05000260/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950814,excess Flow Check Valve Was Not Tested Per TS Requirements Due to Drawing Deficiency. Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A Was Closed to Isolate Sensing Line

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:on 950814,excess Flow Check Valve Was Not Tested Per TS Requirements Due to Drawing Deficiency. Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A Was Closed to Isolate Sensing Line
ML18038B412
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/13/1995
From: William Jones
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18038B409 List:
References
LER-95-006-01, LER-95-6-1, NUDOCS 9509180170
Download: ML18038B412 (10)
v • d • e


LER-1995-006, on 950814,excess Flow Check Valve Was Not Tested Per TS Requirements Due to Drawing Deficiency. Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A Was Closed to Isolate Sensing Line
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
2601995006R01 - NRC Website
v • d • e

text

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(SOIISSION ROVED BY (NIB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COHPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORNARD COMHENTS REGARDIMG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATIOM AND RECORDS MANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HMBB 7714), U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTOM DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Browns Ferr Nuclear Plant BFN Unit 2 DOCKET NQIBER (2) 05000260 PAGE (3) 1 OF 5 TITLE (4) AM EXCESS FLOM CHECK VALVE llAS NOT TESTED PER TECHMICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIREHENTS DUE TO A DRANIHG DEFICIENCY HONTH DAY YEAR EVENT DATE 5

LER NINBER 6

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER REPORT DATE 7

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED B

DOCKET NUHBER FACILITY NAHE N/A YEAR MONTH DAY 08 14 OPERATING M(X)E (9)

PONER LEVEL ('10) 95 95 006 00 N

100 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(fi) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 9 13 FACILITY NAHE N/A DOCKET HUMBER 20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50 '3(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50'3(a)(2)(x) 73.71 (b) 73.71(c)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text,TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10'CFR Check one or more 11 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME William C. Jones, Compliance Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(205) 729-7857 C(NIPLETE OHE LINE FOR EACH C(NPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13

CAUSE

SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

CAUSE

SYSTEM COHPOMENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

HOMTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

(16)

On August 14, 1995, at 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, TVA determined that an excess flow check valve, which was part of a primary containment

boundary,

.was not tested pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 4.7.D.1.d.

On discovery of this condition, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-95-138-3.7.D was entered requiring the valve to be returned to operable status or have the line isolated by a containment isolation valve in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

At 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> on August 14I 1995@

containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate this sensing line and the LCO was exited.

This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

The root cause of this event was inadequate documentation of excess flow check valves included in primary containment boundaries.

Specifically, the excess flow check valve was not shown on the appropriate plant drawings.

The excess flow check valve will be added to plant drawings and the affected Surveillance Instruction.

A review of Unit 2 valves has not found other excess flow check valves that are not identified in the design output documents.

Prior to restart of Unit 3 and Unit 1, TVA will also verify excess flow check valves in each unit are identified on design output documents.

9509180170 950913 PDR ADOCK 05000260 8

PDR

41LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQOIISSIOM APPROVED BY (WB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REOUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AMD RECORDS HANAGEHEHT BRANCH (HHBB 7714),

U.S.

HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION,,

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF HANAGEHEHT AND

BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET M(ABER (2)

LER NNQKR (6)

TEAR SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVISION MUHBER PAGE (3)

Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95.

006 00 2 of 5 TEXT lf more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

I.

PLANT CONDITIONS

At the time of this event, Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power.

Unit 3 and Unit 1 were shutdown and defueled.

I

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

.A.

Event At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br /> Central Daylight Time (CDT) on August 14,

1995, TVA determined that a reportable event existed because excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A [CKV) had not been tested pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.D.l.d.

The valve is within the primary containment boundary for vessel sensing line penetration 2-X-28B.

A 0.25 inch orifice is installed upstream of the check valve to limit flow on a line break.

The event was discovered during the process of revising Site Standard, Practice (SSP)-8.7, "Containment Leak Rate Programs."

On discovery of this condition, Operations personnel [utility, licensed]

entered Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)

LCO 2-95-138-3.7.D requiring the valve to be returned to operable status or have the line isolated by a containment isolation valve in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

At 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> on August 14,

1995, containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A [RTV), located upstream of the excess flow check valve, was closed to isolate this line and the LCO was exited.

B.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

Ino ereble Structures Com onents or S stems that Contributed to the Event:

C.

None.

Dates and A

roximate Times of Ma or Occurrencest August 14, 1995 at 1715, hours CDT at 1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br /> CDT at 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br /> CDT TVA discovered an excess flow check valve that had not been tested per TS requirements Entered 4-hour LCO retroactive to 1715 Containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed and the LCO was exited

'0

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQSIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY ais NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COHPLY 'WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:

50.0 NRS.

FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714),

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND

BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1)

DOCKET IHNIBER (2)

LER NLNBER (6)

YEAR SEQUEH IIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER PAGE (3)

Browne Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 3 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

D.

Other S stems or Secondar Functions Affectedt None.

E.

Method of Discove This condition was discovered during the process of revising SSP-8.7.

During this process, TVA determined that excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A was not shown on the appropriate plant drawings.

Upon further investigation, TVA determined that this valve had not been tested pursuant to TS requirements.

F.

0 erator Actions:

Following the discovery of this condition, Operations personnel entered LCO 2-95-138-3.7.D.

Subsequently, Containment Isolation Valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate the sensing line and the LCO was exited.

G.

Safet S stem Res onses:

None.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A.

Immediate

Causes

The immediate

cause of the event

was the failure to test excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A pursuant to TS requirements.

B.

Root Cause!

The root cause of the event was inadequate documentation of excess flow check valves that are included in primary containment boundaries.

Specifically, the appropriate plant drawings did not show the excess flow check valve.

This, condition resulted in a failure to test the valve.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

There are no normal reactor operations,,automatic safety functions, or engineered safety features which required the usage of the affected check valve.

This condition does not seriously compromise plant safety or seriously degrade the plant's principle safety barriers.

This condi ion is only a failure to test an excess flow check valve.

This line is seismic category I piping and a.0.25 inch orifice is installed upstream of the check valve to limit flow:on a line break.

A manual isolation valve downstream of the reactor has been closed toNUCLEAR REGULATORY CNRIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY (N(B NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN-PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 771C),

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OF F ICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET,

'WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NLNBER (2)

LER NIMBER (6>

TEAR SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVISION NUHBER PAGE (3>

Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 4 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17>

V.

isolate the line.

Therefore, there are no safety consequences associated with this event.

Additionally, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.A ~

Immediate Corrective Actions

Containment isolation valve 2-RTV-3-240A was closed to isolate the sensing line.

Operations placed a hold order on this valve to ensure that it remains closed until the check valve is tested.

B.

Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

The excess flow check valve will be added to appropriate plant drawings and the affected SIs.

A review of Unit 2 valves has not found other excess flow check valves that are not identified on the design output documents.

Prior to restart of Unit 3 and Unit l, TVA will also verify excess flow check valves in each unit are identified on design output documents.

An evaluation is being performed to determine if the valve is functionally required for Unit operation, or if the valve can be removed and the line capped.

If this valve is not removed, TVA will test this valve during the Unit 2 Cycle 8 refueling outage (currently scheduled to begin late March 1996) as required by the TS VI ~

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Com onents Bo None.

Previous LERs on Similar Eventsi TVA has previously issued LERs concerning TS required tests that were not performed.

None of the previous LERs involved the failure to test excess flow check valves.

One LER (259/85-030) addressed the failure to test a containment isolation valve.

The event occurred because an SI was not revised to reflect a TS change.

test." This valve is tested as part of the reactor vessel operational pressure

II

(

NRC FORH 366A (5->2)

U S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NNISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTZNUATZON APPROVED BY'MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COHPLY. WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:

50.0 NRS.

FOR'WARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714),

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555'-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH.

PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET/

WASHINGTON DC 20503'ACILITY NAHE (1)

DOCKET NINBER (2)

LER HISSER (6)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER PAGE (3)

Browns Ferry Unit 2 05000260 95 006 00 5 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use sdditionaI co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

VIZ~

COMMITMENTS

Excess flow check valve 2-ECKV-3-240A will be added to appropriate drawings and the affected SZs by May 14, 1996.

2.

Zf this valve is not removed or disconnected, TVA will test this valve during the Unit 2 Cycle 8 outage as required by the TS.

3.

Prior to Unit 3 restart, TVA will verify excess flow check valves in Unit 3 are identified on design output documents.

4.

Prior to Unit 1 restart, TVA will verify excess flow check valves in Unit 1 are identified on design output documents.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIZS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g.,

[XX)).

0

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