ML18011A482
| ML18011A482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1994 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Robinson W CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9406270146 | |
| Download: ML18011A482 (36) | |
Text
FORD 1 REGULRI INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI(YSTEM (RIDE)
ACCESSION NBR:9406270146 DOC.DATE: 94/06/07 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1," Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION JOHNSON,J.R.
Region 2 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ROBINSON,W.R.
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
SUBJECT:
Summarizes 940526 mgt meeting w/util re NRC presentation of SALP of plant which assesses periof from 920927-940402.List of attendees
!t slides encl.
DISTRIBUTION -CODE:
IE45D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Summary of Significant Meeting with Licensee (Part 50)
NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.
DOCKET I 05000400 R
S 05000400 y
F RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LE,N COPIES LTTR ENCL 1.
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL R
INTERNAL: AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/PMAS/ILRB U
STRACT FILE 02 RGN2 FILE 01 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
'1 DEDRO 1
1 NRR/PMAS/IRCB-E 1
1 OGC/ROED 1
1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1
1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1
1 NSIC N
T NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.
ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'7 NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 12 ENCL 12
JUN -7 K84 Docket No.:
50-400
" License No.:
NPF-63 Carolina Power 5 Light Company ATTN:
Mr.
W.
R. Robinson Vice President
- Harris Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.
Box 165, Mail Code:
Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
SHEARON HARRIS SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE This refers to the management meeting conducted at the Shearon Harris Energy and Environmental Center on May 26, 1994.
The purpose of the meeting was for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to present the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) of the Shearon Harris facility which assesses the period from September 27, 1992 through April 2, 1994.
A list of attendees and a copy of our slides are enclosed.
In addition, a meeting was held with State and Local Officials at the conclusion of the SALP presentation.
A list of attendees is enclosed.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
1.
List of Attendees-SALP Presentation 2.
List of Attendees-State and Local Officials Meeting 3.
SALP Slides Jon R.
J nso
, Acting Director Division of R actor Projects cc w/encls:
(See page 2) 940b270i K 05000400 PDR ADOC PDR 8
Carolina Power
& Light Company cc w/encls:
Hr.
W. S. Orser Executive Vice President Carolina Power and Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.
Box 1551
- Nail Code CPB 12
- Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 H.
W. Habermeyer, Jr.
Vice President Nuclear Services Department Carolina Power
& Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551
- Hail OHS7
- Raleigh, NC 27602 J.
Donohue Plant Manager Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 David HcCarthy, Manager Regulatory Affairs Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 H.
Ray Starling Manager
- Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.
P. 0.
Box 1551
- Raleigh, NC 27602 Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N.
C. Department of Environmental Commerce
& Natural Resources P. 0.
Box 27687
- Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 Karen E.
Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P, 0.
Box 629
- Raleigh, NC '7602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. 0.
Box 11649
- Columbia, SC 29211 (cc w/encls cont'd
- See page 3)
JUN -7 SS4
Carolina Power
& Light Company (cc w/encls cont'd)
Admiral Kinnaird R.
McKee 214 South Morris Street
- Oxford, MD 21654 Robert D. Martin 3382 Sean Way Lawrenceville, GA 30244 JUN -7 l994 bcc w/encls:
'H. Christensen, RII N. Le, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5421 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9998 SEND OFC R I I:DRP Rll DRP J,g PI TO NAME JStarefos:tj HChristensen PDR'?
DATE 0
/94 Yes Ho COPY?
Yes OFFICIAL RD COPY No 06/Q /94 0/
/94 Yes Ho DOCUMENT NAME:
P:iHARRIS
.MSM Ho
/
/94 Yes No Yes
/
/94 Ho
ENCLOSURE I Nuclear Re ulator Commission:
LIST OF ATTENDEES S.
D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
J.
P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RII S.
S.
Bajwa, Chief, Decommissioning Section, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,(NRR)
W.
H. Bateman, Director, Project Directorate II-I, NRR H. 0. Christensen, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch I, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII J.
E. Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector
- Harris, DRP, RII D. J.
- Roberts, Resident Inspector
- Harris, DRP, RII J.
L. Starefos, Project Engineer, DRP, RII Licensee Attendees; W. Cavanaugh, President and COO W. Orser, Executive Vi'ce President W. Robinson, Vice President, Harris H. Habermeyer, Vice President, Nuclear Services Department J.
- Donohue, Plant General
- Manager, Harris D. McCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs G, Rolfson,
- Manager, Engineering
ENCLOSURE 2
LIST OF ATTENDEES Nuclear Re ulator Commission:
S.
J.
W.
H.
D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RII H. Bateman, Director, Project Directorate II-1, NRR
- 0. Christensen, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII J.
E. Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector
- Harris, DRP, RII D. J. Roberts, Resident Inspector
- Harris, DRP, RII J.
L. Starefos, Project Engineer, DRP, RII Licensee Attendees:
W.
H.
D.
D.
W.
B.
G.
R.
Cavanaugh, President and COO
'abermeyer, Vice President, Nuclear Services Department
- McCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs Crew', Carolina Power 8 Light Hindman, Carolina Power
& Light McFeaters, Emergency Preparedness Manager Adams, Site Communications Manager
- Prunty, Licensing Manager Local Officials M.
M.
C.
F.
S.
L.
J.
R.
M.
N.
L.
B.
B.
W.
H.
W.
J.
R.
R.
H.
- Stanton, NCEMPA Yarborough, Lee County EAB
- Hoyle, Lee County EAB Lewis, Crime Control and Public Safety, PIO
- Jones, Crime Control and Public Safety, PIO Sudia, Director, Harnett County Emergency Service
- Padgett, DRP - N.C.
- Johnston, North Car'olina Division of Emergency Management
- Chriscoe, Wake County Emergency Management
- Cheer, Wake County Emergency Management
- Bennett, Town of Fuquay-Varina, North Carolina
- Cameron, North Carolina State Director, Emergency Management Gentry, North Carolina State Director, Emergency Management Moore, North Carolina State Director, Emergency Management
- Garner, Lee County Commissioner Lee, Sanford-Lee County Emergency Services
- Holland, Wake County Managers Office Hoffman, North Carolina Crime Control
& Public Safety Tidy, Chatham County Emergency Management
- Dunlap, Chatham County Commissioner
ENCLOSURE 3
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
+@
@6 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Appraisal Period - September 27, 1992 through April 2, 1SS4 Meeting - IVlay 26, 1994
Resident Program inspection NEW SALP PROCESS Region Based Inspection LIcensing SALP BOARD REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR SALP Special Inltlatlves Event Reviews MIP
FUNCTIONALAREAS FOR OPERATING REACTORS PLANT OPERATIONS 2.
MAINTENANCE 3.
ENGINEERING 4.
PLANT SUPPORT
- Radiological Controls
- Security
PERFORMANCE CATEGORY RATINGS Category t.
Licensee attention and involvement have been properly focused on safety and resulted "in a superior level of-performance.
Licensee programs and procedures have provided effective controls.
The licensee's self-assessment efforts have been effective in the identification of emergent issues.
Corrective actions are technically sound, comprehensive, and thorough.
Recurring problems are eliminated, and resolution of issues is timely.
Root cause analyses are thorough.
Category 2.
Licensee attention and involvement are normally well focused and resulted in a
good level of safety performance.
Licensee programs and procedures normally provide the necessary control of activities, but deficiencies may exist.
The licensee's self-assessments are normally good, although issues "may escape identification.
Corrective actions are usually effective, although some may not be complete.
Root cause analyses are normally thorough.
Category 3.
Licensee attention and involvement have resulted in an acceptable level of safety performance.
- However, licensee performance may exhibit one or more of the following characteristics.
Licensee programs and procedures have not provided sufficient control of activities in important areas.
The licensee's self-assessment efforts may not occur until after a potential problem 'ecomes apparent.
A clear understanding of the safety implications of significant issues may not have been demonstrated.
Numerous minor issues combine to indicate that the licensee's corrective action is not thorough.
Root cause analyses do not probe deep enough, resulting in the incomplete resolution of issues.
Because the margin to unacceptable performance in important aspects is small, increased NRC and licensee attention is required.
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SALP BOARD MEMBERS J. Philip Stohr Director (Chairperson)
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Region II Johns P. Jaudon Acting Deputy Director Bivision of Reactor Projects Region II Singh S. Bajwa Acting Director, Project Directorate II-1 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Albert F~. Gibson Director Division of Reactor Safety Region II
HARRIS SALP MEETING'PERATIONS STRENGTHS:
~
CONSERVATIVE OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND MANAGEMENTINVOLVEMENT
~
OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE
~
EVENT REVIEW TEAMS
~
IMPROVED OPERATOR TRAINING CHALLENGE:
~
CONTINUING ATTENTION TO DETAIL
HARRIS SALP MEETING MAINTENANCE
. STRENGTHS:
~
EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE
~
PROACTIVE MAINTENANCEACTIVITIES
~
MANAGEMENTINVOLVEMENT/SUPPORT CHALLENGE:
~
WORK CONTROL CENTER
HARRIS SALP MEETING ENGINEERING STRENGTHS:
~
DESIGN CONTROL
~
OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCESUPPORT
~
MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT/SUPPORT CHALLENGE:
~
ENGINEERING SELF-ASSESSMENT
HARRIS SALP MEETING PLANT SUPPORT STRENGTHS:
~" ALARAAND EXPOSURE CONTROL PROGRAMS
~
RADIOLOGICALEFFLUENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING, AND CHEMISTRY PROGRAMS
~
MANAGEMENTSUPPORT
~
PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS CHALLENGES:
~ ATTENTIONTO DETAIL/PROCEDURALCOMPLIANCE
~
HOUSEKEEPING
~
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SALP RATING
SUMMARY
FUNCTIONAL AREA P LANT'OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING PLANT SUPPORT RATING LAST PERIOD 1 (Decliningj 2 (Improving)
N/A EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS SECURITY SAFETY ASSESSMENT/
QUALITYVERIFICATION
pe RE@(lC'fp0
~**++
Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
NPF-63 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 MAY l3 lggg Carolina Power
- 5. Light Company ATTN:
Mr.
W.
R.
Robinson Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.
Box 165 Mail Code:
Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-400/94-01)
The NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) has been completed for your'Harris facility.
The facility was evaluated for the period of September 27, 1992 through April 2, 1994.
The results of the evaluation are documented in the enclosed SALP report which will be discussed with you at a public meeting to be held at the Harris facility on May 26,
- 1994, at 9:00 a.m.
The assessment was conducted in accordance with the July 19, 1993 revision to the SALP program which addresses the four functional areas of Operations,,
Maintenance,'ngineering, and Plant Support.
The revised program places greater emphasis on the last six months of the evaluation period in developing the assessment.
The assessment concluded that Harris attained superior performance in all four functional areas.
This was achieved by sustained superior performance in several areas and improved performance in those areas previously identified as having good performance.
There were several repetitive themes that ran through the assessment
- proactive management, focus on high priority tasks, reduction of backlogs and effective teamwork among the departments.
The management and staff, both station and corporate, are to be commended for their superior performance.
j In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Carolina Power 8 Light Company MAY I 3 I994 No reply to this letter is required;
- however, should you. have any questions or
- comments, I would be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
SALP Report
- Shearon Harris Unit 1
cc w/encl:
Mr.
W. S. Orser Executive Vice President Carolina Power and Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.
Box 1551
- Mail Code CPB 12
- Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 H.
W, Habermeyer, Jr.
Vice President Nuclear Services Department Carolina Power
& Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551
- Mail OHS7
- Raleigh, NC 27602 David McCarthy, Manager Regulatory Affairs Harris Nuclear Project P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 H.
Ray Starling Manager
- Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.
P. 0.
Box 1551
- Raleigh, NC 27602 Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N.
C. Department of Environmental Commerce 5 Natural Resources P. 0.
Box 27687
- Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 (cc w/encl cont'd - See page 3) tewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator
Carolina Power
- 5. Light Company (cc w/encl cont'd)
Karen E.
Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0.
Box 629
- Raleigh, NC 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. 0.
Box 11649
- Columbia, SC 29211 Admiral Kinnaird R.
McKee 214 South Morris Street
- Oxford, MD 21654 Robert D. Martin 3382 Sean Way'awrenceville, GA 30244 MIRY I 3 I994
ENCLOSURE SALP REPORT -
SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1 50-400/94-01 SEPTEMBER 27 1992 - APRIL 2 1994 I.
BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on April 19, 1994, to assess the nuclear safety performance of Harris Unit 1 for the period of September 27,
- 1992, through April 2, 1994.
The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, "Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board members were J. Philip Stohr (Chairperson),
Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region II (RII); Johns P. Jaudon, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RII; Albert F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII; and S.
Singh Bajwa, Acting Director, Project Directorate II-l, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas used below are. defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6, "Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS -
PLANT OPERATIONS This functional area consists of the control and execution of activities directly related to operating the plant.
It includes activities such as plant
- startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to transients.
It also includes initial and requalification training programs for licensed operators.
During this assessment period, which encompassed an entire operating cycle,,
the operators controlled the plant in an effective manner, anticipating problems.
The're were no unplanned reactor trips and only one brief but planned shutdown to make a repair.
There were five instances in which power was reduced briefly to perform maintenance.
The instances of power reduction were indicative of the conservative approach to plant operations taken by management, demonstrating a philosophy of addressing problems well before the problems reached a limiting condition.
The licensee also used the simulator effectively to allow the operators to practice in preparation for power reductions.
This was supported by thorough briefings before the power changes were made.
Although a power reduction is an event for which the operators are trained, it was a relatively unusual evolution at Harris because the plant had been at power for long periods.
In this, the licensee demonstrated a conservative approach to operations and the ability to control events instead of being controlled by them.
Although there were no significant operational
- events, licensee management was proactive in establishing event review teams in order to examine those relatively minor occurrences which did happen.
These event review teams were used in order to identify precursors and to preclude repetition of them.
As a result, corrective actions were effective.
The previous SALP had identified operator performance and attention to detail as challenges.
Operator performance in the plant, as discussed above,,
demonstrated a superior level of achievement.
While there were a few instances which could be characterized as representing inattention to detail, there were other instances in which operator attention to detail prevented potential transients.
Control room demeanor and professionalism were excellent.
Operations management was involved in training, and the performance standards taught in the simulator matched those expected in the plant.
There was a
perfect pass rate for all NRC administered examinations.
While some minor problems were identified in written examinations, such as a
common area of weakness in radiation monitor operation, the overall assessment of operator training and performance was excellent.
As discussed above, specific training was successfully conducted for unusual evolutions.
The Plant'Operations area is rated, Category l.
III.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE This functional area addresses activities associated with diagnostic, predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance of plant structures,
- systems, and components and with the overall physical condition of the plant.
It also encompasses all surveillance testing and other tests associated with equipment and system operability.
The programs and procedures for the performance of maintenance activities were noted to be excellent and in nearly all cases gave the proper level of guidance and direction.
This supported the overall improvement in maintenance during the assessment period.
Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were consistently conducted in a timely manner because of the improved quality of the procedures and the effectiveness of the scheduling program.
The reliability-centered maintenance
- program, the system of alternating periods for train-related maintenance, the motor-operated valve maintenance
- program, and the erosion/corrosion control program were all strengths.
Some minor procedural weaknesses and personnel errors were noted in the early part of the assessment
- period, such as the changing of the motor leads without properly following tagging out procedures and the spilling of contaminated water in the" reactor auxiliary building caused by an inadvertently open drain valve.
The licensee's corrective actions avoided similar problems from recurring for the remaining part of the assessment period.
Management involvement in and support for the maintenance area were excellent.
Improvements made during the assessment period were noted in the following areas:
work-planning process; integrated work control center; implementation of the stop, think, act, review (STAR) program; training program for the maintenance support staff; and a policy of fixing equipment before it breaks.
For example, even though an erosion predictive computer calculation indicated that no problem should exist, the licensee inspected six-inch diameter pre-heater bypass piping and associated auxiliary feedwater piping in the steam tunnel and containment building.
As a result, 30 feet of piping were found in need of replacement.
The implementation of these improvements demonstrated effective management of planning and control.
Outage planning was excellent.
Management, control was enhanced by effective daily meetings to ensure
coordination between plant organizations.
These efforts resulted in reducing the volume and the average age of the plant work backlog.
Excellent plant material condition and overall equipment performance contributed to operating without a reactor trip or a plant transient during the assessment period.
Several innovative maintenance practices were continued this period; for
- example, a full-time dedicated crew of instrumentation and control technicians was maintained to perform testing and troubleshooting of the reactor protection system and engineered safety feature instrumentation.
Work during outages was often staged with mocked-up hardware for craft training, thus, effectively reducing personnel exposure.
This demonstrates that the licensee has a firm commitment to the implementation of a proactive and preventive maintenance program.
In general, the maintenance staff was stable, experienced and well trained to perform the assigned tasks.
Self-assessments performed by the Nuclear Assessment Department, in the maintenance
- area, were effective.
By observing field activities, quality control personnel continued to effectively identify and resolve isolated performance deficiencies.
Root cause evaluations were generally adequate.
Corrective actions were effective most of the time, and issues were typically resolved without a significant safety i'mpact.
Plant management recognized the need to improve the effectiveness of the newly implemented work control center and is taking action to address this area.
In some instances, implementation of corrective actions was not timely, and a few minor repetitive failures occurred.
The Maintenance area is rated as Category l.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING The functional area of engineering addresses the adequacy of technical and engineering support for all regulated plant activities and interfaces.
Design control and modifications are encompassed as is the engineering support for operations, maintenance,
- outages, testing, and licensing related activities.
Effective design controls assured that changes in plant design were consistent with a well documented design basis.
Drawings were legible and up-to-date, safety evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 were technically sound, plant modifications were properly designed, and licensing submittals were adequate and timely.
The backlog of planned design changes was appropriately prioritized for implementation.
Strong management involvement was evident in the site and corporate engineering programs.
In general, the engineering staff were knowledgeable and well qualified which was reflected in the quality of their efforts.
Lessons learned at other sites were applied at Harris.
Aggressive performance goals were set and appropriate resources were provided for implementation.
Backlogs of engineering work were monitored by management and were steadily reduced throughout the period.
Significant reductions occurred in the backlogs of engineering calculations, drawings and plant change requests.
The backlog of planned modifications was reduced, in part, by cancellation of
modifications that were no longer justified.
These cancelled modifications received appropriate safety review prior to cancellation.
Strong engineering support was provided to plant operations.
Engineering support was effective in reducing design and maintenance conditions that adversely impacted operator activities.
An improving trend in such conditions continued throughout the period.
The backlog of plant temporary modifications was reduced.
Effective engineering support was provided in response to operational events.
For example, engineers provided effective assistance in troubleshooting a turbine runback in February 1993.
Their independent calculations of heater drain pump net positive suction heads revealed instrumentation scaling errors that had resulted in false indications.
Strong engineering support was also provided for plant maintenance activities.
Several plant modifications were successfully implemented to increase the reliability of safety-related equipment.
Examples included replacement of Train A, 480 volt circuit breakers with breakers of a more rel'iable design, and installation of a spare battery cell and charger in each battery room.
Thermography, vibration analysis and oil analysis were used effectively for predictive maintenance.
Good engineering support was also provided for the development and implementatio'n of testing programs.
Examples included programs for diagnostically testing motor operated
- valves, non-destructive examination, and the program for predicting degradation of piping due to erosion and corrosion.
An exception to this good test support was the failure to specify adequate post maintenance testing for a charging/safety injection pump.
Evaluations of engineering performance by the Nuclear Assessment Department were effective.
The licensee identified the need to strengthen self-assessments performed by the Nuclear Engineering Department and site engineering organizations and took steps to improve this performance.
The engineering area is rated Category l.
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS -
PLANT SUPPORT The plant support functional area addresses all activities related to radiological controls, plant chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection, and housekeeping.
In the radiological control area, a well managed ALARA program has been effective in reducing the collective dose.
Dose reduction initiatives implemented during the period included early boration, teledosimetry, and increased remote camera usage.
During 1992, the collective dose was limited to 213 person-rem with a refueling outage contributing 173 person-rem to this total.
Doses received during the outage were commensur ate with the work involved. In 1993, the collective dose was limited to 31 person-rem which was considered excellent for the non-outage work performed.
Strong management support to the radiation protection program was evidenced by equipment
- upgrades, personnel resources, and ALARA performance initiatives.
Contamination control practices were considered a strength during this period.
Contaminated area continued to be maintained low, and for 1992 and
- 1993, was
maintained at about 0.4 percent of the Radiation Controlled Area.
The number of personnel contamination events were reduced from 134 in 1992, to 45 in 1993.
Improvements were also noted in the NAD assessment function in this area.
Increased management attention to identified. issues resulted in improving the overall effectiveness of the self-assessment function.
Adherence to radiological control procedures was generally good.
The program for control of radiological. effluents was effectively conducted this period.
Radiation detection equipment and monitors were well maintained.
Comparison of results for radionuclides showed good agreement when compared with known values.
Primary and secondary chemistry program parameters, were well within Technical Specification requirements.
An improved secondary chemistry sampling system was installed during this period.
The radioactive waste management program achieved annual decreases in the volume of waste over the past two years, and the shipping program was well executed by dedicated, competent personnel.
Progress was noted in efforts to upgrade the Post Accident Sampling System.
Performance in the area of emergency preparedness showed improvement, particularly in the latter part of the period.
Increased management support was noted by OSC upgrades, staffing increases, and the establishment of an Emergency Preparedness Advisory Board.
An excellent working relationship has been maintained with the offsite support agencies.
The declaration and response was appropriate for two actual events classified as Notification of Unusual Events during the period.
The audit program and exercise/drill critique process was noted to be both detailed and comprehensive.
During the 1993 annual exercise; two exercise weaknesses were identified related to damage control team response and EOF dose assessment activities.
Both of these have been appropriately addressed by CPKL.
Additionally, weaknesses associated with ERFIS reliability were satisfactorily addressed toward the end of the period.
The physical security program conti'nued to be very well implemented during this period.
Security personnel were well trained and exhibited professionalism in the performance of their duties.
Significant improvements were made in the area of equipment maintenance and repair which resulted in a reduction of required compensatory measures.
Audits of the security program were thorough,
- complete, and in-depth and were considered a strength.
Resulting corrective actions were thorough and timely.
Noteworthy during this period was the contingency planning for a land vehicle bomb threat scenario.
During the period, there were some relatively infrequent examples of lack of.
attention to detail, e.g.,
misissuance of security badges.
The fire protection program continued to be effectively implemented during this period.
Control of fire fighting equipment was good.
Relocation of the turnout gear/dressout area resulted in improved access.
Performance during the frequent fire fighting drills was generally good.
During the period, there were some instances of lack of attention to detail in the areas of maintenance of pre-fire plans and performance of fire watches.
While overall housekeeping was generally good, some decline in housekeeping conditions was noted during the latter portion of the SALP period.
The Plant Support area is rated Category l.
Distribution Sheet Distri93.txt Priority: Normal From: Stefanie Fountain Action Recipients:
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Item: ADAMSDocument Library: ML ADAMS"HQNTAD01 ID: 003671776
Subject:
Letter discussing inspection plan for scheduled inspections at Shearon Harris from Jan uary 3, 2000 through Julu 31, 2000.
Body:
PDR ADOCK 05000400 Q Page 1
Distri93.txt Docket: 05000400, Notes: Application for permit renewal filed.
Page 2
December 23, 1999 Carolina Power & Light Company ATTN:
Mr. James Scarola Vice President - Harris Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Code:
Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLAN FOR SHEARON HARRIS
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On December 6, 1999, the NRC staff reviewed the performance of Shearon Harris as reflected in the performance indicators and inspection results in order to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities at your facilityfrom January 3, 2000, through July 31, 2000. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of our plans for future inspections at your facility.
We have not identified any areas in which you crossed a performance threshold.
Therefore we plan to conduct only baseline inspections at your facility over the next seven months.
- However, the results of a triennial fire protection inspection are still under review and may involve further inspection.
Enclosure 1 details the scheduled inspections that willoccur from January 3, 2000, through July 31, 2000. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
The last four months of the inspection plan are tentative and willbe revised at the end-of-cycle review meeting. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issue Matrix (PIM), that were identified during the pilot plant inspection program period. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between NRC and Carolina Power 8 Light.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures willbe placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
ob'3t.1i (74
CPBL lfcircumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we willcontact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.
Please contact Brian Bonser at (404) 562-4560 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.
Sincerely,
( Original signed by B. Bonser
)
Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50400 License No.: NPF-63
Enclosures:
- 1. Shearon Harris Inspection/Activity Plan
- 2. Plant Issue Matrix cc w/encls: (See page 3)
,1'1I
CPBL cc w/encls:
Terry C. Morton, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Carolina Power 8 Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Burton Director of Site Operations Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Bo Clark Plant General Manager-Harris Plant Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Donna B. Alexander, Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution William D. Johnson Vice President 8 Corporate Secretary Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Electronic Mail Distribution Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission P. O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626 Vernon Malone, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Wake County P. O. Box 550 Raleigh, NC 27602 Richard H. Givens, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Chatham County Electronic Mail Distribution Distribution w/encls: (See page 4)
John H. O'eill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution
CPBL Distribution w/encl:
L. Plisco, Rll W. Dean, NRR/DIPM/IIPB H. Berkow, NRR B. Bonser, Rll R. Laufer, NRR G. MacDonald, Rll J. Coley, Rll R. Baldwin, Rll J. Lenahan, Rll E. Testa, Rll D. Thompson, Rll PUBLIC F
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OFFICIALRECORD COPY CUMENT NAME: G:WARRIS PR599q3Unidcycie r.wpd
Page 1 of 1 12/20/1999 15:25:33 HARRIS Inspection / ActivityPlan 01/01/2000
- 07/30/2000
~n~its nspect on ctivity
- o. 0
- o. assigne on Site to Procedure anne a es Start End nspec ion Type OLB
- REACTOR SAFETY IP 71114.01 Drilland Exercise Inspection EB
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION IP 2515/143 Shearon Hams Spent Fuel Pool (C and D) Expansion PSB
- SAFEGUARDS IP 71130.01 Access Authorization IP 71130.02 Access Control PSB
- RADIATIONSAFETY IP 71121.02 AlARAPlanning and Controls PB4
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION IP 2515/142 Draindown During Shutdown and Common-Mode Failure (NRC GL 98-02)
MB
- REACTOR SAFETY IP 71111.08 Inservice Inspection Activities (I,B)
PSB
- RADIATIONSAFETY IP 71121.01 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas IP 71121.02 ALARAPlanning and Controls MB
- REACTOR SAFETY IP 71111.02 Changes to License Conditions and Safety Analysis Report (M,B)
IP 71111.17 Permanent Plant Modifications (M,B)
PB4
- PROBLEM ID & RESOLUTION IP 71152 Identification and Resolution of Problems 3
01/10/2000 01/14/2000 Other Routine 2
01/24/2000 01/28/2000 Safety Issues 1
02/14/2000 02/18/2000 Other Routine 1
02/14/2000 02/18/2000 Other Routine 1
03/06/2000 03/10/2000 Other Routine 1
04/17/2000 04/21/2000 Safety Issues 1
04/24/2000 04/28/2000 Other Routine 1
04/24/2000 04/28/2000 Other Routine 1
04/24/2000 04/28/2000 Other Routine 1
05/01/2000 05/05/2000 Other Routine 2
05/01/2000 05/05/2000 Other Routine 3
06/05/2000 06/09/2000 Other Routine is repo oes no in u e an a
ivi ies.
This report shows only on-site and announced inspection procedures.
Enclosure l
Page:
1 of 3 12/23/1999 08:30:51 IR Report 4 Region II 05000400 - HARRIS 1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Cornerstone Date Source Significance ID Type Cornerstone Determination Item Title Item Description/Significance 10/09/1999 1999006-01 NRC NCV Barrier Integrity Green 07/17/1999 199900441 NRC NCV Barrier Integrity Green 07/17/1999 1999004-02 NRC NCV Barrier Integrity Green 07/17/1999 1999004-03 NRC NCV Barrier Integrity Green FAILURETO RECOGNIZE THATAN A (1) GOALWAS EXCEEDED.
The licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action under 10CFR50.65 (a)(1) when a maintenance rule (a)(1) performance goal was exceeded for the Target Rock Position Indication performance monitoring group in system 9001, containment isolation valves. The established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was exceeded on June 11 ~ 1999, but was not recognized by the licensee, and appropriate corrective action was not taken until another functional failure occurred on August 17, 1999.
This issue was characterized as a Non-Cited Violation and was determined to have low risk significance because failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not prevent operators from determining valve positions, and other more time~nsuming methods were available.
Second, the failure to rerxrgnize that a maintenance rui goal had been exceeded did not affect the abiiity of any valve to operate.
MODE 4 ENTRY ANDSUBSEQUENT UNITOPERATION WITHAN INOPERABLE CONTAINMENTISOLATION Operating the unit with valve 1CC-176 inoperable and taking no action to comply with Technical Specification (TS) Action requirements during the period from November 24, 1998, through December 6, 1998, was a violation ofTS 3.6.3, Containment Systems.
For approximately 11 days the licensee operated the unit with an inoperable component cooling water system containment-isolation valve. The subject valve isolates component cooling water flowto the reactor coolant drain tank heat exchanger and the excess letdown heat exchanger. The scenario requiring the use of valve 1CC-176 to shut in order to contain a radioactive release was estimated at E-14/year, a relatively low risk significance and was a green inspection finding.The system piping is a dosed loop inside containment and is neither a highwnergy line nor a bypass leakage path. The failure of the valve to close would be indicated in the control room.
Emergency procedures require operators to verifyvalve dosure and manually dose valves which did not dose automatically.
During the subject period the valve could be shut from a manual handswitch on the main control board.
FAILURETO DEMONSTRATE THE OPERABILITYOF CONTAINMENT-ISOLATIONVALVESPRIOR TO ENER Failure to perform an adequate cycling test and verify the isolation time ofvalve 1CC-176 and failure to verify the isolation time of valve 1CC-202 prior to entering Mode 4 on November 24, 1998, and the subsequent entry into Mode 4; was a violation of surveillance requirement TS 4.6.3.1 and TS 4.0 4.
The licensee's program to implement this surveillance did not consider the fact that a portion of the containm isolation valves could not be fullytested from the control room handswitch. As a result valves 1CC-1 76 and 1CC-202 were not adequately tested to meet the TS surveillance requirement prior to entry into mode 4. For risk significance see item 1999004-01.
FAILURETO IDENTIFYAND CORRECT CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO QUALITY(2 EXAMPLES) (SECTIONS 40 Failure to promptly identify and correct a test deficiency during a surveillance test on November 22, 1998, and failure to correct the causes of the failure of valve 1CC-176 to shut during a surveillance test on December 6, 1998, were two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,Corrective Action.
The first example involved failure to use the corrective action program to document a test deficiency which identified that there was a problem with valve 1CC-176 prior to entry into mode 4. The second example involved a failure to correct the causes of the 1CC-176 inoperability which would have allowed the event described in item 19990044)1 to reoccur without being identified by post maintenance /surveillance testing. For risk significance see item 1999004-01.
Dockets (HAR1), Item Type (Compliance,Followup,other),
From 06/01/1999 To 12/23/1999 ENCLOSURE 2
Page:
2 of 3 12/23/1999 08:30:51 IR Report 4 Region II 05000400 - HARRIS 1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Cornerstone Significance Item Title-Date Source ID Type Cornerstone Determination Item Description/Significance 11/23/1999 01014-99273 Licensee VIO Physical Green Protection Failure To Comply With The Regulations In 10 CFR Part 73 and The Provisions Of The Harris Physical Sec Four Examples of a GREEN finding related to access authorization were identified. The examples included; (1)
Failure to review and evaluate background information for persons granted unescorted access, (2) Continuation of the granting unescorted access authorization, (3) Failure to maintain original data on which the licensee granted unescorted access authorization for five years, and (4) Failure to log safeguards events within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery.
Since it was determined that the individuals granted unescorted access would have been granted access ifthe background information had been actually verified, the significance of the violation, under the NRC significance determination process was determined to be a GREEN finding. Although the violation was identified by the licensee, due to the failure to restore compliance within a reasonable time a notice of violation is warranted. ~
This item was dosed by letter dated 11/23/99 (EA 99-273) and documented in inspection report 5(4400/994)07.
Dockets (HAR1)~ Item Type (Compliance,Followup,other)
~ From 06/01/1 999 To 12/23/1 999
Page:
3 of 3 12/23/1999 08:30:51 IR Report 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revised Oversight Process PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Cornerstone Legend Type Codes:
AV Apparent Violation FIN Finding NCV NonCited Violation URI Unresolved item VIO Violation ID Codes:
NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee Avs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Avs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
Dockets (HAR1), Item Type (Compliance,Followup,other), From 06/01/1999 To 12/23/1999