ML18033A682
| ML18033A682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033A681 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0313, RTR-NUREG-313 50-259-89-05, 50-259-89-5, 50-260-89-05, 50-260-89-5, 50-296-89-05, 50-296-89-5, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, NUDOCS 8903200346 | |
| Download: ML18033A682 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1989005
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, NN'.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/89-05,
50-260/89-05,
and 50-296/89-05
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection
n
ct d:
January
30
February 2,
1989
t
tnspecto
,.LJ.
L. Coley
Approved by:
Blake, Chief
a erials
8 Processes
Section
E gineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
D te Signed
D te
igned
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine
unannounced
inspection
was
in the areas
and
Rev.
2) program implementation,
procedure
view, observation
of
work activities,
and review and evaluation of completed data.
Results
Programmatic
weaknesses
were identified in the licensee's
responsiveness
to
NRC
initiatives
and
resolution
of Technical
issues
from
a safety
standpoint
as
delineated
in Unresolved
Item 50-259,
260, 296/89-05-01.
(paragraph
2. a.)
In the areas
inspected,
violations or deviations
were not identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
"R. Boyd, Licensing
- J. Baxter,
Licensing
- C. Eubanks,
Engineer
- F. Froscello, guality Assurance/guality
Control
- M. Gothard,
Engineer,
Nondestructive
Examination
- E. Hartwig, Project
Management
"L. Leonard,
Examiner,
Nondestructive
Testing
- J. Swindell, Plant Support Superintendent
- W. Thomison,
Technical
Support
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during
this
inspection
included
engineers,
technicians,
and administrative personnel.
Other Organization
AMDATA:
- L. Reaves,
Site Supervisor,
and L-III Ultrasonic Examiner
G. Terning, L-III Ultrasonic Examiner
NRC Resident
Inspector
"E. Christnot
"Attended exit interview
Inservice
Inspection
and
Revision
2
(73051,
73052,
73753,
73755)
On January
25,
1988,
NRC
issued
"NRC's Position
on
IGSCC in
BWR Austenitic Stainless
Steel
Piping."
This letter also
forwarded
Revision 2, "Technical
Report
on Material Selection
and
Processing
Guidelines
for
BWR Coolant
Pressure
Boundary
Piping."
Rev.
2, describes
the technical
bases for the staff positions
on materials,
processes,
and
primary
coolant
chemistry
to
minimize
and control
intergranular
stress
corrosion
cracking
(IGSCC)
problems.
Inspection
schedules
and
inspection
sample
sizes
are
based
on
the
susceptibility
of weldments
to initiation
and
propagation
of
Inspection
schedules
are
comparable
to those
specified
in Section
XI of
the
ASME Boiler and
Pressure
Vessel
Code
in
cases
where
the
piping
material is
IGSCC resistant.
Varying amounts of augmented
inspections
are
specified for piping with
a greater
susceptibility
to cracking,
where
there
is
less
certainty
about
the effectiveness
of mitigation measures
used,
or in cases
where repairs
have
been
performed.
When improved water
chemistry control with hydrogen
additions is implemented,
less
augmenta-
tion of inspection
schedules
is required.
The
purpose
of the
was
to
seek
information
regarding
implementation
of the
new staff positions
covering
these
technical
areas.
The Generic Letter
applied
to all boiling water
reactor
(BWR) piping
made
of austenitic
stainless
steel
that
was four inches
or larger in nominal
diameter
and
contained
reactor
coolant
at
a
temperature
above
200~F
during
power
operation
regardless
of Code classification.
It also applied to reactor
vessel
attachments
and
appurtenances
such
as jet
pump
instrumentation
assemblies
and
head
spray
and vent components.
The staff continues
to believe
that
replacing
susceptible
piping with
IGSCC resistant
materials will provide the greatest
degree
of assurance
against
future cracking
problems.
However,
the staff
recognizes
that,
if the staff positions of this Generic
Letter are
implemented,
adequate
levels of piping integrity and reliability can
be achieved.
The staff
believes
the
Generic
Letter,
together with the revision of NUREG-0313,
will be of use
to licensees
in making
sound decisions
regarding
in that
each
can
be evaluated
considering its material,
heat
treatment
history,
stress
level,
chemical
environment,
and
surveillance
program.
This will provide
a basis for
a reasonable
judgment
regarding
the
long-term acceptability
of that
Considering
that
each
piping
system
has
many weldments
and each plant has
many piping systems,
the entire problem must be evaluated
in an integrated
way.
The
Commission
has
determined
that,
unless
appropriate
remedial
actions
are taken,
BWR plants
may not be in conformance with their current design
and
licensing
bases,
including
Appendix A,
General
Design
Criteria 4,
14,
and
31.
Accordingly, pursuant
to
operating reactor licensees
or construction
permit holders
were
requested
to furnish
under
oath
and affirmation their current
plans relating to
piping replacement,
inspection,
repair,
and leakage detection.
On January
30
February 2,
1989,
Region II inspected
TVA's program for
austenitic stainless
steel
piping covered
under
the
scope of this letter.
Procedures,
examination
work activities,
personnel
and
equipment qualifi-
cation
records,
and
completed
examination
data
were
reviewed.
Details
and results of the inspection
are described
below:
a
~
Program
Review
The licensee's
program for austenitic
stainless
steel
piping covered
under the
scope of Generic Letter 88-01
was delineated
in TVA letters
of response
to
NRC dated
August 1,
1988,
and January
12,
1989.
The
program
as described
in TVA letter of response
dated August 1,
1988,
identified
71
that
had
not
been
ultrasonically
inspected
following induction heat stress
improvement (IHSI) on Unit 2.
TVA's
supplemental
response
dated
January
12,
1989,
informed
NRC that
a
post-IHSI weld examination project
had
been initiated to examine the
remaining Unit 2 welds that
had not received
a post-IHSI ultrasonic
0
inspection.
The inspector
re'viewed the letters of response
from the
licensee
to ascertain
whether
the
program pertaining
to austenitic
stainless
steel
piping was
complete
and in conformance with regula-
tory requirements
and the licensee's
commitments.
The inspector also conducted
walkdown inspections
of systems
contain-
ing
reactor
coolant
outside
the
containment,
reviewed .drawings
of systems
for material
type
and temperature,
and held discussions
with cognizant
licensee
engineers.
As
a result,
the
inspector
concluded that TVA's response
to Generic Letter 88-01 is inadequate
in that
TVA has
not addressed
the
6 inch,
5 inch or 4 inch diameter
reactor
pater
cleanup
(RWCU)
system
piping
outside
the
drywell
This piping operates
at
temperatures
far exceeding
200'F
and
is
nonconforming
stainless
steel.
Approximately
450
unexamined
w'elds are involved for the three Units.
TVA's August 1,
1988, letter of response,
paragraph
1. 1.0,
subpara-
graph one,
stated,
in part, that wrought austenitic
stainless
steel
piping
considered
to
be
susceptible
to
according
to
the
guidelines
given.
in
stopped
at
the first
isolation
valve outside
the dry well penetration.
In addition,
in
paragraph
1, 1.0,
subparagraph
three, of the response,
TVA stated that
"A review of all
stainless
steel
piping
systems
was
conducted
in
order to investigate
the possibility
of
susceptibility
in
balance-of-plant
systems.
No
such
systems
were
found to meet
the
susceptibility criteria as stated
in Generic Letter 88-01."
The
inspector
informed
the
licensee
that
an
amended
response
to
the
Generic
Letter
should
be
submitted
to the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation
(NRR) to list, schedule,
and categorize all welds
regardless
of Code Classification
which are susceptible
to
IGSCC in
accordance
with the Generic Letter.
In addition,
the
licensee
was
requested
to address
in their response
why 71 welds were identified
to
be
examined
on Unit 2 in both of their letters of response
and
only
66 welds
are
scheduled
to be examined.
This item was reported
to
the
licensee
as
Unresolved
Item
50-259,
260,
296/89-05-01,
"Amended
Response
to the Office of Nuclear Regulations,
Required for
Subsequent
to the
inspection,
Region II has notified
NRR of the
problem described
above
and resolution
of this finding
has
been
transferred
to the Special
Projects Division of NRR.
Review of Procedures
(Unit 2)
The inspector
reviewed
the procedures
delineated
below to ascertain
whether
the
licensee's
procedures
.pertaining
to
detection
and sizing
conformed to the ultrasonic training
courses
for
examinations
developed
by
the
Electric
Power
Research
Institute
(EPRI), Nondestructive
Examination
(NDE) Center,
in Charlotte,
North
Carolina,
and
demonstrated
effective
by ultrasonic
examiners
in
qualification efforts at the Center.
The following TVA procedures
were
reviewed
for approval,
calibration
requirements,
and
scanning
sensitivities
acceptance
levels,
NRC personnel
qualification require-
ments,
technical
content,
methods
of recording,
evaluating
and
dispositioning of findings.
Procedure
Number
Title
N-UT-25 Rev.
7
N-UT-42 Rev.
0
(Including
PCR ¹89-15)
N-UT-39 Rev.
0
"Ultrasonic Information of Austenitic
Metal
Welds for
IGSCC Using
Manual
Technique"
"Ultrasonic
Examination
Using
the
Intraspect
98 System for the Detection
of
Intergranular
Stress
Corrosion
Cracking in Piping Weldments."
"Manual
Ultrasoni c
Si zing
of
Pl anor
Flows"
QMP-102. 4 Rev.
2
"Qualification
and
Certification
Requirements
for DNQA NDE Personnel"
Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 2)
The
inspector
observed
work activities
involved in the
automated
(Intraspect
I/98
System)
and
manual
ultrasonic
examinations
of
stainless
steel
welds after
IHSI.
TVA had
contracted
AMDATA to
perform the ultrasonic
examination activities.
AMDATA was working
under
TVA's Quality Assurance
Program
and
using
TVA's examination
procedures.
The inspector
reviewed
AMDATA's NDE Personnel
Qualifica-
tion
and Certification
records
for the
following
qualified
examiners:
Examiner
G. Terning
J. Wolf
C.
Lasoya
M. Worby
Level of Certification
UT-L-III
(IGSCC)
UT-L-II
(IGSCC)
UT-L-II
(IGSCC)
UT-L-II
(IGSCC)
Job Title
I/98 Analyst
Sizing and Manual
I/98 Analyst
I/98 Operator
I/98 Operator
The
inspector
observed
the
examiners
in the field calibrating
and
taking data to ensure
that
approved
procedures
were
available
and
being
followed,
specified
nondestructive
examination
equipment
was
being
used,
and
examination
personnel
with the
proper
level
of
qualification
and
certification
were
performing
the
various
examination
activities'.
Data
Review and Evaluation (Unit 2)
The
inspector
reviewed
the
completed
ultrasonic
examination
and
calibration reports for the welds listed
below to ascertain
whether
the data
was within the previously established
acceptance
criteria
and if the methods
used for examination
were sufficient to determine
the full extent of acceptance.
The following records
were reviewed:
Weld Number
GR-2-63
GR-2-29
KR-2-24
KR-2-47
GR-2-57
GR-2-58
RR-2-48
GR"2-3
R-1160
R-1155
R-1159
R-1157
R-1153
R-1156
R-1154
R-1158
C-0274
C-0270
C-0274
C"0270
C-0270
C-0270,
C-0273
C-0271
C-0274,
C-0275
Automated Examination
Calibration Sheet
Number
Manual
Examination
DSCS-2-1
DCS-2-4
C-0269
C-0269
Within the areas
examined,
violations or deviations
were not identified.
3.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and results
were
summarized
on February 2,
1989, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1.
The inspector described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail
the inspection
results
listed
below.
Proprietary
information is
not contained
in this report.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
(Open)
Unresolved
Item
259,
260,
296/89-05-01,
Amended
Response
to the
Office of Nuclear
Reactor
Regulations,
Required for Generic Letter 88-01
(paragraph 2.a.)