Text

Insp Rept 50-400/85-22 on 850528-31.Violation Noted: Inadequate Procedure Used for Welding Stainless Steel Piping & Failure to Follow Procedure for Control of Welding Consumables
	ML18019A268
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/17/1985
From:	Blake J, Hallstrom G; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18019A266	List: ML18019A265; ML18019A267; ML18019A268;
References
	50-400-85-22, NUDOCS 8507110805
	Download: ML18019A268 (18)
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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION

11

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W. pi

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323

Report No.:

50-400/85-22

Licensee:

Carolina

Power and Light Company

411 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh,

NC

27602

Docket No.:

50-400

Facility Name:

Shearon

Harris

Inspection

Conducted:

May 28 31,

1985

License No.:

CPPR-158

Inspector:

G. A.

H

s

Approved by:

~

J.

e, Sect

o

ng

ring Branc

Oiv s on of Rea

o

Safety

SUMMARY

ate Signed

Scope:

This routine,

unannounced

inspection entailed

38 inspector-hours

on site

in the

areas

of construction

progress,

licensee

action

on previous

enforcement

matters,

safety-related

piping

procedures,

safety-related

structures,

and

licensee identified items (50.55(e)).

Results:

Two violations

were identified

"Inadequate

Procedure

for Welding

Stainless

Steel

Piping", - paragraph

6.b,

and "Failure to Follow Procedure

for

Control of Welding Consumables"

paragraph

7.g.

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REPORT DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees

"R. A. Watson,

Vice President,

Harris Project

"R.'. Parsons,

Project General

Manager,

Completion Assurance

N. J. Chiangi,

Manager of Quality Assurance/Quality

Control

(QA/QC)

Harris Plant

R. Hanford,

Manager,

Welding

D. A. McGaw, Superintendent,

QA

~A. H. Rager,

Manager

Construction

Inspection (CI)

P.

Cook, Senior

QA/QC Specialist (Central Control)

E.

C. Mitchell, Resident

Engineer - Second Shift

J. Evatt, Welding Engineering

Superintendent

Second Shift

E. L. Betz,

QC Supervisor

NDE

M. D. Vernon, Superintendent - QC

L. P.

Capps,

Superintendent

Materials

K. A. Douglas,

QA/QC Specialist

"C. K. Wright, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

Other

licensee

employees

contacted

included

construction

craftsmen,

engineers,

technicians,

and office personnel.

Other Organization

J.

P. Kirk, Project Administrator, Daniel Construction

Company

NRC Resident

Inspector

R. L. Prevatte

"Attended exit interview

Exit Interview

The inspection

scope

and findings

were

summarized

on

May 31,

1985, with

those

persons

indicated

in paragraph

1 above.

The inspector described

the

areas

inspected

and

discussed

in detail

the

inspection

findings listed

below.

No di ssenting

comments

were received

from the licensee.

(Open)

Inspector

Followup Item 400/85-22-01,

Housekeeping

in Cable Trays-

paragraph

5.

(Open)

Violation 400/85-22-02,

Inadequate

Procedure

for Welding Stainless

Steel

Piping

paragraph

6.b.

(Open)

Inspector

Followup

Item 400/85-22-03,

Documentation

on

HVAC Duct

Welds - paragraph 7.d.(2).

(Open) Violation 400/85-22-04,

Failure to Follow Procedure

for Control of

Welding Consumables

- paragraph

7.g.

The licensee

did not identify as proprietary any of the materials

provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous

Enforcement Natters

a.

(Closed)

Unresolved

Item 400/83-25-08,

Potentially

Inadequate

Field

Change

Request

(FCR)

This

item

concerned

the

adequacy

of welding

acceptance

criteria

established

by FCR-H-979,

Revision

3 versus

compliance

with require-

ments of the

AWS Dl. 1 structural

welding code.

The inspector

had previously reviewed background

information concerning

NRC approval

of welding visual

acceptance

criteria

incorporated

in

CAR-2165-A-003,

Revi sion

10

(Inspection

Reports

Nos.

400/84-19,

400/84-35,

and 400/85-01).

The inspector

reviewed background

documentation

and acceptance

criteria

of FCR-H-979 in comparison

to the

AWS Dl. 1

Code

and

CAR-2165-A-003.

The inspector

concluded that

no criteria involved was less

stringent

than established

by CAR-2165-A-003.

This item is considered

closed.

b.

(Open)

Unresolved

Item 400/85-12-01,

Adequacy of Corrective Action to

Protect

Permanent

Plant Equipment

This item concerns

adequacy of corrective actions to protect permanent

plant

equipment.

During

an earlier

inspection

the

inspector

noted

damage to the cooling fins of HVAC Air Handler

No.

1AH-4 at elevation

286

on

Unit

1

containment.

This

damage

was

apparently

due

to

unauthorized

climbing

on

permanent

plant

equipment

by construction

craftsmen

who were completing piping weldments

on top of air handler

1AH-4.

The

inspector

had

been

informed that

climbing

on

permanent

plant

equipment

was

considered

an

unauthorized

live construction

load

and

prohibited

by paragraph

3. 10 of WP-48

"Temporary

Construction

Loads

Supported

from Permanent

Plant Components"

unless

the responsible

area

engineer

granted

a construction

load release.

Also, that

an earlier

gA

Surveillance

had

identified

unauthorized

application

of temporary

construction

loads (including unauthorized

climbing on

permanent

plant

equipment)

as

the

root

cause

of

damage

to other

permanent

plant

equipment.

Supporting

documentation

included written notification to

~

!'

all site personnel

prohibiting unauthorized

climbing on equipment which

was

issued

by the Daniel Project

General

Manager

on October 3,

1984,

and

Nonconformance

Report

(NCR)

No.

85-0490

issued

February

22,

1985,

which identified continuing problems in this area.

0'ognizant

licensee

personnel

informed

the

inspector

that

NCR

No.

85-0946

had

been

issued

on April 4,

1985,

and identified several

instances

of temporary

or live construction

loads

being

applied

to

permanent

plant

equipment

without proper

authorization.

Damage

to

equipment

had resulted

in one instance.

Corrective actions

included

modifications to WP-48 to improve its effectiveness

(each discipline is

now responsible

for issuing

load

releases

pertinent

to its work);

followup training of all

area

engineers

to

WP-48

requirements,

and

followup written notification

to all

site

personnel

prohibiting

unauthorized

climbing on permanent plant equipment.

Cognizant licensee

personnel

informed the inspector that all corrective

actions

of

NCR

No. 85-0946

were considered

complete,

The inspector

responded

that

a

construction

craftsman

had

been

observed

climbing

on

permanent

plant

equipment

without

proper

authorization

during this

inspection

as

reported in paragraph

5.

Cognizant licensee

personnel

stated that this

could be viewed as

an isolated

example

when considering

an overview of

corrective

actions

accomplished.

The inspector

informed the licensee

that this item will remain

open

pending

reassessment

of adequacy

of

corrective actions during

a future inspection.

4.

Unresolved

Items

Unresolved

items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Independent

Inspection

(92706)

Construction

Progress

The inspector

conducted

a general

inspection of the Unit 1 containment

and

reactor

power block outside containment to observe construction

progress

and

construction

activities

such

as

welding,

material

handling

and control,

housekeeping

and storage.

During the

above

inspection,

the

inspector

observed

a

HVAC construction

craftsman climbing on appurtenances

of exhaust

fan E-ll-1-4B-NNS in the fuel

handling building.

Cognizant licensee

personnel

informed the inspector that

a WP-48 load release

had not been

issued.

The inspector

reviewed documenta-

tion indicating that the craftsman

involved had

been

aware of restrictions

regarding live and temporary

construction

loads

on permanent

plant equip-

ment.

This item is further discussed

in paragraph

3.b.

During the above inspection,

the inspector

observed

a 2"x 12" x 8'caffold

board

on top of installed cable in cable tray no.

EGB-31 at column 33 and JV

line and approximate elevation

276 in the reactor auxiliary building (RAB).

After investigation,

cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed

the

inspector

that

no safety-related

cables

were

involved

and

no

damage

to installed

cables

had been identified.

However, that the condition observed

was not in

conformance with general

housekeeping

procedure

AP-X-02 and design drawing

No.

B060 sheet

16.

The inspector

stated that

NRC concern

in this area will

be identified as inspector followup item 400/85-22-01"

Housekeeping

in Cable

Trays

6.

Safety-Related

Piping Procedures

(Unit 1)(55161)

The

inspector

reviewed

welding

procedure

specifications

and

quality

assurance

procedures

for safety-related

piping

as

described

below to

determine whether applicable

code

and procedure

requirements

were being met.

The

applicable

code

for safety-related

piping is the

ASME

BLPV Code,

Section III, Subsections

NC and

ND, 1974 edition with Addenda through Winter

1976

(74W76).

Non-nuclear

safety-related

high energy piping identified as

seismic

Category

1, 2,

and 3, or Code

Classes,

1, 2,

and

3 piping

components,

systems at the

SHNPP Project

Installation of Piping

Control of Materials

and Equipment

that

may be harmful to stainless

steel

~

CQC-19,

Rev.

14

CQC-20,

Rev.

3

Weld Control

Post-Weld

Heat Treatment

During the

above

inspection,

the inspector

noted that

MP-07,

Rev.

19

was deficient

due to omission

of the

1.0

percent

maximum

oxygen

requirement

of upper-tier specification

SS

No.

031.

This requirement

is imposed to ensure

adequate

backpurge

when making butt welds with the

GTAW process.

Cognizant licensee

personnel

informed the inspector that

the deficiency was due to a typographical

error in paragraph

4.7.2. 1 of

'evision

19,

which was

issued

on

March 22,

1985.

Further, that as of

December

29,

1983,

a hold point had been established

requiring that

QC

inspectors

check purge

gas at fitup for all open butt stainless

steel

joints.

Further, that

even

though

CQC-19 referenced

MP-07 to enforce

this requirement,

QC inspectors

involved were knowledgeable

of and had

enforced

the

1 '

percent

maximum

oxygen 'equirement.

The inspector

noted that this matter was

a lack of conformance to 10

CFR, Appendix B,

Criterion V,

and

would

be

identified

as

violation

400/85-22-02

"Inadequate

Procedure for Welding Stainless

Steel Piping."

7.

Safety-Related

Structures

(Unit 1)

The

inspector

observed

welding activities for safety-related

structural

steel

and

HVAC ductwork, located inside containment,

and Seismic

1 supports

(pipe,

instrumentation,

and cable tray),

located

inside containment

and in

the reactor auxiliary building,

as

described

below to determine

whether

applicable

code

and procedure

requirements

were being met.

The applicable

code for structural

steel

and Seismic

1 supports is the

AWS D1.1 Structural

Welding

Code,

1975 revision.

The applicable

code for HVAC ductwork is the

AWS D1.3 Structural

Welding Code for Sheet Steel,

1978 revision.

a

0

Welding

Procedure

Specifications

and

Quality

Assurance

Procedures

(55151)

(1)

The

WPS

Review

documented

in paragraph

6.a for safety-related

piping

is

also

applicable

to

safety-related

structures.

Additional

WPSs

applicable

to the

weld joints listed in para-

graph 7.d.

were selected for review and

comparison

with the

ASME

Code

and

AWS Dl.3 as follows:

WPS

1Fl,

Rev.

11

1F2,

Rev.

2

525M1,

Rev.

3

525M2,

Rev.

3

Process

1/ 2/

= FCAW

FCAW

GMAW

~PR

63,

63A

63,

131

62A, 62B,

62C,

62D

86, 86A, 86B

1/

FCAW - Flux cored arc - welding

2/

GMAW Gas metal arc

welding

The

above

WPSs,

and their

supporting

Procedure

Qualification

Records

(PQRs)

were

reviewed

to

ascertain

whether

essential,

supplementary

and/or

nonessential

variables,

including

thermal

treatment,

were

consistent

with

Code

requirements;

whether

the

WPSs

were

properly qualified

and their

supporting

PQRs

were

accurate

and retrievable;

whether all required

mechanical

tests

had

been

performed

and the results

met the minimum requirements;

whether

the

PQRs

had

been

reviewed

and certified by appropriate

personnel

and;

whether

any

revisions

and/or

changes

to

nonessential

variables

were noted.

WPSs

1Fl and

1F2 are qualified

in accordance

with ASME Section

IX, the latest edition and addenda

at the time of qualification.

WPSs

525M1

and

525M2 are qualified in accordance

with

AWS D1.3,

1978 Revision.

(2)

The

quality

assurance

procedures

review

documented

in

para-

graph 6.b for safety-related

piping is also applicable to safety-

Additional procedures

reviewed to ascertain

whether the welding program for safety-related

structures

had

been

approved

by the licensee

and whether adequate

plans

and procedures

had

been

established

to assure

that welding would be controlled

and

accomplished

consistent

with

commitments

and

regulatory

requirements

were

as follows:

Document

No.

Title

MP-08,

Rev.

10

MP-17,

Rev.

6

General

Welding Procedure for

Structural

Steel

(Seismic,

Non-seismic)

and Hangers

General

Welding Procedure

for

HVAC Duct Systems

(Seismic,

Non-seismic)

WP-110,

Rev.

12

WP-139,

Rev.

2

WP-140,

Rev.

1

CQC-18,

Rev.

1

Installation of Q and

Non-Q

Pipe Hangers

and Support

Seismic

Pipe Hanger Work

Package

Preparation

Field Engineering

Review of

Documentation of Seismic

Pipe

Hangers

and Supports

Weld Control for Seismic

Class

1 and Seismically

Designed

Structural

(Reg.

Guide 1.29)

Weldments

QCI-18.2,

Rev.

0

CAR-2165-A-003,

Rev.

10

Seismic

Pipe Hanger Inspection

Documentation

System

Weld Inspection Criteria

SS No. 033,

Rev.

9

Structural

Welding for

Permanent

Plant Construction

b.

Observation of Work Within Containment

(55153)

The

below

listed

welds

were

examined

in-process

to verify work

conducted

in

accordan'ce

with traveler,

welder identification

and

location,

welding

procedures,

WPS

assignment,

welding technique

and

sequence,

materials identity, weld geometry, fit-up; temporary attach-

ments,

gas purging, preheat,

electrical characteristics,

shielding gas,

welding equipment condition, interpass

temperature,

interpass

cleaning,

process

control

systems,

qualifications of inspection

personnel,

and

weld history records.

Drawin

No.

Weld No.

Status

2166B060

SH56C

H1933

IS/1-CS-260

FCR-AS-6481

R/0

2168-G-198501

FCR-AS-4081

4 x 4 TS to

Embed

FW-3

(2 x 2 angle to 3 x 3 TS)

2166-B-060

SH53

(B52 unistrut to TS)

Fill passes

First pass

C.

Observation of Work Outside Containment

(55154)

The

below

listed

wel ds

were

examined

in-process

to verify work

conducted

in

accordance

with traveler,

welder

identification

and

location,

welding

procedures,

WPS

assignment,

welding technique

and

sequence,

materials identity, weld geometry, fit-up; temporary attach-

ments,

gas purging, preheat,

electrical characteristics,

shielding gas,

welding

equipment

condition,

interpass,

temperature,

interpass

cleaning,

process

control

systems,

qualifications

of

inspection

personnel,

and weld history records.

Drawin

No.

Weld No.

Status

A"2-236-1-CW-H-558

R/2C mod 4

A-7-261-1-PDH-4302

R/OA mod

3

A-2-236-1-CW-H-294

R/1B Mod

1

FJ1

FJ2

FJ3

FJl

FJ2

FJ4

FJ5

Fill passes

Fitup/tacks

Fill passes

~

F-2"216-1-4-FP-H-1112

R/5F mod

1

FJ2

First Pass

A-5-26-1-PD-H-4286

CC-236-1 "CC-H-1473

FJ4

FJ3

FJ4

First Pass

Fit-up tacks

Fir st Pass

d.

Visual Inspection of Welds (55155)

The inspector visually examined

completed

welds

as described

below to

determine

whether applicable

code

and procedure

requirements

were being

met.

(1)

The below listed welds

were

examined relative to the following:

location,

length,

size,

and

shape;

weld

surface

finish

and

appearance;

transitions

between different wall thicknesses;

weld

reinforcement height

and

appearance;

joint configurations

on

permanent

attachments

and

structural

supports;

removal

of

temporary

attachments,

arc

strikes

and

weld

spatter;

finish-

grinding or machining of weld surface,

surface finish and

absence

of wall thinning; surface defects,

cracks,

laps,

lack of penetra-

tion, lack of fashion,

porosity,

slag,

oxide film and

undercut

exceeding

prescribed limits.

Reactor Auxiliary Building

Seismic

1 Han ers

PD"H-4312-FJ3

PD-H-4312-FJ4

PD-H-4312-FJ5

CW-H-294-FJ2

CW-H-294-FJ3

SW-H-558-FJ50*

SW-H-558-FJ52"

Unit

1 Containment

Structural

Steel

Re air Welds**

Dwg.

No. 2168-G-219

R/6

Dwg.

No. 2168-G-320

(NCR 85-1174)

Repair

weld No.

1 to A

Repair weld No.

1 to 3

Repair weld No.

2 to 3

10

Unit

1 Containment

HVAC Ductwork

Work Packa

e No.

PC Mk. No.

Weld No.

HV/1-G-519-503-006

41-1

41

42

Duct A to Duct A

" See

paragraph

7.g for report

on Stress

Relief Activities

- See

paragraph

7.h for report

on Repair Weld Activities

(2)

guality records for the above welds were examined relative to the

following:

records

covering

visual

and

dimensional

inspection

indicate that the specified inspection

were completed;

the records

reflect adequate

weld quality; history records

are adequate.

During the above examination cognizant licensee

personnel

informed

the inspector that quality data for the

HVAC duct welds could not

be

located

during this inspection.

The

inspector

stated

that

pending

review of the quality data

involved this matter will be

identified as inspector followup item 400/85-22-03

"Documentation

on

HVAC Duct Welds."

Welding Filler Material Control (55152)

The

inspector

reviewed

the

CP8 L

program

for

control

of welding

materials

to

determine

whether

materials

were

being

purchased,

accepted,

stored

and

handled

in accordance

with

gA procedures

and

applicable

code

requirements.

The

following specific

areas

were

examined:

Purchasing,

receiving,

storing,

distributing

and

handling

procedures,

material

identification;

and

inspection

of welding

material

issuing stations.

Welding

material

purchasing

and

receiving

records

for

the

following materials

applicable

to

the

weld joints listed

on

paragraph 7.b., 7.c.,

and 7.d.

were reviewed for conformance with

applicable

procedures

and code requirements:

~Te

E7018

E71T-1

E7018

Size

1/8"

0-045"

3/32"

Heat

Lot

Batch/No.'7425

50573 25416

21531

~

f.

We 1 der Qual ificati on (55157)

The inspector

reviewed the

CP&L program for qualification of welders

and welding operator for compliance

with QA procedures

and

ASME Code

requirements.

The

following welder qualification

status

records

and

"Records

of

Performance

Qualification Test"

were

reviewed relative to the

weld

joints-listed in paragraph 7.b., 7.c.,

and 7.d.

Welder

S mbol

WPS

J-61

G-32

SA-19

I-91

SP-17

F-45

J-24

J-69

G-72

I-48

SN-1

.

SB-56

I-7

J-7

1F2

1A4

lA4

1A4

lA4

g.

Weld Heat Treatment

(55156)

The inspector

observed

post-weld

heat

treatment activities for welds

listed below to determine

whether weld area is instrumented to provide

time-temperature

records for the duration of the entire heat

treatment

cycle;

temperature

monitoring

instruments

are

properly calibrated;

sufficient

temperature

measuring

devices

and

used;

post-weld

heat

treatment

(PWHT) temperature

and holding time is specified,

is adhered

to;

maximum initial temperature,

heat-up

and

cool-down

rates

are

specified

and

are

adhered

to;

temperature

records

being

generated

reflect adherence

to regulatory requirements.

Drawin

No.

Weld No.

A-3-216-2-SW-2-H-558

FJ50

FJ52

During the

above

inspection,

the inspector

noted quality data

was in

error in that welding material

requisition

(WMR) form Nos.

326601

and

326602

had been incorrectly issued to welder J-24 to enable

attachment

of the thermocouples

for the post-weld heat treatment.

The

WMRs indi-

cated that the

WPS to

be

used

was the

FCAW procedure

1F2

even

though

welder J-24 is not qualified to procedure

1F2 and

E7018

SMAW electrodes

were issued.

Further this error was not identified by the

QC inspector

12

during inspection of the stress relief involved and preparation of the

QA/QC field report required

by CQC-20,

Rev.

3.

Therefore,

requirements

of

MP-03

"Welding Material

Control"

had

not

been

met

by the craft

foreman in preparing the

WMR (MP-03 Section 4.5)

and the weld material

issue

station attendant

on issuing the

E7018 electrodes

(MP-03 Section

4.7).

After

investigation,

cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed

the

inspector

that

the

thermocouples

had

been

attached

using

SMAW

WPS

No.

1A4 for which welder

J-24

is qualified

and

for which

E7018

electrodes

are specified.

Further that the

FCAW WPS No.

1F2 had been

used to weld the joints involved and the

WMR error had occurred

due to

the craft forman's misinterpretation

of paragraph

3. 12. 1 of the MP-04

procedure for post weld heat treatment.

The inspector

stated that this

matter was

a lack of conformance to

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

and would

be identified as violation 400/85-22-04

"Failure 'to Follow

Procedure for Control of Welding Consumables."

h.

Special

Welding Activities (5515B)

The inspector

examined

special

welding activities including weld repair

as described

below to determine

whether applicable

code

and procedure

requirements

were being met.

The below listed repair welds were examined relative to the following:

welding procedure

used;

repair welding procedure

includes all pertinent

requirements;

repair

welding

procedure

qualification; repair welder

performance

qualifications

ANI witnessed

performance

qualification;

repair

area

does

not

exceed

limits;

base

and filler material

as

specified;

base material repairs

documented;

NDE performed,

and records

completed.

Drawin

No.

Weld No.

2168-G-219

R/6

2168-G-320

(NCR-85-1174)

Repair Weld No.

1 to A

Repair Weld No.

1 to 3

Repair Weld No.

2 to 3

Within the areas

examined

one violation was identified as reported

on

paragraph

7.g.

No deviations

were identified.

8.

Licensee Identified Items (92700)

Prior to the inspection,

the licensee identified the following items under

10 CFR 50.55(e):

~

13

a.

(Open)

400/CDR 83-104,

Defective

Welds

on

480V Switchgear - (10 CFR 50.55(e))

One

March 4,

1983,

the licensee

notified Region II of a 50

F 55(e) item

concerning

vendor

weld deficiencies

in the

transformer

sections

of

seismically-designed

class

1E and

nonclass

1E switchgear

(transformers

lAl, 1CA2-SA,

1A3-SA,

1B1,

1B2-SB

and

1B3-SB).

The final report

was

submitted

on March 28,

1985.

Corrective

actions

required

reinspection

by

the

vendor

and

the

licensee,

repair of weld defects,

correction to drawings/documentation,

and

engineering

analyses

to justify actions

taken.

On

review of

corrective

actions

the

inspector

questioned

the justification for

accepting

several

welds which were not reinspected

due to being covered

with

an

approximately

1/4

inch thick coating of shellac.

Cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed

the

inspector

that this

issue

would

be

addressed

and

a

supplement

to

the

final

report

transmitted

to

Region II.

This item remains

open.

(Open)

Item 400/CDR 83-127,

Weld Deficiencies

in Unit

1 Chilled Water

Valve (10 CFR 50.55(e)).

On April 7,

1983,

the

licensee

notified Region II of

a 50.55(e)

item

concerning

vendor

shop weld defects

in a

HVAC chi 1-led water valve.

The

final

report

was

submitted

on

October 31,

1983.

Due

to later

identification of shop weld deficiencies

on other

three-way chilled

water

valves

purchased

under

P.O.

NY-435176

the

licensee

informed

Region II on January

18,

1985, that this item was considered

re-opened

and supplemented

by new 50.55(e)

item 400/CDR 85-199.

C.

The inspector

requested

information on the status of this item and was

informed that corrective actions

were not complete.

This item remains

open.

(Open)

400/CFR

83-143,

Bus

Duct and Transformer

Weld Deficiencies

(10 CFR 50.55(e))

E

On

September

2,

1983,

the license notified Region II of a potential

50.55(e)

item concerning

vendor

weld deficiencies

in sections

of bus

duct nos.

CC-1 and

CC-2 and transforms

nos.

1Dl, 1D2,

1El and

1E2.

The

final report was submitted

on January

12,

1984,

and indicates that the

item was

evaluated

and considered

not-reportable.

Cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed the inspector that no rework was required

due to the

weld

discrepancies

identified

since

engineering

analyses

had

established

considerably

greater

than required factor s of safety for

the joints involved with

no credit

taken for any

length

of weld

exhibiting deficiencies.

On

review of the engineering

analyses

the

inspector questioned

the acceptance

of the

PC P9 (box member)

assembly

for the transformers

involved since

a considerable

portion (up to 50%)

of the welds involved was not able to be inspected

due to configuration

of

the

fabrication.

Cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed

the

14

inspector that acceptance

of these

items

was additionally supported

by

seismic testing but that the test reports would not be available until

after the close of this inspection.

This item remains

open

pending

review of the test reports involved.

d.

(Closed)

Item

400/CDR

84-174,

Stainless

Steel

Olets

guestionable

Starting Material - (10 CFR 50.55(e)).

On

May 15,

1984,

the licensee

notified Region II of'

50.55(e)

item

concerning

vendor

supplied

stainless

steel

olets which

had not been

manufactured

from starting material

purchased

to ASME NCA-3800 require-

ments.

The final report was submitted

on June

14,

1984.

On review of

corrective

action

during

a

(Report

No. 50-400/

84-30),

the

inspector

had

requested

a

review of potential

generic

significance in light of item 400/CDR 84-178

as

discussed

below.

The

inspector

reviewed

the

licensees

analysis

and

concluded

that all

potential similar discrepancies

had

been investigated.

None other than

those

reported

below

have

been

identified at

Plant

Harris.

The

fittings involved were returned to the vendor.

This item is considered

closed.

e.

(Closed)

Item

400/CDR

84-178,

Sockolets

and Meldolets

guestionable

Starting Material - (10 CFR 50.55(e)).

On June

19,

1984,

the license notified Region II of a 50.55(e)

item

concerning

vendor

supplied

stainless

steel

weldolets

and

sockolets

which had not been manufactured

from staring material

purchased

to ASME

NCA-3800 requirements,

The manufacturer of the weldolets

and sockolets

also manufactured

the deficient olets

reported

in

CDR 84-174.

Of the

139 fittings involved,

132 were returned to the vendor for performance

of the required

chemical

overchecks.

The inspector

examined acceptable

certified

material

test

reports

(CMTRs)

for the

seven

fittings

remaining on-site.

The final report

was submitted

on January

30,

1985.

The

report

has

been

reviewed

and

determined

to

be

acceptable

by

Region II.

The inspector

held discussions

with responsible

licensee

representatives,

reviewed

supporting

documentation,

and

observed

representatives

samples

of work to verify that the corrective actions

identified in the report have

been completed.

9.

Previously Identified Inspector

Followup Items

(Open) Inspector

Followup Item 400/85-12-02,

Arc Strikes

on Refueling Cavity

Liner Plate

3

This

item concerns

base-metal

arc strikes

on the refueling cavity liner

plate.

The

inspector

reviewed

modifications

to section

6.4.4 of

CgC-19

requiring

a final visual walkdown to verify that fuel pool liner plates

are

free from arc strikes,

dents,

scratches,

foreign materials,

etc.

Cognizant

licensee

personnel

informed the inspector that corrective

actions to repair

all base

metal arc strikes identified was not complete.

This item remains

open pending review of completed corrective action.

ML18019A268

Text

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