ML18031A135

Forwards Second Round Questions Re Containment Design & Testing.Revision 1 to Design Assessment Rept Is Currently Under Review

ML18031A135
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	05/15/1979
From:	Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 7906150105
Download: ML18031A135 (12)

Text

hfAY L5 t979 Docket Hos.

50-387 an Mr. Norman W. Curtis Vice President - Engfneerfng and Construction Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Distributi on Doc et Fil NRC PDR Local PDR LMR II3 File R.

Boyd D. Vassallo F. tlfllfams

0. Parr S. Miner M. Rushbrook R. Mattson D. Ross re:

J. Knight R. Tedesco R.

DeYoung V. Moore R. Vollmer M. Ernst R. Denise OELD IE (3)

M. Butler E; Farouk BCC:

NSIC TIC ACRS (16)

SUBJECT:

SUS(UEHANHA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS NOS.

1 AND 2-

'E(VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION As a result of our review of your application for operating licenses for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Plant we find that we need additional information in the area of containment design and. testing.

The specific information required is listed fn the Enclosure.

These are round 2 questions.

The review did not include the information presented fn the Design Assessment Report (DAR).

Fle are currently reviewing Revision 1 to the DAR.

Please inform us within 10 days after receipt of this letter of the date when this requested additional information will be 'available for our review.

Please contact us ff you desire any discussion or clarification of the information requested.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

As Stated cc* w/enclosure:

Ori In..l Signed by 0.

'. Pair

'lan O. Parr, Cheer Light llater Reactors Branch Ho.

3 Division of Project Management yP~6, (y aII'o5 ee OI rlOOW ouNNAeaa ~

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t'ir. Earle M. Head

, Project Engineering Yanager Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsyl vani a 18 101 Jay Si 1 berg, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbri dge 1800 N Street, H.

W.

Washington, D.

C.

20036 Yir. William E. Barberich, Vuclear Licensing Group Supervisor.

Pennsyl vania 'Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street

'l 1 entown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Yir. Robert J. Shovlin Project Yanager Pennsylvania Power..and Light Co 2 Vorth Ninth 'Street

'l 1 entown,-'Pennsyl vani a 18101 Alan R.

Yuspeh, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 N Street, N.

W.

I.'ashington, D. C.

20036 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Co-Director Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State

College, PA 16801 t::::::::::::

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Edward N.

Ha g el, Esquire General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ni nth St rect Al 1 entown, Pennsyl vania 18 101 Bryan Snapp, Esq.

Pennsyl vania Power

& Light Company 901 Hamilton Street Al 1 entown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Robert N. Gallo Resident Inspector P. 0.

Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsyl vani a 18655 Susquehanna Environmental Advocates z/o Cwrald Schultz, Esq.

500 South River Street Wi1kes-Barre, PA 18702 John L. Anderson Oak Ridge National Laboratory Uni on Carbi de Corporat i on Bldg. 3500, P.

0.

Box X

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 t1r. Thomas N. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Resources Comonwealth of Pennsylvania P.

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Box 2063 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Ns. Colleen Narsh Box 538A, RDi 4 Nountain

Top, PA 18707 r'1rs.

Irene Lemanowicz, Chairpersoi::::

The Citizens Against Huclear Dangers P.

O..Box 377 RDgl

Berwick, PA 18503

Et(CLOSURE RE VEST FOR AOOITIONAL IHFOR,'1ATION SUS UEHAhs(A STEAlh ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET HOS.

50-387 AiNO 50-388

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021.0 021. 51 Containment Systems Based on our review of the information presented in subsection 6.2.1.1.5 of the FSAR and the responses to questions 021 F 10 and 021.22, we find that your discussion of steam bypass from the drywell to the wetwell for a steam line break to be unacceptable.

In your response you indicated that the requested information represents a substantial resource expenditure, which is unjustified because the information is required only to describe the degree of compliance of various systems,.

>le find this not to be the case.

The staff's position that was attached to Item 021.11 is intended for implementation on all Mark.II containments because of its safety significance.

In addition, you stated in your response to 021.10 that Ben C. Rusche's directive to the NRC staff dated January 31, 1977 is the appropriate procedure for review of the Susquehanna FSAR.

It should be noted that the referenced letter concerns documentation of departures from the Standard Review Plan.

guestion 021.10 was forwarded to you specifying our position that the Susquehanna containment should be designed to have a steam bypass capability as characterized in Appendix I to Standard Review Plan 6.2.l.l.c.

(It should be noted that Appendix I has been I:::::::::::::.

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021-2 previously forwarded with question 021.22 as Branch Technical Position CSB 6-X).

Accordingly, provide the appropriate discussions, justifications and analyses to demonstrate compliance with the Appendix I to SRP 6.2.l.l.c.

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021.52 Section 6.2.1.1.3.2 of the FSAR indicates that the loss coefficient of the vacuum breaker was calculated based on actual flow measurements conducted in the manufacturer's shop.

Discuss the applicability of the test performed (e.g., flow regime) considering the conditions that are expected in the containment when the vacuum breaker is required to operate.

Provide a diagram showing the locations of the vacuum breakers relative to the downcomer and the floor slab.

Discuss your plan to co'mply with the requirement

( Item'3.b) of Appendix I to SRP 6.2.1.1.C.

021'.53 The response to Item 021.32(4) references system P&ID's which do not.

show the location of the water-seal relative to system isolati'on valves; provide a sketch to show these elevations for each path where water seals eliminate the potential for bypass leakage.

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021.54 The statement is made in Secti'on 6,2.3.2.3 of the FSAR that closed systems are not relied upon as barriers to eliminate bypass leakage.

It was further stated that, isolation valves inside or outside the primary containment are considered to limit but, not to eliminate bypas's leakage...

It app ars that some of the lines list d in Tables 6.2-15a (e.g.,

RBCCM)

021-3 e

have been eliminated as potential bypass leakage paths because of either or both of the above mentioned statements.

Provide clarification

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for this apparent discrepancy.

In addition, provide the quality group and seismic qualification of the closed systems that are relied upon to eliminate bypass leakage.

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021.55 Item 3 on page 6.2-36a of the FSAR provides justification for elimination of the Rl<CU line (DBA-101} as a bypass leakage path.

Similarly, provide the justification for line EBC-104.

021.56 Note 8 in Table 6.2-12 of the FSAR indicates that the valve isolates two piping penetrations.

Provide a sketch to show the typical arrangement and discuss how such an arrangement meets the General Design Criteria.

021.57 Provide justification for using a check valve outside the containment as a containment isolation valve for the following penetrations; X-210, 211, 214,

215, 216 and 217.

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021.58 Item -II.6 of Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, "Containment Isolation Systems,"

requires diversity in parameters sensed for initiation of containment isolation.

Provide justification for not having diversity in the parameters sensed to initiate isolation o

the following lines; X-121, 35-B, 208A, 211,

215, 216,

217, 226A and 246A.

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4 021-4 021.59 With regard to'the control rod drive system provide the following information:

(1) The piping integrity test to detect any leakage from the'ydraulic control unit; (2) The type and number of valves and method of actuation on the charging water, drive water and cooling water; (3) The type of indicators available to the operator to indicate any leakage; (4) Whether the CRD system is vented during the performance of the type A test; and (5) The proposed Technical Specification limit on leakage through the 1

hydraulic control unit.

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I'21.60 The statement is made in subsection 6.2.4.3.2.1 of the FSAR that the feedwater valve is remote manually closed from the control room upon operator determination that continued makeup from the feedwater system is unavailable or unnecessary.

Me find this approach acceptable,

however, discuss the information that will be available to the operator to alert him of the need to isolate the feedwater, the time when this information would become available, and the time it would take'the operator to complete this action.

021-5 021.61'uestion 021.42 requests certain information reoarding the containment purge system addressed in section 6.5.3.1.of the FSAR.

Your response to that question and to question 021.11 is related to the containment hydrogen purge system.

Provide the information requested in 021.42.

021.62 The response to question 021.44 does not provide enough justification for the testing of certain containment isolation valv s in tho reverse directi on.

Therefore provide the fo1 1 owing information:

(1), The method by which these penetrations are to be tested and how

. the leakage will be assigned to that penetration (i.e., if test pressure is between the valves and the total leakage is assigned to that penetration);

(2) Justificat'ion that the isolation valves have similar leakage characteristics in both the forward and reverse direction for those penetrations discussed in item a above; and (3) Justification that these testing methods will yield results at least equivalent to the case when the valve is tested in the forward di rection for any other valves that wi 11 be tested in the reverse direction.

021.63 Provide the rationale for not including leakage from :alves identi ied in Table 6.2-22,with notes 14 and/or 26 'in the 0.60 La total Type 8

and C tests.

021-6 021.64 Discuss the method by which water seals will be maintained for 30 days following LOCA.

Specify the quality group and the seismic qualification of all components that are relied upon to perform this function.

021.65 The statement is made in subsection 6.2.6.3 of the FSAR that a factor will be applied to contaminated liquid to determine the airborne fraction that will be added to Type B and C test totals.

Provide the methods by which this factor is determined.

021.66 The statement is made in subsection 6.2.6.5.1.2 of the FSAR that the I'LilIIIV 'I I'

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low pressure test to determine drywell to suppression chamber atmosphere bypass area will,be conducted at each integrated leakage rate test interval.

This approach is unacceptable.

Our posi tion is stated in Appendix" I to SRP 6.2.1.1.C.

Revise the FSAR to indicate compliance with.our position.

021. 67 Mith regard to the analysis of hydrogen production and accumulation within the containment following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident:

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'1)

Provide the corrosion rates for the zinc base paint and galvanized steel in this environment.

In so doing provide a copy of references 6.2-7 and 6.2-8 for our review and discuss the applicability of these referenced data considering the environmental conditions that are expected following a LOCA.

021-7 (2) The staff is currently undertaking additional effort toward better defining the various sources of hydrogen, including zinc-rich paints and organic materials.

The attached figure depicts the hydrogen generation rates as a function of temperature that the staff currently uses for confirmatory analysis.

Provide a

sensitivity study based on this figure that shows that the hydrogen concentration inside ihe containment will not exceed ihe acceptance criterion of 4 volume percent.

In so doing provid the time the hydrogen recombiner should be turned on and the time needed to heat up the recombiner.

021.68 With regard to the secondary containment's functional capability:

(1) Discuss if there is any connection between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 F'

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secondary coniainments.

If there is a door thai separates the two secondary containments, discuss if the SGTS is capable of maintaining a 1/4" water gauge negative pressure in the affected unit's secondary containment assuming the door was open at the time of LOCA.

(2)

Discuss the design provision incorporated to prevent such doors from being inadvertently opened.

(3)

Discuss the test that will be performed to verify ihe inl akage assumption and the drawdown time for reesiablishing

-0.25 inches of water gauge following LOCA.

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