ML18012A613
| ML18012A613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18012A611 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-97-01, 50-400-97-1, NUDOCS 9704160061 | |
| Download: ML18012A613 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1997001
Text
14
NRC guidance to inspectors for enforcement of rated thermal
power
contained in NRC Inspection Procedure 61706.
This guidance
was not
issued for the purpose of defining rated thermal
power for licens
s.
Rated thermal
power is already defined for licensees
in their
op
ating
license
and the Technical Specification Definition section.
T
Operating License
(NPF-63)
and Technical Specifications for d
ket
50-400 state that rated thermal
power is 2775 megawatts ther al
(100
percent rated core power).
The new basis
used the enforce
nt guidance
to inspectors
for the purpose of redefining 100.0 percen
rated thermal
power
as
a number that floats based
on the amount of ti
that power
was
over rated thermal
power .
As such,
power could be as
igh as
102
ercent,
without the licensee declaring that rated t
rmal
power
had
een exceeded
and
a flux map initiated.
The inspec
or considered that
the basis statement
and the Technical Specificati
were in conflict.
The inspector
reviewed the February
21
1996
P
nt Nuclear Safety
Committee
(PNSC) meeting minutes
assoc
ed
w
h the LER.'he minutes
included
a discussion of the proble
s
t
with TS 3.2.3 due to
ammendment
50 and that the pr epar
ion
n
eview of ammendment
50 was
considered
inadequate.
The minu
als
ndicated that the words which
were included in the new TS Basi
r T
3.2.3 were discussed
and agreed
to although ther e was no ment
n th t
ey would be put in the TS Basis.
The inspector observed that t
minu
s did not mention any discussion
about processing
a TS change.
'nspector
considered that the
PNSC
missed
an opportunity to
sur t t this problem was properly
corrected.
The inspector
r evie
lic
s e calorimetric data from operator logs for
the performance of
cedur
OST-1004,
Power Range Heat Balance,
Computer Calcul
ion.
dition, the inspector discussed
the
LER and
bases
change
wi h ope
to s.
The inspector
became
aware of a
performance of
S -1004
n Har ch 20,
1996 when the calorimetric value of
power
was 100.2
er e
.
The inspector
reviewed the operator logs for
that performance
d
he OST-1004 data sheet that documented the
calorimetric, the
nterviewed the shift personnel
involved with that
performance
and t
shift supervisors for the next two shifts (24 hrs).
The inspector
co eluded from.these
reviews that the event reported in
the
LER had re
rred on Harch 20,
1996 in that power
had exceeded
100.0
percent
(100.
percent)
and
a flux map was not performed.
The
interviews
dicated that the operators
had chosen to use the new TS
Basis
as t e foundation for their decision.
The licensee's
decision
was
based
on
onsiderable
discussion
over several shifts.
The i
pector
discussed this issue with licensee
management
on
Janu
y 29,
1997.
The licensee
generated
a TS Basis
change to remove
th
conflicting verbage,
which was sent to the
NRC on February 13,
1997.
e ulator
Si nificance
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures
be
established
to assure that conditions adverse to quality such
as
deficiencies,
deviations,
and nonconformances
are promptly identified
9704i60061
970328
ADQCK 05000400
9
C
CPSL
The inspector
reviewed the February 21,
1996 Plant Nuclear Safety
Committee
(PNSC) meeting minutes associated
with the LER.
The minutes
included
a discussion of the problems created with TS 3.2.3 due to
ammendment
50 and that the preparation
and review of ammendment
50 was
considered
inadequate.
The minutes also indicated"that the words which
were included in the new TS Basis for TS 3.2.3 were discussed
and agreed
to although there was no mention that they would be put in the TS Basis.
The inspector observed that the minutes did not mention any discussion
about proces'sing
a TS change.
The inspector considered that the
PNSC
missed
an opportunity to ensure that this problem was properly corrected.
14
NRC guidance to inspectors for enfor cement of r ated thermal
power
contained in NRC Inspection
Procedure
61706.
This guidance
was not
issued for the purpose of defining rated thermal
power for licensees.
Rated thermal
power is already defined for licensees
in their operating
license
and the Technical Specification Definition section.
.The
Operating License
(NPF-63)
and Technical Specifications for docket 50-400
state that rated thermal
power is 2775 megawatts
thermal
(100 percent
rated core power).
The new basis
used the enforcement
guidance to
inspectors
for the purpose of redefining 100.0 percent rated thermal
power
as
a number that floats based
on the amount of'time that power was
over rated thermal
power.
As such,
power could be as high as
102
- percent,
without the licensee declaring that rated thermal
power
had been
exceeded
and
a flux map initiated.
The inspector considered that the
basis statement
and the Technical Specification were in conflict.
The inspector
reviewed licensee calorimetric data from operator logs for
the performance of procedure
OST-1004,
Power Range Heat Balance,
Computer
Calculation.
In addition, the inspector discussed
the
LER and bases
change with operators.
The inspector
became
aware of a performance of
OST-1004 on Har ch 20,
1996 when the calorimetric value of power was 100.1
percent.
The inspector
reviewed the operator logs for that performance
and the OST-1004 data sheet that documented the calorimetric, then
interviewed the shift personnel
involved with that performance
and the
shift supervisors
for the next two shifts (24 hrs).
The inspector
concluded
from these
reviews that the event reported in the
LER had
recurred
on March 20,
1996 in that power had exceeded
100.0 percent
(100.1 percent)
and
a flux map was not performed.
The inter views
indicated that the operators
had chosen to use the new TS Basis
as the
foundation for their decision.
The licensee's
decision
was based
on
considerable
discussion
over several shifts.
The inspector
discussed this issue with licensee
management
on
January 29,
1997.
The licensee
generated
a TS Basis change to remove the
conflicting verbage,
which was sent to the
NRC on February
13,
1997.
Re ulator
Si nificance
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures
be
established
to assure that conditions adverse to quality such
as
deficiencies,
deviations,
and nonconformances
are promptly identified
ENCLOSURE 2
EXECUTIVE SUHHARY
Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/97-01
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
and plant support.
The report covers
a six- eek
period of resident inspection.
In addition, it includes the results of
announced
inspections
by regional reactor engineers
and
a regional
eactor
inspector.
~0erations
In general,
the conduct of operations
was professiona
and safety-
conscious
(Section 01.1).
Operator performance during several
abnormal
pla
challenges
was good,
including a reactor trip (Section Ol.
, subseq
nt unit restart
(Section 01.4),
and an unplanned
boro
ilutio
(Section 01.6).
The
post-trip crew debrief was excellent
e
io
01.3),
and the post-trip
review package
was thorough (Secti
n
.4).
However, there
was
a late
Notice of Unusual
Event declarat'
a
N
notification related to a
Security Alert event (Section
.
and
S ction P4).
An unresolved
item was iden
ied
er aining to the unavailability of an
immediate
means for the Ope
ns
ift Supervisor to check operator
license conditions
as
uir d
y
ant procedures
(Section 01.2).
The Licensed Operator
ifi ation program continues to meet
NRC
requirements.
I
dit
n, t
licensee
was effective in determining
the errors that
h
, or coul
have, occurred over the past year as well
Additional emp as'n
hum
per'formance error reduction techniques,
particular ly 'h
area
identifying each instance of the operators
failing to c
p y w th
nagement
standards
and expectations,
was
needed. as th
om on f
tor s that contributed to most of the personnel
errors.
Shif
ag
ent and supervisors
were proactive in taking steps
to mitigate t
num
r of operator errors
by standardizing
communications
pro ocol, ensuring operators
continuously use procedures,
and instituting
peer
check policy (Section 05.1).
A violation w
identified when inadequate
corrective actions for a
Licensee've t Report
(LER) resulted in an additional
non-compliance
with Techn
al Specification 3.2.3 Action Statement
C.1, which
r equired
core flu
apping when power exceeded
100.0 percent
power .
The cause
was the
nappropriate
use of a Technical Specifi,cation Basis
change to
accomp ish
a Technical Specification
change
(Section 08.3).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/97-01
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
and plant support.
The report covers
a six-week
period of resident inspection.
In addition, it includes the results of
announced
inspections
by regional reactor engineers
and
a regional reactor
inspector.
~0erati ons
In general,
the conduct of operations
was professional
and safety-
conscious
(Section 01.1).
Operator
performance during several
abnormal plant challenges
was good,
including a reactor tr ip (Section 01.3),
subsequent
unit restart
(Section
01.4),
and an unplanned
boron dilution (Section 01.6).
The post-trip
crew debrief was excellent (Section 01.3),
and the post-trip review
ackage
was thorough (Section 01.4).
However, there was
a late Notice of
nusual
Event declaration
and
NRC notification related to a Security
Alert event (Section 04.1 and Section P4).
o
An unresolved
item was identified pertaining to the unavailability of an
immediate
means for the Operations Shift Supervisor to check operator
license conditions
as required by pl'ant procedures
(Section 01.2).
The Licensed Operator
Requalification program continues to meet
NRC
requirements.
The training staff was effective at finding weaknesses
in
the
operator
's technical skills; however, additional
emphasis
on human
performance error reduction techniques,
particularly in the area of
identifying each instance of the operators failing to comply with
management
standards
and expectations,
was needed.
In addition, the
licensee
was effective in determining the errors that had,
or could have,
occurred
over the past year as well as the
common factors that
contributed to most of the personnel
errors.
Shift management
and
supervisors
were proactive in taking steps to mitigate the number of
operator errors by standardizing
communications protocol, ensuring
operators. continuously use procedures,
and instituting a peer check
policy (Section 05.1).
A violation was identified when inadequate
corrective actions for a
Licensee
Event Report
(LER) resulted in an additional
non-compliance with
Technical Specification 3.2.3 Action Statement
C.1, which required
core
flux mapping when power
exceeded
100.0 percent
power .
The cause
was the
inappropriate
use of a Technical Specification Basis change to accomplish
a Technical Specification change
(Section 08.3).