ML18031B324

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Commission Paper Providing Sixth Status Rept on Activities in Response to Issue Associated W/Tva.Supporting Documentation Encl
ML18031B324
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/12/1986
From: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML18031B325 List:
References
FOIA-86-639, TASK-PII, TASK-SE SECY-86-001E, SECY-86-1E, NUDOCS 8610280152
Download: ML18031B324 (50)


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POUCY ISSUE (Information)

AD/A

AD/I C/TB C/AB Asst File SECY-86-1E For:

From:

~Sub 'ect:

~Pur use:

B~rr:

The Commissioners Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations STATUS OF STAFF ACTIONS REGARDING TVA To provide the Comission with the sixth status report on activities in response to issues associated with TVA.

I On December 13, 1985, Chairman Palladino directed the staff to prepare periodic written reports sumarizing the major NRC

plans, schedules, and organizational assignments related to all TVA plants.

The staff identified a number of major TVA issues requiring resolution prior to the restar t of any of the TVA reactors and has provided periodic status repor ts'o the Comission, the most recent of which was issued July 15, 1986 (SECY-86-10).

The staff last briefed the Comnission on these issues on June 6, 1986, and stated that TVA expects Sequoyah Unit 2 to be the first 'reactor ready to resume operation.

TVA last briefed the Comission on their activities on March 11,

1986, and briefed the ACRS on July 10, 1986.

TVA submitted Revision 2 to their Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan and Revision 1 to the Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan on July 17,

,1986.

Discussion:

The staff remains heavily comitted to a substantial review and inspection of TVA activities.

Sequoyah Unit 2 is expected to be the first TVA facility to be restarted.

Major TVA and staff activities in the past two months are summarized in the following paragraphs.

I.

Cor orate Activities

Contact:

Hugh Thompson, 492-9595 The staff review of the Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan is essentially complete and the NRC Safety Evaluation

'of the Corporate Plan will be issued within a few weeks.

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The Commissioners 2>>

The TVA Co porate Plan is generally acceptable to the staff, subject to our review of TVA implementation in the coming months.

Conflict of interest issues in connection with TVA's arrange-ments with Stone and Webster,

Bechtel, and others remain unresolved.

The TVA Inspector General (TVA IG) and General Counsel are investigating this matter in response to the U.S.

Office of Government Ethics concerns.

Related to this matter is a reduction in Bechtel staff level effort on the resolution of employee concerns.

The ACRS issued its report on TVA and recommendations to the Commission on August 12, 1986.

The ACRS agreed with the TVA diagnosis of their management

problems, believes that immediate, technical and management issues are being addressed, and provided comments to the staff.

The staff has requested that TVA respond to the ACRS comments and will consider the TYA response in its ongoing review.

TVA responded to the Commission's evaluation of harassment and intimidation (H 5 I)'at TVA on August 15, 1986, providing their response to staff concerns and stating their strong views on prohibiting harassment and intimidation in the workplace.

The TVA IG is investigating the H

E I and wrongdoing issues prior to recemending action by TVA line management.

Additionally, on August 8, 1986, TYA responded to the staff's Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (issued July 10, 1986) regarding certain discriminatory acts.

TVA paid the civil penalty and stated their corrective actions, including Mr. White's strong position against H I I.

The staff is reviewing these responses.

In response to the TVA IG's expressed need to contact concerned individuals directly as part of his investigative process in the H 5 I area, the staff contacted selected concerned individuals in an attempt to establish communications between the individual and the TVA IG.

Arrangements for direct contact between concerned'ndividuals who responded to the staff and the TVA IG are in process.

Selected H 5 I cases have been transferred from the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) to the TVA IG.

OI will monitor the TVA IG's investigation of these issues.

Other recent corporate developments include the resignation of the TVA General Counsel and the Assistant General

Counsel, on

'ugust 19, 1986.

The Deputy General Counsel announced his intent to retire in October 1986.

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The Comnissioners

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Se uo ah TVA submitted Revision 1 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan on July 17, 1986.

As part of that submittal, Mr. ophite stated that TYA expected to complete actions necessary for the restart of Sequoyah Unit 2 earlier than the announced date of January 1987.

The staff believes the TVA target of early November 1986 to be optimistic.

TYA has slipped completion targets for certain issues, e.g.,

employee concerns applicable to Sequoyah and design verification issues.

Also, an increasing

-number of items are forecastto be completed in late September or'arly October and the sheer number of items will probably result in the delay of some.

Sequoyah is receiving priority attention by both TVA and the staff.

Staff resources will be severely impacted in order to complete the number of Sequoyah issues being readied by TVA in a short period.

a or issu re described below:

o Em lo ee Concerns Pro ram On August 29,

1986, TVA submitted their revised program for management of employee concerns received prior to February 1, 1986, including those applicable to Sequoyah.

The first group of Sequoyah employee concerns element evaluation reports was received in early September.

The pacing group of Sequoyah employee concerns involves engineering and design control issues and most of these element reports are not expected before:

early November.

The staff believes the TVA program is generally acceptable but that resolution of many individual issues may impact the Sequoyah restart.

Staff technical review teams are assigned and, in some cases, the staff is reviewing draft documents at the site to stay abreast of TVA progress.

On July 17,

1986, TYA submitted their revised program for management of new employee concerns received beginning February 1, 1986.

The staff believes this program is generally acceptable, subject to our review of TVA implementation in the coming months.

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'VA submitted its Design Baseline and Yerification Program (DBYP) and the staff found the TVA approach generally acceptable.

Staff concerns remain unresolved

The Conmissioners regarding TVA interim criteria for small bore piping and cable tray supports.

TVA is implementing the DBVP and ongoing inspections will continue in September and October.

This item may impact Sequoyah restart, depending on the progress of TVA implementation and the extent of corrective actions.

o

~We 1 din TVA and staff activity in this area is nearing completion.

Notwithstanding their innocuous nature, the number of weld discrepancies found during TVA reinspections (and not identified during the original construction) has led the staff to consider the need for an accelerated completion date for the first 10-year inservice inspection program for both Sequoyah units.

This will further assure the quality of welds in ASHE-scope piping, pipe

supports, and major component supports.

o Technical S ecification Surveillance Re uirements NRC inspection efforts identified deficiencies regarding the adequacy of the licensee's surveillance test program.

TVA acknowledged these concerns and has developed a program to reassess the adequacy of Sequoyah surveillance procedures and their performance.

This program is designed to ensure that surveillance procedures are technically adequate prior to Sequoyah restart.

Due to the significance of this issue, an enforcement conference was held in the Region II office on August 25, 1986.

As part of the NRC emphasis in this area, additional inspection is scheduled during October.

o Containment Isolation Valves During a recent inspection at Sequoyah, the staff found that valves in the reactor coolant pump seal injection lines and an RHR return line may not provide adequate assurance of containment isolation in certain accident situations.

TVA and the staff are evaluating the adequacy of the isolation provisions to determine if any corrective measures are required prior to restart.

This configuration also exists at watts Bar,'nd may exist on other similar Mestinghouse facilities.

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Watts Bar Based on informal discussion with TVA, Watts Bar Unit I is not expected to be ready for licensing before May 1987.

P~acin as are expected to be TVA completion of the Design Vaseline and Licensing Verification Program, reanalysis of piping and

supports, and resolution of em lo ee concerns.

Formal schedules regar i ar e no een received and the

'submittal date for the Watts Bar portion of the Nuclear Performance Plan remains uncertain.

TVA also believes their inability to hire sufficient contract personnel may result in delays to their internal schedules.,

Major issues are described below:

o Desi n Baseline and Licensin Verification Pro ram To address and reconcile various problems related to design control and licensing issues at Watts Bar, TVA is developing a comprehensive Design Baseline and Licensing Verification Program (DBLVP).

TVA met with the NRC staff on August 21, 1986, to discuss their proposed program which fs being created to supplement and confirm the effectiveness of existing design, construction, and licensing processes.

TVA intends to confirm that

'icensing,

design, and construction activities appropri-ately implement requirements and that Watts Bar 1 is ready for power operation.

This includes verification of licensing comnitments, design bases, design documents, construction, and configuration control.

The staff is in general agreement with the TVA approach; however, review of the docketed program and inspection of implementation remains to be accomplished.

TVA schedules and milestones for this effort are not definite but the program is extensive and may be the pacing item to licensing.

o Em lo ee Concern Pro ram As'iscussed under Sequoyah

issues, changes to the employee concern program have been made and TVA is in the process of evaluating Watts Bar concerns.

The level of effort by TVA contractor staff personnel has been impacted by conflict of interest and contractual matters between TVA and Bechtel.

Periodic inspections of TVA progress are ongoing.

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~Wel din TVA continues to reinspect welds at Watts Bar.

Although their data is incomplete, TVA expects to expand the scope of the weld inspection effort in the structural area by about 1200 components and is evaluating the need for further expansion in different population groups on the basis of discrepancies found in the initial sample (the initial sample involved about 1700 components in various systems).

TYA is expected to respond to staff questions regarding the Watts Bar program within the next few weeks.

The Region 1

NDE van has been onsite, and staff and consultant inspections of TVA weld activities are ongoing.

o TC Em lo ee Concern Records The staff completed the screening and expurgation of ETC employee concern files and has transmitted expurgated files to the TVA 1G.

Details of this effort are being provided separately to the Commission.

IV.

Browns Ferr TVA submitted the Browns Ferry portion of the Nuclear Performance Plan on August 28, 1986, and an initial staff review is in progress.

Although no TVA schedule for Browns Ferry restart is available, TVA stated that Unit 2 is expected to be the first unit to be ready (sumner 1987).

The staff will meet with TVA at the Browns Ferry site in mid-September to coordinate the staff review and inspection schedule with TVA.

Na)or issues are described below:

o Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRA The staff met with TVA regarding the (undocketed) draft PRA performed by TVA and their contractor in the early 1980s.

TYA and the staff agreed to a plan and schedule for review of the draft PRA and the additional TVA analysis needed to establish the severe accident characterization of the facility.

TVA and the staff will meet periodically to discuss

status, progress, and direction of the additional analysis.

A final report on the severe accident characteristics will be submitted prior to the restart of any of the Browns Fer ry Units.

On August 15,

1986, TVA was requested to provide the draft PRA for staff review.

This effort is consistent with, and will support the NRR initiative on improvement of BWR containment performance.

The, Conmissioners w7 o

Confi uration Mana ement/Desi n Control All but a few facility moNfications have been suspended pending system walkdown and verification that the design drawings reflect the as-built plant components.

Walkdown activities for the baseline program which had been suspended pending review of procedures, are expected to resume in September.

Delays in this program, in turn, could impact some modifications and the program to revise operating and surveillance procedures.

The whole base-lin'e program is being reevaluated for purpose and depth, and TVA has not briefed the NRC staff on the Browns Ferry program.

~il 11 I Staff mandated (Generic Letter 84-11) inspection for intergrandular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in Unit 2 recirculation system piping found a number of nozzles with numerous crack indications.

TVA is considering options for replacement or permanent weld overlay and will meet with the staff prior to submitting a recomnended course of action for staff review.

The reinspection of other system piping and structural welds is near completion.

The staff is planning on a team inspection of the current TVA activities in about two months.

o Fire Protection Representatives of NRR, IE, and RII met with TYA personnel at the Browns Ferry site in late June to review the modifications and actions proposed by TVA in early 1986 to meet Appendix R requirements.

While the general concept appeared reasonable, the NRC staff requested that TYA submit additional documentation regarding the fire hazards analysis combustible loadings calculations for each area and manual operations that would be required to support shutdown.

The staff is continuing to evaluate the fire protection program, Fire protection could be a

limiting issue for startup if TVA's request for specific exemptions cannot be found acceptable.

o Dr ell Penetration and Cables Replacement of three drywell electrical penetrations to meet Eg requirements was scheduled to start:the week of August 25, 1986.

This could be a critical path item if

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~,rN The Commissioners replacement penetrations are not delivered on schedule.

All safety-related drywell cables are being replaced with qualified cable.

This work has not started pending

. approval of and training on procedures that meet TYA specifications.

Conclusion Although TVA targets for completing critical actions and submittals have continued to slip at Sequoyah, the staff believes that a scheduled restart date of January 1987 appears achievable.

Staff resources will be strained to assure timely and comprehensive review of TYA activities and submittals in the next few months.

Where activities at other TVA facilities have progressed sufficiently to allow meaningful staff review, the staff has comnitted the necessary resources to facilitate prompt evaluation and feedback to TYA.

The staff is currently conducting normal inspection activities at all of the TVA facilities and conducting special inspections or reviews of particular TVA issues, as described above.

- Nore information on activities will be provided in subsequent reports.

ctor Ste lo, Js:

Executive Director for Operations

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TASK ASSIGNMENT SHEET BELLEFONTE PROGKQ1S SECTION E

ngineer Info Only Principal Engineer for Task To Assist Principal Engineer Review and Comment RELATED DOCUHENTATION Attached Q/ Yes

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DATE DUE

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'CDRAFT:

I 9/26/8 10/4/83 BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1

AND 2 CABLE BEND RADIUS PROBLEMS INTRODUCTION

~~

Multiple NCRs have been initiated concerning violation of the minimum bend radius for installed power cable at Bellefonte Nuclear Plant as specified zn construction specification G-38, "Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts Inclusive."

A review of all NCRs associated with cable bend radius, discussions with appropriate electrical engineers and study of other associated materials als, i.e., standards, construction specifications and NRC reports, was made to gain insight into this problem'.

PROBLEM TYPES The following categories of cable bend radius problems were noted:

1.

Cables routed in cable trays.

2.

At points of transition from cable tray to conduit or equipment.

3.

Cables pulled through'or into condulets and pull boxes that allow insufficient cable bend radii.

4.

Cables entering and terminated within electrical equipment t'erminal boxes or housings.

DISCUSSION Cables installed in the Bellefonte cable tray system have an inherent problem becau cause the cable tray system was installed with all 12-inch fittin s.

These fi g

he e fittings limit the minimum bending radius of the cables'>fielded power cable larger than 1-inch in diameter could likely violate minimum bending radius criteria as specified in construction specification G-38.

Also vertical drops or riser from the cable trays are made with the Z43269.02

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~able bend exceeding th minimu~ bending g adius.

NCRs, 2330, and 2331 s

document this deficiency.

To resolve this problem the cable manufacturers

~re'requested to give their recommendations.

In most cases the requirements as specified in construction specification G-38 were relaxed.

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~e following instructions were supplied to CONST: <~For the BLN installed shielded power cable and the on-hand shielded power cable yet to be installed from Okonite Company and Collyer Insulated Wire, the minimum training radius by cable size is as follows:

BLN SHIELDED POWER CABLES (V5 Level)

Cable Manufacturer 2/0 AWG 4/0 AWG 300 MCM 400 MCM 500 MCM Okonite Company 4.94 5.43 5.84 6.38 6.89 (4.4 x cable OD)

Collyer Insulated Wire (8.0 x cable OD) 9.10 N/A N/A N/A The a

he above tabulated values are acceptable at BLN regardless of where

@e ~trainin radius occurs (e.gtt in standard cable tray fittings, in xpnstandard manufactured cable tray fittings, in transitions from tray to tray or tray to conduit, in conduit boxes, in cable wireways, in electrical equipment, etc.).

These values are based on information provided by the wspective cable manufacturer.

Z43269.02

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The above information is uoted quo ed from R.

M. Hodges'emor um to L. S.

Cox dated July 28,

1983, "B

efonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Minimum standalone quality xnformatxon" memorandum.

This is a misuse of "quality information" memorandum which apparently violates

~ DES-EPs 1.28, 1.50, and 3.04.

R.

M. Hodges wa d

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ges was in ormed of this misuse ble Bend R

, ~ le, Bend Radius for Installing Insulated Cable" (EEB 830729 925)

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reworked to meet the acceptable criteria.

training cables without violating minimum bend radii are reworked.

This rework may be only to the equipment, such as moving terminals, etc.,

or

~fdxng larger or new compartments.

NCRs )196,

1439, 1703,
2053, 2103,

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Cooney s memorandum dated August 23,

1983, "Use of Memorandum to j

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convey Design Information Apparent Violation of Procedures" (ESB 830823 l'4).

In cases where relaxation of cable bend radius is not obtained from

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en cannot e Justified, the cable is

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2154, 2297,
2308, 2345,
2372, 2410, and 2446 are in this category.

relaxation of bend requirements apply in this case w ere applicable.

h NCR 2189 was initiated to d o document exceeding cable minimum bending radius for electric motor leads.

EEB wrote letters to v ers o various e ectric motor

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~nufacturers with a TVA proposed criteria derived f th rom t e requirements of table 2-1 of NEMA PCS-1976 for a minimum bending radius for motor leads in 5e main terminal box of class lE motors.

The manufacturer's recommendations were re uested.

IIn general, the motor manufacturers were Z43269.02

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~, not aware of the conduct c or and cable size used to feed p

r to electric actors.

Sometime larger size cable is used to pr o prevent excessive voltage dr'op >to the motor, it is therefore TVA's responsibility to state size of terminal box required for each motor individually.

The terminal boxes for

~dium voltages are almost always adequate because the ve d

e ven or is required to supply boxes large enough for stress cones Low volta t

1 ow vo age terminal boxes are the main concern.

TVA must handle the terminal box size requirement in a controlled design

document, i.e ~, design standard etc At present pere 1s no ex> sting criteria approved except for

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s an a one quality information" memorandum (EEB 830718 928) from F.

W. Chandler to R.

M.

edges dated July 18, 1983.

This memorandum was endorsed to CONST for use as design criteria on July 25, 1983 (BLP 830725 039).

NOTE:

This again is '

misuse of "QI" memorandums and violates EN DES>>EPs 1.28, 1.50, and 3.04.

Relaxation of the cable There are multiple condulets and pull boxes used in cable installation at Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.

Cable pulled in many of th many o

ese may exceed the recommended minimum bend radius of the cable.

ben requirements per cable manufacturer's recommendations is utilized d

Were possible.

Also, a computer program is being developed to verify correct installation.

All cable installations with condulet and pull box size are entered in this program.

B'llefonte is in the process of collecting data

&r thxs program, which will classify the installation as a go, no go, or p.'obable.

The probables will bear investigation.

Data has already been collected and run for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

There were less than

.5 p:rcent "probables" all others were " o "

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.A cable bend radius task f ask force has been organized to study the cable bend I. red>us problem.

This task force consist f t 1

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wo e ectrical staff engineers fran EEB, one each from Bellefonte and Watt B

D a

s ar esxgn and one each from

~lie'fonte and Watts Bar CONST.

Their respo

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eir responsi i ity is to review and make recoaxnendations concerning the problem of bl m o ca e exceeding minimum bend radius.

It is apparent that mostt problems concerning medium voltage are being dispositioned adequately.

The task fore h

orce as just egun to study low

~ltage cable bend radius.

Walkdown downs ar b

owns are eing performed to locate problems that ma not be doc umented.

Also inspectors are present during cgble installation to document installation.

EEB is developing a new'esign standard DS-E12.1.5, "Hinimum Radii for Pield Installed Insulated Cable Rated 15,000 volts or Less," which will

@dress cable bend radii. It will cover transfer of cable and

~eczfications for cable for Bellefonte and Watts Bar because of the 12-inch radius tray system.

It will 1 also cover design criteria information deviously transmitted to CONST hy "stand 1

s an a one quality information"

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~randums.

EN DES-SEP 83"08, "Identification E

i ica x.on, Evaluation, and Resolution of Cable Bend Radius Problems at Watts Bar and Bellefont N

1 Pl n

e uc ear Plants, was issued on August 4, 1983.

This SEP establishes a program for identifying, valuating, and resolving cable bend radius bl

'us pro ems or eviations from the d

cable bend radius valVes specified in con t t'ns ructxon specification C-38.

Z43269.02

C..Ahe cable bend radius fore orce developed an implementi procedure, "OEDC Program to Identify, Evaluae, and Resolve Cable Bend Radius Problems at MBN I

~d BLN" (EEB 830805 929).

The contents of this program are incorporated in EN DES-SEP 83-08.

This Program identifies cabl b

bl i ies ca es y cable mark number, cable size, and cable diameter, and gives the bend d'n ra ius required by Construction Specification G-38.

To determine the d

e egree o

cable bend bl radius problem of each category an inspection

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n samp ing) program is to be conducted on BLN Unit 1.

The results are to be ev 1

t d d

o e eva uated and resolutions recommended to problem areas at HLN and WBN.

CONCLUSIONS During the course of this stud the foll y,

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owxng questions and concerns remained unanswered:

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rowns Ferry Nuclear Plants; being investigated for items in cate ories 2

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n 4P,It is apparent that as many problems would not exist for the cable tray systems because of the use of 18-inch radius fittin s g

There was no crater@a xn existence for motor

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leads at the time of construction for Sequoyah and Browns Ferry.

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~ i Bar...xs being xnvestigated parallel with Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Watts,~

concerning this problem.

To verify " ualit r

y "q elated and associated" cable worlsjpreviously II II

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installed walkdowwns and sampling inspections are to be conducted, especially for low voltage and other cables.

Apparently the installation of medium voltage cables is well in hand.

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parently lacks documented ins on by CONST due to a misinterpretation of G-38.

Regulatory Guide 1.74 interprets

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,"associated" cable as being equal to full class lE cabling when it is

)installed in class 1E cable trays.

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Once cable insulat'on has been stressed by over bending, what method f'ther than meggering is there to assure that the cable has not been

'>'f' deteriorated?

Mill overstressing increase the effect of radiation?

(4) The Ok

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he Okonite Company letter to F.

W. Chandler dated June 7

1983 on 1

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contract 79K5"82-5903 (EEB 830610 014) indicates that incomplete slippage may cuase wrinkles in the tape but does not indicate that incomplete slippage may cuse the tape to tear.

RECOMMENDATION (1) Several ins tan ances of misuse of QI memorandums were noted.

Evidently, II II N DES"EP 1.50 is subject to being misinterpreted.

We recommend zevxsxon of EP 1.50 to prevent misuse by interpretation.

Also, an HCR apst be issued to document previous misuse of "QI" memorandums.

There is no inspection sampling quantity indicated.

The sampling p xng gantxty should be at least based on standard. statistical methods be '

unde part of the SEP 83-08.

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item's related to tl installation su h

a son suc as, motor WIWIWa~r C

~ops from cable trays, etc

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leads, condulets,

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~i (4) Construction Specification G-38 does not distinguish between pulling bend radius and training bend radius.

G-38 should be revised to explain pulling and training bend radius even though the value may remain the same.

REFERENCES (1) G-38 "Constructi struction Specification for Installing Insulated Cables Rated

+ to 15,000 Volts" (2) EN DES-SEP 83-08 Identification, Evaluation, and Resolution of Cable

~nd Radius Problems at Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants" (3) Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants - "Implementation Procedure for the Identification, Evaluation, and Resolution of Cable Bend Radius problems"

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Deacriptioa ot Lief~Ciao ~code Dee etandard IS-l13.1.2 "

ia kedLI for'PuIILig 'Ln Conduit", !idea'niniaLac bend radii for yawing cable.

Caa ve iaterpreC thie Co~ Chat

~after Che ~IJt'-La the ~[sask CRS'dover radLL caa be'50 percent oX the puXILag CadH>>

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CXNT Eagr ià OK5 Xagr Date

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Required Date Dzaviaga Affected I 5-15-79

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Prefect Manager Da e 79052S>03O6 Engineering @coign Diapoeitioac hfte?'be cable haa been d it'ehall be sap veo5az 0~

aaible to use a eLinicam tie dovn raine ot..50 percent of the pulling?tdII.

Po? additional dance for bending cable at te?ainal ecIuLDJtent, follov eJDJLp-aJent cnnufactu?c?

a ?eccenJendatioo aa deacribed in aectlan 2<<R>>6 of 0 38<<

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~ah and Watts Bar Deal~ Pco3ecta

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c>r'j" pleaae refer to aub)ect DIR, 'Ihcrnas B. Horthern> Jc.< to R. I(. Pierce dated hpcll 30'979 (le 790130 lie) ~

'Ihe refecenoed DIR la related to the ainiaLan bendlsn2 radii of Lnaulatadl3acketed

cable, vhen being forged foc terklnatlcn Ln j~icn bclea and cabinets, oc bell+ clod dorm

~

r cables have been pulled.

hftec fur ev ua crl o tbe tr radius of cable, m have detacalned the reccmended values of Insulated Cable Enginaers haaoclatim (ICKh) are applicable.

She training cadLua la the alninana to which a cable +~be bent vithout ttnalcn on the cable.

Engineering Design DLSpooltlcxl ($8 Mi~22 45)

Ls revLaed to read as deaccibed belay) pl~ attach this cevlsim to yolr original DIR-W. B-9, vhich should be aarkad revtaicm l.

~ applicable Insulated Cable Inglneera haaoclaticn (ICEh) training cadii for insulated cables ls aa follarar Q~sn. the ccecpleted cable dl~r foc shielded penner cables (togo ~ pQMcr cables)

~

Cable training radii foc ocher 600 volta or l~ cables depend cn Inaulatlcn thickness and trail cable diffl Ir. ( p~ppSIY1OH EXHIBIT s'able tray fittirs)e at I(BN are provided vith a 12-Inch r lus. before, cables can be 'trained'o not be less than the above r 11 before tying g.

then dcam in cable tray.

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~ t TennE:sscc Valley A51tl)n) ity 400

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IIC326 I'nft>fvi 1 1 c a TM 3? 901 Sublrct:

TIt'A Contracts 74C?-850ri9-2 72C?-75228-1

Dear Hr. Chandler:

Regardinlr, your lettE;r dat<<<l Oc'rober 27,

3982, cnncerninI., the referenced contracts fur cable incorrectly installed af tlIc VATES IEAR NUCI.IihR PLANTS, ua Ceul that, in order to attain optimum service life, !visit voitaae shietded never cable should be installed in strict conformance uith the

~

minfmuR b ddinn radius guidelines that are d~eined in tha ICEA standards","

which were dcvelopf.d hy l<nowleflpeable cable engineers h Ised upon viable historical data.

Any devintio>> from this r<<fercncefl estab3ished practice

.would, in our opinion, sl)o):ten tl)e service life of the cable.

cnu3d To the best of our hno)13ed);e, tl)ere is currently no real viable t t

h e

cs t at cnu effectively sir5553atu the op<<rating cor!ditions of those cahl<>stalled at tlI>> 15'ATTS IJ5)'uclear pl;Ints.

Mi thout thi., il)fur~ation, Vlmtltd.on 5 we would be unable tn nrcflict th<<actual i>>pac) on the cab3e's service life, as a result of your refercncf d inst allatio>> cn>>clition.

e rc);rot tl)at we cannot be of any furthtr 'Issistance in this area.

Very trulv yours,

/cb cc:

W.

Zel)e TRltdbcl.)'.

5'5.'C, I'NC.

r rue)'eter P.

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Gg4, dent 1 caen l This is tn%eply to your lettrr regarding cable lnstallat)ons at the )tatt5 bar and S>>lie fonte Nuclear Ilants.

Your lettl r addr>>ss<

s some eoneern osf r th<< fact that so>!le of th>> bends vhere cables liass tlirou))i co>>dulets may

)se lea ~ ah thor eo r d tl

~ la nr ~ a lrcA sl e f e t'

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your ))svewttqat)uns

)sttafa'onfxr)tsc)1 L)i>> fJct t)s4t halmr Isa nds arl ~

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5) ec)! li d and you hi>>>> so)It>> conca tli LIIJL fu).uta moaf>>mi l.t and svtt lnl o L)ir c iblas may c)usv add) t)nnal

>><<4>>f)s <<)n t)>>

4 <<d)ng rvdi).

hf'alar J) ti'I )n h) tv ta'. t )till 5ucla lli~

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ree tendril>>n t en art!en!eat!

~lh..r otssance an sat)s actor>

5eraf)ce 1)fa.

Oablcs vn)ch do not confairm tn

~<si ~K8aaaons fata bc subject to es>>chan)cal fore>>5 vhich could affccL Lerfortaanc>>.

Obv)ouslys each cahl>> )ystvm I as its ovls charactrr)htlc 1

a t t o and ol 'tl I co dr i.

hach ge ad!tao lie toft ct i Ll

'nfonaat)ond ve do not fl'el that vl can su)a'ly )nfurnat)on r JJrd)llg sllcrts na d Cable

1) fe nar Can Ve ident) fy any I~rtreulor mrel Jn) Smi I >> Vill.'e fJl I alta could ta'k>>

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lf t'il. cal;les arc noL s)sielJ<<d.

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CORPORA T IC7~

421 Ridge Steel Rome, New Yoik 13440 Tetephone 3 f5f'337-3000 popes alice TWX 510I2 November 12 1982 EEH

'82 ill.5 Tennessee Valley Authoxity 400 Nest Summit Hill Drive, WBC126 Knoxville, TN 37902

'ATTENTION: Yx F ~ M. Chandler, Chief, Electrical Engineering Support Branch Mr. Kent Brown Electrical Engineering Suppoxt Branch Gentlemen:

In reply to your latter of October 27, 1982 ther'e is reason to expect your "

installation using less than the minimum training radius and bending radius'or medium voltage powex cables, as recommended by ZCEA, would have a shorte, service life than an installation that met the ICEA bend radius standards Mechanisms that would cause a shorter life would involve the following.

Damage to the metallic shielding tape causing reduced conductance, separation of'he extruded insulation shield from the insulation causing voids where ionization could take place, electrical stress plus increased physical stxess (tension) in thc outcr ocriphcry of the cable at the band, electrical stress plus incxeased physical stress (compression) at the inner circumference of the bend.

'.A?3. of the above negative factors would be increased by the load cycling which would occur during the life of the cable Kent Bro en of youx office advised mc on November 9th, 1982 that the cable

~ involved is a

2Q/

with a bending radius of 10 ~ 9 tines the dianeter of the cabl rather than the 12 times the diameter of the cable as scecified by ICEA.

The negative effects on this cabala.~M ba.zgnsiderably less than the effects o.>

the Ql add cable oith a bend~En tidaos'-:od'M2 times the diameter of the cable as described in your letter trul~ yours, I

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3790l lt5&TCNs: ) >

Chief, tee crlcal Engineering Support branch Dear Nr+ Chacdler<

Zf there i~ anything additional you require, please

advise, Wry~ly yours,

~~kccetlon rzlgineer Jan >de 1/6/83 AC ilSG cc:

IQD6 V

6 CW Qfer to your letter o! hooch So, ]902 concerning the training radius ot ~ LV fewer cable, gee installetice of the alee 1/0 ace cable at an installed bend radius ot 10 g t&ees the cable CO rather than tbe afnlnLec re~Sad bending radius ot 12 tines tbe cable CO should nance eo ascertainable difference ln cable

~erotica life+

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June }], ]985 CLASS ]E G/BLS lEND R2Q)IQS ss HERBS Report No. I-56 06-~g-0]

Starting in ]973 an evolutionary process chtracterisis cable bend radius te%uirements in TVh epecificationa.

Present sptcificatioh.re%uir~snts azo based on sainilua va]ues specified by cable manufacturers or,)y lCEA atandards o

Xn sofke i'ns'tances g these va]ues have peen pio]ate4 e

non cphfo~ing COnditiOas identifie4 vithin the tVh qA proVam.

Eased on recent atudies and by utilisimg recognised cahle properties, ve believe that the cable bead radii issue should not affect restart

~

Our rationale is provided belov.

furthermore, ve believe that tbis approach vill Provide a 40-year qualified life for the vast slajority. of our cab]e, I

c basis for our approach st~a from the fact that the property <>retention of e]ongation" of cable insulation ie th<<<<epted aethod of ~easgzfng (an4 establishing) the end of life in cables, Typical cable insu]ation aateriala have unaged elongation properties vhich wary from 2SO to S00 percent.

Tt ie accepted that after thermal aging, aacbanica]

stress, radiation, and postu]ated accident env iron@:ent, elongation proper t J cs degrade to a degree depending on t'..: sp~c. insulation material.

k cab]e bent to a given radius produces an elongation stress on the outer surface of its insulation.

This can be calculated.

h cab]e having a bending radius of one times its dieter has an elongation stress pf 33 Percent.

This stress has been shown to have a ainor effect on the qualified life of the cab).e Our analysis vill shou that foz the vorst-case (minima a1]ovab]e) cable bending radius (one'inea its outer di,cueter),

the zesultisg stress jzc-t5a bead radius ril'. not a"...". the gualifisf e o: t "e cable, Qc strongly believe that tbi ~ analysis ri]1 conclusively shov that cables hare a qualified l&e of at least

$ 0 years vith the past aajotity qua]ified for 40 years, vcrst-case bending rad:.:~ vas based on (he fact. ths cable installa:ion io cpndulecs vitbia a conduit system sub)acta a cable to the ssaallest pessib]e radius.

Hindu+ bend radius vithin each condulet sire ra ~

determined.

Gondu]ct radii vas then established for each safety-related conduit installation at

%BR, Out of approximate]y ]0,$00 conduits all had radii greater than ].5 tfaes the diameter of any installed cable.

practica] ly apeaking kt is v ery 41 fficu]t to bend a cable to lass than one tines the cab]e outside dimctez

~

k survci'llsoce programma:ril] bc estab]ished to detect and corzect deviations to this ner ainimva bend requiremant in locations outside the racevay sy!

ea> specifically vi th tc tuating coeLpsrcmcnc

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Semor dun 9 'd,

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8

References:

I. L V. Mlitt s memorandum to B+ Ho Pierce dated July 9$

1985 ((gl 850709 05O),

R..N. Pierce's memorandum to R. M. %bitt dated Ju)y 8, 1985 (f01 850708 504),

TENNESSEE VALEEY A

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~

I s aevxev Qroup, T16c Ea-C (2) 1}iractor of Nucl ear Rngireering,

%1 2 Ak 2 C-K Dune 18, 1986 B43

'86OS o9 9ZZ

'ECT: ~TTS~t NUCLEAR PLANT (MSN) - INVESTIGATION OF AN EMPLOYEE CONCERq REQARDINC CABLE ROUTING )

INSTALLATIONp AND INSPECTION NUCLEQt SAFETY REVIEW STAFF RSPORT MO. I 85,, DS MBN This is to supplement R,

H Pierce's memorandum (refereace 2 above) vjtg regard to the cable sidcvall Pressure issue.

hNE instituted the folloving

~ actfons to evaluate the effect of excessive tensions aad sidevs11

%carin pressures (GAMP) oa cables.

e s

earing Ca le P ilia Fozce I-MBH-02

~ ~

A esxga calcu'1:t'or t: dc:tcrnioe'the acceptability of SMPs exerted oa Class lE cables ia existing conduit installations st watts Ssr Nuclear Plant vas initiated fo11oved by a eampliag program involving approximately 10,400 conduits>

Screening calculations tRefereace MBH Document "Sjdevall Pressures of Class lE Cables ia Conduita" (343 850310 935)} reduced'the a@aber of conduits to 1914 vhich vere considered potential csndi'dates for high sjdavall bear.'ng pressure.

Prom these 1914 coaduits, s field inspection team consisting of OZ>

OC>

sad PA/+,personnel conducted a

valkdova of. 778 oo=dujts to determine the worst-cases end selected 82 coaduits for snaiys js, The 82 conduits consisted of approx jma<ely 20 conduits each frea voltage levels Y

Y3s Y4 and Y5.

Conduita from voltage level Vl vere not considered as ther~ are no Class 1E cables in voltage leve1 Yl,

%seed oa the isometric sketches furnished by hJ COB for routing of these 82

conduits, tens joa snd SMP calculations vere perfor ed analytically for each cable to determine the vorst"case SMP.

The cs1culated 8QPs vere compared

<<ith the SMP ljaics recommended in the construction specification C-38m

?t vss noted Chat 21 cables kn 12 of the 82 conduits exceeded tbe SMP limits.

The TYh Central Laboratories performed extensive tests on the above 21 samples in sddit jc> to representative samples selected from SgN/

/PHD SLH nuclear pover plants to include djfhereat cable trpes (pover, control signal end instrument ion) aad coaxial) ) types of insulation, jacket materials and manufacturers.

These tests established allovsb]a SWP 1+j,ts fa excess of that required vjthin margin.

TVA test resu1ts are also consistent vith EPRI Report Ho, EL"3333 vhere allovablc vere determined to be 4. 5 t&es higher than previous manufacturers'jm its,

0 ~

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Ri L Ieiberling June 18<

19B6 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR, PLANT (MBH) - ZHVESTIGATION Oi'H BHPLOYEE CONCERN REGhRDIHQ CABLE ROU'XIHGy INSTALLATIONy h+tP QtSPKCTIOH NUCLEAR SAFQ7'f REVIEW STAFF REPORT NO' 85"06 WSN The test vas performed in a fixture containing four 90'orizontal bends was set up and cables vere pulled through the conduit, vith tension forces freya 2 to 12 times more than the recommended values in Q-38.

The csbles vere subjected to pulling tension values very near the ultimate breaking strength of cable.

Each cable, after being pulled,

@as inspected, dimensioned, carefully stripped to examine individual conductors of multi-conductor cable and sub)ected to dielectric breakdo~ test

~

The dielectric breakdown values of the tensioned cable vis co'%pared vith the dielectric breakdown value, of the virgin cable o! same sample The average dielectric breakdown value of all the 32 cables tested +as vithin 20 percent of the average dielectric breakdown value of the respective a'irgin cable sample>

thus meeting the acceptance criteria set for the test per hSZN D 149, Further>

none of the cables revealed.

any significant degradation of

'insulation.

The results of the test are presented in the 'Cable Side@all Bearings Pressure Tests'eport prepared by the Centra1 Zaboratories of the

'V/A, 4ated May 30, 1986 (EI3 860604 001),

It is noteworthy that the results reflect extreme conservatism as the cables vere subjected to SMPs far higher than the values normally zecowendcd,

.y 'ca'. Values obt i"..c".l vere'.

600V Contxol and Pover Range of Teat Value ~

lb ft 2027 602 Present G-38 Va1i ea a

300 300 8 kV Fover 3104 2889 300 300 Ina trumenta tion 1'96 447 100 100 Coax 1242 373-100 100

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~VhT NUN.EAR ?Lh8T (VBH) - THYESTIOATIOH OE'N EHPLOYSE CONCERN REChlLDZNG CABLE ROUTING, INSTALLATIONS hHD KNSPECTIOH - NUCLEAR SkjETY RZVT&t BTAP8 EXPORT NOy 4 B56 MBH

~ F Aa evidenced by the calculation end the, SMP teat, it ie clear tbat excess Pulling tensions and SMPe on cables did not cause any damage to the cab)e iaeulition and ao ie not and abou1d not be i concern fox Matte Ber Nuclear flint<

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