ML18036A264
| ML18036A264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1991 |
| From: | Mcguire D, Thompson D, Tobin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036A262 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-91-18, 50-260-91-18, 50-296-91-18, NUDOCS 9106270396 | |
| Download: ML18036A264 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1991018
Text
Aa REOII>
Vp
+
O~
O
I
n
0
(N
+**++
ONITEo sTATEs
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/91-18,
50-260/91-18,
and 50-296/91-18
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection
Conducted:
April 30 - May 3, 1991
Inspectors:
W. J.
Tob1n,
e ior Safeguards
Inspector
ate Signed
D.
H.
ho
son,
afeg
rds Inspector
Approved by:
D.
R. McGuire,
hief
Safeguards
Section
Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Branch
Division of Radiation Safety
and Saf'eguards
a e Signed
ate Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This special,
announced
inspection
was conducted
in the area of the licensee's
Fitness
For Duty (FFD) Program.
Specifically, the licensee's
Policy,
Program
Administration
and
Key
Program
Processes
were
reviewed using
NRC Temporary
Instruction
2515/106
"Fitness
For
Duty - Initial Inspection of Implemented
Program"
dated July 11,
1990.
Results:
0
As noted in the details of this report several
strengths
were found in the
licensee's
FFD Program,
however,
one violation was identified relative to the
conduct of specimen collection (50-259,
260 and 296/91-18-01)
and
one Inspector
Followup
Item
was
noted relative to the
need for more
weekend
and holiday
random testing (50-259,
260 and 296/91-18-02).
gipb27035b
910~>>
ADDCK 05000259
Q
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
C. Bailey, Corporate
Manager,
Employee Assistance
Program
J. Beasley, Site, guality Assurance
(Interviewee)
R. Brewer, Collection Facility Technician
- A. Brittain, Assistant Site Security Manager
S.
Chardos,
Corporate,
Manager,
Behavioral
Science
J.
Cox, Site, Operations
(Interviewee)
C. Davis, Corporate,
Licensing Engineer
E. Felcher,
Corporate,
Manager, Clinical Services
- P. Hamilton, Corporate,
Fitness
For Duty Coordinator
R. King, Site, Medical
Review Officer
J.
Maddox, Site,
Engineering
(Interviewee)
- R. Morris, Corporate,
Manager, Clinical Support
- S. Moss, Site,
Human Resources
Officer
- P. Reynolds,
Corporate,
Fitness
For Duty Manager
M. Rogers, Site, Nuclear Support
Manager
- J. Rudge, Site, Nuclear Support
Manager
- P. Salas,
Site, Licensing Manager
C. Taylor, Site, Medical Technician
R. Thompson,
Corporate,
Personnel
Screening
Supervisor
C. Willis, Site, Operations
( Interviewee)
- 0. Zeringue, Site, Vice President
Contractor
Employee
T. Borden,
Bechtel
(Interviewee)
J. Nichols, Stone
and Webster
(Interview'ee)
NRC Resident
Inspector
- C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
~Attended exit interview
Licensee's
Written Policy and Procedure
The licensee's
FFD program
had its inception in early
1977 with the
publication of a Policy prohibiting the use of alcohol
and illegal drugs.
Evolving =since that time
have
been
drug
awareness
programs,
supervisor
training,
pre-employment
alcohol
and
drug screening,
for-cause
testing
(based
upon reasonable
suspicions),
and,
in October
1987,
random testing.
The licensee
implemented
the
NRC Part
26 requirements
approximately
one
month prior to the effective date of the Rule.
As
a result of Part 26,
the licensee
needed
to expand
the population
pool for random testing to
1
0
~
'nclude
those
employees
required to report to any nuclear power emergency
center
(of which the licensee
has
seven locations),
increase
the frequency
of refresher
FFD training, increase
the frequency of random drug testing,
institute
a five hour abstinence
prohibition, institute
a "call-in"
procedure,
revise its for-cause
testing criteria, formalize
procedure
changes
and, finally, increase its disciplinary sanctions for offenders.
Currently,
the
licensee's
policy is
found in Nuclear
Power
Standard
82-1.11,
Revision 0, dated
December ll, 1989, titled, "Fitness
For Duty
Program Administration."
This
54
page
standard
is
a product of the
Nuclear
Human Resources
Department.
Effective July 4, 1991, there will be
revised
Nuclear
Power
Standard
(81.6)
"Fitness
For Duty."
In either
standard it is the licensee's
policy to ensure that each
employee
has
a
safe,
drug-free
workplace,
and
to provide
reasonable
assurance
that
personnel
supporting the Nuclear Power program will perform their tasks in
a reliable
and trustworthy manner
and are not under the influence of any
legal
or illegal
substance
or mentally or physically impaired
from any
cause
which in any way could adversely affect their ability to safely and
competently perform their duties.
These
standards,
or procedures,
were
found to be very thorough,
concise
and "user friendly."
Program Administration/Management
Within the Office of Nuclear Power, the Nuclear
Human Resources
Department
had
been
tasked with assuring
corporate direction of the licensee's
Program.
A FFD Task
Force
has
been
gathered
to steer this effort and is
represented
with legal, medical,
employee relations,
security, training,
and
licensing
membership.
The
Corporate
Nuclear
Human
Resources
Department
Manager
has
assigned
the
Employee
Relations
Manager to chair
this Task Force
as the Corporate
FFD Manager.
A Corporate
FFD Coordinator
assists
in this effort as
a member'of the licensee's
FFD Task Force.
The
inspector
noted
that this coordinator
provides written
responses
to
questions
posed
by employees/contractors
relative to the licensee's
program.
Other individuals involved in the
FFD Program include proprietary Medical
Review Officers
(MRO),
Employee
Assistance
Program
(EAP) professionals,
laboratory
technicians,
testing
specialists
and couriers.
Only the
confirmatory testing laboratory is non-proprietary.
Resource Allocation
The licensee
operates
collection facilities at the following locations:
Knoxville (Corporate Offices)
Chattanooga
(Corporate Offices)
Bellefonte Nuclear Station
Watts Bar Nuclear Station
Sequoyah
Nuclear Station
Browns Ferry Nuclear Station
and
Muscle Shoals,
The initial testing facility is at the licensee's
medical
laboratory in
Chattanooga.
Confirmatory testing
is
performed
under
contract
in
Knoxville, Tennessee.
The inspector
toured the initial testing facility and noted the facility
is secured
by a combination of closed circuit television,
coded-key-card
access,
secured
outer doors,
a receptionist
(during regular hours)
and is
located within a licensee's
owned
and operated
building.
The licensee
pointed out that
alarms
sound within the
main security office if the
locked refrigerators
exceed
a certain temperature.
Proactive
Measures
The inspector
noted several
strengths
in the licensee's
FFD Program that
exceed
NRC criteria;
The population
composing
the
random
pool
exceeds
NRC requirements,
i.e., the current
random pool totals
10,517 individuals, of whom only
4,535
are
there for the
purpose
of meeting
Part 26.
This is
partially the result of the fact that
NRC requires
individuals
responding
to the Technical
Support
Center or Emergency
Operations
Facility to be in the
random pool, however,
the licensee
has
expanded
that
population
to include
those
individuals reporting
to
seven
emergency
response
centers.
As mentioned earlier in this report, Nuclear
Power Standard
1.6 will
reach
complete effectiveness
by July 4, '1991.
This revised
Standard
will require
supervisory
review of work performed
by individuals
receiving
positive test results.
Additionally, the
MRO and
counselor will be notified of quantitative
BAC less
than
the
NRC
cut-off level of .04 but in excess of .02
BAC.
In order to meet the criteria of Appendix A, Subpart
B, paragraph
2.3,
(...
measures
shall
ensure
that
the integrity of
[FFD program
administration]
persons
is
not
compromised...
due
to
personal
relationships
with
any
individuals
subject
to testing...),
the
licensee
has
a computerized
program which automatically identifies
those
candidates
who
have
been
allowed
two
excuses
for being
unavailable
for the
random testing.
In these
cases,
access
is
cancelled
and
an automatic
pre-access
test is administered
upon the
individuals return to any of the
seven collection facilities.
The
inspector
found that the kinship of individuals administering
the
Program with other individuals subject to the program is not formally
known to the
FFD Manager.
The manager
agreed that the licensee
needs
to
know on
a factual
basis
those
people in the
random
pool
who are
related to those administering
the testing of the random pool.
The integrity of the administration of the
FFD program is assured
by
a
background
investigation
and
psychological
evaluation,
initial
alcohol
and drug test
(and repeated
every three years),
a behavioral
observation
program
and
random testing for all personnel
responsible
for administration of the program.
The licensee's
Security Screening
Section
in Chattanooga will do
a
complete reinvestigation
of those
persons
who have
been
under
EAP,
prior to their recertification for unescorted
access.
An individual
who has tested positive is not necessarily
returned after the
14 day
suspension
allowed
by the
Rule.
They are
returned
only after
a
consensus, between
Health Services
(EAP)
and the Security Screening
Section.
It is the licensee's
practice
not to hire
an individual
who
has
tested positive for drugs within the last three years,
nor to grant
unescorted
access
to those
who have three alcohol related convictions
within the last three years,
the
same is true for any drug related
misdemeanor within the last three years.
Em lo ee Assistance
Pro
ram (EAP)
The
licensee's
EAP is
designed
and
implemented
to
achieve
early
intervention through confidential assistance
by offering assessment,
short
term counseling
and referral services.
The licensee's
EAP professional
referred
to their continued efforts to
"market"
their
program
through
home
mailings,
newspaper
articles,
attendance
at Safety Meetings,
use of an 800 telephone
number,
and in the
near future
a mobile video display
booth to
be set-up onsite.
Their
efforts
since
the
inception
of the
Rule
have
resulted
in
a minor
percentage
change
of more self-referrals
and
more marital
referral
matters.
This increase
had
been partially absorbed
by site
EAP counselors
who are State
licensed Alcohol and
Drug .Counselors.
A proprietary psychologist,
following the administration of the Minnesota
Multi-phasic
Personality
Inventory,
will additionally
interview
approximately
25Ã of the professional staff and
40K of the crafts.
Of interest
was
the licensee's
mechanism of having the Medical
Review
Officer authorize
Health Services
to inform Nuclear Security
badging of
the
need to cancel
an unescorted
access
badge.
Thus, the
EAP professional
maintains
the confidentiality of a person without identifying them
as
a
threat
nor
as
an alcohol or drug patient.
Health Services
request
to
cancel
a badge could be based
upon numerous other legitimate reasons.
Training/Policy Communication
The
NRC Resident
Inspectors
witnessed,
in part, the licensee's initial FFD
training of crafts
and
supervisors.
During this
inspection
course
curriculum and training manuals
were reviewed which reflected
a thorough
Cl
effort to ensure
employees
and managers
knew the criteria of the Rule.
Of
interest
was the licensee's
decision to train all of its contractors
and
contractor
supervisors
to
assure
itself of their understanding
of
sanctions
and
FFD program impact on the entire workforce.
Additionally, employee
retention
of training relative
to five hour
abstention,
sanctions,
EAP and appeals
was judged to be very good by the
inspectors.
5.
Key Program
Process
Notification/Identification/Collection
Candidates
typically receive
one
hour prior notification of their
scheduled
drug test from their immediate supervisor.
As discussed
earlier
in this report,
candidates
can
be excused for legitimate
reasons
twice;
after that the computer will identify the candidate
as needing
a mandatory
pre-access
test.
Upon arrival at the Collection Facility, the candidates
provide positive identification
by
use of
a
photo-badge
or driver'
license.
The candidate
is then
requested
to furnish
a list of those
drugs/prescriptions
ingested
within the last
30 days which, in effect,
initiates the chain-of-custody fo'r the specimen.
The inspector
noted several
deficiencies
in the licensee's
actual
specimen
collection
technique.
Appendix A (Subpart
B,
2.4,
"Specimen
Collection
Procedure" ) requires
various
measures
to ensure
the
security of the collection facility during specimen collection,
and,
the
validity of the chain-of-custody
by not allowing candidates
access
to
other water sources,
nor to purses.
Additional, Subpart
B requires
the
candidate
to
remain
in the
presence
of the collection site technician
during
the
collection
process.
Contrary
to
the
requirements
of
Appendix A,
Subpart
B,
paragraph
2.4,
the
inspector
witnessed
the
fol.lowing on Nay 2nd.
The rear
door
of the
Nedical
Building, in which the collection
facility is
located,
was
propped
open
and
could
have
allowed
unauthorized
access
to the collection facility during the time of
specimen
collection.
The inspectors
in fact entered
the
one story
Nedical Building through this door and walked
down the hallway to the
collection offices.
The licensee
explained that the reason for the
door being
open
was
to assist
in ventilating
the building.
The
licensee
immediately
secured
the
door
and
instructed
medical
personnel
on the
need to keep the door closed.
Those candidates
waiting for specimen collection are allowed to carry
personal
belongings
(purses)
into the
hallway of the collection
facility and
leave
the
items
on chairs.
Once the candidate
washes
his/her
hands
and is given the specimen
container they then leave the
technician
and walk down the hallway, around
a corner
and enter
one
of three bathrooms.
Only one bathroom
had blue-dye in the reservoir,
others
had faucets
and other water sources
available.
In one
case
the inspectors
observed
a candidate
enter the wrong bathroom but
a
nearby
technician
corrected
this error.
The licensee
locked the
other
two
bathrooms
and
instructed
technicians
that
they
must
accompany
the candidates'efore
and after the
use of the bathroom.
Additionally, all personal
items
are
now left in the waiting area
exterior the collection facility.
The failure of the technicians
at the collection facility to adhere
to Appendix "A" requirements
is considered
a violation (50-259,
260
and 296/91-18-01).
The licensee
acknowledged
the failures witnessed
by the inspectors,
took immediate corrective
measures
and explained
that on-going
"for-cause" testing of one particular work unit was
overtaxing the technicians
and the facility.
One other
weakness
was
pointed out to the licensee
which was not
considered
a violation but did receive corrective
response
by the
licensee;
the candidate
donors
do not keep the
specimen
in view at
all times prior to sealing
the container.
This is
a self-protection
guarantee
for the
donor
and
the technician
that
no adulteration
occurred in the specimen prior to its being sealed.
The inspector further noted that the licensee
has
chosen
not to split
the specimen.
'This practice is not prohibited by the Rule.
Regarding
a "permanent
record book," the licensee
uses
several
such
books,
one for
each
technician
work station
(4),
which
are
sequentially
numbered.
Randomness
Since
December
2,
1989 until Apri 1 24,
1991, the licensee
conducted
16,231
random tests
from a population
pool of approximately
10,517.
Repeat tests
are
as follows:
Once
Twice
Three times
Four times
Five times
Six Times
Seven
times
Eight times
Totals
v
5165 tests/employees
5294 / 2647
3489 / 1163
1504 / 376
575 / 115
138 /
23
42/
6
24/
3
9,498
16,231
As mentioned earlier in this report, the licensee's
popul'ation pool is in
far excess
of
NRC criteria.
The
pool is
a function of the
Employee
Information System
and the Contractor
Information System which sees
only
one possibility of being randomly chosen
even if an individual is badged
at multi-sites.
Random
drawings
occur daily and interface with the
security plant
access
computer
data
base
thus precluding
a newly badged
I'
worker having
unescorted
access
for more
than
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without being
eligible for random testing.
The licensee
has four centers
where
the
primary
and alternate lists will printout; Knoxville, Chattanooga,
and
Muscle Shoals
are
merged into one population,
Browns Ferry is
a second,
Sequoyah
a third, and Watts
Bar and Bellefonte are merged for the fourth.
Technicians
at
one location cannot
have access
to the lists generated for
another,
nor
can
the lists
be altered
or erased.
At the
Chattanooga
Corporate Offices, the
FFD Manager
and his coordinator
have
passwords
into
the system which allows them to monitor each location.
Due to the unavailability of a routine work force at the
Chattanooga,
Knoxville and Muscle Shoals offices
no weekend testing is scheduled.
The
inspector
determined'hat
the
licensee
has
conducted
the
following
weekend/holiday
random tests at all four it its nuclear facilities;
Columbus
Day (October 8)
17 tests
Saturday
(November
17)
19 tests
M. L. Kings Birthday (January
21)
24 tests
Easter
Eve, Saturday
(March 30)
4 tests
Sunday (April 2l)
9 tests
73 random testing
The licensee
has established
a goal of more frequent
random testing for
the remainder of calendar
year
1991
such that
once per quarter testing
will occur
on I holiday
and I weekend
day.
Of interest
was the result of
six
random
interviews
which resulted
in
one individual assuring
the
inspectors
that the licensee
did not test -on weekends
and the other five
knew of no one
ever
tested
on weekends
and weren't sure if it was ever
done.
The licensee's
efforts to more frequently test
on weekends
and
holidays will be tracked
as
an Inspector - Followup - Item (50-259/260
and
296/91-18-02)
Sanctions
and
A
eals
It is the licensee's
policy to rehabilitate
employees
having tested
positive for alcohol or illegal drugs
on the first occasion.
Vendors will
be denied
access.
Employees
are terminated in the
second
occasion of a
positive test, or, for possession
or sale at
a licensee
work location.
Nuclear
security officers, supervisors
and
managers
are terminated
upon
the first positive test result.
Hourly licensee
employees
with less
than
one year of employment
are
treated
as contractors
under the licensee's
sanctions.
The licensee
takes disciplinary sanctions
based
upon the results of the
preliminary test
except for amphetamines
and barbiturates
which must
be
confirmed.
Appeals are heard
by a second
Medical
Review Officer.
e
Audit
The licensee
performed guality Assurance
Audit ESSA 90007
between
May
1
and
May 23,
1990 using four auditors
and three technical specialists.
The
auditors
visited all
the relevant locations
(except
Muscle Shoals)
and
contacted
the appropriate
FFD personnel.
No "significant technical
issues"
were identified and only one
recommendation
relative to the cut-off level
for marijuana
was
noted.
The licensee's
Central
Medical Laboratory
was
audited in that it is there that the preliminary tests
are conducted.
All
elements of the
FFD program were found to be "adequate
and effective;"
6.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and results
were
summarized
on
May 3,
1991, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1.
The inspector described
the areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the inspection
results listed below.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.