ML18033B515
| ML18033B515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1990 |
| From: | Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B514 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-90-25, 50-260-90-25, 50-296-90-25, NUDOCS 9009260291 | |
| Download: ML18033B515 (3) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on July 21 - August 17,
- 1990, two violations of NRC requirements were identified.
The first violation involved failure to have an adequate fire protection surveillance instruction.
The second violation was for failure to follow a work plan to protect emergency electrical equipment from water intrusion.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990),
the violations are listed below:
A.
Technical Specification (TS)
Section 6.8. 1, Procedures, requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
Contrary to the
- above, surveillance requirement 4.11.B.1.f.(4) had not been performed on the high pressure fire protection system since incorporation of TS amendment number 159 dated December 27, 1988.
Once every 18 months, the system pressure is required to be verified greater than or equal to 120 psig after sequential fire pump starts.
Surveillance instruction O-SI-4.11.B.l.f, Simulated Automatic and Nanual Actuation of the High Pressure Fire Pump System, which had been performed on January 6,
1990, did not verify the 120 psig requirement or refer to a calibration procedure for pressure switch PS-26-44 that would include the requirement.
The pressure switch was found to be calibrated with a 100 psig setpoint.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) applicable to all three units.
B.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with the instructions, procedures, or drawings.
TVA Nuclear 'uality Assurance
- Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89A, Section 6.1, establishes the requirements for control and use of procedures and instructions.
TVA work plan (WP) 2396-90 required that watertight covers be placed over penetrations in the roof of the Unit 1/2 diesel generator building where conduit had not been installed and grouted.
900926 Cy 05000 91 90091 59
'DR PQC
Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
2 Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Contrary to the
- above, on July 23,
- 1990, during the implementation of the work plan, the penetrations made in the Unit 1/2 emergency diesel generator building roof were not covered with watertight covers.
Water entered the building through the open penetrations and wetted the "B" and "C" emergency diesels and controls and the "C" emergency diesel batteries, which resulted in the "C" diesel generator being placed in an inoperable status.
Water had previously entered the DG building on July 11, 1990.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) applicable to Units 1
and 2.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include:.
( 1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results
- achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this]'i%ay of September 1990 ruce A. Wilson, Chief TVA Projects
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