ML18037A238
| ML18037A238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1980 |
| From: | PARSONS, BRINCKERHOFF, QUADA & DOUGLAS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053B374 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002040540 | |
| Download: ML18037A238 (74) | |
Text
Evacuation Time Estimates for Areas Near the $ite of James A. FitzPatrick and Nine MilePoint Power Plants prepared for Niagara MohmvkPower Corporafion preparedby Parsons BrinckerhoffQuade & Douglas, Inc.
January 31, 1980:
1' I
I I r
3f 4
n II 5 J
'l V
C C
I A ll 4
I i ~
g II b
Table of Contents
~Pa e
I INTRODUCTION II EVACUATION SECTORS AND EVACUATION AREAS III ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY IV SPECIAL FACILITIES V
EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES VI LOCAL OFFICIAL COMMENTARY Appendix Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter of November 29, 1979 Roadway Capacity Methodology C
Local and State Officials'ommentary D
State Office of Disaster Preparedness Letter 15
)
I I
r l
I.
INTRODUCTION a ~
b.
On November 29,
- 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC'equested that the power reactor licensees (the Power Authority of the State of New Yor k and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation) prepare evacuation time estimates for the James A. FitzPatrick and Nine Mile Point power plants.
The information requested was contained in an enclosure to the NRC's letter of November 29, 1979; the enclosure was entitled "Request for Evacuation Time Estimates (After Notification) for Areas Near Nuclear Power Plants."
(Copy of the letter and enclosure are attached in the Appendix.)
This document presents the estimate of the time required to implement evacuation of areas near the nuclear power plants.
The areas for which evacuation estimates are given have an outer boundary of approximately 10 miles radius, basically corresponding to the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ).
See Figure 1.
II.
EVACUATION SECTORS AND EVACUATION AREAS Based on the format specified in the November 29, 1979 letter from the
- NRC, an evacuation area within a circle with approximately a 10-mile radius was defined.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the irregularly shaped evacuation area is, in many places, considerably larger than the area included within the 10-mile radius.
These irregularities occur because the perimeter of the evacuation area was constructed to follow either natural or political boundaries to the extent possible.
Further effor ts were taken to avoid bisecting communities and densely populated areas.
Within this evacuation
- area, ten internal sectors were developed in conformance with the NRC requirements.
The internal sectors include:
two 180 sectors within a two-mile radius of the power 0
plant; four 90 quadrants in the area between the two-and five-0 mile radii; and four 90 quadrants between the five-and ten-mile 0
radii.
Similar to the outer 10-mile boundary, the boundaries of the ten internal sectors also follow natural or political boundaries wherever possible.
As a result, in many cases there is an overlap in the area covered by adjacent sectors.
Because it is assumed that coterminous inner sectors will always be evacuated simultaneously with the outer sectors, an evacuation area is defined as the combination of sectors that would be evacuated in different situations.
For example, if Sector 5 is to be evacuated, the evacuation area would include Sectors 2 and 5.
Evacuation of Sector 7 would also require the evacuation of Sectors 1 and 3.
The list below identifies the sectors which comprise the evacua-tion areas which are identified as A through J.
ll I
1
As indicated in the list, Evacuation Area K includes all ten sectors.
In this case, the internal boundaries
- and, hence, the over lapping areas are eliminated as this situation requires evacuation of the entire area.
Following is the list of the evacuation sectors in each evacuation area and the figure on which each evacuation area is shown.
~Pi ure Evacuation Area Evacuation Sectors 2,
5 2, 5, 9
2, 6
A, C, D,
E and F
2, 6, 1O 1,3,4,7,8 1 through 10 A brief description of the perimeter boundary of each evacuation area follows:
EVACUATION AREA B (SECTOR 2) (Figure 3)
From Shore Oaks Drive at edge of Lake Ontario, south on Shore Oaks Drive to North Road (Co.
Rd. 1).
West on North Road to Co.
Rd.
29.
South on Co.
Rd.
29 to Middle Road.
West on Middle Road to Creamery Road.
North on Creamery Road to North Road (Co.
Rd.
1).
West on North Road to Lake Road (Co.
Rd.
1A).
Northeast on Lake Road to four th road on left.
Follow fourth road northwest to Lake Ontario.
EVACUATION AREA G (SECTORS 2
- 5) (Figure 4)
From Shore Oaks Drive at edge of Lake Ontario, South on Shore Oaks Drive. to North Road (Co.
Rd. 1).
West on North Road to New Haven/Scriba town line.
South along New Haven/Scriba town line to Mud Lake Road (Co.
Rd. 51).
South on Mud Lake Road to Hall Road (Co.
Rd. 4).
West on Hall Road to County Road 29.
North on County Road 29 to O'onnor Road.
West on O'onnor Road to May Fly Road.
South on May Fly Road to Hall Road (Co.
Rd. 4).
West on Hall Road to Oswego City Line.
North along Oswego City Line to East Albany Street.
West on East Albany St. to Penn-Central Railroad.
North along Penn-Central Railroad, continuing north across Middle Road to shoreline on Lake Ontario.
EVACUATION AREA H (SECTORS 2
5
- 9) (Figure 5)
From Shore Oaks Drive at edge of Lake Ontario, south on Shore Oaks Drive to North Road (Co.
Rd. 1).
West on North Road to New Haven/Scriba
town line.
South along New Haven/Scriba town line to Mud Lake Road (Co.
Rd. 51).
South on Mud Lake Road to Hall Road (Co.
Rd. 4).
East on Hall Road to North Volney Road (Co.
Rd. 6).
South along North Volney Road to Clifford Road.
East on Clifford Road to Cape Horn Road.
South on Cape Horn Road to Mount Pleasant-Palermo Road (Co.
Rd. 45).
West along Mount Pleasant-Palermo Road to junction with Hawk Road.
- South, then west on Hawk Road to Silk Rd. South on Silk Rd. to Howard Rd.
West along Howard Road to County Road 57.
North along County Rd.
57 to Chalone Drive.
West on Chalone Drive, crossing Penn-Central Railroad and Oswego River to Cunningham Road (Co.
Rd. 85).
West along Cunningham Road to Ridge Road.
North on Ridge Road to Oswego Town Line.
West along Oswego Town Line to Rathburn Road.
North on Rathburn Road to Furniss Road.
West along Furniss Road to Johnson Road,(Co.
Rd.
- 7) ~
North. on Johnson Road to Tug Hill Road.
West on Tug Hill Road to Bunker Hill Road.
North on Bunker Hill Road to Maple Avenue (Co.
Rd. 20).
West on Maple Avenue to Route 104.
North on Route 104 to West Lake Road.
West on West Lake Road to Lake Shore'oad.
North, then east on Lake Shore Road to the road on southwest boundary of Snake Swamp.
North along this road to edge of Lake Ontario.
EVACUATION AREA I (SECTORS 2
- 6) (Figure 6)
From Butter fly Creek mouth at Lake Ontario, follow creek to North Road (Co. Rd. 1).
East on Co.
Rd.
1 to Co.
Rd. 43.
South on Co.
Rd.
43 (Tollgate Rd.)
Continue south on Co.
Rd.
43 to U S Rte 104.
West on U S Rte 104 to Egglestone Road.
South on Egglestone Road to Stone Road.
West on Stone Road to Darrow Road.
South on Darrow Road to Co.
Rd. 51.
West on Co.
Rd.
51 to Mud Lake Rd.
(Co.
Rd. 51).
South on Co.
Rd.
51 (Mud Lake Rd.) to Hall Rd.
(Co.
Rd. 4).
West on Hall Road (Co.
Rd. 4) to Co.
Rd. 29.
North on Co.
Rd.
29 to Middle Road.
West on Middle Road to Creamery Road.
North on Creamery Road to North Road (Co.
Rd. 1).
West on North Rd. to Lake Road (Co.
Rd.
1A).
Northeast on Lake Road to fourth road on left.
Follow fourth road northwest to Lake Ontario.
EVACUATION AREA J (SECTORS 2
6
- 10) (Figure 7)
From mouth of Salmon River at Lake Ontario, follow river south to Selkirk Shores State Park boundary.
Follow park boundary south to Co.
Rd. 28.
Co.
Rd.
28 south to Daysville Rd.
West on Daysville Rd. to Krebs Road Spur.
South on Krebs Road Spur to Krebs Road to Manwaring Rd.
Manwaring Rd. southeast to Co.
Rd. 41.
Southwest on Co.
Rd.
41 to Smithers Road.
Southeast on Smithers Road to U S Rte 104.
U S Rte 104 west to Emery Road.
South on Emery Road to Standpipe Rd.
(Co.
Rd. 58).
From Standpipe Rd, south and then east on Stone Road to NYS Rte 69.
West on NYS Rte 69 to Larson Road.
West on Larson Road to Pumphouse Rd.
Pumphouse Road south to Pople Ridge Road.
West on Pople Ridge Road to NYS Rte 3.
South on NYS Rte 3 to Co.
Rd. 4.
West on Co.
Rd.
4 to Co.
Rd 35.
South on Co.
Rd.
35 to Clifford Road.
West on Clifford Road to Red School House Road.
South on Red School House Road to Co.
Rd. 45.
West on Co.
Rd.
45 to Baldwin Road.
Northwest on Baldwin Road to Silk Road.
North on Silk Road to Hall Road (Co.
Rd. 4).
West on Hall Road to Co.
Rd. 29.
North on Co.
Rd.
29 to Middle Road.
West on Middle Road to Creamery Road.
North on Creamery Road to North Rd.
(Co.
Rd.
1)
West on North Road to Lake Road (Co.
Rd.
I; I
II
1A).
Northeast on Lake Road to fourth road on left.
Follow fourth road northwest to Lake Ontario.
EVACUATION AREA K (SECTORS 1-10) (Figure 9)
From mouth of Salmon River at Lake Ontario, follow river south to Selkirk Shor es State Park boundary.
Follow park boundary south to Co.
Rd. 28.
Co.
Rd.
28 south to Daysville Rd.
West on Daysville Rd. to Krebs Road Spur.
South on Krebs Road Spur to Krebs Road to Manwaring Rd.
. Manwaring Rd. southeast to Co.
Rd. 41.
Southwest on Co.
Rd.
41 to Smithers Road.
Southeast on Smithers Road to U.S. Rte 104.
U S Rte 104 west to Emery Road.
South on Emery Road to Standpipe Rd.'Co.
Rd. 58).
From Standpipe Rd., south and then east on Stone
'Road to NYS Rte 69.
West on NYS Rte 69 to Larson Road.
West on Larson Road to Pumphouse Rd.
Pumphouse Road south to Pople Ridge Road.
West on Pople Ridge Road to NYS Rte 3.
South on NYS Rte 3 to Co.
Rd. 4.
West on Co.
Rd.
4 to Co.
Rd. 35.
South on Co.
Rd.
35 to Clifford Road.
West on Clifford Road to Red School House Road.
South on NYS Rte 3 to Co.
Rd. 4.
West on Co.
Rd.
4 to Co.
Rd. 35.
South on Co.
Rd.
35 to Clifford Road.
West on Clifford Road to Red School House Road.
South on Red School House Road to Co.
Rd. 45.
West on Co.
Rd.
45 to junction with Hawk Road.
- South, then west on Hawk Road to Silk road.
South on Silk Road to Howard Road.
West along Howard Road to Co.
Rd. 57.
North along Co.
Rd.
57 to Chalone Drive.
West on Chalone Drive, crossing Penn-Central Railroad and Oswego River to Cunningham Road (Co.
Rd. 85).
West along Cunningham Road to Ridge Road.
North on Ridge Road to Oswego County Line.
West along Oswego County Line to Rathburn Road.
North on Rathburn Road to Furniss Road.
West along Furniss Road to Johnson Road (Co.
Rd. 7).
North on Johnson Road-to Tug Hill Road.
West on Tug Hill Road to Bunker Hill Road.
North on Bunker Hill Road to Maple Avenue (Co.
Rd. 20).
West on Maple Avenue to Route 104.
North on Route 104 to West Lake Road.
West on West Lake Road to Lake Shore Road.
North, then east on Lake Shore Road to the road on southwest boundary of Snake Swamp.
North along this road to edge of Lake Ontario.
Remaining sectors extend into L'ake Ontario.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY a ~
~Po ulation The population for the area covering the 10-mile radius, as well as each of the sectors, was derived from the 1970 U.S. Department of Commerce Census and updated by the 1976 Population Estimates and Projections issued January 1979 by the U.S. Department of Commerce Census.
The overall area was divided into ten sectors with each sector extending beyond its quadrant limits and thereby creating overlapping areas.
The total area was identified as the 11th Sector.
Each sector was subdivided into varying numbers of subsectors.
I" g
(J I"
Subsector perimeters were determined by any or a combination of the following:
census tract delineations, town boundaries, park boundaries, highways or roads.
The population of the subsectors was determined from census tracts when thei full area of the tract was equal to the area of the subsector.
When a subsector was less than or greater than the area of the census tract, block statistics were used to compile the population.
In some instances where block statistics were unavailable, house counts were made on the New York State Department of Transportation planimetric maps and a predetermined number of occupants per household based on 1970 U.S.
Census was used to determine the population.
The sector population is the aggregate of the subsector's population.
The population of the total area (11th Sector) is not the sum of Sectors 1 through 10's population because of the overlapping boundaries.
Based on the 1970 Census data of households with automobiles, a ratio was established to determine the number of people with automobiles.. Dividing the number-of-people-with-automobiles by the number-of-people-per-household determined the number of automobiles.
The following table shows the 1976 population estimates.
b.
Evacuation Time Estimates Methodolo To estimate the time required to evacuate the areas surrounding the nuclear power plants, the evacuation process for each sector was simulated.
A process was developed whereby evacuation was analyzed for each evacuation area and used as a basis for estimating the time to evacuate the area population.
The evacuation analysis estimated the time for evacuation of the area population through the use of existing transportation facilities.
Of primary concern was to minimize the number of primary evacuation routes and to utilize available public bus transit and special vehicles located either within the ten mile limit or in close proximity.
This process was used to determine a best estimate and adverse weather estimate of evacuation times for the general population and special facilities.
Subsectors within the sectors were disaggregated into smaller areas (zones) of population concentrations which would produce trips using the maJor roadways.
Upon completion of the sector disaggregation to zones, the following steps were executed in estimating the time to evacuate a particular zone and, subsequently, the sectors and evacuation areas.
Step 1 - Zonal Trip Generation Step 2 - Transportation Facility Identification Step 3 - Capacity Determination Step 4 - Modal Trip Assignment Step 5 - Evacuation Time Estimation The process required a certain amount of feedback and iteration within the five steps.
Co 1;
FITZPATRICK/NINE MILE POINT POWER PLANTS 1976 POPULATION ESTIMATE Evacuation Area Evacuation Sector 1976 Po ulation Estimate 1,O88 2,5 3 $733 2~5 j9 35>973 2,6 2,824 2,6,1O 9 i575' through 10 43,772 SOURCE:
1970 U.S. Department of Commerce
- Census, updated by 1976 Popu1ation Estimates and Projections, U ~ S. Department of Commerce
- Census, January, 1979.
I, I'
Zonal Tri Generation This step of the process consists of converting population into vehicle trips at a zonal level.
For this purpose the zonal population was divided into general population without vehicles and general population with vehicles.
Additionally, the populations of special facilities were identified so that separate evacuation plans could be developed.
When estimating the vehicle trips for the general population with vehicles, it was assumed that one vehicle trip would be generated by each family in evacuating the area.
Using average family statistical data, the number of vehicles generated by the general population with vehicles was estimated for each zone.
For the general population without vehicles, both school buses and transit buses with capacities of 40 and 50 persons, respectively, were used.
The mixture of transit vehicles depended largely on the estimate of time (best estimate or adverse weather) being made.
The number of bus trips estimated were converted to passenger car equivalents (PCE) for purposes of assigning the trips jointly with auto trips to the selected routes.
For the adverse weather estimate, school bus trips were determined and also converted to PCEs for assignment purposes.
A factor of two was used to convert school and transit buses to passenger car equivalents.
Vehicles generated by special facilities were also estimated and where buses were needed these were converted to PCEs.
Special facilities often required a mix of ambulances, wheel chair vehicles and buses for evacuation.
The net result of the trip generation process was the estimation of equivalent passenger vehicles for each zone in the ten mile area.
Trans or tation Facilit Identification Identification of existing transportation facilities required a determination of the primary evacuation routes and an inventory of the existing transit facilities in or around the ten mile limits.
Based on information provided by the New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness, County officials, field reconnaissance, information on file, and general familiarity with the area, the primary and secondary evacuation routes were selected.
Each of the selected
- routes, as well as others, were traveled in order to assess sufficiency for evacuation purposes and to determine the physical characteristics (number of lanes, lane and shoulder widths) needed for capacity computations.
~
I Cg I'l
Information regarding transit facilities and special vehicles available for evacuation was obtained through personal contact with transit operators, school districts, emergency vehicle operators, and the special, facilities.
Ca acit Determination A critical element in determining the amount of time needed to evacuate any given area is the capacity of the existing roadways to accomodate the anticipated vehicular. volumes generated during evacuation.
The procedure used in determining the primary evacuation roadway capacities was based on the Federal Highway Adminiatration'e
~Hl hwa
~Ca gait Manual
- 1965 Edition.
Capacities were estimated at roadway Levels of Service D and E for use in computing travel times for the adverse weather and best estimate conditions, respectively.
A more detailed explanation of the method used in determining these capacities is included in the appendix.
The New York State Department of Transportation and the Office of Disaster Preparedness were consulted with regard to using these capacities for the time estimates and concur fully with the approach (see C.P.
Kole letter to R.W. Tweedie dated January 25, 1980 in the Appendix).
Modal Tri Assi nment The next, step in the process is to assign the trips generated by each. zone to the selected fixed routes for evacuation.
A computer program was developed which would receive as input a description of all the roadway characters (i.e. free flow
- speed, link length, and capacity) for the selected evacuation
- routes, the selected evacuation routes for each zone and the zonal trip generation and terminal time; the program output was a summary of travel times and delays for the evacua-tion routes and other statistical information which could be used in evaluating the evacuation route selection.
In some cases, several computer runs were made for an evacuation area to arrive at the best balance between number of evacuation routes and evacuation time.
In making an assignment of PCEs to the evacuation
- routes, it was assumed that all trips would be on the route at the same instant.
This approach is somewhat conservative since all people do not react alike and,
- hence, the distribution of evacuees that would more likely occur would not result in all trips on the routes simultaneously.
Evacuation Time Estimates Best estimates and adverse weather estimates of evacuation times were made separately for the general population (with and without vehicles) and for special facilities.
The estimates of evacuation times for each of these categories were comprised of the following.
P) i i
1
\\
a)
Terminal time, which in the case of vehicles departing from home accounts for the time to drive from the home via feeder streets to the primary evacuation route.
For buses and special vehicles (such as ambulances and wheelchair vehicles),
terminal time represents the time it takes a driver to go from the bus garage or storage area to its assigned evacuation pick-up area.
b)
Roadway travel time is the time it takes a vehicle to traver se the entire length of the evacuation route.
This time is a function of the roadway free flow speeds and roadway delays owing to conditions where the vehicle volumes approach or exceed the capacity of the roadway at a par ticular location.
- Hence, the roadway travel time is the sum of the time for the first vehicle to traverse the evacuation
- route, assuming free flow speeds, and the delay time (computed at Level of Service E capacity for the best estimate and Level of Service D capacity for the adverse weather condition).
c)
Adverse weather delay time penalty of twenty minutes was added to the evacuation times to account for unpredictable isolated delays associated with adverse weather conditions.
d)
General population mobilization time amounting to twenty minutes was added to the estimated evacuation times to account for mobilization at the home end.
This was in accordance with the New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness'ODP) recommended mobilization time for the general population only (as per ODP Report entitled Evacuation Anal sis Ten Mile Radius Indian Point Nuclear Reactors Site dated December 1979).
e)
Multiple trip time for special facilities where a number of round trips were required by ambulances and wheelchair vehicles.
In these
- cases, the roadway travel time included travel time beyond the evacuation limits to a point of destination for all but the last trip, return time to the special facility for as many round trips as were required, and time for loading and unloading passengers.
Where the facility administrators estimated a mobilization time greater than the roadway travel time, the mobilization time plus travel time to the evacuation area limits became the evacuation time.
It should be noted that the times to evacuate general population without vehicles and ambulatory patients in special facilities assumed use of bus facilities only.
The use of railroad facilities in the area was not considered.
Where feasible, use of the existing rail facilities would be expected to reduce evacuation times.
'I 1
~
I
~
C ~
Notification and Confirmation The NRC's November 29, 1979 request for evacuation times relates primarily to the time required to implement an evacuation as opposed to the times required for notification or confirmation that an evacuation has taken place.
The local civil defense directors have furnished the notification and confirmation times listed in Section VI of this document.
These estimates are based on the notification and confirmation systems presently in use in the area.
d.
Future Efforts It is anticipated the. evacuation time estimates could be refined as an evacuation plan is detailed.
The development of details such as implementation of improved public notification
- systems, EPZ refinements, use of rail facilities during evacuation, and additional input from state and local agencies could all affect to some extent, very probably decreasing, the times presented in this document.
IV.
SPECIAL FACILITIES All the important special facilities within the plume exposure EPZ have been considered in the analysis.
Note that elementary, middle and high schools have been considered as part of the general population rather than as special facilities.
The following three special facilities have been determined to take the longest time to evacuate:
S ecial Facilit Location Reference Designation
'tate University, College at Oswego Oswego Oswego Hospital Lake Ontario Oswego a.
Following is a brief discussion of the three facilities based on data furnished by the college or the hospital administration or by the Coast Guard.
State Universit of New York (SUNY)
Colle e at Oswe o (C)
During regular Spring and Fall semester, residential student popula-tion is approximately 4200; faculty and staff live off-campus.
Therefore, after 10 p.m., the residential students and 10 security staff are on-campus.
During peak hours (9 a.m. -
1 p.m.)
an additional 1800 commuting
- students, 404 faculty, and 1096 staff are on campus; between 4:30 and 10 p.m.,
the additional population is about 800 students,
- staff, and
l
faculty.
Vehicle registration stickers for residential and commuting students number 992 and 1,542, respectively; faculty and staff register 1, 978 vehicles.
Residence halls are closed during January.
Approximately 25 staff people remain on campus.
During the summer, there are pre-, regular, and post-sessions to which most students commute.
The following table indicates 'campus population througout the summer:
pre-session (June) 1,631
. 260 regular session (July) 2,471 575 4
post-session (August) 1, 421 155 Occasionally, conferences are held during the summer, to which about 75$ of attendees drive.
The largest conference held on-campus to date had 700 attendees.
The college administration feels the campus population has adequate facilities to provide for its own evacuation.
Oswe o Hos ital (H)
~
With a current inpatient population of 162 at Oswego Hospital, there are 49 patients who would require ambulance transport for evacuation; the remaining patients are ambulatory.
Staff numbers range from 301 on day-shits to 53 at night, though this latter figure could be increased through an existing telephone alert system to summon staff in case of emergency.
Required patient care staff to patient ratio for evacuation would be 1 to 5, 1 to 8, and 1 to 10 during day,
- evening, and night shifts, respectively.
The Hospital owns one pickup truck; most staff drive and could, therefore, provide for its own evacuation.
Lake Ontario Lake Ontario is considered a special facility requiring separate evacuation time estimates developed from a set of assumptions different from that applied to the special facilities within Oswego County.
One such assumption, based on communication with the U.S Coast
- Guard, is that the Coast Guard Station Oswego will respond in the event of an emergency by assisting with notification and evacuation of all people and crafts from Lake Ontario.
Such assistance will be conditional on the availability of Coast Guard resources from other operational commitments.
b.
Analysis of the time to evacuate the special facilities has shown the following:
10
I I
I
The facility which would take the longest time to evacuate is the State University, College at Oswego (C).
In those evacuation areas which contain no special facilities, evacuation of the general population without cars, including school populations, was found to take the longest time.
Evacuation planning is not necessary for the months of January through March because of weather conditions.
V.
EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES a.
Notification and Confirmation Time Estimates The following table indicates the times required to notify the public of a need for evacuation and the time required to confirm that evacuation has taken place.
Evacuation Area B
G HI J
K 1 For the detailed C.
Time Re Notification 1 hr 1 hr 1 hr 1 hr 1 hr 1 hr uired for 1
Confirmation 1 hr 30 min 2 hrs 30 min 3 hrs 30 min 2 hrs 30 min 3 hrs 30 min 6 hrs minimum response for each evacuation
- area, see Appendix b.
Evacuation Time Estimates and Route Descri tion The following table summarizes the estimated evacuation times for each of the six areas to be evacuated.
As shown, evacuation times were estimated separately assuming two conditions, a best estimate and adverse weather estimate.
'The best estimate assumes a summer night at 3:00 AM when the family is together at home.
The adverse weather estimate assumes a winter condition occurring at mid-afternoon during a weekday when children are in school, businesses are in progress and the roads, although clear of any recent snowfall, have reduced capacity and operating speeds.
Both the best estimate and adverse weather estimate have been computed for both general population and special facilities.
With regard to evacuating the general population, it is that population without autos which is the determining factor in both the best estimate and advers weather estimate.
With the exception of evacuation areas H and K, there is an adequate bus supply in Oswego County to accommodate the general population without vehicles during the night when school is not in session.
- However, an estimated terminal time of thirty minutes is required for the buses to travel from their garaged location and pick-up the passengers in their designated area.
Evacuation Areas H and K require CENTRO buses from Syracuse which need up to an hour to travel to Oswego and pick up passengers.
11
I
FITZPATRICK/NINE MILE BOINT POWER PLANTS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Evacuation Area Additional Notification Time (1}
General Po ulation Best Estimate (2)
(3)
Travel Time Total Adverse Weather (2)
(4)
Travel Time Total S ecial Facilities (5)
Best Adverse Estimate Weather B
H 45 min 45 min 45 min 1 hr 10 min 1 hr 10 min 2 hrs 50 min 1 hr 55 min
.1 hr 30 min 2 hrs 15 min 1 hr 55 min 1 hr 40 min 2 hrs 25 min 3 hrs 35 min 4 hrs 40 min 5 hrs 25 min '
hrs 10 min 3 hrs 30 min 45 min 45 min 45 min 1 hr 10 min 1 hr 30 min 2 hrs 50 min 1 hr 55 min 1 hr 40 min 2 hrs 15 min 2 hrs 3 hrs 35 min 4 hrs 40 min 2 hrs 25 min 2 hrs 45 min 5 hrs 25 min 2 hrs 10 min 3 hrs 30 min (1)
These figures include the additional notification time above fifteen minutes.
(2)
Includes general population mobilization time (20 minutes) and the roadway travel time.
(3)
Calculated as the sum of the Additional Notification Time plus the Best Estimate Travel Time.
(4)
Calculated as the sum of the Additional Notification Time plus the Adverse Heather Travel Time.
(5)
For special facilities it is assumed that notification will occur within fifteen minutes and that mobilization and evacuation will begin immediately thereafter.
I R
~
For the adverse weather condition the situation is complicated by the fact that school children must be transported to reception centers before the buses can return to pick up the general population without autos.
- Hence, several trips are required by some buses to evacuate school children and general population without vehicles for evacuation areas H and K.
SUNK Oswego College takes the longest time to evacuate of the special facilities for both the best estimate and adverse weather estimate.
The next longest time of the special facilities to evacuate is that of Oswego Hospital.
This is attributable to the time to evacuate wheelchair patients since the wheelchair vehicles are located in Mexico and require an estimated thirty minutes at night to get to Oswego and load patients.
In the daytime, first priority of wheelchair vehicles is to evacuate the Board of Cooperative Education Services (BOCES) wheelchair students to Syracuse before returning to Oswego Hospital for their wheelchair patients.
The following are descriptions of the selected primary evacuation routes for each of the six evacuation areas.
Evacuation Area B (Sector
- 2) (Figure 3)
The primary routes used in evacuating the 2 mile area are Lake Road and County Route 29 in Scriba and Shore Oaks Drive in that portion of New Haven which is in the evacuation area.
Evacuation Area G (Sector 2 5) (Figure 4)
The primary routes used in evacuating the five mile area incorporating parts of Towns of New Haven and Scriba, and the City of Oswego are:
Shore Oaks Drive south from New Haven, Route 1 West to Route 29 South, to the Town of Volney; Lake Road and Route 29 south through the Town of Scriba to the Town of Volney; Route 1 in Scriba west to Kocher Road and south to City Line Road; and Klocks Corners Road from the town center of Scriba south to the 5 mile limit (Route 4).
Evacuation Area H (Sectors 2 5 9) (Figure 5)
The primary routes used in evacuating the ten mile area to the southwest of the power plant are:
Shore Oaks Drive south from New Haven to Route 1 west, to Route 29 south, to Silk Road south, to Route 45 south, and finally to Route 6 south to the limits of the 10 mile area; Lake Road and Route 29 south following the same path as before for Route 29, from the Route 1 intersection; 12
I
Route 1 in Scriba west to Kocher Road south, to City Line Road south to Route 4 east, Route 53 south to Route 45 east and to Route 176 south to the 10 mile limit at Howard Road; Klocks Corners Road from the town center of Scriba south to Route 4, east on Route 4 to Route
- 176, and south to the 10 mile limit at Howard Road; From the City of Oswego to the 10 mile limit, Route 57 south, Route 48 south, Route 25 south, Route 7 south, U.S.
104 west and Hillside Ave/Gardnier Rd/Route 7 south; and From other areas within the 10 mile area, west of the power
- plants, Routes 57 and 8.
Evacuation Area I (Sectors 2 6) (Figure 6)
The primary routes used in evacuating the five mile area southeast of the power plants are:
Shore Oaks Drive south from New Haven to Route 1 west to Route 29 south to the Town of Volney; Lake Road and Route 29 south through the Town of Scriba to the Town of Volney; and Hickory Grove Road, Route 6 and Route 104 in the remainder of New Haven..
Evacuation Area J (Sectors 2 6 10) (Figure 7)
The primary routes used in evacuating the 10 mile area southeast of the power plants are:
Shore Oaks Drive south from New Haven to Route 1 west, to Route 29 south, and to Silk Road south to Route 45; Lake Road and Route 29 south following the same path as before for Route 29 from the Route 1 intersection; Hickory Grove Drive south to Route 6, south on Route 6 to Route 64 east and south on Route 35 to the 10 mile limit; Route 104B from eastern New Haven and northern areas in the Town of Mexico east to Route 3 and north on Route 3 to the 10 mile limit.
From Arthur in the Town of Mexico via Clark, Countryman, Lanzier and Newcomb Roads to the 10 mile limit; and From the Village of Mexico east via Routes 104 and 58 and south via Route 3 to the 10 mile limit.
13
I l I
Evacuation Area K (Sectors 2 5 6
9 10) (Figure 9)
The south of primary routes used in evacuating the 10 mile area to the the power plants are:
Shore Oaks Drive south from New Haven to Route 1 west, to Route 29 south, to Silk Road south, to Route 45 south and finally to Route 6 south to the limits of the 10 mile area; Lake Road and Route 29 south following the same path as before for Route 29, from the Route 1 intersection; Route 1 in Scriba west to Kocher Road south, to City Line Road south, to Route 4 east, Route 53'outh to 'Route 45 east, and to Route 176 south to the 10 mile limit at Howard Road.
Klocks Corners Road from the town center of Scriba south to Route 4, east on Route 4 to Route
- 176, and south to the 10 mile limit at Howard Road; From the City of Oswego to the 10 mile limit, Route 57 south, Route 48 south, Route 25 south, Route 7 south, U.S.
104 west and Hillside Ave/Gardnier Rd/Route 7 south; From other areas within the 10 mile area, west of the power
- plants, Route 57 and 8; Hickory Grove Drive south to Route 6, south on Route 6 to Route 64 east and south on Route 35 to the 10 mile limit; Route 104B from eastern New Haven and northern areas in the Town in Mexico east to Route 3 and north on Route 3 to the 10 mile limit'rom Arthur in the Town of Mexico via Clark, Countryman, Lanzier and Newcomb Roads to the 10 mile limit; and From the Village of Mexico east via Routes 104 and 58 and south via Route 3 to the 10 mile limit.
In addition to the evacuation of land areas, Lake Ontario, which is considered a special facility, must be evacuated within the limits (2,5 or 10 miles) of the evacuation areas.
Based on discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard Station in Oswego, the following information was gathered.
o The Coast Guard requires five minutes to mobilize and get water borne.
o Between five and ten minutes are required to travel to the power plant.
o Twenty to thirty minutes are needed to cover the ten mile area.
14
l 1
I I
I
~
~
o The quoted time estimates apply to both day and night operation.
o Evacuation planning is not necessary for the months of January through March because of weather conditions.
Based on the above information, Lake Ontario can be evacuated within the maximum time to evacuate special facilities as shown in the table of evacuation times.
VI LOCAL OFFICIAL COMMENTARY Several meetings were held with the New Yor k State Office of Disaster Preparedness and with the local civil defense director for Oswego County
.relative to the NRC's November 29th request.
The input of those agencies has been invaluable in the development of the information in this document.
The Appendix contains copies of the comments of those agencies to the evacuation estimates and to the assumptions and methods used.
15
~
~
Appendix A i/sijg-o T
g/l7/Pd gA NCCII
~pl
(~
0
- >l(
o
~mes+
UNITEQ STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON WASHINGTON, D. C. 40555 ALL POMER REACTOR LICENSEES November 29, 1979
~/ - t i (
~<I=" Opt:
6 Gentlemen:
4'his letter,'which is being sent to all licensees authorized to operate a
nuclear power reactor and to all applicants for a license to operate a power reactor (FSAR docketedl, is a request for i.nformation regarding estimates for evacuation of various areas around nuclear power reactors.
The requested information is in addition to that requested by the October 10, 1979 letter to all power reactor licensees from Darrell G; Eisenhut, Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Although evacuation time estimates are expected to be prepared in the course of the upgrading of the state of emergency preparedness as specified in the October 10, 1979 letter, submission of these estimates to the NRC is being requested on an accelerated time scale so that the NRC can identify those instances in which unusual evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered.
In some cases of extreme difficulty~here a
large population is at risk, special facility modifications may also be a
ropriate The requested information will also enabl'e the NRC to be
'esponsive to a recommendation from the Environment, Energy and Natura 1 Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations.-
The information requested in the enclosure "should be submitted no later than January 31, 1980.
The October 10, 1979 letter indicated that efforts to develop a model plan were continuing. It now appears that the model plan will not be completed on a schedule which will be of use in developing upgraded plans for the requested January 1, 1980 submittal.
The upgraded plan aevelopment should therefore proceed on a site-specific basis.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
Request for Evacuation Time Estimates Brian K. Grimes, Director Emergency Preparedness Task Group Office of.Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc w/enclosure:
Service List A-l
I t
P
RE VEST FOR EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (AFTER NOTIFICATION)
FOR AREAS NEAR. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
~Back round Prior to recent NRC requests that means for py'ompt notification to the public be installed around each nuclear po~er plant site, a significant component of evacuation time estiraates was the time required to'notify the public of a need for evacuation.
Studies of actual evacuations that have taken place generally do not distinguish between the time required for'notification, the
~
.time required to i'mplement the evac~~tion, and the time required to confirm that an evacuation has taken place.
The estimates for time required for evacuations now requested 'relate primarily to the time to implement an.
evacuation as opposed to the time required for notification.
These estimates may be based on pr'evious local experiences (e.g.,
chemical spills or floods) or may be based on studies rel.ated to population density, local geography and road capacities.
No standard method for making such estimates is identified for. use at this time.
The basis for the method chosen should be described in the response.
As an independent check on the evacuation time estimates, agreement with or comments on the.time estimates made should be obtained from the principal local officials res'ponsible for carrying out such evacuations.
Such agreement should be documented or the areas of disagree-ment indicated in the submittal.
~ The format given below is appropriate for reporting to the NRC estimates of the time required to implement evacuation of areas near nuclear.power plants.
These estimates, are to be. made for the primary purpose of making available, to those officials who would make evacuation decisions in an emergency situation,. knowledge of the time requi. ed to complete one of the protective action options (evacuation) available for a particular potentially affected
~
segment of the population.
A second purpose of these estimates is to identify to all concerned those instances in which unusual evacuation constraints exist ana that special planning measures should be considered.
In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is at risk, special facility modifications may also be considered.
Given a decision to evacuate rather than shelter in an actual event, fe~er or more sectors or different distances than given in the reporting format might be evacuated should this be the chosen protective action.
For
- example, three 22-1/2'ectors might, be initially'evacuated in a downwind direction (the sector containing the plume and an adjacent sector on each side),
followed ny the evacuation of other sectors as a precautionary measure.
Hans, D. M., Jr.,
and T. C. Sell, 1974 Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental Research
- Center, Las Yegas, EPA-5ZO/6-74-UU2.
A-2
Format for Reportins !nformation The areas for which evacu'ation estimates are required must encompass. the entire area within a circle of about 10 miles radius, and have outer boundaries corresponding to the plume exposure EPZ.
These areas are as follows:
Oistance 2 miles 5 miles Area two 180'ectors four 90'ectors
~ r about 10 miles four 90'ector s Estimates for. the outer sectors shou1d assume that the inner adjacent sectors are being evacuated simultaneously.
To the exent practical, the sector boundaries should not divide densely populated areas.
Nhere a direction corresponding to the edges of areas 'for which estimates have been made is thought not to be adequately represented by the time estimates for adjacent
- areas, an additional area should be defined and a separate estimate made for this case.
The format for submittal should incluae both a table and a
'figure (overlaid on a, map) which each give the information requested in items 1
and 2.below.
Additional material may be provid d in associated text.
Required Information 1.
Two estimates are requested in each 'of the areas defined in item 1 for a general evacuation of the population (not including special facilities).
A best estimate is required and an adverse weathei estimate is required for movement of the population..
2.
The total time required to evacuate special facilities (e.g., hospitals) within each area must be specified (best estimate and aaverse weather).
3.
The time requi red for confirmation of evacuation should be indicated.
Confirmation times may consider special instructions to the public (e.g.,
tying a hankerchief to a door or gate to indicate the occupant has left the premises).
4.
Mhere plans and prompt notification systems have not been put in place for areas out to about lU miles, estimates. of the times required to evacuate until such measures are in place for the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) should also be given.
Notification times greater than 15 minutes should be includea in the evacuation times and footnoted to indicate the notification time.
I 1
~
~
n 3
5.
Mhere special evacuation problems are identified (e.g., in high lation density areas) specify alternative protective actions, such as sheltering, which would reduce exposures and the effectivene ss of these measures.
6.
A short background document should be submitted giving the methods d to make the estimates and the assumptions made including the routes and methods of transportation used.
This document, shou ld
'lso note the agreement or areas of disagreement with principal local officials regarding these estimates.
)
~
I l ~~
)
~
~
l l
'l e
I.'-iN~~U&
2 fElciEBE'REiE Appendix B
Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade 6; Douglas, Inc.
Engineers
~ Planners January 25, 1980 Hr. Ronald W. Tweedie, Director Transcortation Data Services Bureau New York State Department of Transportation 1220 Washington Avenue
&~any, New York 12226
Dear Ron:
Confirming the conclusions reached during our telephone conference which included Ron Tadross (PBQGD), Joe Hein (ODP), Dick Herskowitz (ODP),
and ouxselves, we shall proceed with the evacuation time estimate for Indian Point and Oswego as follows:
1)
The optimum, fair weather evacuation time estimate will be derived based on the capacities described in the attached memo entitled Indian Point and Oswe o Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Plans Roadwa Ca acit Estimates oated 1/25/80.
We all agree that this estimated time reflects an optimal program and conditions prior to and du ing the evacuation period.
2)
We will use the Level of Service D capacities as determined in the referenced memo to estimate the adverse weather condition evacuation time.
It was also agxeed by all parties that these time estimates are based on what are presently considered reasonable assumpt'ons of a plan and program for evacuation which must. subsecuently be developed in particular detail.
I am forwarding copies of this letter to the other participants for their information and record.
Yours very truly, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade
& Douglas, Inc.
Chaxles P. Kole CPZ/tf cc:
R.A. HerskowiM J. Hein Zadross One Penn Plass, 250 West 34th Street
~ New York. NY. 10001 212-239-7900 ~ Cable: Parklsp, New York 'IlierWU12-5441
~ RCA 232 117 B-1
(
e R fixclke~iI Appendix C
Parsons Brinckerhoff suade 8: Douglas, Inc.
Engineers
~ Planners January 29, 1980 Mr. George Brower, Director Oswego County Office of Emergency Preparedness 200 North Second Street
- Fulton, New York 13069 Re:
Evacuation Analysis, Nine Mile Point and James A. Fitzpatrick Power Plants
Dear Mr. Brower:
This letter provides written confirmation of the following comments expressed by both you and l4r. Gary Burgess of your office at our January 28, 1980 meeting.
Our understanding is you essentially agree with evacuation time estimates in the draft copy of the analysis dated January 22, 1980, and you have the following comments (othe considerations may be added in the future):
1.
The time recuired to notify the public to evacuate is between 45 and 60 minutes for all evacuation areas up 'to 10 miles according to the following considerations:
a ~
b.
determine the extent and type of release meteorological factors (wind direction, speed, stability) c.
which roads within the sectors are and will be effected-by the plume d.
data on radiation levels must be taken (RDO's, monitors, equipped and deployed) e.
calculation (best estimate) of plume dimensions f.
data evaluated and authorization made to evacuate.
This time may be significantly reduced if the nature of the accident is such that prior to the complete performance of all the above items an evacuation can be begun.
2.
The time required to mobilize the required emergency work staff for all evacuation areas up to 10 miles is between 30 and 45 minutes.
Mobilization of the emergency work staff could occur at the same time as the notification of the public to evacuate One Penn Plaza. 250West 34th Street
~ New York. NY. 10001 212-239-7900
~ Cable: Parklap. New York ~ Telex WU12-5441
~ RCA 232 117 C-1
<a 1
/
3.
The time recuired to confirm evacuation of the public 's as follows for each of the evacuation areas:
EVACUATION AREA TIME TO CONFIRM EVACUATION TO THE PUBLIC 60 to 90 minutes in addition to the time to evacuate 2 to 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in addition to the time to evacuate 3 to 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in addition to the time to evacuate 2 t'o 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in addition to the time to evacuate
'I 3 to 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in addition to the time to evacuate a minimum of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in addition to the time to evacuate.
These estimates of time required to confirm evacuation to the public require the following:
a.
A complete list of every individual and their residence within a sector b.
A way to indicate whether a person outside of their sector has reached a staging area.
c.
Nonindigenous persons (hunters, vacationers, etc.)
have to be accounted for d.
Manpower needed to either man a check point and/or travel repeatedly throughout a sector e.
New location of evacuees must be compiled f ~
Searching of multiple dwelling buildings.
The time estimates outlined in the preceding three sections are based on the utilization of present existing emergency systems in your jurisdiction.
We wish to thank you for your prompt and detailed review of our preliminary time. estimates.
Very truly yours, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade 6 Douglas, Inc.
Bruce E. Pcdwal BEP/tf cc:
B.W. Deist (PASNY)
C-2
I l
DISASTER R:"SPONSE Notification and Mobilization Time Estimates Action Minimum Maximum
'NFO to SWP SWP to BRH BRH to NF0 3 min.
10 min.
3 min.
20 min.
3 min. '0 min.
BRH discuss w/NFO, BRH to SWP SWP to ODP 2 Hl1n r 0 min.
3 min 5 min.
3 min.
15 min.
ODP to Local Authority 5 min.,
15 min.
Local Authority to Scene 10 min.
30 min.
Organ. of Emergency Forces on the Scene 0 min.
10 min.
29 min.
118 min.
Legend:
NFO Nuclear Facility Operator SWP State Warning Point BRH NYS,Bureau of Radiological Health ODP NYS Office of Disaster Preparedness P
Typed from a handwritten communication received
- January, l980, from the New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness, Nuclear Protection Planning.
C-3
l 1
Aoaendix D
r s
J
~
HUGN L. CAREY GOVERNOR STATE OF NEW YORK DIVISION OF MILITARYANO NAVALAFFAIRS PUBLIC SECURITT BUILOINQ STATE CAHIJUS ALBANY,NEW YORK l2226 VITO J, CASTBLLANO MAJOR GEIIERAL CHICF OF STAFF TO THC COVCANOA MNDP 29 January 1980 Mr. Bruce E.
Podwal Assistant Vice President" Parsons Brinckerhoff One Penn Plaza New York, NY 10001
Dear Mr. Podwal:
The State Office of Disaster Preparedness concurs in your evacuation analysis time estimates for the Nine-Nile Point and James A. Fi.tzpatrick Nuclear
'Power Plant's Emergency Planning Zone for the plume pathway as described in NUREG-0396.
According to our Nuclear Civil Protection Planning Section these times are both reasonable and realistic within your definitions of "best estimate" and "adverse weather"..
Sincerely, ARI'T'OLD W.
GRU HYY Director, Disaster Preparedness Program earn
I
9 MILE POINT 8f'.A.
FITZPATRICK POVIER PLANTS 01VTARIO 3
g tIa 3
SCALE: I
= 2 MILES
)Idea Ao 41 14 Pa a)
Romana Beach take View Nano Mafe Porn)
Shore Oaks Pleasant Point Hickory Grove Oem)ter Beach Mexico Point Mexico Bay Beach 40 Texas nvl a ~
a
~o ao WIIkor
()5)
North Scfit)a 4))
I co er I I
~aaao IO, nooaa
~aaorr
~I
)5
)O d 441114141 I Ill(rOr Iaalr aa OR@co ra S
\\
klaaoair
~ k J')
)Sl as~
C tensing R
~ l Ktocks 1)O i ae 5
Pbntf fin)ax r)nar Seuth Sari)as Hammonlys Corners I
I 1
B A
I xiwr l)anal Na South New Haven New Haven 0
)5 0
I North Volney/
A
~ 3/
E alaanw Butterfly Ve Toll Gate ol I
k 3
3 Ie ftff xlco 104 X
Sl 0
Iaaaa IISf I l)1 I~II%I
)1 an
(
~ a Hli 4$
.Mingtff)
Oaaao 11 1 11 1
~ 5 Sayle'I Come Monger'I Comers adylnge a
5)) lao waxx ox aa IO nt Pkasant a)1 p g9-1 1)o 5
rs 45 Cfifford SA Russ Mgfs P
A L
E R
M 0
IS Catfi
~5
~ra a aa alltl I
$ 5)
V 0
waaa n aaaKna
~a Ion Volnay "/
3 Loomis Comers 45 as East lenno ls Peat Cornea la Cc Oexter-,
ville Center
~A)
~
al nl amn on FULTON LfHIafafarranfa R
A N
~laoanaaaa(
OIP '+
5ll
/Farley's I Comers
/
Gftaen Migs LOCATION MAP FIG.
I
j
~ f t f
LEGEND:
6 9 Mile Point 5 J.A. FitzPatrick Power Plants Evacuation Sectors 5
verlcp Sector between Sectors 5 8 6 SCALE: l N2.32MlLES 7.
4 Cy 6
IO 9 0 I 0 MILE RADIUS EPZ EVACUATION SECTORS KEY MAP
J ll
'k P
~,res
~
g v ~
LEGEND:
Q 9 Mile Point 8 J.A. Fitzpatrick Power Plants SCALE: I"= I.m+ MILES 2 Ql E
L A
0 Ni e Nile Poinl Rd.
t LU a
C R
Ol B
A z Rte;I Em oK
.Middle Rd.
EVACUATION AREA 8 (SECTOR 2)
Fl G.
l
~
C
N SCALE'
- l.52 MILES Nine Nil I
0 R
0 Point Ol IL' i
Rte.
I Middle Rd.
S lO LOCl C
Ro~
a JC O
hC U.S. 104 P I
~one +r B
LEGEND:
Q 9 Mile Point 8 J.A, FitzPatrick Power Plant
" Ry,
/
Ate ~
VO
. /
0 EY EVACLNTION ARIEA 6 (SECTORS 2 8 5)
FlG.
]
) r%
.cs
~
ne NI - Poinf SCALE'
< t.3 i MILKS 0
~O I
Ch a
K 0
giddle Rd.
IPQ O
C Rg B
OSeFGO
+te. q P1 onn 0
/~
Rte. q Tg Hill Rd V
0
~ao Qo/
(o Y
8q1~ in CliffordRf LEGEND 0 9 Mile Point 8 J.A. FitzPatrick Power Plants Oswego County Hospital State University of New York, College at Oswego Rle. 85 Howard'YAc
/gg ~
/P(y ATlON AREA (SECTORS 2, 5 8 9)
FIG. 5
4
SCALE:
I *1.3+ MILES L
A y
E g
/I/
7 Wee Ni Pant Rd.
C R
Rte. l
~ QlLES Middle Rd.
CS lK l
BA~
co
,$ V)
U.S. IO g.)o< l 1
l 1
~
E 0
O Rte A, V E
N S~
Rd.
5 elLES
/
I V
NKY O
he La Rto.si LEGEND 9 Mile Point 8 J.A, FitzPatrick Power Plant EVACUATION AFTRA (SECTORS 2 8 6)
Fl G.
6
c <,I t
Rd.
C R
l e
B A
o Nilo Poinf.
SCALE-I I.5+ MILES 0
AflLES ok Rte. (
Ev glL Ogp~
hfly~(e s.lo I
I III I
I I
I V Og Rt
]
S tane d.
I I~
l -'o~
Rte (~
I I
AfPgl I
I ~
fg 080n o
t Cp
/'
o
+o.
<<Iba] Rc.
I I
L J
q o.sio LEGEND Q 9MilePoint 8 J A FitzPatrick Power Plonts Io MILES 8I
] ~
QL
/~/
light,OIg Og J ////I/
b
@0/
O O gF/
)e P5
+ re~i'~ue O
aran) n Cg EVACUATION AREA J (SECTORS 2, 6 8 IO)
FIG.
7
~
g 0
0
SCALE'
>I.SC MILES LO ~ILES LEGEND Q 9 Mile Point 8 JA. FitzPatrick Power Plants Oswego County Hospital State University of New York College at Oswego g gILES
~
r r
/////III-II I
I I
I ll.
G 2 MILES g)
CO
'I g
0 Iy N
E Vl A
y E
N M
E X
7 I
C 0
I 0
R C0LOC
,o" GS E GO OSNEGO /
(
I EvAcUATioN ~REAs A,c, 0, E a F (SECTORS I, 3,4, 7 8 8)
FIG. 8
C
LEGEND 9 Mile Point 8 J.A FitzPatrick Power Plants 8 Oswego County Hospital State University of New York College at Oswego SCALE: I = 23+MILES LAKE ONTARIO gS Rd. I
~ Pilr Pal 0
Rd.
PSH pep m
5 I
(
Ql
~
tg x
z C
S c
'5 lilt d.
o.s.
.S. loo I
e 4
<n, on S.lO IIIe IIII 5
Rl l r lode
/
c p
I, II "looon
,1 os I
g I
I.
4 I
v
~
I Slnno I
lono Rlo lI
.I or lb I
Rd I
x r
I 1
lb' I
ICp II Z
4 I
J 4/O $p 0
'5 lo R Rd.
Dc nR
+l.
66 o
//
o/
/
e
///////
"ooooi
+~
~n.
l//oid EVACUAT)ON AREA K-FI6. 9
r k
h
't
'P
'4