Text

Insp Rept 50-400/85-28 on 850722-26.Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure for Baseplate Grout Insp
	ML18019A357
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/19/1985
From:	Blake J, Liu W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18019A355	List: ML18019A354; ML18019A356; ML18019A357;
References
	50-400-85-28, NUDOCS 8509040294
	Download: ML18019A357 (16)
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UNITEDSTATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323

Report No.:

50-400/85-28

Licensee:

Carolina

Power and Light Company

P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh,

NC

27602

Docket No.:

. 50-400

Facility Name:

Harris

1

Inspection

Condu ted:

July 22-26,

1985

Inspector: W..

u

Approved by:

a e,

ec son

le

n sneering

Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

License No.:

CPPR-158,

8////d~

Date Signed

/f

a

e

igne

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine,

unannounced

inspection entailed

34 inspector-hours

on site

in the areas of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related

piping systems

( IEB 79-14),

pipe suport baseplate

designs

using concrete

expansion

anchor bolts (IEB 79-02),

licensee

action

on previous

enforcement matters,

and inspector followup

item.

Results:

One violation was identified - Failure to follow procedure for base-

plate grout inspection - paragraph

7.e.

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REPORT DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees

E. Wagner,

Engineering

General

Manager

G. Forehand,

Director,

QA/QC

N. Chiangi, Manager,

QA/QC

L. Loflin, Manager.,

Harris Engineering

C. Bohanan, Director, Regulatory Compliance

J. McKay, Resident

Engineer - Civil

C. McDonald, Pipe Hanger Resident

Engineer

J. Nevill, Principal Engineer

K. Hate, Principal

QA Engineer

R. Haney, Supervisor,

QC/CI, Mechanical/Welding

R. Calabro, Assistant Resident

Engineer

L. Garner, Civil/Mechanical Unit Supervisor

M. Hutton, Project Engineer

Other licensee

employees

contacted

included

QC inspectors,

engineers,

and

office personnel.

NRC Resident

Inspector

R. Prevatte,

Senior Resident

Inspector - Construction

Attended exit interview

Exit Interview

The inspection

scope

and findings were

summarized

on July 26,

1985, with

those

persons

indicated in paragraph

1 above.

The inspector

described

the

areas

inspected

and

discussed

in detail

the inspection

findings listed

below.

No dissenting

comments

were received

from the licensee.

(Open) Violation 400/85-28-01,

Failure to follow procedure for baseplate

grout inspection,

paragraph 7.e(1).

(Open)

Inspector

Followup

Item 400/85-28-02,

Verification of baseplate

grouting for pipe support installations,

paragraph

7.e(2).

1

The licensee

did not identify as proprietary

any of the materials

provided

to or reviewed

by the inspector during this inspection.

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3.

Licensee Action on Previous

Enforcement Matters

4.

(Closed)

Unresolved

Item 400/85-19-01,

Mechanical

Snubber

Nonconformance

Reportability.

This item concerned

the reportability of snubber

tests prior

to actual

installation.

Of 1417

snubbers

tested

by the licensee

as of

June

14,

1985,

a total of 87 snubbers

failed the drag

and or acceleration

test

by utilizing an allowable drag limit of 1% of the rated load capacity.

With the approval of the

FCR H-1718 for which the allowable drag limit was

raised

to

2A of the rated

load capacity,

the failure of snubbers

tested

reduced to 35.

This was equivalent to a failure rate of 2.5Ã. It should

be

noted that the

snubber

manufacturer's

acceptance

testing

has

an allowable

drag limit of 5%.

This item is considered

resolved.

(Closed)

Unresolved

Item 400/85-19-02,

Pipe

support

inspection

unresolved

questions.

This item involved three

supports

that were identified by the

NRC inspector.

A review of the response

from the licensee

indicates that

support

1-CS-H-468 will serve its intended function once the pipe is filled

with water

and

the preset

pins are

removed

from the spring

can;

support

1-SI-H-1286

has

the correct lubrite plate

because

the licensee

purchased

only one type of lubrite plate for use at the Harris site;

and information

number

33 for support

1-MS-H-444 was

endorsed

by Harris Plant Engineering

Service

(HPES).

The

design

organization will detail

skewness if they

consider it to be critical.

This unresolved

item is considered

closed.

Unresolved

Items.

Unresolved

items were not identified during the inspection.

5.

Independent

Inspection Effort

The inspector

conducted

a general

inspection of the containment building and

the auxiliary building to observe

construction

progress

and construction

activities

such

as welding, material

handling

and control, housekeeping

and

storage.

6.

Within the areas

examined,

no violations or deviations

were identified.

Inspector

Followup Item

(Closed)

Inspector

Followup Item 400/84-02-01,

Unanalyzed

stress

problem

anchor loads.

This item concerned

the interaction of category I piping with

non-category

I piping for which loads were generated

for anchor

design.

The

licensee

had

completed its review of the seismic/non-seismic

interface

anchors utilized at the Harris site.

The licensee

identified 220 seismic/

non-seismic

interface

anchors.

104 of these

anchors

were

found to

be

acceptable

as

designed.

The remaining

116 anchors

were required to have

modifications

on the

non-seismic

side of these

anchors.

The licensee's

evaluation with respect

to the

above

concern

appeared

to

be acceptable.

This item is considered

closed.

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7.
Pipe
Support
Baseplate
Designs
Using Concrete
Expansion
Anchor Bolts (IE
Bulletin 79-02)
a.
Documents
and Procedures
Review
The
inspector
reviewed
portions
of the
following documents
and
procedures
pertaining
to safety-related
pipe supports
and
concrete
expansion
anchor
bolts to determine whether appropriate
procedures
have
been established
and whether they comply with NRC requirements
and the
licensee
commitments.
7. 1.A, General
Design Guide for Civil/Structural Engineering Unit,
April 18,
1985
Work Procedure
WP-29, Grouting, July 16,
1985
Technical
procedure
TP-37, Grouting inspection,
March 13,
1985
NPS baseplate
program user's
manual,
March 21,
1984
b.
Baseplate Flexibility Consideration
A review of the aforementioned
documents
with respect to IE Bulletin 79-02
requirements
reveals
that
the
licensee
has
employed
the
NPS
Baseplate
Analysis
program
which calculates
anchor bolt loads for
flexible baseplates
using
an economical finite element
approach.
The
use of flexible plate theory provides
a more conservative
analysis
of
anchor bolt pullout loads
than rigid plate theory.
c.
Factor of Safety for Anchor Bolts
The inspector verified allowable loads
used in the design of concrete
expansion
anchor bolts.
The inspector
found that the criteria set
forth met the bulletin requirements.
d.
Tension-Shear
Interaction
The inspector
noted that anchor bolts subjected
to both tensile
and
shear
loads
were being designed for the combined effects of both types
of loads.
The method of combining tension
and shear
was through the
use of the interaction equation.
The licensee
had
employed
a linear
type interaction equation for calculations of anchor bolt loads.
As a
result,
these
anchor bolts were more conservatively
designed
than those
by an elliptical type interaction equation.
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e.
Field Inspection of Baseplates
and Anchor Bolts
The inspector
conducted
a general
inspection of pipe support baseplates
and concrete
expansion
anchor bolts in the containment building and the
reactor auxiliary building to determine
whether the installations
were
accomplished
in accordance
with the design
drawings
and the applicable
procedures.
In general,
the appearance
of the installations
was
good
with the exception of two pipe support baseplates
identified below:
Support
No.
1-RH-H-19,
Rev.
10S2,
in the residual
heat
removal
system
was inspected.
It was
noted that portions of the support
assembly
were
not installed in accordance
with the applicable
procedur'es.
One
of the
wall
mounted
baseplate
which
had
previously
been
inspected
by
a civil inspector
was not properly
grouted,
in that there
appeared
to be voids in three places
behind
the baseplate.
One void was approximately 3/4" in width,
1 1/2"
in depth
and 4" in length.
The other void was 1/2" in width, 2"
in depth
and 3" in length.
The third void was 3/4" in width, 6"
in depth
and
6" in length.
The inspector
held discussions
with
licensee
representatives
with regard to the
above
concern.
The
licensee
subsequently
took
immediate
action
by conducting
a
special
training meeting
with the
grouting
inspectors
and
by
performing
an inspection of 20 baseplates
for which grouting was
specified
by the design
drawings.
No major discrepancies
were
identified by the licensee.
Paragraph
3.0 of Harris work procedure
l<P-29, Grouting, requires
that grouting materials
between
concrete
and steel
baseplates
are
in place to assure
a complete filling of the designated
void and
to assure
complete contact
between
the grout and the baseplate
at
all times.
Paragraph
3.3 of technical
procedure
TP-37, Grouting
Inspection,
requires
that
any
gaps
found between
the grout
and
baseplate
interface shall
be considered
structural
repair.
The
responsible
engineer
shall
be notified in the event that gaps are
discovered
during
post
placement
inspections
of
grouted
baseplates.
Discrepancies
identified from the aforementioned
support assembly
indicate that portions of the inspection activities
had not been
performed in accordance
with the
above
procedural
requirements.
This is
a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and is
identified as Violation 400/85-28-01,
Failure to follow procedure
for baseplate
grout inspection.
(2)
Support
No. 1-CC-H-1588,
Rev.
OS2, in the component cooling system
was
examined.
It was noted that the grout between
the concrete
and the baseplate
was not in place.
A review of the inspection
package
revealed
that the baseplate
anchor
placement
report was
issued
on
March 28,
1984.
The final
hanger
inspection
was
completed
on July 16, 1984.
The as-built inspection
was completed
on
May 5,
1985.
The inspector
held dicussions
with licensee
'f
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representatives
with respect
to the grout placement.
It appears
that
no mechanism
has
ever
been established
by the licensee
for
coordination
between
the civil inspection
group
and the hanger
inspection
group
to
ensure
that grout
placement
between
the
concrete
and
the
baseplate
was
not overlooked.
The licensee
representatives
indicated that the
open
items list for building
turnover would include grouting, but baseplate
grouting for pipe
support installations
had not specifically
been
addressed.
The
inspectoi
concludes
that the above
concerns
need to
be monitored
during future inspections.
This will be inspector
followup item
400/85-28-02, "Verification of Baseplate
Grouting for Pipe Support
Installations".
Within the areas
inspected,
one violation was identified.
8.
Seismic
Analysis for As-built Safety-Related
Piping
Systems
(IE Bulletin 79-14)
a.
Documents
and procedures
Review
The
inspector
reviewed
portions
of the following documents
and
procedures
pertaining
to safety-related
pipe
supports
and
piping
systems
to
determine
whether
appropriate
procedures
have
been
established
and
whether
they
comply with
NRC requirements
and
the
licensee
commitments.
7.2. I, Design Guidelines for Piping Stress
Analysis, July 19,
1985
7.2.H, 79-14 Stress
analysis verification of safety-related
piping
systems,
April 19,
1985
Work procedure
WP-110, Installation of g and Non-g Pipe Hanger
and
Supports,
June 7,
1985
b.
Piping Stress
Analysis Evaluation
The inspector
held discussions
with licensee
representatives
in the
areas
of piping stress
analyses
associated
with thermal
movement
and
seismic applications.
It was found that the analysis
methods
used for
the stress
analyses
were generally conservative.
This included the use
of low damping values
and the enveloped
seismic
response
spectra
at
various locations.
c ~
Pipe Support Design Calculations
Review
The inspector
reviewed
portions
of the follow design
calculations
associated
with the safety-related
pipe support
and restraint systems.
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Su
ort Number
Pi
e
S stem
1-CC-H-751, Rev.
2S1
1-CC-H-753,
Rev.
3S1
1-CC-H-508,
Rev.
4E
1-RH-H-16, Rev.
2S3
1-RH-H-22, Rev.
9S1
1-SI-H-95, Rev.
3S1
1-SI-H-98, Rev.
S2
Component Cooling
(CC)
CC
CC
Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR)
RHR
Safety Injection (SI)
SI
Discrepancies identified during this review
The above design calculations
were reviewed for conformance to analysis
criteria, applicable
code,
NRC requirements,
and the licensee
commit-
ments.
In addition,
these
calculations
were
evaluated
during the
review for thoroughness,
clarity, consistency,
and
accuracy.
The
inspector
noted that design calculations for support
no.
1-CC-H-751,
Rev.
2S1,
had
minor discrepancies
in that
the existing
design
calculations
which were performed
by the Bergen-Paterson
support group
contained
errors in two places.
Member
item 4 of the design
drawing
showed
a load of 551 pounds
in the axial direction.
The correct
load
was
559 pounds.
The design
drawing
showed another
load of 492 pounds
at Elev.
241'
8 1/2".
The licensee
representatives
was not able to
identify the 'source
of this load.
The correct
load,
when it was
considered
as
a component of the load of the
559 pounds,
would be 270
pounds
based
on
an angle of 61.08
degrees
from the horizontal line.
The latest
loads for the
support
design
were
much less
than
the
aforementioned
existing loads.
Therefore,
no further calculations
were
required.
The inspector
held discussions
with licensee
representative
with regard to the above error and noted that the
HPES was committed to
review all existing support
calculations
for design
adequacy.
The
inspector indicated that monitoring in this area
would be followed by
future inspections.
Pipe Support Field Inspections
The inspector
selected
and
examined
the following pipe supports that
had previously
been
gC inspected
for
a verification inspection
to
determine
the effectiveness
of the licensee's
program.
Su
ort Number
1-CC-H-508, Rev.
4E
1-CC-H-1588,
Rev.
OS2
1-RH-H-19, Rev.
10S2
1-SW-H-37, Rev.
6S2
1-BD-H-590, Rev.
SO
1-SI-H-165,
Rev.
2S2
Pi in
S stem
Component Cooling
(CC)
CC
Residual
Heat
Removal
Service
Water
Steam Generator
Blowdown
Safety Injection
Indicates discrepancy identified dur ing the inspection.
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The above six supports
were partially inspected
against their detail
drawings
for
configuration,
identification,
location,
fastener
.
installation, welds,
and damage/protection.
In general,
the appearance
of the supports
was
good
and the supports
were installed in accordance
with design
documents
with the exception
of one support identified
below:
(1)
Support
No. 1-CC-H-508,
Rev.
4E, in the component cooling system
was inspected.
It was
noted that the locknut at the, lower end of
the rigid strut was loose.
Appendix
F of Harris'P-110,
states
that
a locknut is required to have
snug tight against
the mating surface.
The snug tight is defined
as
the full effort of a man using
an ordinary wrench.
The
inspector
held discussions
with licensee
representatives
with
respect
to the
above concerns.
It was found that paragraph
3.2.3 of
Harris'P-141
provided the following assurance:
The 79-14 open items tracking list (OITL) shall
be used to control
the resolution
of minor discrepancies
to final accepted
pipe
supports.
These discrepancies
shall
be limited to minor hardware
items
such as:
replacing cotter pins, tightening jam nuts, etc.
The inspector
concludes
that the
above
concerns
need to be monitored
during future inspections.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
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