ML18033A664

Submits Addl Guidance Re NRC Requirements for Facility Tech Specs Re App R Safe Shutdown Equipment,Per Util Submittal & Subsequent Withdrawal of Tech Spec Change 249

ML18033A664
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	03/03/1989
From:	Black S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Kingsley O Tennessee Valley Authority
References
GL-81-012, GL-88-012 NUDOCS 8903130535
Download: ML18033A664 (7)

Text

C~

1 Docket'o.

50-260 License No. DPR-52 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 March 3, 1989 DISTRIBUTION NRR PDR TVA TP R/F ADSP R/F D. Crutchfield B. D. Liaw S. Black R. Pierson F.

McCoy W. Little G. Hubbard J. Rutberg S.

Varga B. Grimes E. Jordan ACRS (10)

C. McCracken J.

Craig.

D. Kubicki D. Notley

SUBJECT:

TVA BFN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NO.

249 - APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT - ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE As a result of your submittal and subsequent withdrawal of TS change 249-Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment, the staff agreed to provide written guidance for the staff requirements for the Technical Specifications.

This guidance is specific to Browns Ferry Unit 2 and is not intended to represent generic guidance on Appendix R related Technical Specifications.

It is our understanding that no change is presently being proposed in the fire protection Technical Specifications (suppression, detection, barriers, and fire brigade).

However, we understand that the administrative sections of the Technical Specifications will be revised per Generic Letter 88-12 to facilitate removal of the fire protection Technical Specifications after the Appendix R inspection.

The following guidance is applicable to the Technical Specifications on alternative shutdown systems.

1)

Post-fire alternative shutdown systems should be included in the Technical Specifications in accordance with Generic Letter 81-12.

2)

HVAC does not have to be addressed in the Technical Specifications.

(It must be adequately addressed in the post-fire shutdown procedures, however).

3)

All comp'onents determined to be an identifiable part of the post-fire alternative shutdown system should be listed as such in a separate table in the Technical Specifications.

This table should be of sufficient detail to provide for varying limiting conditions for operation and provide surveillance requirements for different components, if required.

4) An acceptable limiting condition for operation on an alternative shutdown component or system would allow 7 days to restore the minimum required equipment for alternative shutdown to operable status.

If this cannot be accomplished, an equivalent shutdown capability may'be, provided for up to 60 days.

After 60 days the plant must be in Hot Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

O>I 8903i30535 890303 PDR ADOCK 05000260 P

PDC

')' '.i

>>,'Ml'l

~ f

',,Hv ')v>>

')'H.f r>>

1 4

W W

4 gu

~

I t"..J r IH>>

u A ur v

u k ) U a 't t'Py

. "v

, Wu !!i

>> tr J

>>t'i W

'. )

)

r

. I' vvim v l

)1

)>>4 h

v

~

i,

~ tv M

M P<<W

~

Iv 1>>

s u/

I 4'i v,

u j.

>>Wi v'g Wv Wv Ilri)

H.

v

<<Pi p

'I g vi)

'f 0(

f>> )

1

'V VM

.')

v f v>>"

f at i, vg

'j h

V l

h

. ~v'u iT

~ '

vr hf,~ v

~ >>r W

wI'. ll M

V

~ '>>

J

'< lJ

'u'

~ i u

>>- K I vf.g

>>h t

v i

v 1,IQ v ~

H r I c

tI v

~

I' v

~ 1 u>>v y g

~

v

'.y ",,) )

~

W tl t

i.

KV

• f I'>>r.,

-i! )rr

~

,1

~

)

3 I

II M

>)

li ]>>

A u

u

! )

t

., il II>>

t v

>>V,W

, re<)

I I ra i

<<rrrrg i

. 6 1>>,

f u) ','>>Ww')

)

'll I

",f.l r

. I v

I "I

~ v lf yt

,fv t>>J M

tel f,g fJ if,; f) v I

Nr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

5) 6)

Equivalent shutdown capability may take the form of temporary procedures, hardware modifications or firewatches.

Firewatches must be continuous when applied to areas lacking automatic fire detection and where existing fire detection does not meet NFPA code requirements (without an approved deviation) or is not operable.

It is our understanding that most of the existing BFN fire detection systems will be upgraded to a code compliant system in July 1990.

We will not consider the BFN fire detection system as totally code compliant until those upgrades are completed.

The equivalent shutdown capability provided when the alternative shutdown system is inoperable depends on the specific equipment involved, and, there-fore, should be sufficient to assure that the intended shutdown actions can be accomplished, or that fires can be reasonably precluded during that time for which alternative safe shutdown equipment would otherwise be required, consistent with the alternative safe shutdown design basis.

Any temporary procedures or special fire watch patrols established to provide this equivalent capability should be reviewed by ~(PORC/',l and approved by the plant manager prior to implementation.

It is our position that this will require in place written procedures covering postulated inoperability conditions.

Any inoperability condition outside of the written procedures will require

analysis, proposal of a temporary fix, PORC and plant manager approval, and implementation within 7 days to avoid shutdown of the reactor.

7) The definition of "equivalent shutdown capability" and supporting information such as provided in Items 5 and 6 above should be included in the bases of

-the Technical Specifications.

8) 9)

Certain areas may present special problems to a continuous fire watch (such as the cable spreading room which is protected by CO ).

Such problems should be noted and addressed in evaluations made to support the adequacy of the fire watch as an appropriate temporary measure.

Periods of time for which equivalent procedures are in effect longer than 60 days may be proposed in the Technical Specifications for special systems and/or components listed in the table specified in item 3 (above).

Such proposals shall require separate justifications in the Technical Specification bases regarding adequacy of equivalent shutdown procedures and need for a greater time period to requisition, receive and replace that component or system.

• See Previous Sheet for Concurrence Sincerely, F

I

~g-1 sl~ed bS p

Suzanne C. Black, Assistant Director for, Projects

,'TVA.Projects Division

'Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I

OFC TV :PSB*

TV :PSB/BC*

TV

D/TP~

~

~

W W

W NAME : RGWescott

GHubbar'd

RCPierson wee

+

~ <<eeww e

wm DATE

2/24 89 2 24/89 2 24 89 TV :PD t.

SCBlac

3/

/89 RR:

CEB Mc racken

3/

/89

NRR:SPLB" NR TSB 4

JCraig

ESutcher w + ~ wwww

3/1/89

3/

/89 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY w opia% b~w

e I

>>a a

K, e

j <<,

a>> ~

Qfy I'>> VF F

P P I

,FP

>>N e

a I

A

~

a I

~

I

~

I e

A C

<<Jv l1I e

h e'"

F,IP<<

<<e a

I,'P u<<e a

I PJ M

F>>,IP J J

F I

F I

v M

J u

a' k

t I I<<

~

"J F

I a

F,j >>

M

~ i I

~ I'jl II a,<<

. I,

~

I "eh e

I

~ M f 'a J

>> r I( i<<4>>

~ t I,

IJPJF L>>

I' a>>'P'F F I Ia' t>> a I

I F

F I

~

'I e

F

, p<<,),

~ AV v

ma

~

~

. ~ e a

~ ~ eea e ae e

I e

~

I,i, e

Fa

1' Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

2 Equivalent shutdown capability may take the form of temporary procedures, hardware modifications or firewatches.

Firewatches must be continuous when applied to areas lacking automatic fire detection and where existing fire detection does not meet NFPA code requirements (without an approved deviation) or is not operable.

It is our understanding that most of the existing BFN fire detection systems will be upgraded to a code compliant system in July 1990.

We will not consider the BFN fire detection system as totally code compliant until those upgrades are completed.

The equivalent shutdown capability provided when the alternative shutdown system is inoperable depends on the specific equipment involved, and, therefore, should be sufficient to assure that the intended shutdown actions can be accomplished, or that fires can be reasonably precluded during that time for which alternative safe shutdown equipment would other-wise be required, consistent with the alternative safe shutdown design basis.

Any temporary procedures or special fire watch patrols established to provide this equivalent capability should be reviewed by (PORC) and approved by the plant manager prior to implementation.

It is our position that this will require in place written procedures covering postulated inoperability conditions.

Any inoperability condition outside of the written procedures will require analysis, proposal of a temporary fix, PORC and plant manager approval, and implementation within 7 days to avoid shutdown of the reactor.

Certain areas may present special problems to a continuous fire watch (such as the cable spreading room which is protected by CO ).

Such problems should be noted and addressed in evaluations made to support the adequacy of the fire watch as an appropriate temporary measure.

Periods of time for which equivalent procedures are in effect longer than 60 days may be proposed in the Technical Specifications for special systems and/or components listed in the table specified in item 3 (above).

Such proposals shall require separate justifications in the Technical Specification bases regarding adequacy of equivalent shutdown procedures and need for a greater time period to requisition, receive and replace that component or system.

Sincerely, Suzanne" C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TYA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

- 4g~

NAME : RGWescott

~

W 0

DATE

2/

/89 0

u bard:

RC i rson 2P /89:

2/0'1/89 I

~ WWWWW WO WW

SCBlack

CMcCracken Craig 2/

/89

2/

/89

2/

/89 W

&&\\0

EButcher 2/

/89 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

v ff I

~

I>> ftf VJ

,-vfj I I

v 4

If

~ M v

4 t

w M

~

tf

~

VI

I K,

K W tf M

l h<<

~

l h

~

f Ml M

K

~

I

~

,I M ii W,

~

'2 fi>>

4 4)",K M<<

E rl r

~ 4 M ~

I lf

~ ')

W I

~

- v.v v

I Hk v

h

>> MVM<< ~

It Kf v

4

~ 4 WI v

P, fpv 4

~

I hvv N

I 4 c

,W 4

fv 4

1 v

4 4

c 1

v Ilv H'

4 IV V

4 I,

I N

h 2c j

'2'r M

h tff iww I

Il Nl

) <<II Ii

<<"fhl '

~ I K >>K,I)

' It )

I fv

)2W ff vl'I

~

M 14 2 <<

Kv14 f I V

v f1l I

HAMI M

l MKKII) 4 I

)

]

V v

I'g II I

lc v

M 2 I

I 1

-V <<I r

v

~

IV

~

~ Eel

~

p

~

I Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

CC:

General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive Ell B33 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Mr. R. L. Grfdley Tennessee Valley Authority 5N 157B Lookout Place Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. C. Mason Tennessee Valley Authority Drowns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O, Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602 Mr. P.

Car ier Tennessee Valley Author ity Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O.

Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602 Mr. D. L. Williams Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive W10 B85 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

Chairman, Limestone County Commission P.O.

Box 188

Athens, Alabama 35611 I

Claude Earl Fox, M.D.

State Health Officer State Department of Public Health State Off'ice Building Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Resident Inspector/Browns Ferry NP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 12, Box 637

Athens, Alabama 35611 Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U. S.

House of Representatives Washington, D.C.

20515 Tennessee Valley Authority Rockville Office 11921 Rockville Pike Suite 402 Rockville, l1aryland 20852