ML18043A584
| ML18043A584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1979 |
| From: | Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-15-10, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7904030332 | |
| Download: ML18043A584 (7) | |
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- Area Code 517 788-0550 March 30, 1979 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -
PWR MODERATOR DILUTION ANALYSIS In response to your request for additional information dated February 1, 1979, Consumers Power Company has evaluated the potential for other boron dilution accidents not analyzed in the FSAR and the consequences of any boron dilution accidents so identified.
We reported our findings to you on Ju~y 6, 1978.
We have identified no other potential boron dilution accidents.
With regard to the third situation described in our July 6, 1978 response, Consumers Power Company maintains that Sodium Hydroxide Tank (T-103) is iso-lated from the Shutdown Cooling System whenever the possi-oility exists for that accident to occur (see response to Item 1 below).
Therefore, a single failure will never result in the inadvertent transfer of the contents of T-103 to the Shutdown Cooling System and Items 2 and 4 need not be considered.
Our responses to Items l and 3 are as follows:
Item l Submit a detailed description of the administrative controls to prevent the event.
Response
Attachment I is the Engineered Safeguards portion of our Start-VP Master Check Sheet. It provides for double valve isolation of the Iodine Removal System from the Shutdown Cooling System.
Thus, Tank T-103 will always be double valve isolated from the Shutdown Cooling System unless it is required for neutralization of the Containment Sump following Safety Injection.
The Piping and Instrument
'?90403033~
- -V I
2 Diagrams are being changed to reflect the actual normally closed position of Valves 3365 ES and 3366 ES.
Attachment II - Page l of System Operating Procedure (SOP)4 - states in the Plant Req_uirements section that "The iodine removal system is to be valved out of service whenever PCS pressure is~ 1400 psi."
Consumers Power Company concludes that Attachments I and II provide adeq_uate administrative controls to prevent the dilution of boron in the Primary Coolant System from the Iodine Removal System.
Item 3 Provide the error band used in the determination of the critical boron concen-tration.
Response
The error bands chosen were conservative on the high side such that criticality will not occur at boron concentrations higher than those stated in our response of July 6, l978.
They can be represented as follows:
Cold Shutdown Critical Boron Condentration = l036 +/- ~ ppm Refueling - All Control Rods Removed Critical Boron Concentration= ll70 +/- ~ ppm David P Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator
ATTACHMENT I PALISADES PIANT A5.l 1/3 Rev.
li:.l~GINEERED SAFEGUARDS ADMINISTRATIVE COT:.'TROL VERIFICATION Page 1 of 3 Systems normally in operation are verified operable if f'unctioning normally, and stand-by equipment is test started.
COMPONENT COOLTIIG WATER Verify flow through each heat exchanger by ~bservation*of TIA-0914 and TIA-0916.
Test start each comp. cool. pumps; 6
P52A P52B P52C Verii'ied by:
CHEMICAL and VOLUME CO!l"TROL Verify charging :flow with FIA-0212. Test run changing pu...rnps; P55A P55B P55C
____________ f __
---'I_ __
~--
Verify normal letdown flow and diversion flow; FIC-0202 CV-2056 VCT CV-2056 RWS I
Verify concentrated boric acid valves operable; M0-2140 M0-2169 M0-2170 I
I I
Verify concentrated boric acid pumps; (process valves closed, recirc. valves open}
I*
SAFETY IlIJECTION and SETJrDOWN COOLING
\\ *HPSI valves open after 'PCS* 1400 psi and line Uu'sh completed. (See SOP 3.6.3.5.)
Mo-3007 M0-3009
- M0-3011 M0-3013 Verified by:
I Verify operability of redundant high pressure injection valves;
. MO-3062 MO-3064 MO-3066 MO-3068 I
I I
Verify operability of low pressure injection valves; MO-3008 MO-3010 MO-3012 M0-3014 I
I Containment spray headers de-pressm-ized; Verify operability of contairune!lt spray valves; ~nual spray stop valves open; PI-0360 CV-3001 CV-3002 3258-ES 3259-ES DATE.
I ATTACHMENT ~
SAFETY INJECTION and SHUTDOWN COOLilm A5.l 2/3..
~eri:tY-*all pumps lined u~rrectly; all pump breakers r~
in position, control Page fuses iq.8talled correctly; 2 of 3 Suction.
Discharge Recirc.
Breaker Fuses Veri:fied*bi:
P54A LC-P54B IJJ-P54C LC-P66A LO-
. "" H.P.S.I. pump P66B LO-
- .. fuses after 1400 P66c LO-
-3 psi on PCS P67A L0-3198 LO-P67B L0-3189 LO-
- Verify valves open, hand switches lee ked open, 48ov*ABC's open and locked; CV-3041 CV-3045 CV-3049 CV-3052 I
I I
I Veri-f:y valves open, hand switches in open position; and key switches locked open and amber lights extinguished.
cv-3027 cv-3056 Verify valve open, air supply valve closed, HIC-0306 in manual, full open; ang "caution tagged cv-3006
- I AU'...CILIARY FEED WATER Verify auxiliary feed water flow, FI-0736, FI-0737, manual recirc. valves locked open; P8A.
P8B 216-FW 217 -FW I
1-I SERVICE WATER Verify service water pumps by observing no change in CCW heat exchanger temperature; P7C CO:HPLETED BY Rev. 4 DATE.
-~~~~~~~~~-
. PRC __
5_,,/-+l--l"'-/7_8 __. ------
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APPR.
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- l.
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AS.l 3/3 IODINE REMOVAL INJECTION SYSTEM Verify the fo.llowing valves are positioned as VALVE LOCATION POSITION 3363ES Safeguards Open 3364ES Safeguards Open 3352ES Under SIRWT Open 3353ES Under SIRWT Open 3354ES Hatch on Roof Open 3355ES Hatch on Roof Open 3365ES
\\ Under T103 Closed 3366ES Under Tl03 Closed 437CA
\\
NE Corner of Open Turb. Bldg.
CV 0438A CCW Room Handjack Closed CV 0438B CCW Room Handjack Closed Completed by~~~~~~~~~~~-
Rev 5 stated - Reference CL3.2 Check INITIAL Caution Tag HS0438A Caution Tag HS0438B PRC 7/12/78
---pr-------
AC.~
APPR Sheet.
- I
1.0 PURPOSE CONTAI.NM~IT SPP_A_Y A.'.iB IODDTE RE!'10V_~.L SYST~
- System Operating Proc.edures - SOP 4 Rev 4 ATTACHMENT II The purpose of the containment spray system operating procedures is to outline.the steps necessary to operate the system and its components.
The purpose of the containment spray system is to:.
- a.
Limit containment pressure use in event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
- b.
Reduce post-accident level of fission products in the containment atmosphere by iodine. retention.
2.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND PLANT REQUIREMENTS
- 1.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REFERENCES Section 3.4.l through 3.4.5.
. 2.
PLANT REQUIREMENi'S
- a.
The iodine removal s stem is to be alved out of service whenever PCS
~e_:;tiure is < l 00 psi,
- b. ~ne removal filters, V-940A and V-940B, shall be ready for service during all modes of operation.
- c.
Iodine injection makeup tank T-103 will normally be manually valved out of service and the cover gas maintained at a minimum pressure.
- 3. 0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
- 1.
Ensure safety injection and refueling water tank is at desir~d boron con-centration before starting a containment spray pump.
- 2.
When filling.safety injection tanks, watch pressure indication in tank being filled*.
If high-pressure alarm (235 psig) is actuated, open the ta.Ilk vent valve C'V~306J, CV-3065, CV-3063 or CV-3051 and decrease tank pressure to 2l5 psig, then close vent valve.
4~0. INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1.
Safety injection and refueling water tank at operating level with boron concentration at ~ 1820 ppm, and 2 2000 ppm.
- 2.
At least one shutdown cooling heat exchanger ready for service.
- 3.
Ccmponent cooling water system in operation.
- 4.
Service water system in operation.
- 5.
Cnecklist CL-3 completed.
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