ML18046A785

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Forwards 810610 Final Draft Safety Evaluation for SEP Topic VI-7.F Re Accumulator Isolation Valves Power & Control Sys Design,Recommending Mod to Tech Specs.Sys Design Does Not Meet Current Licensing Criteria
ML18046A785
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/1981
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Hoffman D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-06-07.F, TASK-6-7.F, TASK-RR LSO5-81-06-134, LSO5-81-6-134, NUDOCS 8107130437
Download: ML18046A785 (10)
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Docket No. 50-255 LS05-81 134 Mr. David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W Parnall Road.

Jackson. Mi ch1 gan 49201

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

June 30, 1981

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VI-7.F, ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVES POWER' AND

  • coNTROL SYSTEM DESIGN. SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PALISADES The enclosed revised staff safety evaluation and its supporting contractor's evaluation replaces the documents provided in our letters of December 12.

1980 and May 29, 1981.

The chang_es result from comments provided in your letter of May 19, 1981.

Our revised safety evaluation continues to propose modifications.to the Technical Specifications.

The need to actually implement these changes will be determined during the integrated plant safety assessment. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or 1f NRC criteria relating

==-*-=*~-c-~~= = 0-~---~tQ,_tM_~ topic are modified before the jntegrated assessment 1s completed.

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cc w/enclosure:

See next\\ page

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I 8107130437 810630 PDR ADOCK 05000255 P

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Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Brancb_No. 5 Di vision of Licensing

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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGP0:1981"-335-960

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~1 Mr. David P. Hoffman cc M. I. Miller~ Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaz~

Chi~ago, Illinois 60670

  • Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Corrpany.

212 West Michig~n Avenue Jackson, Michigan

  • 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Pov1er Company 212 West Michigan Avenue

Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois. 60611

  • Ms
  • Ma ry P * " S i n c la i r Great Lakes Energy A 11 i ance 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public Library 315. South Rose Street __.

Kalam.azoo, Michigan 4.9006 Township Supervisor Covert Tov1rish.ip Route l, Box 10.

Van Buren County~ Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor (2)

Room l - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor~ Michi~an 48103 Palis~des Plant ATTN:

Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 *

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u~ S. Erivironmental Protecii~n Agency Federal A'ct i vit i es Branch RegionVOffice*. *..

ATTN:. EIS COORDINATOR 230 South 6earbo~~ Sife~t Chicago, Illinois 60604 **

. Charles* Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman*

. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

  • Panel U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washitlgto~, D. c.. 20555 Dr~ Georg~ c. And~rsori
  • Department* of Oceanography University of Washingto~

Seattle, Washington 98195 Dr~ M. Stanley Living~ton' *

.1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o u.

s~* NRC P. O. Box 87 South Haven, Michigah 49090

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TOPIC:

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SYSTEMATtC EVALUATION PROGRAM T 0 PI C V I -7. p,.

PALISADES.

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V 1-7. F.. ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVES POHER AND CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN

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N Introdl,lction

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For many loss-of-cool ant accidents; ttie performance of the ECCS in PvJR plants depends upon the proper functjonfog of the accumulators.. The motor-operated isolation valve, provJ;ifed bet\\>1een the accumulator and the primary system;-. !TIUSt be considered to b'e an* "operating bypass" (IEEE 279-1971) beca~se, when closed, it prevents th~ a~cumulator from perfbrming the intended protective fun ct ion.. Accordingly, the motor-operated i sol a ti on valve should be designed against a single failure that can result in a loss of capability to perfq.i::m a safety function.

.f Ari additional operational* requirement for these valves is that they be*

closed to permit primary system depressurization during reactor shutdown.

(See the staff's discussions of Topics V-3 and VII-3).

Review Criteria The review criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report l302F.

Related Safety Topics and Interfac~s There are no review areas ootside the scope of this topic and there are no-other safety topics that are dependent on the present topic infotma-tion for completion.

  • Iv.

Revtew Guidelines Jhe objective of this SEP Topic is to assure that the accumulator isola-tion valves:

(1) Meet the "operating bypass" requirements of IEEE 279-1971 which states that.the bypass of a protective function will be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met to assure that a_

single failure in the electrical system or single opera~or error cannot result in the loss of cap?bility of an accumulator to perform its safety function, and (2) A~sure th~t the valves are operable for safe shutdown of the p 1 ant.

V.

Evaluation As noted in EG&G Report 1302F, The Palisades accumulator isolation valve power and control system design meets the requirement of ICSB 18, Part 2, with the exception that plant Technical Specification~ do not list

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the isolation valves by number.

Report 13 02 Falso indicates that the plant*

.* design cannot accommodate the loss of a single accumuiator'during a large LOCA and, as a consequenc~, the Technical Specifications allow only one SI Ta.nk to be out of service for no more than one hour during

  • .power operation.

This siti.Jat1on is a direct Consequence of the

  • accident analyses assumption that a 11. of the contents of one* SI tank.

. is.lost out of *t.he break without flowing through* the core.

The report also notes that the valve breakers are located inside of containment, only a single valve position system is provided, and that.

the motor control center.(MCC9) is not qualified for an accident environ*'

ment.

Additional reviev1 by I&E has shown that MCC9 is not powered *

  • from an onsite source *.

VI.

Conclusions The staff recommends that the Techni'cal Specifications be modified to*include designation of the subject valves by number.

The Palisades accumulator isolation valve povier and con.trol system design does ~ot meet turrent licensing criteria, in* that control room.valve*

  • position indication is neither redundant nor single-failure free~

How-ever, the Palisades design Js acceptable to'the staff, because the single valve position indicator combined with the administrative '

procedures for removing power from the valve and the verification of valve position meets the intent of.redundant valve position indicators.

The use of a non-Class lE valve motor power circuits is acceptable*

because procedures for remote venting of.the accumulators from outside of the c'ontainment.during* plant cooldm*rn are available.

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SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION to*p1c vr...:Lr. *./

ACCUMUtATOR ISOLATION VALVES POWER AND CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN*.,

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  • FINAL DRAFT PALISADES Docket.No.* 50-255: *
  • .June 1981

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6-10-81

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

2. 0 CR ITER I A 3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

. 3. l 3.2 Discussion Evaluation 4.0

SUMMARY

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5. 0 REFERENCES

. CONTENTS

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l.O INTRODUCTION SEP TECHNICAL EV_~LUATION.

TOPICVI~7.F '. *..

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ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVES POWER AND.CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN*

PALISADES

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The* O:bjective of this review i?.: to 'dete'rmine if th~;, accumulator isolatfo~ v.~lve power and control *~§~tern is in corriplianc~ with current licensing criteria.

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. The specific requirements *.f9r accuniu.latq.r' isolation valve power and C:ont~ol system design derive from IEEE 2l9;l971, which st.ates that the bypass of.a protective function will be removed ~utomat~cally when-

. ever permissive conditions are not met and which also ass~res that a single electrical failure or op~rator error will not result.in loss of capability of ihe accumulator to perform its saiety~fun~ti~n.

1 The criter.ia are further defined in Branch Technical Positions. ICSB 42 3

and ICSB

  • 18.
  • 2.0 CRITERIA Current licensing criteria from ICSB ~ are:
1.
2.

3.'

"4.

Automatic opening *of 'the va 1 ves \\'/hen either primary coolant system pressure exceeds a*preselected value (to be specified.in the Technical Specffications*);;

  • o r a s a f et y i n j e c t i o 11 s i g n a 1 i s
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Bot h.

primary coolant system pressure and* safety injec-tion signals should be provided to the valve operator.

Visual indication in the control room of the open or closed* status of the valve.~.

An audible and visual alarm, independent of item 2.

above, that fs actuated by a sensor on the valve

~when the. valve is not in the fully-open position.

Utiiiiation of a safety injection sign~l to remove automatically (override) any bypass feature that

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may ~e provided.to allow an isolatiori valve. to be.

closed fo~ short per~ods of time ~hen.the reacto~.

coolant syitem 'i~~at ~ressu~e (in acc6~dance with provisions of the Technical Specification~).

  • Current licensing ctiteria from ICSB 18 are:

. l.. * *Failures in both the "fail to function" sense and

  • .the "undesirable.function".sense of components in

. elect~ical systems including val~es and other flui~

~ystem components should be crinsidered in ~esigning

.against a single failure, even though the valv~ or other fluid system component may not be call~d upon to function in a given s~fety operational sequence.

2.

Where it is determined that fail4re of an electri-cal system component can cause undesired mechanical

~otion of a valve or other fluid system component

~nd this motion results in losi of fhe system saf-ety function, it *is acc~ptable, in lieu of design

.changes.th~t al~o may be acceptable, to disconnect power to the electric* ~ystems of the valve or other*

fluid system component.

The plant Technical Speci-

  • fications should include a list 6f all electrically-operated valves~ and the required positions of these valves, to which the requir-ement for removal of electric power is applied in order to.satisfy the single failure criterion~
  • 3.

Electrically-operated valves that ar~ tl~ssified as 11 active" valves, i.e., are*required to open or close in* various safety system operational sequen-ces, but are manually-controlled, should b~ opera-ted from the main control room.

Such valves may not be included among those valves from which power is removed in order tci meet the single failure criterion unless (a) electrical power can be re-stored to the valves from the main control room, (b) valve operation is not necessary for at least ten minut.es fol lowing occurrence of the* event re-quiring such operation, and (c) it is demonstrated that there is reasonable assurance that all neces-sary operator actions will be performed within the time shown to be adequate by the analysis.

The pla~t Technical Specifications should include a list of the required positions of manually-controlled,. electrically-operated valves and should identify those valves to which the requirement for removal of electric power is applied in order to satisfy the single failure criterion.

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When the sing.le.failu~~ cdte.ri'on.is... satisfied by

  • removal of electrical power fr'om valves. descr.ibe:....::.'*

in 2. and 3. above,* these"* valves shoul.fj,. have *;;red0~1.:.

  • dant position indication i.n the majn cor}trOl ~roorn..

and the position indication system should,\\jtself, 4.*

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meet the single failure criteri6n.

Th~ phrase," '!electrical ly-op~raefed val ve.s, i.,:*;~l'i1c l Ll.des

. both valves operated di r:-ect iy by an e lectrj:caJf device (e.g., a motor-operated valve :.or a_:.. so"l.epoid-operated valve) and those valv_es*~.:loperated 1ndi}ectly

_by.an.-electrical device (e.g.,*'rari iair..:.operat~ct

  • valve whose air supply iS,;;COnt-rolled by an elettri-..

. ~al solenoid valve).

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3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION t.:...

3.1 Discussion~ The. Palisades* plant uses,fout Safety Injection

.(Accumulator) Tanks, each of which has a motor*:*c;p*era~ed iso.lation 4

. valve..

These valves are MO 3041; MO 3045~ MO 3049, and MO 3052~

Each valve has a single positon indication. *The Palisades Technical Specifications requite that, prior to attaining !eactor criticality, the Safety Injection Tank Isolation Valves must be opened and that power to the valve motors must be rem~ved.by~locking:~he control room key swi.tc:hes open and opening the 480V. b*reak.e~rs at MCC 9. 5 Removal of valve motor power*does not. disable. valve ~6sition indication, which is pbwer~d from a separate 125 V DC bus. 6 The breakers which supply the val~e motors are located inside the containment. 7 The valves are spec{f ied by fu~ction rather than by valve nu~ber. *The Technical Specifications also allow any one SI tank to be out of service for no

~ore than one hour during power op~ration ~ithout going to hot shutdown.

3.2 Evaluation.

The Palisades accumulator isolation valve power and control s~stem design meets the requirement of JCSB 18, part 2, with the exception that plant Technical Specifications do not list the isolation valves by number.

The design does not,; *however, meet the.

requirement of ICSB 18, part 4, which must be complied with when removal of val~e motor power is used to meet the single failure criterion; only one position indication per valve is available in the control room, an indication scheme which is single-failure susce~tible.

  • Also, location 3

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of the valve motor breakers inside containment poses problems* in rester~

'ing accumulator isolation capability: if necessary.*'

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SUMMARY

  • The Palisades accum~lator isolafion.valve powet and control.s~stem des\\gn dbes ~ot c6mply with:curtent ~icen~in~*~rit~ria b~ca~se (aj plant Tech~i~al Specifi~ations ~o not spetify by valve n~mbe~~which v~l~es must be op'ened and deenergized, (b) control room valve position indica-tion.is.neither. redundant n~r si.ngle-failure free, and (c) valve motor breakers are located inside tontainment.
5. 0 *REFERENCES
1. **.*IEEE Standard 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
2.

Branch Technical Position ICSB 4, "Requirements of Motor-Operated Valves in the ICCS Accumulator Lines.'*'

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Branch Technical Position ICSB 18, "Application of the Single.

F a*i 1 ure *criterion to Manual ly-Contro 11 ed Electrical ly..,Oi:ierated Valves."

4.

Becht~l-Palisades Drawing 5935 M~203, Revision 12, dated 1-14-77.

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"Technical Specifications for the Palisades Plant," Amendment 31, dated 11-1-77, paragraph l.3;

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Be~htel-Palisades Drawing E-243, sheet 2; No Revision, dated 4-3-79.

7.

'Bechtel-Palisades Drawing M-5, Sheet 5, Revision 5, dated 10-22-74.

8.

Lettet, Consumers Power (~offman} to NRR (Crutchfield), dated May 19, 1981.

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