ML18033A383
| ML18033A383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1988 |
| From: | Partlow J NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033A384 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0660, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-0899, RTR-NUREG-660, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-NUREG-899 NUDOCS 8810030274 | |
| Download: ML18033A383 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000260/1988200
Text
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ACCESSION NBR:8810030274
DOC.DATE: 88/09/28
NOTARIZED:
NO
DOCKET
ACIL:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear
Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee
05000260
UTH.NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
RTLOW,J.G.
Ofc of Special Projects
RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
WHITEiS.A.
Valley Authority
SUBJECT:
Forwards
Emergency Operating Instructions
Insp Rept
50-260/88-200
on 880808-19.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
DF01D
COPIES
RECEIVED:LTR
/
ENCL
TITLE: Direct Flow Distribution:
50 Docket
(PDR Avail)
NOTES:1 Copy each to: S.Black,
J.G.Partlow,
S.Richardson
B.D.Liaw,F.McCoy.
SIZE:
05000260
S
RECIPIENT
ID CODE/NAME
INTERNAL: NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
EXTERNAL
LPDR
NOTES:
COPIES
LTTR ENCL
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1
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NRC PDR
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ID CODE/NAME
COPIES
LTTR ENCL'
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES
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UNITEDSTATES
~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
September
28,
1988
Docket
No. 50-260
Nr.
S.
A. Mhite
Senior
Vice President,
Nuclear
Power
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout. Place
1101 Yiarket Street
Chattanooga,
37402-2801
Dear Nr. White:
SUBJECT:
BROMNS
FERRY UNIT 2
EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS INSPECTION
(50-260/88-200}
This letter forwards the report and the executive
summary of the emergency
operating instructions
(EOIs) inspection
performed
by an
NRC inspection
team
during the period August 8-19,
1988.
The activities involved are authorized
by
NRC Operating
License
No.
DPR-52 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear
Power Station
(BFN), Unit 2.
At the conclusion of the inspection,
the
team discussed
the
findings with the members of your staff identified in Attachment
A of the
enclosed
inspection report.
Areas
examined during the inspection
included review of the EOIs, the
documents
used to develop the EOIs, the
FOI validation and verification
program,
and the
EOI training program;
walkdown of the
EOIs in the control
room and plant; evaluation of operator
performance of EOIs os your
site-specific simulator;
and performance of a
human factors evaluation of the
EOIs.
An overview of the inspection
and the team's findings are provided in
the enclosed
executive
summary.
Details of the inspection
are provided in the
enclosed
inspection report.
The team determined that the
when used
by trained operators,
can
function adequately
to mitigate the consequences
of an accident.
However, the
team identified a number of weaknesses
involving the development
and
implementation of the EOIs.
Your attention is invited to the items detailed
in Section
3 of the inspection report.
These
include the need for improved
communications
among control
room personnel,
improvement of in-plant
communications
systems,
better definition of the duties of shift personnel,
and improved staging of EOI related tools in the plant.
BFN management
attention
should
be directed at the weaknesses
noted above.
Other items that the team considered
needing
management
attention included
evaluation of containment venting procedures,
evaluation of personnel
access
to the reactor building during emergencies,
and review of deviations of the
EOIs from the documents that were used to develop
them.
Your responses
to the
identified weaknesses
outlined in Section
3 of this report are requested within
60 days of receipt of this letter.
880W28
8810030~7~
5000260
ADOCY 0
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S.
A. White
The responses
directed
by this letter and its enclosure
are not subject to the
clearance
procedures
of the Office of Management
and Budget
as required
by the
Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1900,
PL 86-511.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790{a),
a copv of this letter and enclosures will
be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this inspection,
please
contact
me or
Yir. J.
Cummins
(301-492-0957) of this office.
Sincerely,
Jame
G. Partlow, Director
Offi e of Special
Projects
Enclosures:
1.
Executive
Summary
2.
Inspection
Report 50-260/88-200
cc w/enclosures:
See next page
0
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l.
Mr. S.
A. White
-3-
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
'0
General
Counsel
Valley Authority
400 West Summit Hill Drive
E11
B33
Knoxville, Tennessee
37902
Mr. R. L. Grid'ley
Valley Authority
5N 157B Lookout Place
Chattanooga,
37402-2801
Mr. C.
Mason
Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P.O.
Box 2000
Decatur,
35602
Mr. P. Carier
Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P.O.
Box 2000
Decatur,
35602
Mr. D. L. Williams
Valley Authority
400 West Summit Hill Drive
W10 B85
Knoxville, Tennessee
37902
Chairman,
Limestone
County Commission
P.O.
Box 188
Athens,
35611
Claude
Earl
Fox, M.D.
State Health Officer
State
Department of Public Health
State Office Building
Montgomery,
36130
Regional Administrator,
Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
101 Marietta Street,
N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia
30323
Resident
Inspector/Browns
Ferry
NP
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Route
12,
Box 637
Athens,
35611
Dr. Henry Myers, Science
Advisor
Committee
on Interior
and Insular Affairs
U. S.
House of Representatives
Washingtor
D.C.
20515
Valley Authority
Rockvi lie Office
11921
Rockvi1 le Pike
Suite
402
Rockville, Maryland
20852
Mr. S.
A. White
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EXECUTIVE SUNNARY
INSPECTION
REPORT 50-260/88-200
BROWNS
FERRY NUCLEAR POWER
STATION
During the period August 8-19,
1988,
an
NRC inspection
team evaluated
the
Browns Ferry Nuclear
Power Station
{BFN) emergency
operating instructions
(EOIs).
The inspection
was conducted
to verify that the
EOIs were technically
accurate;
that thei r specified actions could be physically carried out in the
plant using existing equipment,
instrumentation,
and controls;
and that the
plant staff could correctly perform the procedures.
The inspection also
verified that the licensee's
program for development
and implementation of the
EOIs complied with the requirements
of Supplement
1 to NUREG-0737,
"Requirements
for Emergency
Response
Capability."
The inspection
was conducted
in accordance
with the guidelines
in Temporary Instruction 2515/92,
"Emergency Operating
Procedures
Team Inspection."
To evaluate
the EOIs, the team performed the following activities:
reviewed the
EOIs and the procedures
generation
package
submitted to
the
NRC for their development
compared
the
EOIs with the owners'roup
emergency
procedure
guidelines
(EPGs)
and reviewed the licensee's
justification for deviations of the
EOIs from the
EPGs for adequacy
performed in-plant walkdown of the
t
evaluated
the
EOIs during the execution of accident scenarios
on the
site-specific simulator
performed
human factors evaluation of the
EOIs during all phases
of the
inspection.
SUMYiARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
It appeared
to the team members
observing
performance of the accident scenarios
on the simulator, that improved communications
between control
room personnel
could have
made the
EOI accident
response
more effective.
Specifically, the
team observed
instances
where the unit operator
was providing important
information to the
ASOS, but the
ASOS was not listening because
he was too
involved in reading the
EOIs and focusing
on other problems in the plant.
Also, interviews with BFN staff personnel
and observations
made during plant
walkdowns indicated that in plant communications
systems
were not adequate
to
support the implementation of EOI appendices
which required operations
outside
the control
room.
0
Duties of shift personnel
for responding
to events
were not clearly defined.
There
was
no clear-cut assignment of responsibilities
and roles nor an
indication of who was qualified to perform tasks outside the control
room when
called for in the EOIs.
The functions of the shift technical
advisor
and shift
operations
supervisor
were not clearly defined.
It was apparent that during the first few minutes of some transients,
the
assistant shift operations
supervisor
(ASOS),
who was responsible
for reading
the
EOIs and directing the response
to the accident,
did not have time to
follow the
EOIs step
by step.
As
a result, unit operators
had to take actions
such
as controlling pressure
before being directed to do so by the
ASOS.
After
the initial transient,
the
ASOS had time to refer to the
EOIs to ensure that all
immediate actions
had
been correctly performed.
The
ASOS could then begin to
use the
EOIs to deal with the emergency
by reading the steps
and giving directions.
There appeared
to be
a lack of coordination
among the
BFN staff groups
responsible for the detailed control
room design
review labeling program,
plant labeling program,
and
EOI revisions.
During the inspection,
the
team noted that these
groups
appeared
to be functioning in a largely
autonomous
mode until a restart
date is approached.
Although the procedures
for containment venting were consistent with the
Boiling Mater Reactor Owners'roup
guidance,
the plant-specific analyses
had
not been
done to confirm vent valve capability and reactor building integrity.
No evaluations
had
been
performed to confirm that vent path valves
and dampers
would function at expected
flow and differential pressure
conditions;
this
evaluation,
however,
was in progress
during the inspection.
Vent path ductwork
was expected
to fai 1 inside the reactor building.
In this case
vented flow
could be processed
via reactor building ventilation to the filtered elevated
release
point, but the possible
consequences
of containment building pressuriza-
tion had not been analyzed.
The effects of accident radiation levels in the reactor building on the
operators'bility
to perform local operations
had not been analyzed.
NUREG-0737, item
II.B.2, and
an
NRC Confirmatory Order of July 10,
1981, requi red the evaluation
of personnel
access
to the reactor building during emergencies.
In its response,
prepared
before the current symptom-based
EOIs were issued,
the licensee
concluded that the radiation levels would preclude reactor building entry, but
that the previous event-based
EOIs and plant design would support accident
mitigation without reactor building reentry.
The symptom-based
EOIs require
entry to compensate
for equipment failures.
Since the development
and imple-
mentation of the current
symptom-based
EOIs, the licensee
had not reevaluated
its former position
and analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
The
EOIs were generally technically accurate
and could be performed
by the
plant staff using existing plant equipment,
instruments
and controls.
Following the
EOIs would be difficult in a rapidly developing event;
however,
it appeared
that the EOIs, when used
by trained operators,
would function to
mitigate the consequences
of an accident.
The
BFN staff demonstrated
that the proper personnel,
basic procedures,
and
program plans were in place to correct the problems with the
EOIs identified in
this report.
Problems pertaining to personnel
that will require
management
decisions
and increased
attention include:
(1) improving communications
between control
room personnel
and (2) defining the duties of shift personnel
during emergencies.
4
4
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