ML18025B911
| ML18025B911 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1983 |
| From: | Kammer D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B912 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8301310096 | |
| Download: ML18025B911 (33) | |
Text
DOCKET 05000260 I
)EGULATORY:ORMATION OISTRIBUTION SYQM (RIBS)
'CCESSION NBR:8301310096 DOC ~ DATE: 83/01/25 NOTARIZED:
YES FACIL:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station~
Unit 2q Tennessee AUTHBNAME AUTHOR AFP ILIATION KAMPERgD ~ Ss Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP ~ NAME REC IP IENT AFFILIATION DENTONgH ~ RE Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director
SUBJECT:
Forwards final rept on indications in recirculation sys manifoldsRept includes assessment of indications 8 action plan for resolution of problem, Linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis will be submitted by 830204, DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 3'740t 400 Chestnut Str eet Tower IX January 25, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
In the Matter of the Tennessee Valley Authority Docket.No.
50-260 Enclosed is the final report on indications discovered in the recirculation system manifold at the Br owns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2.
The enclosed report is the assessment of the indications discovered and the action plan for resolution.
This report was discussed with your staff and Region II representatives in a meeting on January 6,
1983.
The enclosed report references the Linear Elastic, Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) analysis performed by General Electric Company.
This LEFM analysis and results were presented to the NRC staff in the January 6
meeting.
Xt is not included in the enclosure but will be submitted the week of February 4, 1983.
As requested by the NRC staff, the LEFM analysis will correlate throughwall crack size with leak detection limits to demonstrate the "leak before break" capability of the piping.
As discussed with the Browns Ferry Project Manager, R. J. Clark of your staff, your staff's review of our enclosed report can proceed without the
'EFM analysis.
As a result of NRC staff concerns expressed in our January 6 meeting, TVA has taken the following actions.
We have performed a dye-penetrant examination on the outside diameter of the suspect welds.
Also, the redundancy of the leak detection tape was doubled making the complete loss of the leak detection function extremely remote.
Xn addition, we are making the following commitments in response to discussions with your staff in our January 6 meeting.
- 1. If during the next cycle of operation leakage is suspected in either of the two welds, or if leak detection is lost in either of the two
- welds, NRC will be promptly notified. If either of these events
- occur, TVA will proceed to monitor and record unidentified leakage at least every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to ensure that the technical specification limit of 5 gpm is not reached.
83013i0096 830i25 PDR ADOCK 05000260 P
PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer
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Mr. Harold R. Denton January 25, 1983 2.
NRC Region II will be notified when accelerometer data acquisition starts,and a report documenting results will be submitted within 60 days after completion of the test.
3.
The welds in question will be reexamined at the next unit 2 r efueling outage and the results compared to the current examination results for assessment of any potential crack gr owth.'ased on the above action plan which includes
( 1) justification by
- analysis, (2) installation of instrumentation to assist in assessing vibrational effects, and (3) installation of sensors near the two suspect welds to ensure early leak detection, TVA concludes that the detected cracks are unique to unit 2, they will not affect safe operation of the unit, and that star tup as planned on February 16, 1983 is justified.
If your staff has any problems with our approach, please inform us immediately.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
~E.. Subscrib
-.a sworn to efore me this day of D. S.
Kammer Nuclear Engineer 1983 ~
Notary Public My Commission Expires Enclosure cc (Enclosur e):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN:
James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. R. J. Clark Browns Ferry Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland 20014
) ~ I "ft'-
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'1
r owns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit Recirculation Manifold Indications Assessment and Action Plan FINAL REPORT Bac~k round The recent discovery of throughwall intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in the thick-wall recirculation piping at Nine Mile Point unit 1 has resulted in an increased concern to the BWR IGSCC issue, particularly for larger pipes.
As a result, NRC issued IE bulletin 82-03 which requires that inspections of increased sensitivity be performed by BWR licensees whose plants are currently in or scheduled to be in a refueling mode or extended outage through January 31, 1983.
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2 is currently near the end of an extended outage and the IE bulletin 82-03 inspections are complete.
The completed inspections, which were performed by LMT, Inc., on 40 class 1 welds did not reveal any unacceptable IGSCC indications.
As a result of indications that were found in a sweepolet at Hatch unit 2, NRC region II inspectors requested that TVA examine a sweepolet-to-manifold
)oint nearest the manifold end cap.
TVA proceeded to perform a preliminary examination on sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 in loop B and found unacceptable indications.
LMT was then called back to Browns Ferry to examine sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 and three additional sweepolet-to-manifold welds.
LMT found three unacceptable indications in weld KR 36 and one unacceptable indication in the loop A sweepolet-to-manifold weld
)oint nearest the end cap (KR-2-14).
As a result of the unacceptable indication in KR-2-14, the four remaining sweepolet-to-manifold welds were examined.
No additional unacceptable indications were found.
Descri tion of the Indications The unacceptable indications which were found in the loop B sweepolet-to-manifold joint nearest the end cap (KR-2-36) were determined to be in the heat-affected zone (HAZ) of the manifold, and their orientations looking down toward the sweepolet were approximately 1:30, 4:00, and 5:00 o'lock positions assuming a 12:00 o'lock reference position in the direction toward the manifold end cap.
.The indication which was found in the loop A
sweepolet-to-manifold )oint nearest the end cap (KR-2-14) was also determined to be in the HAZ of the manifold, and its orientation looking down toward the sweepolet was approximately at the 1:30 o'lock position assuming a 12:00 o'lock reference position in the direction toward the
'anifold end cap.
All of the indications were interpreted by LMT to be cracks and were determined to be approximately 1-1/4 inches in length and 20-percent wall thickness in depth.
A detailed report summarizing the ultrasonic inspections has been prepared by LMT and submitted to TVA."
TVA proceeded to drain the recirculation lines so that radiography could be performed on the two welds in the four areas where the UT indications were found.
The radiography was performed by Industrial laboratories, Inc.
The technique involved double-wall shots taken with a 100-curie iridium source and M-type film.
Source location was such that straight shots-as well as various angle shots were made in the areas containing the indications.
The sensitivity level was 2T.
The X-rays confirmed the evidence of cracklike indications in the 4:00 o'lock and 5:00 o'lock positions of sweepolet-to-manifol'd weld KR-2-36.
The X-rays could not confirm the presence of cracklike indications in the 1:30 o'lock position of weld KR-2-36 nor in the 1:30 o'lock position of weld KR-2-14; however, these X-rays have been sent to Aptec Engineering for image enhancement.
Preliminary results from Aptec confirm the cracklike indication in the 1:30 o'lock position of weld KR-2-36.
Based on the ultrasonic examinations pet formed by LMT and the radiography, performed by Industrial Laboratories, it is TVA's position that three small cracks exist in sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-36 and one small crack exists in sweepolet-to-manifold weld KR-2-14.
Because the original shop X-rays and the ASME Section XI preservice examinations did not reveal any similar indications in these
- areas, TVA believes that these cracks are service induced.
Assessment of Indications TVA does not believe that the detected indications are the result of IGSCC indications because shop records show that both joints KR-2-36 and KR-2-14 were solution annealed after the final welding was complete and therefore are not sensitized.
This has been verified by review of the original shop radiographs and the original heat treatment records.
Also, metallography was performed by. TVA adjacent to and in shop weld KR-2-36'loop B) and in shop weld KR-2-14 (loop A).
Both welds were examined in the area of the indications and had solution-annealed microstructures.
The pipe adjacent to shop weld KR-2-36 was tested using in-place, electrolytic-oxalic acid etch (ASTM A262, practice A).
No sensitization was found using this method.
Additionally, delta ferrite readings taken by TVA in the shop welds showed less than, 1 percent delta ferrite, whereas the field welds adjacent to the headers had 8-to 10-percent delta ferrite.
This low level indicates that the delta ferrite present from welding was transformed to austenite by the solution heat treatments.
The metallurgical report describing these findings is attached at the end of this report.
TVA believes that the indications were fatigue induced for the following reasons.
There was a past problem with recirculation pump flow-induced vibrations and audible noise in. the general area of the unit 2 reactor.
TVA therefore believes that there is a strong possibility that this phenomenon caused vibrations in the recirculation piping system.
This problem was discovered in December 1979. If fatigue is the real cause, TVA believes that the two sweepolet-to-manifold joints with unacceptable indications would be the most likely locations to experience fatigue problems because the amplitude of vibration is expected to be greater near the free ends (capped ends) of the 22-inch recirculation manifold.
This greater amplitude would then result in'higher cyclic stress levels in the suspect sweepolet joints.
Also, the locations and orientations of the indications in the manifold HAZ are where one would expect fatigue cracking caused by vibration-induced bending moments on the sweepolets because the stress levels in the area of the indications are higher.
This has been documented by past research conducted by Battelle Memorial Institute relative to fatigue in sweepolet branch connections (previously sent to NRC).2 TVA determined that the audible noise was due to a resonant frequency that was generated by the recirculation pumps when they were operating at approximately 80-percent capacity.
TVA has eliminated this
noise problem by operating the pumps at different speeds during startup and during normal operation as the unit passes through these critical points.
If fatigue cracks were initiated as a result of these vibrations, TVA believes that the driving force has been eliminated.
In response to a question that was raised during TVA's presentation to NRC on January 6,
- 1983, TVA stated that the OD surfaces of welds KR-2-14 and KR-2-36 had not been liquid penetrant examined.
Because of this concern, TVA performed a documented liquid penetrant examination of these welds on January 10, 1983.
The welds were evaluated in accordance with the acceptance criteria of ASME Sections III and XI and both were found to be acceptable.
Action Plan Two basic options are available to disposition the cracks that were found during the subject inspection:
(1) repair by welding or (2) perform a linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) analysis to demonstrate that the flaws will not propagate to an unacceptable level during the next cycle of operation and monitor the two welds for any service-induced stresses.
TVA ruled out performing a repair at this time for the following reasons.
Because the flaws are assumed to be service
- induced, a throughwall repair would be involved.
This would involve extremely high personnel exposure
- rates, as well as posing problems with back purging and moisture.
In addition, the welding would sensitize the manifold in the excavated areas and a worse condition could develop as a result of a throughwall repair.
The "backlay" repair technique, which has been used by other utilities, has not been demonstrated to be acceptable for sweepolet-to-header welds and in TVA's opinion is not an acceptable repair technique for fatigue-type cracking at this time.
Because of the many problems associated with any type of weld repair, it is TVA's decision to provide justification for continued operation in the "as is" condition.
This justification will consist of ( 1) performing LEFM analysis to show that the indications will not grow to unacceptable sizes during the current fuel cycle, (2) installing instrumentation (accelerometers, etc.) near both suspect welds to assess the vibrations, (3) installing moisture-sensitive tape near the suspect joints to monitor for leakage at these joints, and (4) reinspecting the suspect welds at the next refueling outage and determining if any crack growth has occurred.'he following discussion presents the details of this justification.
1.0 Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM)
An LEFM analysis has been performed by General Electric Company (GE) to predict the growth of the indications during the next fuel cycle.
The analysis predicts growth by using the anticipated system loading from the design stress report.
The fatigue crack growth as well as IGSCC crack growth (conservatively assuming 0.2 ppm 02 environment and a furnace-sensitized condition)
.was determined.
In both cases, the end-of-cycle sizes of the indications are shown to be acceptable using the criteria in the proposed Appendix X to ASME Section XI.
The GE analysis will also correlate allowable throughwall crack size with leak detection
capabilities to demonstrate the "leak before break" capability of austenitic stainless steel piping.
TVA will submit this report to NRC under, separate cover before startup of unit 2.3 2.0 Vibration and Dia nostic Instrumentation As stated previously, in December
- 1979, TVA detected a loud audible noise in the unit 2 reactor and control areas at some point during startup with the recirculation pumps in a balanced flow mode.
TVA suspects that the noise emanated from the recirculation piping and that these vibrations were the principal driving force in initiating the cracks; therefore, TVA will conduct a vibration and diagnostic test of the recirculation system piping during startup and operation of the unit.
During this test, TVA will attempt to reproduce the noise that was hear d and will monitor various parameters to determine the cause.
In addition, any excessive vibrations in the vicinity of welds KR-2-14 and KR-2-36 during normal operation will be factored into the GE analysis to determine whether the predicted crack growth rates are affected.
Although the test and associated instrumentation are considered temporary by TVA, the installation of all instrumentation, mounting brackets, elyctrical cable, etc., will be performed in accordance with TVA-approved procedures.
As discussed in the meeting with NRC on January 6,
- 1983, TVA anticipates that all pertinent data associated with the test will be taken within the first two months of operation.
NRC Region II will be notified when TVA begins collecting data so that NRC may observe the test data.
In "addition, TVA will submit a written report of the results of the data within 60 days after the test has been completed.
Four types of test instrumentation will be installed on the unit 2 recirculation system.for the purposes of this test.
Each type is briefly explained below.
As stated previously, this test is temporary; and once the pertinent data is collected, the instrumentation will be removed as unit conditions permit.
2.1 Accelerometers Endevco model 2273 AM20 high-temperature, radiation-hardened accelerometers will be used to detect the higher frequency recirculation system piping vibration.
The accelerometers are shown schematically in figures 2, 3, and 4.
The locations are indicated by the symbols V, T, or H, representing vertical, tangential, or horizontal acceler ometers.
A list will be maintained identifying the sensor, its charge converter, field cable number, penetration identification, and pin identification for each test point designation.
2.2 Proximit Probes A Bentley Nevada 7200 series proximity transducer system will be used to monitor the recirculation pump speeds.
Each pump will have two transducers mounted for this purpose.
2.3 Position Transducers Houston Scientific International; Inc.,'series 1850 position transducers will be used to measure thermal and low-frequency pipe movement. If the transducers cannot be physically mounted far enough from the recirculation pipes, then some sort of cooling air bath will be needed.
The transducers must also be wrapped with lead to decrease the amount of radiation exposure.
If available, Ailtech model SG125 high-temperature, weldable strain gages will be used to measure the static and dynamic strains in the recirculation loop piping during the unit heatup and operation.
Figures 5 and 6 indicate the locations where the gages will be installed.
Each gage will be individually welded, in place, using a low energy capacitive discharge welding technique in accordance with ASME Sections III and XI. After installation, each gage will be protected from damage by wrapping it with a silicon rubber mat and by indenting the mirror insulation to prevent surface contact strains.
Cabling from each strain gage will be routed from underneath the insulation through the holes at the accelerometer mounting clamps.
As stated during the meeting with NRC on January 6,
- 1983, TVA will install the strain gages as availability permits.
3.0 Leak Detection The leak detection system to be installed on the reactor recirculation piping in the areas of the crack indications is the Techmark Limited System TUM 100.
~ This system utilizes a moisture-sensitive tape as the active element.
The tape consists of a pair of spaced copper foil conductors separated by a polyester webbing impregnated with a chloridefree salt.
In the dry (normal) condition, the tape has a
resistance in the megohm range.
When moisture or saturated steam reaches the tape, the resistance drops to the 10,000-ohm range.
This change activates the display/control equipment to the alarm condition.
The moisture-sensitive tape is fastened to small steel plates which are strapped to the outside of the piping insulation.
A 1/2-inch-diameter guide tube penetrates the piping insulation and provides a
path from the pipe OD to the"tape mounting plate (see figure 7).
Any moisture or steam which might escape as a result of a throughwall pipe crack will activate the moisture-sensitive tape through the guide tube.
The System 100 is reportedly sensitive to leak rates of 0.1 gpm.
The system to be installed in the vicinity of welds KR-2-14 and KR 36 will consist of three loops per weld, or a total of six loops.
Each loop operates independently from all other loops and consists of two moisture sensors, one transducer, and all necessary cable.
To
,provide separation, two loops from one weld will exit through one penetration while the third loop will exit through a different penetration.
This is shown schematically in figure 8.
This combination of sensors provides a double redundant system such that
during operation, in the unlikely event two loops are lost on 'one of the welds, leak detection capability is still intact.
The locations of the sensors at each weld are as follows:
two near the top, two near the pipe centerline, and two near the bottom (see figure 9).
Outside of containment each loop will be connected to a transducer whose output is connected to the control/alarm cabinet.
This configuration places all electronic components outside primary containment to allow for system maintenance.
The control/alarm circuitry performs continuous scanning of the detectors, transducers, and control circuitry to detect any system failure or the indication of moisture at any of the sensors.
In the event of any alarm, the system will identify the loop.
The control/alarm center will be located in the reactor building and will be monitored once per day by the plant Engineering Section.
The following discussion describes the procedure TVA will use to evaluate any alarm from the leak detection system.
(This is also shown schematically in figure 10.)
In the event that an alarm is indicateg by two of the three loops monitoring one weld (or two of two loops if only two loops are operable; or one loop if only one loop is operable),
TVA will notify NRC of suspected throughwall leakage of the suspect weld.
At this time plant personnel will measure and record unidentified leakage within the containment in accordance with plant surveillance
" instructions to ensure that the leakage is below 5 gpm.
Plant personnel will continue to monitor and record leakage as conditions warrant.
In the event that an alarm is indicated by one of the three loops monitoring the weld (or one of two loops if only two loops are operable),
the nuclear central office will be notified and an evaluation will be performed to identify the cause of the alarm..If the alarm is due to a failure of one of the loops of the system, Techmark Limited representatives will be netified so that the loop can be repaired.
If at any time during the next cycle of operation all three loops of either weld KR-2-14 or KR-2-36 are determined to be inoperable, NRC will be notified.
Until such a time when the system can be repaired, plant personnel will proceed to monitor and record unidentified leakage within the containment once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in accordance with plant surveillance instructions to ensure that the leakage is below 5 gpm.
4.0 Ins ections at Next Refuelin Outa e
The two sweepolet-to-manifold joints will be ultrasonically examined again at the next refueling outage using similar techniques to those used during this outage, and the results will.be compared to the current examination results for assessment of any potential crack growth.
Conclusion As a result of NRC comments during the meeting on January 6,
1983, this report addresses the following NRC concerns:
( 1)
NRC Region II will be notified when TVA begins to collect vibration data; (2) TVA will submit a written report of the results of the vibration and diagnostic testing within 60 days after the testing is complete; (3) the LEFM analysis will correlate throughwall crack size with leak detection limits to demonstrate the "leak before break" capability of the piping; (4) if during the next cycle of operation leakage is suspected in either of the two welds or if leak detection is lost in either of the two welds, NRC will be notified; and (5) if either of these events occur, TVA will proceed to monitor and record unidentified leakage at least "every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to ensure that the technical specification limit of 5 gpm is not reached.
Based on the above action plan which includes
( 1) Justification by
- analysis, (2) installation of instrumentation to assist in assessing vibrational effects, and (3) installation of sensors near the two suspect welds to ensure early leak detection, TVA concludes that the detected cracks are unique to unit 2 and will not affect safe operation of the unit.
References 1.
- Report, "Browns Ferry Unit 2 - Recirc Pipe Weld Examinations-Tennessee Valley Authority," November/December 1982 - TVA-038/039 2..
"Final Report on Fatigue Evaluation of Sweepolet Branch Connections in Carbon Steel Pipe to Bonney Forge Division, Bonney Forge and Foundry, Inc.," May 15,
- 1970, by C. E. Jaske and H. Mindlin, Battelle Memorial Institute 3.
Linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis by General Electric Company for TVA (to be transmitted under separate cover).
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