ML18038B412

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LER 95-006-00:on 950814,excess Flow Check Valve Was Not Tested Per TS Requirements Due to Drawing Deficiency. Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A Was Closed to Isolate Sensing Line
ML18038B412
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/13/1995
From: William Jones
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18038B409 List:
References
LER-95-006-01, LER-95-6-1, NUDOCS 9509180170
Download: ML18038B412 (10)
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Text

NRC FORM 366 S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(SOIISSION ROVED BY (NIB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORNARD COMHENTS REGARDIMG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATIOM AND RECORDS MANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HMBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) NASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTOM DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NQIBER (2) PAGE (3)

Browns Ferr Nuclear Plant BFN Unit 2 05000260 1 OF 5 TITLE (4) AM EXCESS FLOM CHECK VALVE llAS NOT TESTED PER TECHMICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIREHENTS DUE TO A DRANIHG DEFICIENCY EVENT DATE 5 LER NINBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED B SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAHE N/A DOCKET NUHBER HONTH DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITY NAHE N/A DOCKET HUMBER 08 14 95 95 006 00 9 13 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10'CFR  : Check one or mor e 11 M(X)E (9) N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b)

PONER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 100 LEVEL ('10) 20.405(a)(1)(fi) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50 '3(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract below and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50 '3(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

William C. Jones, Compliance Licensing Engineer (205) 729-7857 C(NIPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH C(NPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COHPOMENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED HOMTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 14, 1995, at 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, TVA determined that an excess flow check valve, which was part of a primary containment boundary, .was not tested pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 4.7.D.1.d. On discovery of this condition, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-95-138-3.7.D was entered requiring the valve to be returned to operable status or have the line isolated by a containment isolation valve in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. At 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> on August 14I 1995@ containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate this sensing line and the LCO was exited. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS. The root cause of this event was inadequate documentation of excess flow check valves included in primary containment boundaries. Specifically, the excess flow check valve was not shown on the appropriate plant drawings. The excess flow check valve will be added to plant drawings and the affected Surveillance Instruction. A review of Unit 2 valves has not found other excess flow check valves that are not identified in the design output documents. Prior to restart of Unit 3 and Unit 1, TVA will also verify excess flow check valves in each unit are identified on design output documents.

9509180170 950913 PDR ADOCK 05000260 8 PDR

41 NRC FORM U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQOIISSIOM APPROVED BY (WB NO. 3150-0104 5/31/95 366A'5-92)

EXPIRES ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REOUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AMD RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION,,

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHEHT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET M(ABER (2) LER NNQKR (6) PAGE (3)

TEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER MUHBER Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95. 006 00 2 of 5 TEXT lf more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

I. PLANT CONDITIONS At the time of this event, Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power. Unit 3 and Unit 1 were shutdown and defueled.

I DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

.A. Event At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br /> Central Daylight Time (CDT) on August 14, 1995, TVA determined that a reportable event existed because excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A [CKV) had not been tested pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.D.l.d. The valve is within the primary containment boundary for vessel sensing line penetration 2-X-28B. A 0.25 inch orifice is installed upstream of the check valve to limit flow on a line break. The event was discovered during the process of revising Site Standard, Practice (SSP)-8.7, "Containment Leak Rate Programs."

On discovery of this condition, Operations personnel [utility, licensed] entered Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)

LCO 2-95-138-3.7.D requiring the valve to be returned to operable status or have the line isolated by a containment isolation valve in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. At 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> on August 14, 1995, containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A [RTV), located upstream of the excess flow check valve, was closed to isolate this line and the LCO was exited.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

B. Ino ereble Structures Com onents or S stems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

C. Dates and A roximate Times of Ma or Occurrencest August 14, 1995 at 1715, hours CDT TVA discovered an excess flow check valve that had not been tested per TS requirements at 1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br /> CDT Entered 4-hour LCO retroactive to 1715 at 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> CDT Containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed and the LCO was exited

'0 NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQSIISSION APPROVED BY ais NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY 'WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS. FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHAT I ON AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET IHNIBER (2) LER NLNBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUEH IAL REVI SION NUHBER NUHBER Browne Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 3 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

D. Other S stems or Secondar Functions Affectedt None.

E. Method of Discove This condition was discovered during the process of revising SSP-8.7. During this process, TVA determined that excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A was not shown on the appropriate plant drawings. Upon further investigation, TVA determined that this valve had not been tested pursuant to TS requirements.

F. 0 erator Actions:

Following the discovery of this condition, Operations personnel entered LCO 2-95-138-3.7.D. Subsequently, Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate the sensing line and the LCO was exited.

G. Safet S stem Res onses:

None.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT A. Immediate Causes.

The immediate cause of the event was the failure to test excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A pursuant to TS requirements.

B. Root Cause!

The root cause of the event was inadequate documentation of excess flow check valves that are included in primary containment boundaries. Specifically, the appropriate plant drawings did not show the excess flow check valve. This, condition resulted in a failure to test the valve.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT There are no normal reactor operations,,automatic safety functions, or engineered safety features which required the usage of the affected check valve. This condition does not seriously compromise plant safety or seriously degrade the plant's principle safety barriers.

This condi ion is only a failure to test an excess flow check valve.

This line is seismic category I piping and a .0.25 inch orifice is installed upstream of the check valve to limit flow:on a line break.

A manual isolation valve downstream of the reactor has been closed to

NRC FORM 366A'5.92)'.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CNRIISSION APPROVED BY (N(B NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN-PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHAT I ON AND RECORDS HANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 771C), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OF F ICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

'WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NLNBER (2) LER NIMBER (6> PAGE (3>

TEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 4 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17>

isolate the line. Therefore, there are no safety consequences associated with this event. Additionally, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.A ~ Immediate Corrective Actions:

Containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate the sensing line. Operations placed a hold order on this valve to ensure that tested.

it remains closed until the check valve is B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

The excess flow check valve will be added to appropriate plant drawings and the affected SIs. A review of Unit 2 valves has not found other excess flow check valves that are not identified on the design output documents. Prior to restart of Unit 3 and Unit l, TVA will also verify excess flow check valves in each unit are identified on design output documents.

An evaluation is being performed to determine functionally required for Unit operation, or removed and the line capped.

ifif the valve is the valve can be If this valve is not removed, TVA will test this valve during the Unit 2 Cycle 8 refueling outage (currently scheduled to begin late March 1996) as required by the TS VI ~ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Failed Com onents None.

Bo Previous LERs on Similar Eventsi TVA has previously issued LERs concerning TS required tests that were not performed. None of the previous LERs involved the failure to test excess flow check valves. One LER (259/85-030) addressed the failure to test a containment isolation valve.

The event occurred because an SI was not revised to reflect a TS change.

This valve is tested as part of the reactor vessel operational pressure test."

II (

NRC FORH 366A U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NNISSIOH APPROVED BY'MB NO. 3150-0104 (5->2) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY. WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 NRS. FOR'WARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHAT I ON AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555'-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH.

TEXT CONTZNUATZON PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET/

WASHINGTON DC NAHE (1) DOCKET NINBER (2) 20503'ACILITY LER HISSER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 5 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use sdditionaI co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

VIZ ~ COMMITMENTS Excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A will be added to appropriate drawings and the affected SZs by May 14, 1996.

2. Zf this valve is not removed or disconnected, TVA will test this valve during the Unit 2 Cycle 8 outage as required by the TS.
3. Prior to Unit 3 restart, TVA will verify excess flow check valves in Unit 3 are identified on design output documents.
4. Prior to Unit 1 restart, TVA will verify excess flow check valves in Unit 1 are identified on design output documents.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIZS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g., [XX)).

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