ML18045A545

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Discusses Two Problems Associated W/Ability of Facility to Cope W/Steam Line Rupture Accident.Requests That Matter Be Promptly Forwarded to Ofc of Nuclear Reactor Regulation W/ Request to Have Tech Specs Changed
ML18045A545
Person / Time
Site: Palisades 
Issue date: 08/04/1980
From: Streeter J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Bryan S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML18045A544 List:
References
TASK-15-02, TASK-15-2, TASK-RR AITS-F03085580, AITS-F3085580, NUDOCS 8008280345
Download: ML18045A545 (1)


Text

a uNtTEo sTATEs I

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS N

REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 60137 August 4, 1980*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

S. E. Bryan, Assistant Director for Field Coordination, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE "THRIJ:

A4 / R.

  • Heishman, Chief,. Reactor Operations and Nuclear (J/' /

Support Branch *

.FROM:

stmJECT:

J. F. Streeter, Chief. Nuclear Support Section 1 REQUEST TO CHANGE PALISADES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (AITS F03085580)

This memorandum is forwarded for action.

There are two problems associated with the ability of Palisades to cope with a steam line rupture accident; One problem is that only one high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump and one charging pump would be operable following a steam line rupture assuming a loss of offsite power and the failure of an emergency diesel generator.

This single-failure problem las been previously brought. to the attention of.IE:HQ (see AITS F30379H2) and NRR and is being reviewed as part of _the Sys.tematic Evaluation Program.

Tl:ds is a troublesome matter since a recen-t report by the staff* "Loss of Off site Power-Survey Status Report", appears to indicate **that the Palisades site has been parti-culaz:ly susceptible to loss of offsite power occurences.

(There may be other single failures not related to loss of off site po¥er which could prevent the plant from coping with the accident.

We assume the SEP will cover these possibilities as well as the loss of offsite power).

The second problem, *to our knowledge, has not been previously identified to IE:HQ or NRR and is the reason for writing this memorandum.

The analysis of the Steam ~ine Rupture Incident for Palisades was conducted based upon the assumption that two of -the three HPSI pumps and two of the three charging pumps are available.

Technical Specifications 3.3.2.c and 3.2.3.a>r~spec-: -*

tively, allow power operations to continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with only one BPSI pump and one.charging pump operable.

Therefore, the plant is all<JWed to operate for a relative;Ly long (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> plus an additional 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before having to be in hot shutdown) period of time in a situation..,here the plant could not meet the accident analysis flow assumptions even if one does not assume a single failure.

We request that you promptly forward thi.s matter to NRR with a request. for NRR to arrange to have the technical specifications changed.

cc:

D. Boyd P. Wohld 80 B. Jorgensen o 8 2 B*f13YS-

~~

J. F. Streeter, Chief Nuclear Support Section 1