ML18043A286
| ML18043A286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1978 |
| From: | Carlson D, Madeda T, Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18043A285 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-78-05, 50-255-78-5, NUDOCS 7811300117 | |
| Download: ML18043A286 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1978005
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION .III
Report No. 50-255/78-05
Docket No. 50-255
License No. DPR-20
Safeguards Group IV
Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Investigation at: Palisades Site, Covert, MI
,.
Investigation conducted:
January 11-13, 18-20, 24-27, 31-February 3,
and 16-17, 1978
Inspectors: 9 .. t0n4.~
D.J1. Carlson r
-r.1.-:- ?/;~~
T.
- Madeda ...
~- };t. {)_,Lu~
G. M. Christoffer
.
~.£.//~
Approved by:
C. E. Norelius
Assistant to the Director
Investigation Summary
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Jqi I'll~
Pf'&L !~ 197 r
Investigation on January 11-13, 18-20, 24-27, 31-February 3, and 16-17,
1978 (Report No. 50-255/78-05)
Investigation Summary:
Special, announced investigation into allegations
made by an alleger~ members of the security force and an anonymous
caller. Specifically, the investigation covered areas relative to the
security organization, access controls, testing and maintenance, radia-
tion monitoring requirements and licensee action on previous inspection
findings.
The inspection involved 230 inspector-hours onsite by three
NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, five apparent items of noncompliance
were identified in four areas:
(Physical Security Organization - Paragraph
1; Access Requirements - Paragraph 2; Access Controls - Paragraphs 3 and 4;
Testing and Maintenance - Paragraph 5).
The five items are considered to
be infractions *
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NOTE:
Addendums A and B of this investigation report specifically
discuss security details associated with items of noncompliance noted
during this investigation and licensee action on previous security
inspection findings, and are, therefore, exempt from disclosure accord-
ing to Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
The Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, which is owned by Consumers
Power Company (CPC), is authorized to operate under NRC License No.
As such, CPC must provide physical protection of the plant
against industrial sabotage.
Security requirements which must be com-
plied with by CPC are currently contained in their NRG-approved security
plan which was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34(c); applicable
parts of 10 CFR 73.55 which were effective May 25, 1977; and applicable
parts of 10 CFR 73.70.
In fu~filling the security plan con:unitments, the
licensee has contracted with Burns International Security Services,
Incorporated (BISS!) to provide guards and supervisors for security
operations at the Palisades site.
REASON FOR INVESTIGATION
On January 9, 1978, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, RIII,
received a letter from an alleger at the Palisades site concerning
the number of security force members who have either quit or were
fired and who were knowledgeable enough to surreptitiously penetrate
security defenses at the facility.
He believed the underlying cause
of the high turnover rate was attributed to low wages and few benefits
received by the_.Etuards.
In addition, the letter stated that the guard
force was preparing to strike because of low wages and few benefits.
A typed transcript of this letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
An investi-
gation was initiated to determine whether or not there were any direct
or indirect improprieties which significantly affected the security of
the site.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
On January 11, 1978, the alleger who alleged the high turnover rate
of security force personnel and the possibility of a security force
strike, was interviewed.
On January 12, 1978, an investigation was initiated at the Palisades
site. Initial interviews with guards and CPC management representa-
tives and a review of records appeared to substantiate the alleger's
concerns.
However, no noncompliance with NRC requirements were identi-
fied relative to these concerns.
Additional allegations concerning security and other improprieties
at the Palisades site were voiced by security officers to NRC represen-
tatives at the onset of the investigation.
These allegations concern
areas relating to personnel and vehicle access controls, weapons qualifi-
cation and requalification, intrusion detection devices and procedures,
training and radiation controls.
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On February l,, 1978, a message pertaining to security at the Palisades
site was found on the telephone recorder of the ~esident Inspector for
the I>onald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant located several miles aouth of
the Palisades site.
The recorder, vhich was utilized solely to answer
the telephone during the period cf rebruary 10, 1978 (1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />) to
Tebruary 1,, 1978 (0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />), had taped an anonymous caller's con-
versation alleging that a security officer fell asleep on duty and
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had his veapon stolen from him.
!ecause of the nature.of the allegCtions, corrective action on items cf
noncompliance identified during the previous physical protection inspec-
tion conducted on August 9-12, 1977, were reviewed by the NRC represen-
tatives. "l'hese items along with the results of the revie~, are identified
in Addendum! of this.investigation report. It should be noted that
Addendum! identifies.security measures for the physical protection of
the licensed facility, and as such, is considered 10 CFR Part 2.790(d)
information which*shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance vith
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 9.12.
As a result of this :investigation, certain of the licensee's activities
appeared to be conducted :in noncompliance vith NRC requirements.
~one
of the items of no?rcDmpliance represent a direct threat to the health
and safety of the public or common defense and aecurity; however,
certain items were recurring in nature from the above mentioned previous
physical protection inspection. All items were categorized as infractions
which indicate a possible potential for causing a threat. The items,
which pertain to intrusion alann responses, access control requirements,
and testing and maintenance procedures lor detection aids, are identified
in Addendum A of this investigatio1l rep*ort. It should be noted that
Addendum A identifies security measures for the protection of the licensed
facility, and as such, is considered 10 CFR Part 2.790(d) information
,.,hich shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions
cf 10 CFR Part 9.12.
Because of the investigation findings as of February 3, 1976, certain
matters of NRC-concern ~ere discussed during a telephone conversation
on February 9, 1978, between members of the CPC's staff and members
of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region III. Based on that
conversation, the licensee agreed to immediately institute positive
access controls to certain of the vital areas; conduct weapons requali-
fication for certain guards; initiate actions to.reduce the number of
vital area alarms and reduce the response time taken by guards who respond
to alarms; and compfete appropriate retraining to assure that all guards
can satisfactorily demonstrate an understanding of and ability tc per-
form all required procedures.
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On March 7, 1978, a aenior ~anagement aeeting was conducted between the
Director cf the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region Ill,
and the Executive Vice President for Consumers Power Company *. Also
present were certain ~embers of their re5pective staffs. During the
seeting, licensee representatives were informed of:
The *cope cf the
investigation; the NRC's finding for each allegation; and the apparent
noncompliance noted as a result of the investigation or Teview of pre-
viously identified noncompliance.
ln addition, the representatives
were infonned of the NRC's concern.over the ineffectiveness of the
Company's management .control syst~ms.
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J>tTA!LS
I.
Persons Contacted
R. Youngdahl, Executive Vice President!/
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C. Bilby, Vice President, Production and Tta2,mission-
R. Lincoln, Vice President, General Servf7~,-
R.
De~itt, Manager, Producti~n1
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~uclear- ~
J. Levis, Plant.Superintendent--
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R. Mccaleb, Quality Assurance Superf,tendent-
J. McVay, Administrative SupelY2,or-
~.Hodge, Security Supervisor--11
C. Petitjean, T~chnical E.ngineer-
P. Botts, Quality Assurance Engineer
R. Compstock, Vice President - Central Region, Burns International
Security S~rvice, Inc. (B!SS!)
M. Sharp, Captain, Post Commander, !!SSI
V. Middaugh, Lieutenant, Shift Supervisor, !!SS!
s. Leffler, Lieutenant, Shift Supervisor, !ISSI
C. Taylor, Lieutenant, Shift Supervisor, !!SSI
A. Lee, Lieut~tl:Clnt, Shift Supervisor, BISS!
L. Schohy, ~epresentative, Union Plant Guard ~orkers cf America
The inspectors also intervie-.Jed numerous elSSI security officers
assigned to the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
Note 1: Identifies those present ,at *the Palisades site during the
exit interview conducted en Tebruary 3, 1978.
Note 2: Identifies those present at Region III during the
management meeting *Conducted on March 7, 1978.
2.
Allesations
. Tollo*'"ing are the allegations made by the initial allege'(. and
a discussion cf the results of the investigation which was con-
ducted:
a.
Allegation: There is an extremely high turnover rate of
security f otce personnel. Every couple of weeks a ne~ -
training class begins to nplace personnel who have either
quit or have been fired. It is "unnerving" that every fel.*
days a "bitter person" who knows all about the security at
the site either quits or is fired.
This is a perfect weapon
for someone who would like to penetrate site security *
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Tinding: Through a reviev cf records located onsite and
interviews with the Palisades Security Operations Supervisor
and !ISSI'* Post CC>trlltlander, 1t appears that ~here has been
a high turnover rate of *ecurity force per*onnel. A review of
records for the period of August 3, 1976 through January 8 1
1978 revealed that thirty individuals were either terminated
or had tendered their resignation. Specifically, of those
thirty individuals, twenty-two aecurity officers were tenr.inated
and the remaining eight~~endered their resignation cf their o~"Tl
accord.
As of 3anuary 12, 1978,. there were several security officers
employed at the Palisades site. Of those individuals, many
were hired-subsequent to March ~8, 1977.
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In addition to the above, it ahould be noted that nine
- ecurity officers tendered their resignation *ubsequent to
the initiation of this investigation and that one *ecurity
officer was terminated.
The resignations and the one termi-
nation a;&~urred during the period of January 13, 1978 through
February 3, 1978 *
~ith regard to training, cm-s1te re6ords indicated that training
classes were initiated in March, June, luly, August, October
and November, 1977, for seven1 * one, five, three, six and eight
security officers, respectiv~ly;
Although there is no noncompliance associated with this finding,
the seriousness o! this matter was discussed with licensee
management personnel. \\lhile no conclusion vas Wiade as to
whether or not previously employed* individuals were *'bitter,**
it vas concluded that certain security officers interviewed
during the investigation were discontented with certain
working conditions. This however could not be concluded as
being a **perfect weapon" which could be used in penetrating the
security defenses of the site.
b.
Allegation:* The underlying cause of the high turnover ~ate
of security force personnel is attributed to lo~ wages* and
few benefits.
findings: The investigation detetiDined that this may be the
underlying cause, however, no comparative wage and ~enefit
atudy was conducted with similar job functions within the
immediate area.
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c.
At the time that the alleger voiced his concern, the
contract guard service hourly pay scale for an officer
was determined by a contract between the licensee and the
guard service agency.
He also alleged that janitors make
more per hour than security officers.
Inverviews with
plant management determined that janitors earn more per
hour than the starting wage of a security officer *
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With regard to benefits, the final written agreement between
the Union and BISSI was not available to the NRC at the time
this report was written. Therefore, no comparison between
previous and new benefits was made for the purposes of this
report *. It was determined through interviews, however, that
most security officers were dissatisfied with the benefits
offered.
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Allegation:
The security force at the plant is preparing
to strike.
Finding; Initial interviews with certain security officers
on J~wary 12 and 13, 1978 revealed that, except for BISSi
supervisory personnel, most individuals were prepared to
strike on January 16, 1978.
This was the date that the
security officers were to vote for or against the ratifica-
tion of the proposed union agreement.
It was found, however, th~t the two parties (BISS! and the
Union) to the old agreement, which according to the BISSI
Vice President for the Central Region (Chicago) had been
extended to* *cover the period in question, had a no strike
clause. This clause stated that during the term of the Agree-
ment or any renewal or extension thereof, neither the Union,
-it's officers, officials, representatives, agents, members or
any employee will authorize, instigate, aid, condone, promote,
participate in or engage in any strike, work stoppage, slowdown
boycott, picket line, unfair listing, sit-down, sit-in,
refuese to cross any picket line, or other interruption,
refusal, cessation, limitation or interference with the
Employer~s work or the business of ~he Employer, or any
impeding of business of the employer, regardless of
whether there is a claim by the Union of Breach of this
Agreement, or of Federal, State or Local law by the Employer.
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3.
Allegations - Security and Other Improprieties - Security Force
Following are allegations of inadequate security and other
improprieties at the Palisades site which were voiced by
security officers to NRC representatives during the investigation.
a.
Allegation:
Weapons qualification and/or requalification
tests were not being properly administered.
Findings:
During the course of the investigation, a review
of licensee weapons qualification records and interviews
with site security officers revealed that one security
officer (Individual A) was given a passing score on a
weapons-qualification test after another security officer
(Individual C) had fired additional rounds into Individual
A's target.
Individual A, who had the adjusted target
score, made a written statement to this effect to the NRC
representatives.
This. statement was corroborated by the
written statement of another security officer (Individual
B) who witnessed the incident. It should be noted that
Indi'lidual C who fired the rounds into Individual A's
target was interviewed.
This interview confirmed that
Individual C had in fact fired into Individual A's target
so that Individual A would appear to have qualified *
Individual C, however, refused to give a written statement
to this effect.
Based on statements obtained, and documents reviewed, it
was determined that Individual A's weapons' qualification
score had been fals"ified by Individual C.
It was further found that the individual was in a manage-
ment position at the time of the incident.
This individual,
subsequent to the incident date, voluntarily requested to
be reduced to a lower rank. It was also noted that this
individual resigned from work at the site during this
investigation.
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1Jith respect to this *1teni, the act of misrepresent1tion oc:cuTTed
before the *ec:urity requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.55 became
effective. Thh regu1ation vas recently developed to upgrade
f1cility *ecurity to protect against a designed threat.
At the
time of this incident, the licensee vas following the provisions
cf their *ecurity plan which vas *ubmitted in accordance vith
10 CFR Part 50.)4(c). -This plan, which was *ubmitted to the
NRC, generally identifted certain c0tmtitments and/or provisions
~tilized 1n the protection of vital equipment within vital
areas.
Vith regard to audits, it was detencined that the licensee had,
on certain occasions, audited the provisions of the plan for
compliance, including *ec:urity officer weapons' training. lt
is recognized, however, that in this case, the act of collusion
involved several individuals and is obviouslv difficult to dis-
cover. -~e dUcovery of the act vas further* compounded by the .**
fect_tha~ th~ one individual was in a posit;i.on of _authoTliy __
and upon whom the licensee _depended upon for factual documenta- :-
tion, provided the licensee with false information.
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To provide assurance that th~s type of incident will not be
Tepeated, the NRC will specifically revieo.* measures and methods
to prevent recurrence ~uring the revie~ cf the licensee's
recently submitted security plan which was filed in accordance
with 10 CFR Part 73.55.
In addition to the above, the ~"RC representatives determined
through intervie*~ and a review of records that Individual A
had qualifie~*on June 2, 1976 which was prior to the incident,
and that, Individual A had requalified on September 19, 1977,
which was subsequent to the incident.
lt should be further noted that additional allegations
inade by security officers during the investigation conceT'tling
improper weapon qualifications and/or requalifications of
other security officers were investigated.
However, no
additional.weapon qualification and/or requelification
improprieties could be substantiated *. ** This vas determined
through a review cf records and intervi~s vith secu~;ty
officers ~ho were directly implicated by the individuals
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who aade the ellegation as vell as other individuals
In certain instances, signed statements were obtained fror:i
those who alleged the improprieties and those vbo were impli-
cated.
In eddition, interviews with the licensee's Security Operations
Supervisor and !ISSI supervisory personnel revealed no indi-
cation that they were aw~re of any individual in the position of
an anned se.curity office~ who was not *firearms qualified.
b.
Allegation: Access controls, particularly search requirements,
were not always being adhered to.
c.
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Finding: t>Uring the course of the investigation it vas
revealed through personal observations by NRC representatives
that &ec;.urity officers failed to properly administer positive
access coritrol requirements (searches) to licensee employees
- t a portal entrance to the prot~ct~d crea. It =hould be
further note8 that NRC representatives also confirmed the fact
that picture badges are not adequately supervised in accordance
with 10 ~tR Part 73.55 requirements in that, certain information
was omit~eo from several contractor security badges.
Conse-
quently, the licensee was cited with two items of noncompliance
as identified in Addendum A to this-investigation report.
It could not be substantiated that visitors and/or contractor
construction workers were affoided access to the protected
area without first adhering to proper access control require-
ments.
This was detenDined by personal obse'n-'ations by h"RC
representative~.during*the course of the iDvestigation. In
addition, it could not be substantiated that licensee employees
could gain access to the protected area by passing through
an unmanned gate.
It was detennined, however, that-the licensee's security
force was operati:lg below its normal complement of security
personnel, but still within security manpower requirements
for responding to a given designed security threat.
Though
there is no ~oncompliance associated with this finding, the
matter was discussed with the licensee."
Allegation:; Security officer responses to vital area alanns
are inadequate and incorrect response tillles are logged *
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Tindin&: Jt vas found, through a r~iew of recent records
for a forty four-day period, that *ecurity officers failed
to respond to two hundred and eight vital area alarms vithin
~he required time frame.
Consequently, the licensee was
cited vith an item o! ccmco=pliance as identified 1Z1 Addendum
A to this investigation report.
As supported by the above, there was no indication that
incorrect response times were logged.
Further, interviews
with many security off~cers, the plant Security Operations
Supervisor and BISS! supervisory personnel determined
that, to the best of their knowledge, all alarm Tesponses
are accurately recorded and that no individual was ever
provided with instruct~ons to tog anything_ bu~ ac~1=Uil
times.
1n addition, it could not be substaritiated through intervit!\\o"s
that c'ertai.Il alarms were never responded to or logged as such,
er, in one instance, that a vital area alarm was out of aervice.
for sixteen hours and the door vas checked only ~lrlee during
that time. lt vas determined, however, that the Plant ~ecurity
Operations Officer issued verbal instructions for *ecurity
offic~.to check various vital area doors while within the
plant for other reasons. Also, current procedures require that
a vital area door be either aecured or under constant *utveillence
should the monitoring aystem fail~
d.
Allegation: Vehicle control is inadequate.
Finding: A physical protection inspection conducted by NRC
representatives on Augbst 9-12, 1977 (IE Inspection ~eport
S0-255/77*07.) revealed that site designated vehicles were
not adequately controlled to assure use only by authorized
persons and for authorized purposes. As a result cf this
finding, the licensee was cited vi.th an item of noncompliance.
The licensee replied to NP.C's item cf noncompliance in a letter
dated September 21, 1977. ln this letter, the licensee stated
that appropriate security 1mplementing procedures were revised
and implemented to comply with the NRC position !or vehicle
control in the protected area.
During this itivestigat'ion, it was revealed through observations
by NRC representatives that the licens*ee is currently conforming
to 5ecur1ty requirements for control of vehicles in the protected
.a.ru.
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e.
Allegation: The training program is not being adhered to.
Finding:
In one* instance, ~ indfvidual made an
ellegation to the NRC representatives that an eighty-hour
training course vas not bein~ adhered to. This allegation,
as stated, vas found to be true.
~1th regard to this,
bovever, it vas determined that no CDmmitment for *uch a
course was ever made to the NRC and hence' could not be con-
sidered as noncompliance with an NRC requirement.
A revie~
of licensee commitments~o the NRC for security officer
training was conducted. After the reVi~, it was determined
that the licensee was adhering to the requirements of their
program. It ahould be noted, however, that training require-
ments are currently being upgraded to ~eet the requirements
cf 11') en J>"art 73.55. These new training t'equirements must
be effected no later than August, 1978, as required by the
rule.
t:*
In addition to the above, interviews with aecurity officers
revealed that they were dissatisfied with the initial on-the-
job training they received. Interviews determined that *
one-to-~ and a half days of this type of training vas
usually-given to ne~ly-assigned officers. lt was also deter-
ained that most procedural training vas conducted in a
classroom environment and therefore, in some cases, did not
adequately demonstrate the requirtments. lt was further
determined that open book examinations were administered
at the conclusion of the proc-edural training. ln some cases,
officers stated that they would not have attained a passing
score vere they not allo~ed to use the procedural manual
(open book test). lJh1le the NRC neither disapproves nor con-
dones such examination technique, it does encourage that
certain of the procedural examinations be administered
without the use of the reference 111aterial.
This is based on
the fact that certain procedural information must be committed
to the officer's memory in order to i.?mDediately, and without
reservation, react to certain emergency situations.
In vie~ of the foregoing NRC concerns, the licensee initiated
a retraining program to assure that all guards could satis-
factorily demonstrate an understanding of and ability to
perf cnn required procedures.
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f.
Allegation: Access controls to containment are inadequate.
Finding: Vi th regard to providing positive access controls
to containment, it vas revealed through interviews with
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staff and operations members of the site security force and
observations by NRC representatives, that the licensee did
not provide adequate controls to containment during periods
of frequent access (refueling).
Consequently, the licensee
was cited with an item of noncompliance as identified in
Addendum A to this investigation report.
Allegation:
The radiation monitor at a security egress
station is usually inoperative and radiation training for
security force persoi:t.hel is insufficient.
Findings:
A review of portal and portable personnel radia-
tion monitor requirements revealed that all required primary
exit areas were provided with operable monitors.
Secondary
or backup control points, which are not required by the
NRC, are provided at the several locations throughout the
plant. It was confirmed through interviews with certain
guaras and plant management personnel that a_post monitor
was, on certain occasions, inoperable.
In addition, it
was found that personnel exiting the facility could leave
the site Without passing through the secondary backup radia-
tion monitor at a secondary entrance.
With regard to this
matte!'r the licensee stated, that a review of this item
would be initiated and appropriate action taken even though
there was no noncompliance with NRC requirements noted.
With respect to radiation training, a review of the radio-
logical training program fci_r security personnel revealed
that prior to issuance of a film badge, guards receive basic
radiological training.deemed necessary to perform their
duties at the facility.
As in the case of most other site
personnel, security guards do not routinely enter high radia-
tion areas unless escorted by a radiation protection technician
or another person trained in radiation protection.
Further,
personnel protection against inadvertent entry into high
radiation areas is provided through a locking system which is
under specific control. It was noted, however, that specific
training and retraining requirements for the security force
were being reviewed by management at the time of this investi-
gation.
~o noncompliance was noted regarding this item.
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h.
Allegation:
Perimeter fence alarms are not reset *
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Finding:* During the investigation it was determined
through interviews, record checks, and personal
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observations by NRC Tepresentatives that the perimeter
fence alarms are being reset in accordance with. requirements.
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It was Doted by the NRC representatives that the licensee
instituted compensatory procedures to cope with adverse
weather conditions, on certain occasions.
~tails of adverse
weather conditions have been recorded and were available for
Teview by the NRC.
Accordingly, the NRC representatives
reviewed representative records and interviewed security force
1t1enibers relating to the-~implementation of the contingency
111easures employed during and after adverse weather conditions.
No discrepancies were noted by the );RC representatives.
4.
Allegation - A ~ecurity officer fell asleep on duty and had his
weapon stolen from him - anonymous caller.
Finding:
On. J'ebruary 14, 1978, the NRC Resident Inspector for
t.he Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant notified Region III that
his unattended automatic off ice telephone recorder had taped an
anonymous caller's conversation alleging that a security officer's
weapon was stolen while he was asleep on duty at the Palisades
site. With r~~ard to the incident, Region III established through
a telephone conversation with the plant Security Operations
Supervisor on February 14, 1978, that a .38 caliber revolver
vas, in f aet, lost by a guard on February_ 5, 1978. tn view of
this, NRC representatives were dispatched to the site to further
investigate this matter.
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During the investigation, it was tevealed through interviews
and review of licensee incident reports, that on the night of
February 5, 1978, &_.weapon (Colt 53183M), was reported missing.
A check of records 'confirmed that the weapon had been issued
and reported as lost by a security officer. The Security
Operations Supervisor stated that, upon loss of the weapon, a
complete inventory was taken of all veapons.
Also a thorough
search was conducted of all security posts and of all areas
and routes that the officer bad covered. All weapons were accounted
for except the lost revolver.
Since the search did not locate
the weapon and interviews with the officer who was issued the
weapon and other* security force ~embers proyed negative as to
its whereabouts, it was reported lost to the local police
department.
On February 16, 1978, at approximately 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />, the weapon was*
found by a security officer about ten feet from the Security
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luilding beside the path leading from the back door of ~he
Security Building to the Administration Building. The weapon vas
found barrel dovn in the *now_ with the grips exposed. It is the
licensee's opinion that due to the position of and location at
which the weapon was diacovered, it appears that the weapon was
placed there *hortly before it was found. lt shou!d be noted
that the location at which the revolver was found had been searched
visually and with a metal detector *ome time prior to its recovery.
On February 16, 1978, the lic~nsee's Security Operations Supervisor
and representatives from the NRC interviewed the security officer
vho was issued the weapon.
The security officer was reluctant
to admit he even had the weapon and he could not offer an explanation
as to bow it could have left his holster. The licensee stated that
polygraphs would.be given to the aecurity officer and other ~embers
of the security force.
The licensee further stated their investi-
gation vould .continue and the NRC would be kept informed of all
developing matters.
The weapon was *ent to the state crime labora-
atory for further analysis.
~
S.
Exit lnteTVie~
The inspect~r"f_.inet.vith licensee representatives at the conclusion
of the invest_igation on February 3, 1978.
In arlrlition to indbriduals
denoted in ~aragraph 1, ~. ~arnick, Chief, Jleactor Projects, Section
No. 2, Riii, was also present. During the interview, the inspectors
discussed the findings of the investigation and reviewed the
apparent items of noncompliance.
The inspectors expressly reempha-
sized the seriousness of concern felt over the apparent break.do~'Tl.
in effectiveness of the secur1~y system employed by the licensee.
Also, an exit 111eetirig was hel~ February 17, 1978, after the follow-up
investigation of the lost weapon. After discussion of the incident,
the licensee agreed to 1nf orm RIII of any additional findings.
ln addition, a final management meeting was conducted between
senior staff members of Consumers Power Company (denoted in
Paragraph l above) and the Director of the NRC's Office of
Inspection and Enforcement, Jlegion Ill, on March 7, 1978.
During the 1r1eetiug, the licensee was again informed of the acope
of the investigation and was infon:ned of th_e. NRC's finding for
each allegation.
In addition, the licensee's management
representatives-were informed of the apparent items of noncom-
pliance which vere noted as * result of the investigation of
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allegations or review of previously identified ooncompliance.
Further, the Tepreaentatives vere apprised of the NRC'* concern
over the licensee'* aanagement control *ystem, in that, the systetn
was not fully capable of identifying and correctin& problem areas.
Attachments:
i*.
Exhibit l
Statement
2. Addendum A, (Part 2.790(d)
Information)
3. Addendum B, (Part 2.790(d)
Information)
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.'. r*
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Washington, D.C.
Dear Sirs:
I am employed at the Palisades nuclear plant, Covert, Michigan and
I, like almost everyone these days, am concerned with security at
these facilities.
My concerns however regard the security forces
themselves.
Having worked around nuclear power plants for the past
several years I have watched the security forces grow from 2 or 3
retired part time, guards to forces of "several" men and women
equipped with and trained to use modern electronic equipment.
However, I feel less secure now than when I first started working
here!
The biggest reason for my concern is the extremely high turnover rate of
employees on the security forces.
Every couple of weeks a new training
class begins to replace personnel who have either quit or have been .fired.
It is very unnerving to me to know that every few days a bitter person,
who knows all about our security, either quits or is fired.
This is
~
giving a perfect weapon to someone who would like to penetrate -0ur security.
I believe the underlying cause for this situation is the pay and benefits
the guards wor'K'With.
One would hardly feel very good about working for
a place where the janitors make "more" per hour more than they do!
With-
out benefits!
For this very reasons the guard force at out plant is
preparing to strike. Personnaly I don't feel very secure knowing that
ex-security guards could be enticed to join terrorist groups or that
the entire security force could simply-walk off the job!
I believe that if the NRC is really concerned with security they would
investigate this prob~em and help establish professional security forces
who are proud of their jobs, take them seriously, and can live on the
pay without embarassment.
Thank you for listening,
Palisades Nuclear Plant
Covert, Michigan
EXHIBIT 1
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