ML18026A513
| ML18026A513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1981 |
| From: | Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-694, NUDOCS 8104020472 | |
| Download: ML18026A513 (11) | |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STE l (RIOS)
ACCE.SSION NBR; 81 ') 4020472 DOC ~ DATE'. 81/03/27 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50 387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station<
Unit 1< pennsylva 50-368 Susquehanna Steam Electric Stationi Unit 2~ Pennsylva AUTH INANE AUTHOR AFF lLI ATION CURT I Sr U ~ ~l ~
Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Co, RECIP.NA<E RECIPIENT AFFILIATION YOUNGBLDOOz8 ~ J ~
l.icensing Branch 1
SUBJECT:
Forwards responses to NRc concerns on transportation incidents in vicinity of facilities, DISTRIBUTIOtl CODE:
COOlS COPIES RECEIVED:,LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Environ ~
Repor t Amendments 8 Related Cor respondence NOTES:Send 18K 3 copies FSAR L all amends.
Send IH,E 3 copies FSAR K all amends DOCKET ¹ 05 g).038 0'~00 88 05000387 05000388 RECIPIENT IP COPE/NA,'SK ACTION; YOUNGBl OODg B 18 STARkgR ~
05 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/iVAblE RUSMBROOKgM ~
19 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 INTERNAL: EiNv ENG BR I le E OE G FI N
BR 06 15 01 Ob 1
1 2
0 1
1 1
0 MYD/GEO BR NRC pDR 02 RAO ASMT BR 09 SIT ANAL BR 07
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1 1
1 1
1 1
KXTERt'AL: ACRS iN S I C 20 04 3
1 1
LPDR 03 TOTAL NUMBER UF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 18 ENCL 16
TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA. 18101 PHONEs (215) 77 NORMAN W. CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 8 Construction-Nuclear 7705381 Nr. B.J.
Youngblood Licensing Branch 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Transportation Information ER100450 File 841-2 PLA-694 g
(+
I P
March 27, 19
~
s Doclet Nos.
50-387 and 50-388
Dear Hr. Youngblood:
Attached are copies of responses to your concerns on transportation incidents in the vicinity of Susquehanna.
Very truly yours,.
Q ~. ~/~
N.W. Curtis Vice president-Engineering and construction-Nuclear cc:
R.M. Stark bcc:
W.E.
B.A.
C.T.
R.J.
N.W. Curtis Barberich Snapp Coddington Shovlin coo/
5 (l~
PENNSYLVANIA POWER 8
LIGHT COMPANY
. 82040= 6 Hi~
A,
question 2
In order to determine if Class I structures at the Susquehanna SES must be designed to withstand the impact of fuel truck accidents on the township roads adjacent to the site the pote~)jal risk is compared to a probability of occurrence of lxl0 7 per year This determination requires information on the frequency of fuel deliveries on these roads per year, the probability of truck accidents, the probability of explosion per accident, the pressure generated by an explosion and its impact on Class I structures.
PPEL contacted the local fuel oil and propane distributors to-determine the frequency of fuel deliveries made on the township roads ad'jacent to the Susquehanna SES.
It was determined that during the heating season that there was a maximum of 9 fuel.oil and 9 liquid propane deliveries per month on T438, of 2 fuel oil deliveries per month on T419 and of 6 fuel oil deliveries per month on T486.
PP8L assumed that these maximum monthly deliveries continued over a six month heating season.
lilith this assumption, there are 54 fuel oil and liquid propane deliveries per year on T438, 12 fuel oil deliveries per month on T419 and 36 fuel oil deliveries per month on T456.
According to a study done for the Maritime Administration the accident frequency of8tank truck accidents resulting in a spill is approximately 2.7x10
/per mile of road traveled per year.
The Susquehanna SES is located in Tornado Region I and its Class I structures are designed to withstand a dynamic wind pressure of 2.3 psi.
In section 2.2.3.1.2 of the SSES-FSAR, the overpressure resulting from the exp1osion of a 10,000 ga11on propane tank )q~ck was evaIuated using the method described in Regulatory Guide 1.9.1 This overpressure was extended to estimate the distance at which 1 psi would be felt as a
result of this accident.
The resulting distance is approximately 3,300 feet.
A similar analysis was performed for the potential overpressure resulting from a fuel oil explosion both within the tank of the tank truck and from the spreading spill of fuel from a ruptured tank both of these analysis resulting in far lesser explosions than resulting from the propane explosion.
The probability of an explosion resulting from tank truck spill of f'iammabie 1iguid is 0.0113, based upon a~Judy of accident reports done by the U.S. Department of Transportation During a period July 1973 to December 1975, there were 442 spills of flammable liquids from tank trucks of which 5 resulted. in explosions.
It should be noted that these statistics should be quite reliable because since July, 1973, federal law has required the reporting of all unintensional spills of hazardous materials.
These incident reports also included classification'ccording to the results of the spills.
x
The accident probabilities for these township roads are as fo11ows=
1)
T419,adjacent to the site on the north.
Tri s/ ear x accident robabilit /mi/ r x ex 1.2 x 10 2.7 x 10 2)
T438, adjacent to the site on the west.
losion robabilit 1.13 x 10
= Probabil ity/m'i/yr 3.7 x 10 Tri s/ ear x accident robabilit /mi/
1.08 x 10 2.7 x 10 r x ex losion robabilit 1.13 x 10
= Probabil ity/mi/yr 3.30 x 10 3)
T456, adjacent to the site on the south.
Tri s/ ear x accident robabilit /mi/ r x ex 3.6 x 10 2.7 x 10 losion robabilit 1.13 x 10
= Probability/mi/yr.
1.1 x 10 The length of road along which a tank truck explosion could impact a Class I structure was determined based upon the distance from which a 10,000 gallon propane explosion overpressure would be decayed to 1 PSI at a Class I structure.
The 1
PSI overpressure distance is approximately 3,400 feet.
This is a conservative distance to be utilized for its effect for several reasons including a propane explosion was used far both fuel oil and propane tank explosions, the Class I structures are designed to withstand a 2.3 psi overpressure so a
1 PSI overpressure would have little or no impact on Class I structures and the calculation of the explosive overpressure is conservative.
The closest Class I structure to each of the roads is approximately 500 feet, 1,800 feet and 1,430 feet from T419,-T438, and T456, respectively.
The distances along these roads from a 1
PSI or more would be felt at a Class I structure are approximately 6,000 feet (1.2 miles), 3,200 feet (0.6 miles) and 3.940 feet (0.76 mi.), along T419, T438, and T456, respectively.
The overall probability of a Susquehanna Class I structure being affected by a fuel truck accident along the neighboring township roads are as follows:
Probability Length of p
fuel truck 8 ex losion/mi/ r Road to 1 PSI miles T419 3.7 x 10 1.2 4.4 x 10 T438 3.3 x 10 0.6 2.0 x 10 T456 1.1 x 10 0.76 8.4 x 10 All of the probabilities of fuel truck impacting any Class I f'rom an acciden) along the neighboring township roads are for less probable than lxl0 per year and therefore in PPSL's judgement, these risks are acceptable.
(1)
"Evaluation of'Accidents," Standard Review Plan, Section 2.2.3.
NUREG 75/087.
(2)
Arthur D. Little,'nc.', "A Model Economic and Safety Analysis of
- the Transportation of Hazardous Substances in Bulk," report prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritim Administration Office of Domestic Shipping, Washington, D.C., Report No CON-74-11271, 1974.
(3)
"Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation
~ Routes Near Nuclear Power Plant Sit s," Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide.
1.91, January, 1975.
J (4)
"Hazardous Materials Incident Reports Form DOT F5800.1, July. 1973, to December, 1975," V.S. Department of Transportation, tlaterials Transportation Bureau, Office of Hazardous Haterials Operations.
Washington, D.C
(QUESTION 3 In.order to determine if the reactor control room for the Susquehanna SES is designed to meet a postulated hazardous/toxic chemical release an analysis of truck accidents within a radius of five miles of the station was undertaken.-
U.S.
Route 11 is the only major highway within the five-mile radius of the station.
Both Interstates 80 and 81 are located outside this five-mile radius and were not considered in this analysis.
It was ysqumed that an occurrence of 1.0 x 10 7 per year was an acceptable risk<2>.
The determination requires information on the frequency of hazardous shipments per year along U.S.
Route ll, the accident probability per mile per year, reportable hazardous/toxic chemical discharge(s) per year, and the safe distance to the reactor control room.
In a review of both state and federal highway accident statistics, it was impossible to determine the number of shipments traversing U.S.
Route ll in the vicinity of the Susquehanna SES.
In addition, most of the non-local traffic use the interstate system (I-80 and I-81) rather than U.S.
Route 11.
Therefore, to quantify the transportation data along U.S.
Route 11, PPSL surveyed in person essentially all manufacturing industries (approximately
- 60) along the.U.S.
Route ll corridor between the Interstate 80 interchange near Lime Ridge, Pa.
and the crossing of the Susquehanna River at 1<est Pittston, Pa.
This survey included indus-tries -within a one-half mile radius on either side of the highway.
Each of the industries in the surveyed area was questioned as to their use of hazardous and toxic materials, the types,
- amounts, mode of transport, frequency and route.
Of the sixty industries there were seven that used hazardous materials and six of these firms knew that transport of their materials was not alorig U.S.
11 within the five-mile radius.
The seventh firm received one shipment per month (12 per year) of hazar-dous materials but was unaware of the route.
According to a study performed by Brobst
, the accident frequency of trucks carrying hazardous material resulting in a spill is approximately 1.7 x 10-6 per mile of road traveled per year.
In addition the reportable hazardous/toxic chemical discharge per year is 9.3 x 10 The accident probabilities for U.S.
Route Il are as follows:
Tri s ear Accident Probabilit mi r x Re ortable Hazardous Dischar e ear 1.2 x 10 1.7 x 10-9.3 x 10-
= Probabilit mi ~r 1;9 x 10-7 Shipments of liazardous materials per month from this one firm include 4-6 barrels of naphtha Utk and P grades and 4-6 barrels 'in total of xylene, toluene or Stoddards Solvent.
A naphtha spilf yeas not evaluated because it is a solid and is not an inhalation hayaqd(5).
Xylene, toluene and Stoddards Solvent have comparable toxicities
'L5>. However,'.since the toxicity level of xylene is listed in Reg.
Guide 1.78(1) it was. used as the critical substance in this analysis.
This approximate weight for each shipment of hazardous materials is approximately 5000 pounds.
In Pennsylvania, the vehicle weight limit for large semi-trailer trucks is 72,000 pounds.
The approximate truck. weight is 40,000 pounds and the maximum weight of hazardous materials would be 32,000 pounds.
This weight is used in the calculations for hazardous materials instead of the estimated weight of 5,000 pounds.
Under the worst case meteorological condj$ jons (Pasquill F-Stability) using Tables C-1 and C-2 of Reg.
Guide 1.78<~j, the number of pounds of hazardous materials that require consi-deration in accident analysis of a type 8 control room at the Susquehanna SES, at a distance of 0.3 to 0.5 miles is 2,300 equivalent pounds of a hazardous material.
From the data provided from these tables for xylene, the equivalent weight calculated was 1,000 pounds.
Since the control room is a greater distance than 0.3 miles from U.S.
Route 11, hazardous chemical, accidents need not be considergd.
The overall probability of the hazardous/toxic truck accident along U.S.
Route ll affecting the reactor control room is:
~bbiii i
i<<
I
(.1
~i1i
~
1.9 x 10 7
0.3 5.7 x 10 8 The probability of a truck accident al'ong U.S.
Route 11, containing hazardous materials, affecting the reactor control room-is less probable than 1.0 x 10-7 per year, therefore in accordance with Reg.
Guide 1.91(2),
these risk estimates are acceptable.
REFERENCES (1)
"Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release,"
Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide, 1.78, June, 1974.
(2)
"Evaluation of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transpor'tation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plant Sikes," Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission, Regulatory Guide, 1.91, Rev.
1, February, 1978.
(3)
Brobst, W.A., "Transportation accidents:
How probable?",
Nuclear
- News, May 1973, pp. 48-54.
(4)
Rawls, R.L., "Chemical transport - coping with disasters,"
Chem.
5 Engr.
- News, November 24, 1980.
(5)
"Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials," N.I. Sax Editor, 5th Edition, 1979.
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