated accident.

II.

REVIEW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Section 2.0 of EG&G Report 0072J, "Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment."

In addition, in licensing new plants, the staff requires compliance with the recommendations of ~egulatory Guide 1.63 or an acceptable alternative method.

For each containment electrical penetration, the protective. systems should provide primary and backup circuit protection -devices to prevent a single failure in conjunction with a circuit overload from impairing containment integrity.

The primary and backup protection devices must have trip time vs. current response characteristics which assure protection against

~enetration failure.

~he protection devices are to be periodically tested to verify trip setpoints and adequacy of response.

No single failure should al lo~ excessive currents in the penetration cond~ctors that will degrade the penetration seals.

Where external control power is used for actuating the protection systems the power for primary and backup breakers should be derived from separate sources.

Overcurrent signals for tripping primary and backup system devices should be electrically independent and physically separated.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERrACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under the related Topic III-12, Environmental Qualification.

The related t~pic re~ort contains the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subJect matter.

Theoretically, there are no safety topics that are dependent on the present topic information for their completion, hov1ever the res.ults of the present topic have a definite impact upon the capability of equip-.

ment inside of containment to function after a high energy line break.

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3.0 of EG&G Report 0072J, 11 Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment.

11 V.

EVALUATION As noted in the EG&G Report on this topic with a LOCA environment inside containment, the backup protection for some penetrations do not conform to the current licensing criteria.

However, the licensee has implemented a corrective program which is described in their June 15, 1981 submittal.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS As a result of our review we have concluded that a suitable program is in place to assure that the low voltage ac and de penetrations conform to the current licensing criteria.

We also have concluded that the present design of the medium voltage penetrations is acceptable.

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General Ottlc:ea: 212 West Mlc:hlgen Avenue, Jackson, Mlc:hlgen 49201 * (517) 788-0550 Ju.."!e 15, 1981 Di~ecto~, Nucle~r neactor ~egula~icn Att ~tr Dennis M Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors 3rancb No 5 US :\\ruclear Ee~u.lato::-y

~ashington, DC 20555

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vO!!l!!U SS 1 on DOCKET 5C-255 - LIC.c;l'ISE: I:-?R PALISADES ?!JI.NT - SEF TOPIC VIII-4, ET":'C'SICAL PENZ':'RA'IIONS OF REAC'I'OR

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5t~~~ ~icensi~g E~gineer Ct Director, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades pages I

ol

RESPONSE TO OPEN ITEMS NRC LETTER DATED MARCH 26, -1981

!te!!l l 3ackup Protection for Low-Voltage AC and DC Penetrations

Neither the tY}:licaJ. low-voltage ac penetration nor the de voltage penetration co:nplies w"'ith the acceptance criteria as descri"oed. in Section 2.0 of the sub*-

ject SEP topic.

In both cases, the pri.:na..ry interrupter opens the circuit prior to the time at vhich the penetration reaches its li!:U.tin.g te!!lperature.

'The pri!:lary interr..ipters open in app:::-oxilllately five cycles (0.08 seconds).

~e secondary (backup) interrupt devices, hovever, would fail to trip prior to t~e penetration reaching its limiting te!!lperature of 302°c ~"'ith the ;ostu-lated. ccmbinaticn of faults and failure of the pri=iaI"J interrupters.

In the case of the lov-voltage ac penetration, the ti:lle re~uired for the penetration to heat up to its lim..i ting t~perature durir:.g the fault has -oeen calculated to be 1.14 seconds.

The secondary interrupter actuates apprcx.i-m.ately 200 seconcisafter the fault occurs.

I~ the case of the de penetration, the til:J.e required for the penetration to heat up to it3 l'~iting temperature during the fault condition has been cal-c'..!lated to be 8.95 seconds.

The secondary inter:-u~ter actuates approxi~ately 23 seccnds after the fa'..!2.t occurs.

Because ~he probaoility that a primary

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Yl:is effcrt is ~~:;:~ecteC. to be cc*opletei:i *'J7{ *..\\.ug-..is-: l, :981.

2..

ContTcl and instr~e!:.t circui t.s *irrh..ich pe?:etra.te ::Jntair...:meni:

.. rill *:>e di*ii*ied :.:-.to g:""Oups of si:lilar c:.=cui.ts *and a ~epre Seni:i..ti...,.e sample *N.-:.1;. be selected. :"'rem eac!l STOtrp.

For each sc.m~le ci:-cu.i t

=..n e,:a..l";.:at :..on si ~1 lar 'to -:ha.t :.esc::i 'bed :..Oo~re f~r yo~e~ ~i=c~~~s ~ill be ?er~c!"':ned.

~ adG..it~on, inde~en d.e!:!C e o:~ :iow-e!" suw:ilies used. :'or -:ri :::pin~ :?ri::l.ary <:.:ld -:a.ckup

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-:z"'~srts *..til..:. :""0.Ll..o'-'* the ?Oi:e!"' ci:'c:.:i ~ -e"ral:la-:ions, az:.d

..re ex;ec-:ed. to *:JP c~?:;:::leted. *"Jy Oc::.cbe~ l, l.?81.

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3.

,CU;l-. evaluation of the a.deq_uacy of -the Palisades Pla::i.t ove?"current

,----pr-otection su_-veillance testing program *.;ill be pe::-fcr::ed to verify that all appropriate ci?"cuit protective C.evices are in-cluded and t~at testing methods a.::ld frequencies are adequate.

This effort is ex'.?ected to be col!l?leted oy Octobe?" l, 1981.

4.

Folloving the evaluations discussed aboYe, a st:mm.ary of the results, our conclusions and their bases, and a discussion of any ~edifications vhich i!la.Y be dee!!led necessary will be sub-

~

tted to the NRC.

'Tilis report is expected to be submitted :y October 15, 1981.

It is our belief that the above program is fully responsive to the ~IBC's concerns.

we also feel that even though the schedule w"ill re~uire a sub-2

, stantial effort to asse!!ible the necessary d.ata, develop necessa....-y computer i::.odels, and perfor:!l and reTiev the analyses, it is a. schedule *.;hich will a..l.lov our conclusions to be based en detailed technical eviluations rather than subjective judge:nents.

Ite!ll 2

?:-otection of ?ara.Ll.el Conductors e.nd Seals if ~ Open Circuit Should.

Develop T".::i.e !'echnical E:val'..l.aticn of Topic V:II-4 indicates that t*.;ro parallel pene-tra.tions are used ~o supply paver to each pr;~a...-y coolant pump motor.

re<>iity, e::.c:;. pr"'ary coolant :9'..l!:lP ::ictor u~ilizes a. single penetration

e: :et.:::.t :.ons that suppl:r the otter (see se"Da=a.te frcr:.

?e~~e~e~ce 2).

the overload concer~s,,--" C.esc::-:.~ed. in t~e SZ?

valuation C.o D.ct e:pp2.y :o tie ?alisades ?l9.. :i::.

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)
6 1
REFERENCES Reference Descrintion WASR-1400, "Reactor Safety Study," October 1975, USNRC, Append.ix III, Table III 2-2 (Page III-11/12)
Consumers ?ower Company Drawings E-31, Sh 28, Rev l; E-610, Sh 10, Rev l; E-610, Sh 11, Rev O; E-610, Sh 14, Rev l; E-610, S"n 15, Rev O; E-610, Sh 12, Rev l; E-610, Sh 13, Rev O; E-610, Sh 6, Rev land E-610, Sh 7, Rev 0 (Attached)
Consumers Power Campany Drawing E20*950 BB2, Sh.l-3 (_Viking Industries, be Dra-w"ing 23,0000-0005C) "Electrical Penetration
'r<.rpes P-1 and P-2, Master" (Attached.)
Viking Industries Inc Engineering Infer.nation and Price Proposal for Electric Penetrations per Bechtel Speci~ication 5935-E-20, Section 3, "Design Discussion" Standard Eandbook for Electrical Engineers, Fink and Carroll, 10th Edition, ?age 4-198, Tabel 4-80 "Some T".rpical Enamel-Insulated Wires"
";v.!..4.-250.Cl..ir fl2gnetic Circuit 3reaker Design 'I'est Data", Allis-Cne...l~ers S*~*ritc!lgear Di~rision as Signed *oy *-:ti n Lar1e, PE, i*l:!:11c.5er of ~n.gineer:.ng, Septenber 9, 1975
SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION TOP IC VI I I -4.
ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT FINAL DRAFT Revision l PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION Docket No. 50-155 July 1981
.l:.
oonJ 7-2-81
CONTENTS l.0 INTRODUCTION *.. * * * * * * * *.. * * * * * * * * * *. * * * * * * *. * * * * *... * * *. * * * * * * *
T 2.0-*--GR-l-TERIA :.****** * ****.*.******.***** *-.~ **.** ~..*.*****..*** :......
2 3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION * * * *. * * * * *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *. *.. * * * * **.
3 3.1 Typical Low Voltage (0- lOOOVAC) Penetration * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
4
3. l. l Low Voltage Penetration Conclusion * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
5 3.2 Typical Medium Voltage (~1000 VAC) Penetration. * * * * * * * * * *
5 3.2. 1 Medium Voltage Penetration Evaluation **.***********
6 3.3 Typical Direct Current Penetration ************************
6 3.3. 1 Direct Penetration Evaluation * *********************
6 4
0 SUM MARY ********************* * *********************************** !
7
5. 0 REFERENCES * * * * * * * * * * *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * *. * * *.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
8
SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION TOPIC V-LII ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This review is part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), Topic VIII-4.
Consumers Power Company (CPC) has provided information (Refer-ences l, 2 and 3) describing typical penetrations, typical in-contiinment loads, and fault currents.
The objective of this review is to determine the capability of the overcurrent devices to prevent exceeding the ~esign rating of the electrical penetrations through the reactor containment dur-ing short circuit conditions at LOCA temperatures.
General Design Criterion 50, "Containment Design Basis" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear. Power Plants" to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that penetrations be designed so that the containment structure.
can, without exceeding the design leakage rate, accommodate the calculated pressure, temperature, and other environmental conditions resulting from any loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
IEEE Standard 317, "Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", as augmented by Regula-tory Guide 1.63, provides a basis for electrical penetrations acceptable to the staff.
Specifically, this review will examine the protection of typical elec-trical penetrations in the containment structur~ to determine the ability
.of the protective devices to clear the circuit during a short circuit con-dition prior to exceeding the containment electrical penetration test or design ratings at an initial LOCA temperature.
2.'6 CRITERIA IEEE,~tandard 317, "Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" as supplemented by Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide l.63, "Electric Penetration Assem-blies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" prbvides the basis acceptable to the NRC staff. The following criteria are used in this report to determine compliance with current licensing require-ments:
(1)
IEEE Standard 317, Paragraph 4.2.4 -- "The rated short circuit current and duration shall be the maximum short circuit current in amperes that the conductors of a circuit can carry for a specified duration (based on the operating time of the primary overcurrent protective device or apparatus of the circuit) following continuous operation at rated continuous current with-out the temperature of the conductors exceeding their short cir-cuit design limit with all other conductors in the assembly c6rrying their rated continuous current under the specified normal environmental conditions."
This paragraph is augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.63, Para-graph C-1 -- "The electric penetrati.on assembly should be designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum possible fault current versus time conditions that could occur given single random failures of circuit overload protection devices."
( 2)
IEEE Standard 317, Paragraph 4. 2. 5 -- "The rat.ed maxi mum duration
.of rated short circuit current shall be the maximum time that the conductors of a circuit can carry rated short circuit current based on the operating time of the backup protective device or apparatus, during which the electrical integrity may be lost, but for which the penetration assembly shall maintain containment integrity."
2
3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION In t~is.evaluation, the results of.typical containment penetrations being at LOCA temperatures concurrent with a random failure of the circuit protective devices will be analyzed.
Consumers Power Company (CPC) has provided information (References l,*
2 and 3) on typic~l penetrations in the Palisades plant. All were manufac-tured by Viking Industries, Inc.
CPC submitted manufacturer-supplied "rated short circuit data" for the penetrations.
Verification test data was not available for two of the penetrations.
The penetrations consist of carbon steel pipe canisters with stain-1 ess steel headers welded to each end.
Header flanges are later welded to the containment liner.
Identical hermetically sealed glass multipin con-n~ctors are welded to each header for the low voltage AC and the DC pene-trations.
The medium voltage penetrations use hermetically sealed ceramic bushings welded to each header for a single conductor to pass through.
Each penetration is sealed at each of two header plates providing a double barrier against leakage.
The hermetically sealed glass multipin c0nnectors are qualified to service to 575°F (302°C) for 400 hours0.00463 days 0.111 hours 6.613757e-4 weeks 1.522e-4 months per MIL-C-5015. 1 This temperature is the limiting temperature used in sections 3. l and 3.3.
The medium voltage AC penetrations were tested by Bechtel (Refer-ence 6). A three-phase, 2400 VAC source supplied 61,000 rms symetrical amperes for between six and ten cycles to the penetration without damage.
The actual seal is a mechanical interference between the bare conductor and the ceramic insulator.
The ceramic bushing provides a limiting temperature of 650°C. 3 This temperature was assigned as the limiting temperature used in section 3~2.
In supplying the value of the maximum ~hart circuit current available (I f, CPC supplied values for a b*alted fault (three-phase on AC system),
SC this type of fault being able to supply the most heat into the penetration.
3
The following formula (Reference 9) was used to determine the time allowed for a short circuit before the penetration temperature would exceed*
its qualification value.
where t
=
I SC =
A
=
Tl
=
T2
=
[}]2 t 1 og [; 2 + 234]
= 0.0297 234
+
1 0.0297 A2 c2+ 234]
t =
log 2
T1 + 234 I SC Time allowed for the short circuit -- seconds Short circuit current --
amp~res Conductor area -- circular mils Maximum operating temperature (140°C, LOCA condition)
Maximum short circuit temperature (limiting temperature supplied by CPC).
( Formu 1 a 1 )
This. is based upon the heating effect of the short circuit current on the conductors.
Under accident conditions, a peak temperature of 283°F (140°C) is expected for the Patisades plant.
This figure is used for T1 in Formula 1, and accounts for an elevated conductor temperature caused by pre-existing current flow and above normal ambient temperature.
3. 1 Typical Low Voltage (0-1000 VAC) Penetration.
This penetration has #12 conductors and is rated by the manufacturer for a full-load current of 14 amperes and for a* short circuit of 1,500 amperes for three cycles.
T~~ circ~it identified is.power to* the motor-oper~ted pressurizer relief isolation valve, M0-1042A-480AC.
The source can supply 417 amperes at the penetration due to a bolted fault.
4
It is calculated that the time for the penetration conductors to reach 302°C from an initial l40°C (assumed connector temperature under a LOCA environment).is 1.14 seconds.
The circuit breaker curves supplied by CPC show that the*primary cir-cuit breaker clears the maximum I instantaneously, 0.019 seconds per SC IEEE Standard 242-1975, Table 33 (Reference 10), and that any current above 12 amperes is cleared within this same time.
They also show that the secon-dary circuit breaker takes a minimum of 200 seconds to clear the fault should the primary circuit breaker fail; the secondary circuit breaker does not clear any fault of less than 400 amperes.
3. 1. 1 Low Voltage Penetration Conclusion.
With an initial pene-tration temperature of 140°C (the peak LOCA containment tempera~
ture), the containment electrical penetration design for this low voltage penetration is not in conformance with the criteria described in Section 2.0 of this report for a three-phase fault.
3.2 Typical Medium Voltage (~1000 VAC) Penetration.
CPC has identi-fied the 4160 V primary coolant pump, P50A, penetrations as typical.
These
penetrations are constructed of 1,500 MCM copper conducto~ through the ceramic bushings described in Section 3.
These have been tested (Refer-ence 8) to 61,000 amperes for a minimum of six cycles.
CPC has identified the total fault current from all sources to be 30,319 rms amperes symmetri-cal and 44,870 rms amperes asymmetrical.
It. is calculated that the time for the penetration conductors to reach 650°C from an initial 140°C (assumed conductor temperature under a LOCA environment) is 12.4 seconds.
The breaker curves supplied primary air circuit breaker will 0.08 seconds) and the secondary independently in* 0.27 second.
by CPC show that at th.e maximum I
, the SC trip instantaneously (total clearing time, air circuit breaker will clear the fault 5
3.2.l Medium Voltage Penetration Evaluation.
With an initial penetration temperature of 140°C (the peak LOCA containment
*te~perature) the medium voltage containment electrical penetra-tions conform to the requirements described in Section 2.0 of this report.
3.3 Typical Direct Current Penetration.
The penetration identified by CPC as typical for this type has #1/0 conductors and is part of the circuit powering the bearing oil lift pump, P81B*.
CPC rates the full-load circuit capability of this penetration at 76 amperes, and also supplied the manufacturer rating of 15,000 short circuit amperes for three cycles
. (.05 second).
The circuit can supply 2405 amperes into a short circuit at
.the penetration.
It is calculated that, with an initial conductor temperature of 140°C (the peak containment temperature under LOCA conditions), 8.95 seconds elapse between the occurrence of a fault condition and when the conductor temperature reaches 575°F, the qualification temperature of the penetration.
The circuit breaker curves supplied by CPC show that the primary cir-cuit breaker clears the maximum I instantaneously, 0.019 seconds per SC IEEE Standard 242-1975, Table 33 (Reference 10).
The curves also show that the secondary circuit breaker takes between 22 and 72 seconds to clear the same fault 'current.
Fault currents of less magnitude ~how that the secon-dary circuit breaker does not clear a fault fast enough to prevent damage to the penetration seal, and that the primary circuit breaker does not clear a current of less that 450 amperes.
Above 450 amperes, the primary circuit breaker clears the fault before damage to the penetration seal occurs.
3.3. l Direct Current Penetration Evaluation.
With an initial temperature of the penetration at l40°C as expected ~ith a LOCA condition, this penetration does not conform to the criteria described in Section 2.0 of this report.
6
4.'b
SUMMARY
_T_bi.s.evaluation looks at the capab.Uity of the circuit protective devices to prevent exceeding the test or design ratings of the selected penetrati~ns in the event of (a) a LOCA event, (b) a fault current through the penetration, and simultaneously (c) a random failure of the circuit protective devices to clear the fault. The environmental qualifi.cation tests of the penetrations is the subject of SEP Topic III-12.
With a LOCA environment inside containment, the medium voltage pene-trations conform to the criteria described in Section 2.0 of this report.
The low voltage AC and the DC penetrations do not comply with the same criteria regardless of the initial assumed temperature, as the operating time of the backup circuit breakers is excessive.
As a result of this review, CPU will further investigate the design and utilization of the electrical penetrations of the containment at the Palisades Plant.3 This review is expected to be documented by October 15, 1981 and will document the following:
a) appropriate interrupting capacity for all power circuit penetra-
tions, b)
appropriate *interrupting capacity for sc.mpled control and instru-ment circuit penetrations, c) appropriate surveillance testing for circuit protective devices, and d) modifications needed to conform to present 1 icensing criteria.
With this investigation and the completion of any necessary design modifications, the use and the design of the containment electrical pene-tration at the Palisades Plant will be in conformance to the present licensing criteria.
7
The review of Topic III-12, "Environmental Qualification," may result in changes to the electrical penetration design and therefore, the resolu:
tion of t~e subject SEP topic may be deferred to the integrated assessment, at which time any requirements imposed as a result of this review will take into consideration design changes resulting from other topics.
5.'0 REFERENCES
1.
CPC letter, David P. Hoffman, Docket Nos. 50-155 and 50-255, Licenses DPR-6 and DPR-20, Palisades and Big Rock Point Plants, Electric Pene-trations of Reactor Containment, SEP Topic VIII-4, March 19, 1979.
2.
CPC letter, D. A. Bixel to J. G. Keppler, NRC, "Response to IE Bul-letins 77-05,77-05A," December 8, 1977.
3.
CPC letter, R. A. Vincent to Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, "SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Contain-ment," June 15, 1981.
4.
General Design Criterion 16, "Containment Design" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria of Nuclear Power Plants, 11 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."
5.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sta.ndard Review Plan, Section 8.3.1, "AC Power Systems (Onsite)."
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.63, Revision 2, "Electrica.l Penetration.ll.ssemblies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Pm*:er Plants."
7.
iEEE Standard 317-1976, "iEEE Standard fQr Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures f6r Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
8.
Bechtel Test Report, PO 5935-E-20-AC, Report No. 7, January 14, 1969.
9.
IPCEA Publication P-32-382, "Short Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cable."
10.
IEEE Standard 242-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power System."
8

ML18046A845

Contents

Text

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

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ML18046A845

Text

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

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