ML18040A312

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Special Rept:On 970523,Division II EDG Output Breaker Failed to Close When Given Close Demand for Surveillance Testing & Was Not Reported as Required by TS 4.8.1.1.3.Caused by Degraded Subcomponent.Replaced Division II EDG Breaker
ML18040A312
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/1997
From: Conway J
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NMP2L-1709, NUDOCS 9707020095
Download: ML18040A312 (6)


Text

NIAGARA MOHAWK C EN E RATION NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION/LAKE ROAO, P.O. BOX 63, LYCOM IN G, NEW YORK 13093 BUSINESS CROUP June 23, 1997 NMP2L 1709 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 RE: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Subject:

Special Report Gentlemen:

On May 23, 1997, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) identified that on May 16, 1995, the Division II Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Output Breaker failed to close when given a close demand for surveillance testing and was not reported as required by Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3.

Therefore, in accordance with Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) Technical Specification, Section 4.8.1.1.3, we are submitting the following Special Report concerning the Division II Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Output Breaker failure. The failure has been categorized as a valid test and a valid failure as determined by the criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.108, position C.2.e(5).

Diesel Generator surveillance testing is performed on a monthly schedule (at least once per 31 days). The monthly testing interval is in conformance with Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 4.8.1.1.2-1, "Diesel Generator Test Schedule." Including this failure, the Division II EDG has experienced 1 valid failure in the past 20 valid tests and 2 valid failures in the last 100 valid tests in accordance with the test criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.108. This failure would not have required an increased test frequency.

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fi Page.2 On May 16, 1995 at 0513 hours0.00594 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.482143e-4 weeks <br />1.951965e-4 months <br />, with NMP2 in Mode 5, Refueling, Operations attempted to close the Division II EDG Output Breaker, 2ENS*SWG103-14, to perform a load rejection surveillance in accordance with N2-OSP-EGS-R002. The Division II EDG Output Breaker, 2ENS*SWG103-14, failed to close upon demand when attempting to parallel the EDG to Switchgear 2ENS*SWG103. At the time of this failure the EDG was undergoing various Technical Specification required surveillance tests following refueling maintenance activities in preparation for its return-to-service.

The apparent cause of the diesel output breaker failure was a degraded subcomponent. The

~ output breaker positive interlock switch performance was intermittent due to mechanical binding of the switch. Since this event occurred in the past, the switch is not available for a more comprehensive analysis.

The apparent cause for failure to submit a Special Report at the time of the event was work practices in that a Deviation/Event Report (DER) was not initiated in accordance with NIP-ECA-01. In particular, personnel who reviewed the failed Technical Specification surveillance failed to identify the need to write a DER. Had the DER been written, a reportability evaluation as required by NIP-ECA-01 would have identified the requirement for a Special Report.

The Division II EDG Output Breaker positive interlock switch was replaced under Work Order (WO) 95-05136-00. Technical Specification required testing was successfully completed after repairs were made in May 1995.

No additional switch failures have occurred prior to or since this event, and therefore this failure is considered an isolated event.

Deviation/Event Report 2-97-1569 has been written to document this event including the failure to identify the event when it occurred and to submit a Special Report. Individuals involved in reviewing the failed surveillance test will be counseled by July 15, 1997, regarding compliance with the requirements of NIP-ECA-01.

l, Page.3 This event has been categorized as a Valid Test and a Valid Failure as determined by the criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.108, position C.2.e(5).

Very truly yours, ohn T. Conway Plant Manager - Un JTC/GJG/cmk xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector

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