ML18031A779
| ML18031A779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 03015165, Browns Ferry |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1986 |
| From: | Hosey C, Weddington R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18031A777 | List: |
| References | |
| 30-15165-86-01, 30-15165-86-1, 50-259-86-26, 50-260-86-26, 50-296-86-26, IEIN-86-020, IEIN-86-022, IEIN-86-023, IEIN-86-024, IEIN-86-042, IEIN-86-043, IEIN-86-044, IEIN-86-046, IEIN-86-20, IEIN-86-206, IEIN-86-22, IEIN-86-23, IEIN-86-24, IEIN-86-42, IEIN-86-43, IEIN-86-44, IEIN-86-46, NUDOCS 8609230353 | |
| Download: ML18031A779 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1986026
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/86-26,
50-260/86-26,
50-296/86-26
and 41-08165-09/86-01
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N38 A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,
50-296
License Nos.:
and 30-15165
and 41-08165-09
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
3
Inspection
Conducted:
u
21 - 25,
1986
A
Inspector:
R.
E.
Wed ing
n
Date Signe
Approved by:
C.
.
o ey,
S ction
ie
Division of Radiation
S fety and Safeguards
Date
igne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
involved 36 inspector
hours onsite
in the area of followup on previous
enforcement
matters;
followup on nonroutine
events;
management
controls;
control
of radioactive
material; facilities
and
equipment; transportation;
and
IE Information Notices.
Results:
Four violations were identified:
(1) excess
water in
a resin liner
transferred
for disposal,
(2) failure to properly
prepare
shipping
papers,
(3) failure to retain radioactive material receipt
documents
and
(4) failure to
lock a High Radiation area
doo11.
8609230353
ADOCK
0
59
-.8
W PDR
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
R. L. Lewis, Plant Manager
A. W. Sorrell, Site
Radcon Supervisor
D.
C. Nims, Superintendent,
Technical
Services
R.
D. Schulz,
Compliance Supervisor
J.
M. Corey,
Radcon Spervisor
R. H. Albright, Radcon Supervisor
H. N. Crowson,
Radcon Supervisor
D.
C. Smith, Chemistry Supervisor
R.
D. Puttman,
Power Stores
Supervisor
D. S. Hixson, Radwaste
Supervisor
H. S.
Dean,
Power Stores
J.
M. Reagan,
Power Operations
Training Center
L. S. Richardson,
Site Licensing
M. J.
May, Site Licensing
D. R. Thacher,
Nuclear Services
NRC Resident
Inspectors
G.
L Paulk, Senior Resident
Inspector
C. A. Petterson,
Resident
Inspector
C. Brooks, Resident
Inspector
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included technicians,
craftsmen,
public
safety officers and office personnel.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on July 25,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated
in Paragraph
1 above.
The following items
were
discussed
in detail:
( 1)
an apparent violation for excess
water in a resin
liner transferred
for disposal
(Paragraph
4.a);
(2)
an apparent violation
for failure to properly
prepare
shipping
papers
(Paragraph
4.b);
(3)
an
apparent
violation for failure to retain
radioactive
material
receipt
documents
(Paragraph
4.b);
and
(4)
an
unlocked
high radiation, area
door
(Paragraph
3).
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspection findings and took
no exceptions.
The licensee'id
not identify as proprietary
any of the
materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspector during this inspection.
On
August
28,
1986,
licensee
management
was
informed that
the
event
concerning
an
unlocked
high radiation
area
door
was
determined
to
be
an
apparent violation (Paragraph
3).
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
(92702)
(CLOSED)
Violation
(50-259/260/296/86-10-01),
Personnel
entries
into
controlled
areas
with expired qualifications.
The inspector
reviewed the
licensee's
response
of May 6,
1986,
and verified that the corrective action
specified in the response
had been taken.
(CLOSED) Unresolved
Item (50-259/260/296/86-14-01),
Review of circumstances
surrounding
an
unsecured
high radiation
area
door
on the reactor
water
cleanup
(RWCU) heat exchanger
room.
On March 29,
1986,
the licensee
made
a telephonic notification to. the
NRC
Headquarters
Duty Officer pursuant to
10 CFR 50.72 of a possible violation
of Technical. Specification 6.3.D.2.,
which requires
that
access
to high
radiation
areas
in which
the
intensity of radiation
is greater
than
1000 mrem/hr shall
be controlled
by locks or direct surveillance.
The
routine shift check
by health
physics
personnel
of doors
required
to
be
locked
due to radiation levels in the area
in excess
of 1000 millirem per-
hour (mr/hr)
had revealed that the door to the
RWCU heat exchanger
room was
open
and unattended.
Licensee
management
was notified and
an investigation
was initiated.
The
inspector
reviewed
the results
of the licensee's
investigation
and
conducted
interviews
with
licensee 'representatives.
The
inspector
determined
that
on
March 28,
1986,
between
2020
and
2155
hours,
health
physics
personnel
had entered
the
room to perform
a radiation
survey
and
then allowed operations
personnel
to enter to perform
a valve lineup.
An
operations
representative
with the
door
key
was present
outside
the door
during the period of the entry.
The door was left open
when everyone left
the area
at the completion of the work.
At 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />,
a health
physics
technician
performing
a shiftly check of high radiation
area
doors
noted
that the door to the heat exchanger
room was open, but assumed
that the area
did not have to be locked
based partly on his experience
of not finding a
radiation level in excess
of 1000 mr/hr on
a recent
survey
he had performed
in the
heat
exchanger
room of another unit.
At 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />
on March 29,
1986,
health
physics
personnel
found the
door to the
room open
when they
returned
to provide coverage for the
oncoming crew's entry to complete the
valve lineup.
The licensee's
corrective action for the event included
a revision to their
procedure for+igh radiation
door checks
to require technicians
to notify
the
health
physics
supervisor
immediately if any
door is
found
open,
briefings for all health
physics
personnel
on high radiation area controls,
and disciplinary action against
the personnel
involved.
The inspector
reviewed
the procedure
change that
had
been
made regarding
the
shiftly check of high radiation area
doors.
As was the
case prior to the
event,
the technician
performing
the
check
was
given
a list of over
a
hundred
doors
he
was to check.
These
doors
provided access
to all areas
with radiation levels potentially in excess
of 1000 mr/hr, however at any
given time, especially
during periods of extended
shutdown,
many rooms were
not required to be locked.
The inspector stated that it would seem appropriate for the technician to be
told which doors
were required
to be locked
so that
he could immediately
recognize
a problem
and take action
and that the recent
new requirement
to
call
a supervisor
when
a door was found open
may not be workable since
many
doors
were legitimately open.
Licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the
observation
and
implemented
a
procedure
change
to require
that
the
technician
performing the check
be provided with a list of doors that were
required to be locked.
The inspector
reviewed
records
of radiation surveys that had
been
performed
in the
RWCU heat
exchanger
room.
A routine survey
performed
on March 25,
1986,
showed that the highest radiation level in the
room at
18 inches
was
600 mr/hr.
The survey performed
on March 28,
1986, prior to allowing the
operations
personnel
into the room, indicated the highest radiation level at
18 inches
was
2000 mr/hr.
A radiation
survey performed
on March 13,. 1986,
as part of the event investigation,
indicated that the highest
dose rote was
500 mr/hr at 18".
The
measurement
was
made
using
a ruler.
Licensee
representatives
stated that the only recent
survey which indicated radiation
levels in the
room were in excess
of 1000 mr/hr at 18" was the one performed
on March 28,
1986, prior to allowing the entry by the operators.
They also
stated
that the technician
had
made
a conservative
measurement
(i,e., less "
than 18").
Based
on the historical data of radiation levels in the room and
the fact that the technician's
survey
on March 28,
1986,
was conservative,
licensee
representatives
stated
that
they
believed
no
technical
specification violation had occurred,
or that credit should
be given for
licensee
identification
of
the
problem
pursuant
to
Appendix C, Paragraph
IV.A.
The
inspector
stated
that
licensee
identification credit
would not
be
appropriate
in this
case
in that the
licensee
had
received
Notices of
Violation for two similar problems
( Inspection
Reports
82-13
and 83-57) in
the past,
the routine surveillance of high radiation area
doors
had not been
effective
in
discovering
and
correcting
the
problem
and
that
the
identification
by
the
technician
on
the
next shift
was
essentially
self-disclosing.
Upon review of this issue
by 'NRC Region II management
subsequent
to the inspection, it was determined that since the licensee
had
a record radiation
survey which showed radiation levels in the
room were in
excess
of 1000 mrem/hr
and the licensee
had intended to provide appropriate
controls based
on that survey,
the event concerning the unlocked door to the
RWCU heat
exchanger
pump
room
was
an
apparent
violation of Technical Specification 6.3.D.2 (50-259/260/296/86-26-04).
Followup on Nonroutine Events
(93702)
a.
Transportation
Event of April 2,
1986
By letter dated April 8,
1986,
the licensee
was informed by the South
Carolina
Department
of Health
and
Environmental
Control that their
Kp
radioactive
waste
Shipment
Number 0386-048-S
was found,
upon arrival at
the
Chem-Nuclear
operated
burial site
near
Barnwell,
SC, to contain
excess
free standing water.
The shipment consisted
of dewatered
resins
packaged
in a high integrity container
(HIC) within a
USA 9139 shipping
cask.
Condition 32.c of South Carolina Radioactive Material
License
No. 97,
Amendment 41, issued to Chem-Nuclear
Systems,
Inc. required that wastes
in high integrity containers
shall
contain
less
than
one
percent
noncorrosive liquids by waste
volume.
The licensee's
resin liner was
punctured
and
21 gallons of liquid was drained
from the container.
The
one
percent
liquid
by
waste
volume limit was
equivalent
to
12.7 gallons.
The licensee
was assessed
a
$1,000 civil penalty
by the
State
and their resin shipping-privileges
were
suspended
until they
could demonstrate
adequate
corrective actions.
Licensee
representatives
were sent to the disposal site to examine the
resin
liner
and
discuss
the
problem
with
South
Carolina
and
Chem-Nuclear
personnel.
The licensee
was given permission to have the
resin liner returned for evaluation.
The licensee
removed
the resin
from the liner, filled it with water,
and then sparged air through the
liner'.s internal
dewatering
piping.
An underwater
camera
was
used to
observe
for leaks.
Leaks
were
found in several
joints.
Five
new
liners were tested
in a similar 'manner
and leaks were'bserved
in the-
internal
piping of two liners.
The licensee's
test
data
was
made
available to Chem-Nuclear,
the resin liner vendor,
so that they could
review the adequacy
of their quality control
checks during fabrication
of the liners.
The licensee
also identified that the dewatering
pumps
used to dewater
resin liners were only capable of sustaining
a vacuum of about one-half
of their rated
capacity.
Hoses
and
quick disconnects
used
in the
dewatering
process
were also found to be in need of repair.
As result
of their investigation
into this
event,
the
licensee
implemented
the following corrective actions:
- Replaced all the dewatering
hoses
and quick disconnects.
- Implemented
a preventative
maintenance
program for
dewatering
equipment
- Required the inspection of resin liner internal piping for defects
immediately prior to use
- Enhanced
dewatering controls, which included
use of a
higher capacity
vacuum
pump for an additional
two hours
of final dewatering,
adoption of Chem-Nuclear
recommen-
dations regarding
longer dewatering times,
and periodic
tests of loaded resin liners by evaluating
excess
water accumulation after
a seven
day holding period.
The inspector
questioned if water
balance
or final shipping weight
might
be
used
as
a positive indicator that resin liners
had
been
6
adequately
dewatered.
Licensee
representatives
stated
that they
had
evaluated
the possibility of using those
parameters
and determined that
it was not feasible.
10 CFR 20.311(d)(1) requires that any generating
licensee
who transfers
radioactive
waste to a land disposal facility shall
prepare all wastes
so that
the
waste
meets
the
waste, characteristic
requirements
of
10 CFR 61.56 (a)(3) required that solid waste containing liquid shall
contain
as little free
standing
and
noncorrosive
liquid
as
is
reasonably
achievable,
but in
no
case
shall
the liquid exceed
one
percent of the volume.
The transfer of the resin liner for disposal,
which contained
in excess
of one
percent
by volume free standing
water
on April 2,
1986,
was
identified
as
an
apparent
violation
of
(50-259/260/296/86-26-01).
Radioactive Material Shipment Receipt Event of May 29,
1986
The inspector
reviewed
a completed
licensee
incident critique sheet
and
supporting
documents
which described
events
associated
with the receipt
of a radioactive material
shipmeet
from TYA's Power Op'erations Training-
Center
(POTC) in Chattanooga,
on May 29, 1986.
Some
time during
1983,
the licensee
received
from the Electric Power
Research
Institute
(EPRI)
a section of contaminated
pipe, referred to
as
a calibration block, that was to be wsed
by the licensee's
inservice
inspection (ISI) group
as
a reference
standard for ultrasonic tests.
On June
13,
1984, the calibration block was transferred
to the
POTC for
use in training.
The calibration block was apparently
never
used at
the
POTC and it was decided to return it to the ISI group at the Browns
Ferry site.
On
May 29,
1986,
a
TYA van
and driver arrived at
the
licensees
Warehouse
Number
12, which
was
located
outside
the plant protected
.
area.
The shipping
papers
did not indicate
who was to receive
the
shipment,
but the package
was addressed
to the
Power Stores
Supervisor.
Power Stores
personnel
at the
warehouse
signed
the receipt for the
shipment-wnd
obtained
a health
physics
radiological
survey.
Power
Stores
personnel
began
to try to identify who
was to receive
the
shipment.
The driver was directed to drive the
van to the plant main
gate
and
was told
someone
would
come out to bring him inside.
The
driver waited outside
the plant entrance for approximately three
hours
while
attempts
were
being
made
to identify the
recipient
and
discussions
were
held
between
Power
Stores
and
Health
Physics
concerning
who was responsible for completing the security paperwork. to
get the driver inside the plant.
ISI personnel
became
aware that the
shipment
was
outside
the
gate
and
two of them went to talk to the
driver.
The ISI personnel
were given the
package
by the driver.
The
'package
was then placed
in the trunk of a
TYA car
and driven into the
protected
area.
The ISI personnel
placed
the
package
in their work
groups'railer,
which was outside
the radiologically controlled area.
, Approximately ten minutes later, the ISI supervisor
noticed the package
and directed that it be moved into the turbine building controlled area
since
he realized
that radioactive
material
was
not authorized for
storage in his trailer.
Approximately
an
hour after
the
package
had
been
taken
inside
the
plant,
health
physics
became'ware
that the
TYA van
was
no longer
outside
the plant gate.
Health physics
and
power stores
personnel
initiated
an investigation
and
search for the package
and located it
approximately
an
hour
and
a half later.
Radiological
surveys
were
performed of the
van,
ISI trai Ter, the
package
and the area
where it
had
been
placed in the turbine building.
No radiological
problems
were
identified.
The
licensee
held
a
formal critique
of" the event.
The licensee
identified changes
that should
be
made to their radiological control
procedures
to
preclude
similar problems
in the future.
Procedure
changes
were
implemented
that
required
that
incoming
radioactive
material
packages first be transferred
to
an
approved
storage
area
under health
physics
control prior to allowing other parties to take
the
package.
The
inspector
de'termined
that
since
power
stores
personnel
had signed
a receipt for the shipment
and health physics
had
performed
a survey prior to the ISI personnel
taking custody of the
package,
the
package
was
no longer in transportation
when the event
occurred
and
therefore
did
not
represent
a
violation
of
which required
that
byproduct material
only
be
transferred
to persons
authorized to receive
such material.
During review of this event,
the inspector
asked
to see
the licensee's
copy
of
the
POTC's
license.
The
licensee
was
required
by
to verify that the
POTC was authorized
to receive
the
type,
form and quantity of material
being transferred
prior to the
shipment.
The
inspector
was
shown
NRC Byproduct Material
License
Number 41-08165-09,
Docket 30-15165,
issued
on September
27,
1984, to
TVA's Division of Nuclear
Power for use at the licensee's
POTC.
The
license
stated
in Section
8 that the maximum activity possession
limit
of byproduct material with Atomic Numbers
1-83
was
100
mi llicuries.
The inspector
reviewed
the shipping
papers
that
had
been
prepared
to
send
the calibration block to the
POTC on June
13,
1984.
The shipping
papers
indicated
the calibration
block contained
108 millicuries of
radioactivity and the list of nuclides within the radioactive material
included several
transuranics (i.e., atomic
number greater
than 92).
The licensee
investigated
the apparent
discrepancy
and
was able to find
additional
information related
to the
1984
shipment.
The inspector
reviewed
a request for
a license
amendment,
dated April 2,
1984, to
allow the
POTC to possess
the calibration block which stated
that it
contained
94 millicuries of activity.
The
POTC license
was
amended
on
May ll, 1984,
to allow possession
of the calibration
block.
The
inspector
interviewed
licensee
representatives
who
had
prepared
the
1984
shipment.
The inspector
determined
the shipping
data for the
calibration
block
had
been
entered
into the licensee's
radioactive
waste
computer prior to the shipment.
The computer
program applied
10 CFR Part 61 scaling factors
to the shipping data
as if it were
a
radioactive
waste
shipment.
This resulted
in the transuranic
nuclides
being listed
on the shipping
papers
when they were in fact not present
and the computed activity associated
with these
scaled
nuclides
caused
the total activity to increase
from 94 to
108 mi llicuries.
Since the
persons
who
signed
the
shipping
papers
were
aware that
a license
amendment
had
been
received
to specifically allow the
POTC to possess
the calibration block, they apparently did not notice that the shipping
papers
contained
inaccuracies
as to the activity and
name of nuclides
within the material.
requires
that
each
licensee
who transports
licensed
material
outside of the confines of its plant or other place of use,
shall
comply with the applicable
requirements
of the requlations
appropriate
to
the
mode
of transport
of
the
Department
of
Transportation
in 49
CFR Parts
170 through
189.
49
CFR 172.203(d)(l)
requires
that
the
description
of radioactive
material
on
a shipping paper must include the
name of each
radionuclide'n
the radioactive material
and the activity contained in each
package
of the shipment in terms of curies, millicuries or microcuries.
Failure of the licensee
to correctly list the information required
by
49
CFR 172.203(d)(1)
on the shipping papers for Shipment
Number 2618 on
June
13,
1984,
was
identified
as
an
apparent
violation
of
(50-259/260/296/86-26-02).
The inspector
requested
that
he
be provided
copies
of the shipping
documents
for review that
had
been
used
to transfer
the calibration
block to the licensee
from EPRI in 1983
and from the
POTC
on
May 29,
1986.
After an extensive
search,
licensee
representatives
informed the
inspector that the documents
could not be found.
The .inspector
reviewed
TVA's Radioactive
Material
Shipment
Manual to
determine
which licensee
organization
was responsible
for maintaining
records
af radioactive material
receipts.
The procedure
stated that
receipt
documents
would
be
retained
in
accordance
with local
procedures.
The inspector
reviewed
Browns Ferry Site Director Standard
Practice
(BF-SDSP) - 2.5, which specified titles of records
required to
be retained
by various
licensee
organizations.
Attachment
K of the
procedure
listed
documents
required to
be retained
by power stores.
One of the record titles
was listed as "radioactive shipment
records
(solid radwaste)."
Licensee
representatives
stated
that
no other
records
were
described
in the
procedure
and that all radioactive
material
was generically referred to as "radwaste,"
although it may not
technically
be waste.
Licensee
power stores
representatives
stated
that they were responsible
for retaining the receipt documents,
however
it appeared
that sufficient administrative controls
were not in place
to ensure that radioactive material receipt documents
were forwarded to
power stores
or that power stores
could retrieve receipt
documents
they
had unless
they were cross
referenceable
to contract or purchase
order
numbers.
0
requires
that
records
of radioactive
material
shipments
shall
be kept in a manner convenient for review for
a period of at least five years.
Failure of the licensee
to retain
copies of the shipment
records for the calibration block from EPRI in
1983
and
from the
POTC
on
May 29,
1986,
was identified as
an apparent
violation of Technical Specification 6.6 (50-259/260/296/86-26-03).
The licensee
obtained
a copy of the
May 29,
1986 Shipping
Papers
from
the
POTC
and
showed
them to the inspector.
The inspector
noted that
the
shipping
papers,
Control
Number
TC-86-22,
indicated
that
the
radioactive
material
had
an activity of 0.02 millicuries
and that
transuranic
nuclides
were also listed
as being present.
The inspector
questioned
the activity that
was listed in light of the
94 mi llicuries
that
were
reportedly
present
two years
previously.
The activity
calculation
had
been
performed
by the licensee's
corporate
radwaste
group.
The inspector
was
informed that the activity listed
was in
error.
The inspector,
was also i'nformed that the information regarding
transuranic
nuclides within the material
had
been taken from the Browns
Ferry transfer
document
and were also not correct.
Failure
of the
licensee's
POTC
personnel
to correctly list the
information required
by 49
CFR 172.203(I)(1)
on the shipping papers for
Shipment
Number
TC-86-22
on
May 29,
1986,
was identified
as
an
additional
example
of
an
apparent
violation of
(30-15165/86-01-01)
(This violation is against
License
Number 41-08165-09
.
5.
Management
Controls
(83722)
The
inspector
reviewed
the results
of
a recent
reorganization
of the
licensee's
health
physics
group.
The health
physics
supervisor
position
title was
renamed
to Site Radiological Control. Supervisor
and the position
was
upgraded
to the superintendent
level, reporting directly to the plant
manager.
Thewadiological
control staff was reorganized
into four groups:
radiological
health,
radiological
protection,
radiological
outage,
and
radiological field operations.
The radiological
control organization
was
authorized
188 personnel,
156 of which were currently assigned.
The
licensee
was authorized
91 ANSI fully qualified health physics technicians.
The
licensee
currently
had
on
hand
32 fully qualified
technicians,
67 technicians
in training
and another
10 trainees
were in the process
of
being recruited.
All twelve authorized shift supervisor
positions
were
filled.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
d
10
6.
Control of Radioactive Material
(83726)
a ~
b.
The inspector -discussed
with licensee
representatives
a test they were
currently conducting of National
Nuclear Corporation
Betamax
personnel
self frisking units.
The units
use large area plastic scintillation
detectors.
Licensee
representatives
stated that they were evaluating
the feasibility of using the frisking units to replace
use of hand-held
pancake
probes
on
portable
survey
instruments
for
personnel
contamination
surveys.
The inspector stated
the units would have to be
demonstrated
to
be
comparable
in sensitivity to
a properly performed
whole
body frisk using
a
pancake
probe.
Licensee
representatives
stated
that
a
30-second
check
on the frisking unit would detect
5000
disintegrations
per
minute
per
one
hundred
square
centimeters
(dpm/100cm2)
at
the
30
percent
confidence
level
or
8000-
9000 dpm/100cm2 at the 90 percent confidence level.
The licensee
is currently participating with an
EPRI field test of a
computer controlled survey robot
"SURBOT."
The inspector
observed
the
robot
perform radiological
surveys
(i.e., air
samples,
radiation
surveys
and
smear
surveys)
in
a simulated
high
hazard
area.
The
operator
was able to control
and monitor the robot's
maneuvers
from a
remote control station.
The unit also incorporated
a video cassette
recorder
to record
input
from the units
video
cameras.
Licensee
representatives
stated that the Mit was being evaluated for actual
use
for initial entries
into hazard
areas
and for routine surveillances
to
reduce
man-rem exposure.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Facilities
and
Equipment
(83727)
The inspector discussed, recent
changes
with licensee representatives
and was
shown various
new facilities
and equipment.
The following is
a
summary of
recent
changes
made
by the licensee:
0
a ~
b.
Two health
physics
equipment
issue
stations
were placed in the reactor
building.
Personnel
at
the
stations
issue
respirators,
dosimeters
and survey instruments.
A computer terminal is also at each
location to verify individual qualifications prior to issuing
them
equipment.
The licensee
also
demonstrated
how the computer
could
be
used
to -provide historical
data
such
as
the
issuance
history of
a
survey
instrument
or respirator
or
a listing of all respirators
that
had
been worn by an individual.
A respirator
survey,
repair,
test
and
inspection facility was
established.
The facility included
equipment
to perform
DOP bench
tests
on respirators
prior to being placed
in sealed
plastic
bags for
issue.
11
c.
New whole
body counters,
equipped with intrinsic germanium detectors,
have
been
purchased
and
were in the
process
of being
placed
into
operation.
d.
The licensee
had
an aggressive
ALARA incentives
and suggestion
program.
Licensee
representatives
stated
that
100
ALARA suggestions
had
been
submitted in 1985 and that 83 had
been submitted
so far in 1986.
e.
A dosimetry field office was established
at the plant main entrance.to
issue dosimetry
and obtain exposure histories
from incoming personnel.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Transportation
(86721)
The inspector
reviewed the organizational
changes
that
had
been
made in the
licensee's
Radioactive
Waste
Section.
The substance
of the
change
was to
place
the section
under
the Chemistry Supervisor
in Technical
Services
and
the addition of engineers
and craftsmen
organized
under the functional areas
of Technical
Unit, Trash Frisking, Turbine Decon, Plant
Radwaste
and
Crew
Support.
No violations or deviations
were idenitifed.
~
~
~
9.
IE Information Notice (IEN) (92717)
The inspector
determined
that the following information notices
had
been
received
by
the
licensee,
reviewed
for applicability, distributed
to
appropriate
personnel
and
that action,
as- appropriate,
was
taken
or
scheduled.
IEN
86-20:
Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Scaling Factors,
IEN
86-22:
Underresponse
of Radiation
Survey Instrument
to High Radiation Fields
IEN
86-23:
Excessive
Skin Exposures
Due to Contamination
With Hot Particles
IEN
86-24:
Respirator
Users Notice:
Increased
Inspection
Frequency for Certain Self-Contained
Breathing
Apparatus Air Cylinders
IEN
86-42: -- Improper Maintenance
of Radiation Monitoring
Systems
IEN
86-43:
Problems
With Silver Zeolite Sampling of
Airborne Radioiodine
IEN
86-44:
Failure to Follow Procedures
When Working in
IEN
86-46:
Improper Cleaning
and Decontamination of
Respiratory Protection
Equipment