ML18030B227
| ML18030B227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1986 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18030B226 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-06, 50-259-86-6, 50-260-86-06, 50-260-86-6, 50-296-86-06, 50-296-86-6, NUDOCS 8604080268 | |
| Download: ML18030B227 (4) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, 8 50-296 License Nos.
'The following violations were identified during an inspection conducted on February 1 - 28, 1986.
The Severity Levels were assigned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
1.
Technical Specification 6.3 requi r~ that detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists, for surveillance and testing require-ments shall be prepared, approved and adhered to; and temporary changes to a procedure may be made which do not change the intent of the approved procedure.
Contrary to the
- above, this requirement was not met for the following examples:
Surveillance Instruction, ST I.
- 4. 11. A. l-e, Testing of Fixed Mater Nozzles for Blockage, performed..February 5 - 10, 1986, was inadequate,.
in that a non-intent change processed on January 29, 1986, incorrectly deleted one of two isolation valves for fire protection nozzle zones A
through F and remained undetected during testing on Units 1 and 2 until another non-intent change was processed on February 5, 1986, correcting the procedure for the missing isolation valves for Unit 3.
Addition-
- ally, the procedure data sheet format inadequately contained over-lapping signature blocks and column headings such that during the test signatures were being made for the test connection installation and removal only and not for the nozzle inspection as required.
b.
Temporary changes, termed non-intent changes, were made to Surveillance Instruction, S. I. 4. 11.A. 1-e which were intent changes.
Browns Ferry Standard Practice 1.3 defines intent changes as changes in scope, technique, or sequential order of instruction steps that would affect the result of nuclear safety.
A non-intent change processed January 29,
- 1986, changed 38 valves to the procedure changing a
majority of the steps in the procedure.
The changes to the isolation valves affected the number of fire protection zones removed from
'ervice at one time.
Although the fire protection engineer reviewed the original procedure, the non-intent change which affected the fire protection system was not reviewed prior to implementing the change.
0 C.
During performance of Surveillance Instruction, S. I.
4.8.B.2-3A, Airborne Effluents (Meekly Gamma Isotopic) on February 5,
- 1986, Procedure Step VI B. 1 of Chemistry Instruction CI-701 was not performed 8604080268 86040i PDR ADOCK 05000259 9
Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
2 Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, 5 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-542 8 DPR-68 to verify the keyboard terminal in use was connected to the counter containing the sample.
A sample of free air was being counted until this error was detected by another person not performing the test.
d.
Surveillance Instruction, S. I.
- 4. 8. B. 2-3A, Airborne Effluents (Weekly Gamma Isotopic) performed on February 5,
- 1986, which referenced Chemistry Instruction 466.51 (Stack Monitor Sampling) was inadequate in that it did not contain a previously issued non-intent change dated November 1985.
The procedure, if performed as written, left the continuous monitor inoperable after the sample was taken due to the closing of two system valves (AO-305A and A0-282N).
e.
Surveillance Instruction, S. I. 4.4. C. 3, Standby Liquid Control System-Boron Concentration, was not.adhered to on February 10, 1986.
S. I.4.4.C.3 requires that the Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) be sampled per Chemistry Instruction (C. I.) 463. 1.
Step VI.C of C. I.463. 1 requires that valve 2-63-536 be locked closed and verified locked closed.
While sampling the Unit 2 SLC System on February 10,
- 1986, both the valve operator and the chemistry technician initialed the Data Sheet for S. I. 4.4.C.3 indicating that valve 2-63-536 was locked closed and second person verified locked closed even though no locking device was attached to the valve.
0 f.
Standard Practice 14,25, Clearance Procedure, Step 6.4.4 requires that the appropriate protective tags must be properly applied in all instances.
Contr ary to this, the following clearance tags were not appropriately applied:
(1)
On February 9,
- 1986, Tag No. 4, Tag No.
5 and Tag No.
7 of clearance No. 85-1304 were not attached to a lifted lead of the shorting link of fuse block FB1 on Unit 2 panels 9-83, 9-84, and 9-86, respectively.
(2)
On February 12,
- 1986, Tag No.
12 of Clearance No.85-949 was not attached to a
dowel pin which should have been installed in place of removed fuse 13A-F23 on the Unit 2 Panel 9-33.
(3)
On February 12,
- 1986, Tag No.
8 of Clearance No. 85-1517 and Tag No.
6 of Clearance No.85-949 were not attached to a
dowel pin which should have been installed in place of removed fuse 10A-F1A on the Unit 2 Panel 9-32.
(4)
On February 17,
- 1986, Tag No.
11 of Clearance 85-510 was found attached to the Limitorque valve operator for valve 2-FCV-74-77.
The valve had been disassembled and removed from the system even though the protective tag was attached to the valve operator establishing the valve as a clearance boundary for unrelated maintenance.
This is a Severity Level IV. violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to all units.
Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
3 Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, 8 50-296 License Nos.
& DPR-68 2.
Technical Specification 3.5.C.7 requires that there shall be at least two RHRSW pumps, associated with the selected RHR pumps, aligned for RHR heat exchanger service for each reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel.
Contrary to the above, the requirement was not met on January 25,
- 1986, when no RHRSM pump, associated with one of the selected RHR pumps, was operable for RHR heat exchanger service.
While the reactor vessel contained irradiated fuel, loop II RHR pumps 3B and 3D were taken out of service.
This left loop I RHR pumps 3A and 3C as the selected RHR pumps.
RHRSM pumps Al and A2 are the only pumps that can be associated with RHR pump 3A.
These pumps became inoperable when their emergency diesel generator was taken out of service for maintenance at 5:50 a.m.
on January 25, 1986.
The condition existed for about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> until the emergency diesel generator was returned to service.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) applicable to Unit 3 only.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2'01, you are required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violations; (2) the reasons for the violations if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken
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and the results achieved; (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when.full compliance will be achieved.
Security or safeguards information should be submitted as an enclosure to facilitate withholding it from public disclosure as required by 10 CFR 2.790(d) or 10 CFR 73.21.
Date.
APR 0 g lS86