ML18033A255
| ML18033A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1988 |
| From: | Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| TAC-62252, NUDOCS 8807050207 | |
| Download: ML18033A255 (35) | |
Text
.hi",CELERATED DIS%1BUTION DEMONSTR54ON SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8807050207 DOC.DATE: 88/06/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g
FACIL:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit. 2, Tennessee 05000260 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION.
GRIDLEY,R.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Responds to 880419 request for addi info re Phase II Weld Prospect Rept.Addi related matl encl.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
D030D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL 3 SIZE:
TITLE: TVA Facilities Routine Correspondence NOTES:S.Black 3 cy.1 cy.
ea to: Ebneter,Axelrad,S.Richardson, B.D.Liaw,K.Barr, OI.
05000260D RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME SIMMS,M MORAN,D INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD OGC 15-B-18 EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC NOTES:
COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1' 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 1
9 9
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD GEARS,G ADM/LFMB NUDOgS~STRACT 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1,
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 R
D S"'
TOTAL NUMBER'F COPIES REQUIRED.'LTTR 22 ENCL 20
I ~
.Is, Wi
TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 5N 157B Lookout Place VVIIRe ts88 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket No. 50-260 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BROWNS FERRY PHASE II WELD REPORT (TAC 62252)
This letter is in response to your April 19, 1988 request for additional information related to the Phase II Weld Project Report.
The Phase II report was previously transmitted to the NRC 'Document Control Desk on March 7, 1988.
Enclosed are responses to the five questions in the April 19, 1988 transmittal.
Also included as enclosure 2 is an additional letter related to
~ the independent mechanical overview of the weld reinspection.
You should insert this letter as the first entry in attachment 4.4 of the Phase II Report.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to B. C. Morris, BFN, Site Licensing, 205/729-3604.
Very truly yours, TEN S
E V AUTHORITY Enclosures cc:
See page 2
R. Gridley, Di ector Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
(
t l
0@8 i
1 8307050207 880624 PDR ADOCK 05000260 PDC An Equal Opportunity Employer
le P
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosures):
Mr. K. P. Barr, Acting Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NH, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Ms.
S.
C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Nhite Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Browns Ferry Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637
- Athens, Alabama 35611
N
ENCLOSURE 1
RESPONSE
TO APRIL 19, 1988 NRC QUESTIONS PHASE II HELD REPORT Refer to section 2.0 of the BFN-Phase II Report, Bechtel Audit. With respect to the independent Bechtel Audit, provide the following additional information for each audit observation and/or finding:
A.
Details of the TVA Welding Project's (HP) review and investigations.
B.
Reasons and bases for the HP conclusions listed in the Phase II Report.
TVA RESPONSE I
TVA reviewed the results of the Bechtel independent audit and investigated the observations and findings to determine the impact, if
- any, on installed weldments.
The details of the review and investigation supporting TVA's evaluation of each audit observation/finding are as follows:
AUDIT OF THE OFFICE OF CONSTRUCTION AUDIT TVA-02-OC Ke Element 2.0 Ade uac of Desi n Out ut Documents The three observations identified by the audit were reviewed and evaluated by the HP to determine compliance of'he issued documents to the requirements of the subject codes.
The evaluation of the code requirements for observations 1
and 2 determined that the welding procedures were qualified in accordance with the referenced code.
With respect to observation 3, the HP found that the lack of identification of the TVA organizational unit responsible for control of weld documents did "not affect the quality of installed weldments.
Ke Element 3.0 Initial Welder or Heldin 0 erator ualifications In reviewing Key Element 3.0 findings, the HP considered the Bechtel auo"it findings, the vintage of the plant, the requirements for specific
- systems, and the actual installed hardware.
A.
Audit finding AF-01-OC During the time period 'from 1968 to 1970, critical welds were governed by the TVA document titled, "Qualified Welding Procedures and Welding Specifications for Field Welding of Principal Piping, Low Pressure and Service Piping, Steam Turbines and Boiler Connection,"
dated March 1, 1965.
For other type welds there were no procedures specifically addressing welder qualification.
The records review found,
- however, that the
- welders, as identified in the last paragraph of AF-01-OC, were
~C A'(
~ +
ot
B.
Ke qualified in accordance with either ASME IX or ANS Dl.0.
Therefore, the NP agrees with the statement of the audit finding that this finding had no impact on weld quality during this time period.
Audit Finding AF-02-OC During the time period from 1967 to 1970, many of the welder qualification records did not reference a procedure that specified welding progression (uphill-downhill) for welding in the vertical position.
This is considered an essential variable per ASME IX.
This situation was corrected between 1970-1972 after TVA issued G-29 "General Construction Specification for Nelding, Heat Treatment, Nondestructive Examination and Allied Field Fabrication Operation."
The statement, "Since ASME IX eliminated progression as an essential variable for welder qualification in 1974
.." made in the audit report by the Bechtel audit team was subsequently determined by TVA to be incorrect.
However, considering the Phase II inspection results, there 'is no evidence that untraceable welding progression between 1967 and 1970 had an impact on weld quality.
Element 9.0 Use of A ro riate Neldin Procedures The NP reviewed the Bechtel audit data and concurred with the conclusion of the Key Element 9.0 finding.
The basis for this determination is that since the correct procedures were used, the failure to maintain on-site historical copies of applicable procedures had no effect on weld quality.
Ke Element 10.0 Use of A ro riate Ins ection Procedures The NP reviewed the Bechtel rep'ort and concurred with the evaluations for Key Element 10.0 observations.
A.
Observation 1
A review of radiographic film taken during construction indicated that the "Manufacturer's Name" was not always evident on the film as required by ASME III.
However, in all cases as noted in the observation, the radiographic reports identified the necessary elements required by ASME III.
Therefore, the observation is considered to have no effect on weld quality.
B. " Observation 2 Some historical records did not identify the specific procedures that were used.
This observation is strictly related to documentation and this oversight does not affect physical weldment quality.
Ke Element 12.0 Use and Control of Weldin Filler Materials The NP reviewed the subject documentation history and evaluated the results.
The six discrepancies related to welding filler materials noted in the audit finding AF-04-06 are individually addressed as follows:
t S
4 Item (1)
Teledyne-McKay Type E7018 (3/32" diameter)
Lot No.
302701 The TVA contract for this filler material required tensile tests and Charpy V
Notch (CVN) values in the as-welded and Post Held Heat Treatment conditions.
The Certified Mill Test Reports (CMTRs) only reported one set of tensile values and a single CVN value.
The vendor (Teledyne-McKay) was contacted to determine if additional test data existed for this particular lot number.
They indicated that the data represented
~t ical results for E7018 and not the actual results of tests as solicited by the TVA contract.
In this case, the omission of the test data was attributed to a specific breakdown in the procurement system.
The electrodes were. purchased from a welding distributor who apparently failed to relay the TVA contract requirements to the electrode supplier.
Additionally, receipt inspection failed to detect the CMTR omissions.
The electrodes,
- however, should be adequate for use in any quality system based on similar mechanical test data published by the vendor.
The data on another heat of E7018 produced for TVA during the same time period indicates that E7018 electrodes manufactured by Teledyne-McKay will develop mechanical properties (tensile and Charpy V Notch) in both the as-welded and stress relieved conditions that satisfy the requirements noted in the TVA specification.
Therefore, use of the filler material should have no adverse effect on weld quality.
He add that this data correlates to published values of four other electrode manufacturers (Chematron, Airco, Lincoln, and Hobart) and with data published in Dr. Linnet's text, Volume II Heldin Metallur See Table 1 for a listing of mechanical properties for E7018.
TABLE 1
TYPICAL MECHANICAL PROPERTIES E7018 Tensile Strength Vendor/
as Welded Reference KSI CVN at -20'F as Welded ft/1 bs Tensile Strength Stress Relieved KSI CVN at -20 F
Stress Relieved ft/lbs Chematron Airco 75 78 70 90 52 73 72 120 Hobart Lincoln 73.7 74 84 80 72 120 Welding 70-85 Metallurgy
. Linnert Vol. II 26 72 35
t4 j
'1 L
t
ITEM (2)
Hobart Type ER309 (3/32" diameter x 36")
Serial No. 7-10279 The vendor CMTR on this material shows that the chemical analysis complies with the specification for Type ER309 as required by the TVA specification.
The vendor, however, failed to indicate a reference on the CMTR to the specification (AWS-ASME, etc.) for which the tests were conducted.
The subject vendor was contacted and it was.determined that the chemical analysis was performed in accordance with the requirements of ASME-SFA 5.9.69.
Since the material has been determined to conform to specification, this portion of the finding could have been deleted..
Item (3)
Page Type E70S-G (3/32" diameter x 36")
Control No. 00147 This material was procured before issuance of TVA Specification No. PF-1019, "Purchase Specification for Carbon Steel Bare Electrodes and Rods," which required tensile and CVN tests in the as-welded and stress relieved conditions.
The filler metal specification ASME SA-559 and the subsequent SFA 5.18 specification for this type filler material did not require chemical or CVN tests.
- However, both specifications did require an all-weld metal tensile test in'the as-welded condition.
The vendor (Page) supplied a chemical analysis which is indicative of the material used for filler metal conforming to both the ASTM and SFA specifications for similar types.
Considering the reported chemical analysis, and since there were no reported problems associated with this filler material for elapsed time in service, it was determined that this omission of tensile data had no adverse effect on weldment quality.
Items (4) and (5)
Murex Typ'0 E60S-3 Heat No.
89D627 (.035" diameter) and Type E70S-3 Heat No.
82E317 (3/32" diameter)
The E60S-3 was procured before issuance of TVA Specification PF-1019 and was supplied in accordance with ASME SA-559.
The reported chemical analysis and mechanical properties conform to those specified in the governing specification although there were no CVN tests performed.
The E70S-3 was also procured after the issuance of TVA Specification PF-1019 as noted on the supplier's CMTR.
The CMTR reported chemical analysis of the wire, tensile
- data, and impact data in the stress relieved condition though failing to note
l'A
the temperature at which the CVNs were tested.
The chemical analysis and the mechanical tests conform to the specification requirements for this type material.
Since the material specification required CVNs to be tested at O', it is reasonable to expect that the vendor tested at this temperature.
The reported CVN values conform with those expected for this type material tested at O'.
Based on the reported data from the CMTR, it has been determined that the omission of the test temperature does not have an adverse effect on weldment quality.
Item (6)
Teledyne-McKay Type E308-16 Heat No.
610327 The receipt inspection report (Form 209) was approved but recorded the material as carbon steel instead of stainless steel.
Since the correct heat number was recorded, this appears to be a documentation error and is not considered to have an adverse effect on weldment quality.
Current Practice TVA currently has in place a stringent specification for procurement of welding filler metals.
This specification requires that filler metals be procured to the highest standard of anticipated use.
For example, E7018 is procured with actual chemical and mechanical properties including impact testing to -20'.
This material may then be used in any location in the plant.
This practice ensures that filler metal is tested to conservative requirements.
It is also TVA's practice to perform a review of filler metal CMTRs at receipt inspection and again by the responsible welding engineering group.
AUDIT OF THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AUDIT TVA-02-NO Ke Element 2.0 Ade uac of Desi n Out ut Documents The observation from Key Element 2.0 was reviewed and evaluated by the TVA HP regarding compliance of the issued documents to the requirements of the codes.
This observation is the same as that identified for Construction Key Element 2.0 of Audit TVA-02-OC.
This was to be expected since the same welding procedures and qualification records were used as a basis for the program requirements for Nuclear Operations.
The same conclusion reached for the Office of Construction observation"is applicable.
Ke Element 11.0 Use of A ro riatel Trained and uglified Personnel The HP reviewed the Bechtel audit data for Key Element 11.0 and concurred with the finding.
An additional review on the subject of preweld checks was performed related to an employee concern on the same subject.
An expanded discussion of this finding and the evaluation is below.
h
Part II, section 5.3, paragraph 3.1 of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) required inspections to be performed by qualified individuals other than those who performed or directly supervised the activity being inspected.
The plant instruction, Standard Practice BF-6.2, "Quality Control (QC) of Helding Activities," paragraph 5.3.1 also stated in part "the QC inspector shall perform fit-up inspections and so indicate acceptance by his signature on the weld data sheet."
Contrary to these requirements, fit-up inspections of AHS Dl.l structural welds on safety related equipment were performed by the welding foremen responsible for the work.
In addition, a conflict also existed between Standard Practice BF-6.2 and Process Specification O.C.l.l of Office of Power Procedure N73M2 dated March 9,
- 1983, which allowed the use of welding foremen for fit-up inspections.
Preweld checks of safety-related structural welds have been performed by the welder, welder foreman, or QC in accordance wi th Process Specification O.C.l.l of General Construction Specification G29-C since the time of issuance.
Routine surveillance and inspection of welding have also been performed by the site quality assurance organization in accordance with the NQAM.
Fit-up requirements are currently addressed in Site Director Standard Practice:
(SDSP) 13.1, "Quality Control of Helding."
Standard Practice BF-6.2 is no longer being used on current work instructions involving welding.
The HP determined that preweld fit-up inspections of structural welds have been adequately addressed and implemented by BFN site procedures.
This issue, therefore, does not constitute a deficiency at BFN.
Ke Element 12.0 Use and Control of Weldin Filler Materials The one audit observation was reviewed and evaluated by TVA Engineering.
The audit found that the site's controlling procedure for use and control of welding materials was unnecessarily long and confusing.
Specifically, too many procedures were required to be simultaneously used.
The technical acceptability of welding filler materials was not questioned.
The audit team recommended that TVA consider simplifying the procedures for the use and control of welding filler materials.
This recommendation is considered an enhancement and not a deficiency that would affect weld quality.
Note that BFN has since tak'en action to more efficiently control use,of filler material.
This process is described in SDSP series 13 weld procedures.
NRC UESTION 2 Refer to Section 3.0 of the BFN-Phase II Report, Aptech Engineering Report.
With respect to the review performed by Aptech Engineering Services, provide the following additional information:
Hhy were the welding-related Potentially Reportable Occurrences Reports omitted from the Aptech scope of review?
TVA RESPONSE TVA and Aptech formulated a "scope of review" to address the quality of welding at BFN.
In this formulation, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Notice of Indications (NOIs) were considered the most reliable quality indicators of welding.
- Namely, LERs would show whether there have been any significant failures due. to poor initial quality of'elds.
The rate of generation of NOIs was used as, a direct measure of weld quality.
Potentially Reportable Occurrences (at Browns Ferry, these are called Licensee Reportable Event Determinations (LREDs)) are primarily used to determine reportabi lity under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
Note that LREDs are routinely the administrative precursors to LERs and Conditions Adverse to Quality which are both considered as quality measurement indicators.
n-f
'J l
NRC UESTION 3
Refer to section 4.0 of the BFN-Phase II Report, Browns Ferry welding reinspection report.
The reinspection report indicated among other things that the coatings were not removed during the reinspection of structural welds.
In view of this fact, clarify the following:
a.
Has the intent of the Phase II reinspection not to inspect for cracks?
- b. If so, provide the reason why this was done.
TVA RESPONSE The intent of the BFN reinspection effort was to inspect to the criteria of NCIG-01 "Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria for Structural Welding at Nuclear Power-Plants."
This criteria allows the reinspection of welds for cracks and other attributes through coatings.
This is noted in NCIG-01, Section 3.4.7 as repeated below.
"These acceptance criteria are to be used for the acceptance inspection of welds in the uncoated condition.
These criteria may also be used for subsequent inspections after the welds have been coated with the concurrence of the Engineer.
Subsequent inspections
'related to suspected weldment cracking may require removal of the coating or the use of appropriate magnetic particle inspection."
The BFN reinspection effort is characterized as a "subsequent inspection" to the original acceptance inspection.
The reinspection personnel were instructed to visually examine the coatings for any indication that might indicate a crack in the weld.
The BFN reinspection found no such cracks or suspected cracks.
Although fine cracks cannot be easily detected through paint, it would be expected that any problems would become observable wide cracks due to the length of service.
Therefore, coatings were not removed for the specific purpose of weldment crack inspection.
Paint was removed from approximately 23 percent of the reinspected welds for the other investigations.
The reinspection of these particular welds did not reveal any cracks.
Additionally, from the APTECH review of LER's, the HP found no cracks that were weld quality related.
In summary, the HP has not identified a
generic concern of weld cracking as a result of welding fabrication.
Ir E
NRC UESTION 4 Refer to section 4.0 of the BFN-Phase II Report, Browns Ferry Helding Reinspection Report.
Paragraph 4.8, "Assessment of Reinspection Results,"
among other things states that in the area of instrumentation piping and HVAC supports some welded connections were determined to be unstable for seismic loading.
As a result of this determination, the BFN "Small Bore Pipe Reconciliation Program" and the "Seismic Qualification Program" will include evaluation of structurally significant weld attributes.
Paragraph 4.9, "Root Cause Evaluation and Corrective Action," among other things also states, "TVA is instituting a requirement that weld size,
- length, and location be determined in all programs at BFN that require a walkdown to obtain data for structural evaluation."
In view of this comment, provide the following:
A.
Identify the BFN programs that require walkdown inspections for structural evaluation.
B.
Define the scope of each program as a percent of applicable plant population and identify the extent of the planned walkdown inspection effort for each of these programs (e.g.,
the small bore pipe reconciliation program will look at 10 percent of the small bore pipe, the walkdown inspection effort constitutes 50 percent of the program).
TVA RESPONSE Listed in Table 2
are the major structural evaluation programs from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan (NPP).
The majority of these programs have been previously described to NRC in a series of submittals related to seismic issues.
The program listings are shown with the currently defined percentages related to prerestart planning.
The percentages and details of the programs are subject to change in future submittals on individual topics.
The "size, length, location" guidelines have been incorporated into SDSP-9.8, "BFEP Nalkdown Program and Constructability Surveys,"
and are being instituted into the walkdown programs that were ongoing at the time of the Held Project Phase II Report recommendations.
Other programs, as footnoted, utilized field inspection of welds by QC personnel.
Note also that items 3.3, "Cable Tray Supports" and 3.4, "Conduit Supports,"
were previously evaluated under separate programs.
The programs describing these two particular items have been previously docketed.
Your attention is directed to the footnote comments for the program methodology utilized on individual issues.
~,
TABLE 2 STRUCTURAL PROGRAMS
SUMMARY
NPP PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 3.
1 TORUS MODIFICATIONS 3.1.1 TORUS ATTACHED PIPING 3.1.2 TORUS INTERNAL STRUCTURE COMPONENTS PRERESTART PROGRAM (1)
(2) 100 100 100 100 POSTRESTART PROGRAM (1)
(2)
COMMENTS (3)
(3) 3.2 PIPE SUPPORTS-LARGE BORE 3.3 CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS 3.4 CONDUIT SUPPORTS 3.5 HVAC DUCTWORK SUPPORT 3.6 CRD INSERT L HITHDRANAL PIPING SUPPORT 3.7 'IPE SUPPORTS SMALL BORE 40 100 60 (5)
(5)
(6)
(6) 100 100 100 100 100 10 100 (4)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(4)
(3)
(4) 3.8 DRYHELL STEEL PLATFORM Upper Lower I
3.9 MISCELLANEOUS STEEL 3.10 CLASS II FEATURES OVER CLASS I FEATURES 3.11 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION 3.12 MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL ISSUES
- 3. 12. 1 CAPILLARY TUBING SUPPORTS 3.12.2 CONTROL BAY FLOOR STEEL 3.12.3 REACTOR BUILDING STEEL SUPERSTRUCTURE 100 100 100 100 53 100 47 100 100 100 100 (3)
(11)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(3)
(9)
(9)
TABLE 2 (Cont'd)
STRUCTURAL PROGRAMS
SUMMARY
COMMENTS:
(.1)
PERCENTAGE OF PROGRAM COVERAGE COMPARED TO PLANT POPULATION
( 2)
PERCENTAGE OF PROGRAM POPULATION BEING HALKED DOWN
( 3)
WELDS INSPECTED BY FIELD QUALITY CONTROL (QC)
PERSONNEL
( 4)
REINSPECTION BEING CONDUCTED UNDER SITE DIRECTOR STANDARD PRACTICE 9.8 (SIZE, LENGTH, LOCATION) GUIDELINES
( 5)
SEPARATE EVALUATION PROVIDED EARLIER BY UNITED ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS.
RESULTS PREVIOUSLY DOCKETED.
( 6)
CONDUIT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BROWNS FERRY ENGINEERING INSTRUCTION 8S-02 FOR FUNCTIONALITY
( 7)
COMBINATION QC INSPECTION AND SDSP 9.8 HALKDOWN
( 8)
HALKDOHNS FOR HATER SPRAY INTERACTIONS PRIOR TO RESTART, HALKDOWNS FOR SEISMIC INTERACTIONS AS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE USI-A46
( 9)
SUPPORT OR STRUCTURAL HELDS NOT INVOLVED
(.10)
WALKDOWNS AS REQUIRED BY THE PROGRAM TO RESOLVE USI A-46 (ll)
COMBINATION QC INSPECTION, SDSP 9.8 HALKDOWN AND SPECIAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION INSPECTION NRC UESTION 5 Refer to section 6.0 of the BFN-Phase II Report, Browns Ferry Program Results Subsection 6.6, Recommendations, Item 11 states that supports included within the inservice inspection program shall be examined for support and weld configuration.
With respect to this commitment, clarify the following:
A.
Are integral attachments to pressure containing components included in this commitment?
B.
Define the "weld configuration."
TYA RESPONSE A.
Yes.
Integral attachments are to be included in the inspection program related to the item ll recommendation.
B.
Weld configuration is the verification of the weld design to the "as constructed" condition, i.e.,
the type of weld, location of weld with respect to the joint, length of weld, and size of weld.
ENCLOSURE 2
INSERT FOR ATTACHMENT 4.4 INDEPENDENT MECHANICAL OVERVIEN
4 J
C
~
~
Norcfg Seckner, Hanagaz'A MCldkng Project Oubjectt Metdfng Project Phaae 2, Part R
...Srwnc, terry Refnapectfon of
'Setba5ed Mjidi
~
~
CopL04J R,o A'ontgometg Filo Hoi CRH"2D66 Datet October 24, 29S6 Froei C. Ri Hen'ke Oft RFO/Haterfaia and ~a}f,ty Sarvfcas Departeent At!
SO/2 5/409 Ext, e 4-1466 IHD FBHD RV L
~
~
An independent eutvefiianca of the WA ueidfng pro5ect refnspectfon program at browne Perry'uclear piant vas undertaken during the Meeka of July 7>
2986 through 4ggvat l!t~ 1946i The yos'tfon of the refncpection ovemfeMed by myaelf fneluded pipe Meida f.nepected ueing proeadure Httl-168 - Raiding Project Refnapcctfon of Selected
- teide, and:the TQ Visual Inspectfon,Procedurea NV72 and HYTS Revi 5, Lf.quid Penetrant tnapectfon Procedure HPT2 Rev.
6, and the Radkographfc Exa~fnetfon Prooebure 8RT'1 Rev>
4 for radfography inteq retatfpn.
the otarfkeM of the veld ref.nspectfon fnciudedi i,)
Oe%50fkost'hone of the inspectorai 2)'ae f va16 >fnapection toola.
0)
Co~gance with appif cable proccdureai 4) fba ebccogghneai of the Lnapectiona,
.,~ f)'ha N6foe6ty <<ud oonaiateacy of each f.napector.
6}'a proper see and appkj.catfon of }iqufb penetrant mteriala, 2)'omNoy ot: cedfopapbic jf.Rc, '.nte~retitfon
~
I
- 5) 'heoutacy and repreaentativeneaa of reporta to the actual veMa.
OBSERVE' The pereonnal performing inepectfooe vere cartfGed to ANT SAT VC"'V Level K
for,HDE dxaefnatfona fn 1iquid penetrant
<<nd Mgnekf.c particle, and the.
radiographfc tf)a rcvfev,'he vfauai fnspcctfon peraonnel vera ccrtf.(i.ld to naval KZ ko the equfvaleat of BNI-'Ã-Q..
l4
~ ~
It
~
I ~ ) '
r 86~10~1958 UU'Qt5 6l lh LlkhNSlNU-5t N ZUO Y8J 4111 I".86 Horae>> 5etkAat Fags f bctobar 24)..1966 f'roal Co Kg 5enk>>
Su~b eCtt lleidind I'IO)tee Phtt ~ gt PII'romas Fc rry Ro LnIpet Q05 4 g Se lected Melde
%be inc pe etymon tool s and ma te r Lal e u se d ver e a d equ ite and prapcr to carry out the r equit4IN ins pyOtLone ~
I The Lnapeetora demonstrated an excellent understanding of the applicable prOCedurae and the interdapendenaa
'of HHE-16S and the procedurea>
The ehoroughneee of the inspections and examinstfons vis excellent, vith good aomlsunication betveen team nIembera checking actual observed conditLans against each ethet'5 opinion and against procedure requirements.
Each of the teams fnspactfon methods were uniform and the results of the inspections +are aansf.stant between teams sIId individusls ) in tho cases where there vera second thaught! about a unique condition aad a reinspection vis performed>
the reinspectians confirmed the accuracy of the first activity.
t Visual inspections included 3tIl pipe walds of both stainless aieel, mild'steal and aiuminua Iosteriala.
Ihe mild steel uclds had paint removed prior to reinspecCLoa
{>>arne minor amounts of pafnt remained an some welda and was not considered.detrimental to the inspectLon).
A generLc type filler metal check vas parforoad on all atainlcae steal wc)d material usiag a permanent magrict; ba carbon >>teel velde vere detected in con)unction witb atiinless materials.
%e inapeatiane vere accurate and well documented>
using the required record of visual'Md1d examination report Eorm and supplemented vith sketches'o cloaLhy.. dgget. pcOblem area>>
~
t t
. Ae the oveWievat, there vaa only obe disRgraament vith the visual inspections
{veld fft0~14H) '{Thea amounted to 0,26l of the total).
%e veld vae rejected for not having a 1!3 elope or ea underfill. of veld matcrf,al because of its enoroachment oc a material preparation surface'the veld ahou)d have been re)ected for ever-height (7(26) veld fn one 3(4 Loch area.
Maids the tnepaetoz'a found that ha4 s)ight magnetic abborsaalitiee, though of na concern vera Checked vith a Fisher Ferritcscope
(+pa Fe ea u).
To.
eliminatt any future doubt! concerning veld filler materiala>
the Verriteacope findiege confirmed a21 velda vere vali within tha reqllhemebts for stainlaaa veld:fB,)yv:a%~a 14guid penetrant examination var performed on 258 velds; 66 of these wilds.
rcquirad ft at th'e time of construction.
'Ae rcmsinder had been P'Z'd at the time oi construction even though the inspection was nat required by the code, Vha penetrant examinationa vere dona, to N-PT1 ib a very profeaaional
- manner, and any quaaticnaNe nonrelevant indications vera evs)uated by tha team mambarco hny indicatiob ib doubt vas recleaned and reexamined, Ne penetrant examieatians revealed no re5ecteble velds.
There were several &nor base metal indications detectedi
'?becca vere outside the scape of the original construction ab5 testing.requirements for the specific item ~
I
~t
( 1 Xg t.
A 8,
), J'
Qi I C LiVCI'IQlI'IQ DPI'i COD (CW DLJL Iotas(
~
b Horace Sec%nor Paya )
oetobet 14, 19N From3 Oi lL. Hanke 8ub~ectt Meldinj Project Phase 2, tart 2
5rovns Ferry Reinspection oi Selected Maids A radiographic fii>> reviev (refntexpxetation) for veld quality only vas carried out on 29 of the 00 velds specified in the reviev progra>>.
Ibe fil>>
for one veld (WKC S-110B) had not bean located prior to my departure from brims tan'y>>
- h. TVA bevel Kl (R't) (Myatt Golden) reinterpreted the selected veldt prior to reviewing the orfgfnsl reader sheet.
'fbe reinspection vas consistent vith the orfginal interpretation, both vere conservative and the veld quality complied vith the coda<
Two re)acts vere called that vere sub)ective in nature, a call of porosity (reject} rather than porosity and slag (acceptable),
and an internal 'Foot vith an abrupt dens ity change (x e ject) rather than a filled mismatch (vhich vould be acceptable)
> hll other radiographs had the Meld qua1kty'ntaepg etad; cox rect ly.
Wring the course of the x'adiographic reviev, one veld (TRHRS-2-117) vas found that had tvo sets of film that vere from different velds
~
%a original
- (earliest dated) fil>> vas of the correct veld( and the repair (Rl) radiograph vas of a difterent veld.
%e correct Rl radiograph had not been located p~ior to my departure and reradiography of this veld vas being scheduled at the time of my depax'turc fron SF'.
h second veld (TRHRS-3-l23) had tvo sets oE film shot on different days and of diffexent voids, Both sets had code-acceptable veld qualityi, &0 original (earliest dated) film had lov (light) density but was acceptabl ~ for composite vieving, The second set of film vas darker and vithia code for single fL)>> vieving The film )acket vaa rubber stamped "bonsity Acceptable/
Ne ve14 quality is acceptable for veld joint TRHR8 S-123 and theta is no impact an the veld quality because of this diapatki 1n vie@ of the above tvo discrepancies, a visual comparison of the veld surfaces verylpa tha radiographic image vaa undertakexx fox'5 velds (50 percent saxspli) e The follovL$lg) Folu)lies vare noted) 5 veldt. ~ hy4 g~d confirmation 4 valdl: ~ hjd a jcaaonabla confirmation 5 veldt " pe't of the veld vas confirmabla 1 eaM
~ >> did aot have enough "signatures."
Tn addition to the selected
)0 velds,
'}5 additional zelda vere revievcd an4 all Mate tound to ba correctly interpreted and identkfiedi Were does not
'appear to ba any gabbroic film identification-problem.
Hagnetic part'icle inspection vas carried out on three fex'ritic velds in lieu of PTI
'Ab exaxxinatfons vere performed properly and revealed no re)ectabla vakda>
TOTFIL P.87