ML18010A787
| ML18010A787 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A781 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-92-15, NUDOCS 9209250012 | |
| Download: ML18010A787 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1992015
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/92-15
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
July 18 - August 21,
1992
Inspectors:
J.
edrow,
Senior
Resi
t
spec or
Licensee
No.:
7 /7Ip'z
Date Signed
M. Sha
non,~ esident
In
e
or
byy
b by:~. Chr'stensen,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
g
$ z
Da
e
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
surveillance observation,
maintenance
observation,
safety
system
wa'lkdown,
evaluation of licensee
self-assessment,
preparations
for refueling, licensee
event reports
and licensee
action
on previous inspection
items.
Numerous
facility tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these
tours
and observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to properly implement plant procedures,
paragraphs
2,c
and 7.
Efforts to reduce
personnel
exposure
during radwaste
tank cleaning were
effective,
paragraph
2.b.(4).
The operational
support center
has
been relocated to the waste processing
building, paragraph
2.b.(7).
Appropriate aetio'n
was being taken to reduce
the maintenance
backlog,
paragraph
4.a.
09
S001
9~0917
9
OS000400
The continuing training program
and hands-on training facilities contributed
to increasing the. knowledge
and expertise of maintenance
personnel,
paragraph
4.b.
Appropriate management
involvement
was noted for the preventive
maintenance
deferral
process,
paragraph
4.c.
Improvement
was noted in reducing the backlog of required reviews
by the
nuclear safety review unit, paragraph
6.a.
Plant line organization self assessment
activities were considered
to be good
which reinforced quality work and the safe operation of the plant,
paragraph
6.b.
The nuclear plant support section
no longer performs
comparisons
of the
nuclear units,
paragraph
6.c.
Fuel handling procedures for new fuel receipt were considered
to be
cumbersome,
paragraph
7.
Operator action to manually control
steam pressure
following a reactor trip
was considered
to be inadequate,
paragraph 8.f.
0
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- J. Cribb,
Manager, guality Control
- C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
- C. Hinnant,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
- D. Knepper,
Project Engineer,
Nuclear Engineering
Dept.
B. Heyer,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
- T. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
- J. Hoyer,
Manager,
Project Assessment
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
C. Olexi k, Manager,
Regulatory
Compliance
A. Powell,
Manager,
Harris Training Unit
- C. Sawyer,
Project Engineer,
Nuclear Assessment
Dept.
- H. Smith,
Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
G. Vaughn,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
ED Willett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
- W. Wilson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear
Fuel
- LE Woods,
Manager,
System Engineering
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant began this inspection
period in hot standby
(Mode 3).
To
facilitate repair work, the plant was placed in hot shutdown
(Mode 4)
on
July 18 and the
"A" RHR system
was placed in service.
Following
replacement of the low pressure
turbine boot seals,
a plant heatup
was
commenced
and the hot standby condition was reached
at 3: 17 a.m.,
on
July 22.
A reactor startup
was performed
and the reactor
was taken
critical at 2:33 p.m.
Power operation
was
commenced
at 8:45 p.m.,
on
July 22.
The plant continued in power operation for the remainder of
this inspection period.
During the outage
the licensee
performed
several
repairs to secondary
plant equipment,
as well
as inspections/minor
work inside of the
containment building.
Several
main control
board deficiencies
were also
worked.
a.
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
(TS)
and the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's
Log;
Control Operator's
Log; Night Order Book;,Equipment
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Grounding Device Log; Temporary
Modification Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover
Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition,
the inspector
independently verified clearance
order tagouts.
The inspectors
found the logs to be readable,
well organized,
and
provided sufficient information on plant status
and events.
Clearance
tagouts
were found to be properly implemented.
No
violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted
to
observe
operations,
surveillance,
and maintenance activities in
progress.
Some of these
observations
were conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during"this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security perimeter fence;
control
room; emergency
diesel
generator building; reactor
auxiliary building; waste processing
building; turbine building;
fuel handling building; emergency
service water building; battery
rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support
center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
(I)
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary
equipment operating
parameters
were observed
to verify that
indicated parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the
current operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating
shift staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and
that control
room operations
were being conducted
in an
orderly and professional
manner.
In addition,
the inspector
observed shift turnovers
on various occasions
to verify- the
continuity of plant status,
operational, problems,
and other
pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions
- Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various
areas
throughout the Facility were observed to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(6)
Radiological
Protection
Program
- Radiation protection
control activities were observed routinely to verify that
these activities were in conformance with the facility
policies
and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory
requirements. 'he inspectors
also reviewed selected
radiation work permits to verify that controls were
adequate.
The licensee's
activities to clean the Floor Drain Tanks
and
Waste Holdup Tank were followed.
Cleaning the sludge
from
these
tanks
was required
because filters in waste processing
systems
were frequently becoming clogged
when the tanks were
processed
to low levels.
A significant reduction in general
area
dose rates
was also achieved
which should help reduce
personnel
exposure.
The pre-evolution planning
and
briefings for this work were detailed.
Cameras
and dose
rate monitoring devices
were utilized to,remotely monitor
this work which contributed to the low personnel
exposure
received during job performance.
Security Control
- The performance of various shifts of the
security force was observed
in the conduct of daily
activities which included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls;
searching of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval; escorting of visitors;
patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition,
the inspector
observed
the operational
status of closed circuit television
monitors, the intrusion detection
system in the central
and
secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital area barrier integrity,
and the security
organization interface with operations
and maintenance.
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate
and that fire alarms,
extinguishing
equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
Emergency
Response
Facility Relocation
- The licensee
has
recently completed modifications to relocate
the Operational
Support Center
(OSC) from the service building cafeteria to
the ground floor of the waste processing
building.
This
move was
made to avoid
OSC relocation during potential
emergency situations
where the area radiation levels might
increase
and necessitate
facility relocation.
During
a
licensee drill on August 5,
1992, operation of the
new
facility was observed.
The facility was considered
to be
fully functional
and equipped.
The inspectors
found plant housekeeping
and the material condition
of safety-related
components
to be good.
The licensee's
adherence
C.
to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection
requirements,
and
TS requirements
in these
areas
was satisfactory.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse Condition Reports,(ACRs)
were reviewed to verify the
following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
and generic
items were identified and*items were reported
as required
by
ACR 92-320 reported that during
an attempt to backflush the seal
water return filter the system
was aligned improperly.
On
August 7,
1992,
radwaste
operations notified the main control
room
that the reactor coolant
pump seal
return filter required
backflushing.
Routinely these
types of evolutions require only
radwaste
personnel
action,
However,
a few filters require the
main control
room personnel
to open
bypass
valves
when the filter
is isolated.
Operating
procedure
Chemical
and Volume
Control
System,
Section 8.8, specifies
action to be taken to
backflush the seal
water return filter and requires that the
bypass
valve '(1CS-302)
be opened.
Contrary to this, the bypass
valve was not opened.
As
a result,
when radwaste
personnel
isolated the filter, system flow was isolated
and pressure
increased,
which challenged
the seal
return relief valve.
The.
licensee
was
asked to review all these
types of procedures
to
verify that appropriate
administrative controls were in place.
Failure to properly implement procedure
OP-107 is contrary to TS, 6.8. 1
and is considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (400/92-15-01):
Failure to properly implement plant
procedures.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Surveillance tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel
were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized;
and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
~ OST-1004
Power
Range
Heat Balance Daily Interval
Node
1 (above
15
percent
power)
~ OST-1026
.Reactor
Coolant System
Leakage
Evaluation
~ OST-1036
Shutdown Margin Calculation
~ OST-1039
Calculation of quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio,
Weekly Interval
(with alarm operable)
~ OST-1124
6.9
KV Emergency
Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device
Operational
Test
~ EST-813T
Temporary Procedure for 6.9
KV Emergency
Bus Undervoltage
Trip Special
Test
'
EST-221
Type
C LLRT of Containment
Purge
Hake-up Penetration
(M-57)
~ EPT-183
SI Alternate Miniflow Relief Valve Relief Pressure
Test
~ EPT-184
SI Alternate Hiniflow Relief Valve Relief Pressure
,Test
The performance of these
procedures
was found to be satisfactory with
proper
use of calibrated test equipment,
necessary
communications
established,
notification/authorization of control
room personnel,
and
knowledgeable
personnel
having performed the tasks.
Procedure
EST-813T
was performed to verify appropriate
response
of the undervoltage
circuitry which was not previously tested
as described
in paragraph
8.g
of this report..
No violations or deviations
were observed.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to veri.fy that
correct equipment
clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention work permits,
as require'd,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control personnel
were avai.lable for inspection activities
as
required;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
Replacement
of undervoltage
relay 27A-1/1712
and associated
testing in accordance
with procedures
6.9KV Emergency
Bus
(Degraded
Voltage)
Relay
(ITE 27N) Channel
Calibration,
and OST-1124,
6.9KV Emergency
Bus Undervoltage Trip
Actuating Device Operational
Test.
Replacement
of S-2 invertor transformer in accordance
with
procedure
Replace Oil Filled and Electrical
YTIC
Capacitors
and/or Ferro-Resonant
Transformer Assembly in
7.5
KVA Static Inverters.
Repair oil leak/rebuild hydraulic operator for main steam
1HS-62 in accordance
with procedures
CM-H0188, Hain Steam
Power
Operated Relief Valve
(PORV) Operator Disassembly,
Maintenance
and
Reassembly;
and
CM-H0186,
Paul
Honroe,
Hain Steam
Power Operated
Relief Valve
(PORV) Operator Fill and Bleed Procedure
and retest
in accordance
with procedure
OST-1079,
Containment Isolation
Valves Inservice Inspection
Test quarterly Interval.
Remove flow obstruction in piping for containment
cooling unit AH-
2 service water return flow transmitter
(FT-9275B).
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation
of
removed
components
and independent verification of the reinstallation.
a 4
b.
The inspectors
reviewed the backlog of uncompleted
maintenance
work tickets.
The backlog presently consisted of approximately
2,000 non-outage
open work tickets which equated to approximately
10 -
12 crew weeks of work to accomplish.
This amount
was
considered
to be relatively high and was found to be fairly
constant
over the operating cycle.
Sixty percent of the tickets
were classified
as over 90 days old and most of the tickets
involved the I&C/electrical areas.
Approximately 35 percent
(700)
of the non-outage tickets were classified
as safety-related,
To
reduce
the backlog, plant management
obtained
an additional
crew during the middle of 1992 which has concentrated
on
completing the old work tickets.
The inspectors
found that this
additional
help has started to reduce the backlog.
Although the
total
amount of maintenance
backlog
was considered
to be high by
the inspectors,
the number- of safety related
work tickets
was
considered
to be manageable
and appropriate
action
was being taken
to reduce
the backlog.
The inspectors
also reviewed the maintenance
continuing training
program.
This training is conducted quarterly
and includes topics
such
as procedure
changes,
plant modifications, operating
experience,
system reviews, retraining
on complex tasks,
and
training for newly identified job skills.
This program
was
described
in training instruction TI-113; Related Technical
Training and On-The-Job Training for Selected
Maintenance
Classifications.
The inspectors
toured the licensee's
hands-on-training facilities
at the Energy
and Environmental
Center.
Areas were available for
electrical,
mechanical
and instrumentation/control
components,
as
well as
a mobile lab which contained
motor operated
valves
and
associated
diagnostic
equipment.
These facilities were utilized
- for troubleshooting
problems,
rehearsing
procedure
usage,
and
reviewing industry events.
Specific equipment
included the
following:
~ 6.9
KV electrical
bus
and breakers
~
Pumps
and motors for alignment training
~ Relief valves for disassembly/reassembly
and testing
~ Kerotest valves
~ Air operated
valves
~ Transmitters
~ Splicing electrical wires
This equipment
was also utilized during associated
continuing
training topics.
These facilities contributed to increasing
the
knowledge
and expertise of maintenance
personnel.
c.
Due to concerns
at another
CPKL plant that various
PHs were being
deferred,
the Harris
PH program was reviewed.
Requirements
regarding
PH deferral
were contained
in procedure
HHH-003,
Preventive
Maintenance
Program.
Procedurally,
before
any
PH can
be deferred,
the maintenance
supervisor
and the maintenance
manager
both sign to authorize
non-performance.
It was noted that
deferred safety-related
PHs were rescheduled
to the next available
window of opportunity depending
on plant conditions.
The
maintenance staff stated that it would be highly unlikely that
a
safety-related
PH would be voided
and not be rescheduled,
The
maintenance staff also stated that nonsafety-related
PHs were
voided,
but only after
a history search
to verify the last time
the
PM was performed.
A review of voided
PMs over the last month
found
no apparent
problems with the
PH process.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
.Safety
Systems
Walkdown (71710)
The inspector
conducted
a walkdown of the high pressure
safety injection
system to verify that the lineup was in accordance
with license
requirements
for system operability and that the system drawing
and
procedure correctly reflected "as-built" plant conditions.
The
-inspector
noted little evidence of boric acid leakage.
The licensee's
control of, boric acid leakage
was
commendable.
The licensee
had
repaired
many of the oil leaks
on the charging/safety
injection pumps
but continued attention to these
types of leaks is warranted.
Oil
leakage
was noted,
however,
on the operators for valves
and
1CS-
291.
An outer rubber sleeve
on
a flexible conduit for the valve
operator
on
was found to be tom. Also, paint was noted to be
flaking off of many valve operators
in this system.
These
minor
discrepancies
were referred to licensee
personnel
for corrective action.
E
It was also noted that sections of the system piping were warmer than
expected.
Since the alternate miniflow system
has closed isolation
valves,
there
should
be
no flow and the system should
be at ambient
temperature
which is approximately
80 degrees
F.
Temperatures
were
found
as high as
106 degrees
F with the normal charging
system
temperature
at
112 degrees
F, which indicated
leakage
between the A, B,
and
C charging
pump miniflow isolation valves.
Operations
retightened
the manual
isolation Kerotest valves
and subsequently
system
temperatures
returned to normal.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Evaluation of Licensee Self Assessment
(40500)
a ~
The inspectors
vi.sited the licensee's
corporate office to review
the
NAD Nuclear Safety
Review
(NSR) unit activities. Specifically,
the inspectors
checked
the qualifications/experience
of NSR unit
reviewers,
the backlog status of items still pending review,
and
verified that reviews required
by TS 6.5.3 were performed.
The
NSR unit reviewers
were found to be qualified with a
substantial
number of years of nuclear experience.
The
NSR unit
has corrected
a weakness
discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-
400/90-08 regarding
a backlog of required reviews.
This backlog
has
been substantially
reduced to approximately twenty items per
site
and most of these
were
1'ess
than
one month old.
The
inspectors
checked
the quality of three
NSR modification package
reviews, five PNSC meeting minute reviews,
14
LER reviews,
and
five replies to notices of violation.
The inspectors
also
reviewed the
NSR unit's quarterly trend reports for
1992.'he
trending reports
were utilized by the licensee
to identify
appropriate
areas for further scrutiny.
Approximately three
such
mini-investigations
have
been
performed
by NSR personnel.
One
mini-investigation was conducted
which involved
a review of the
generation of a maintenance
agreement
between
the transmission
department
and individual plant generating
stations
and
was
applicable to the Harris site.
The inspector
found the
recommendations
from this review to be appropriate.
One minor problem was identified during these
reviews.
The
licensee
had not yet received
the reply to
for violations 500/92-04-01
and 400/92-04-02
issued
in April 1992.
This reply had
been
issued
by the plant in May 1992 yet the
unit had not yet received the reply as of July 20.
The inspectors
discussed
this matter with licensee
personnel
who stated that the
NSR unit manager
had
been inadvertently omitted from the
distribution list for these letters.
Appropriate action
was taken
to correct the distribution list.
b.
In summary,
the inspectors
found that improvement
had
been
made
by
this organization
and that
TS requirements
regarding the
independent
reviews of plant changes,
tests,
and procedures
were
being
implemented satisfactorily,
Licensee
management
recently issued
information to plant personnel
describing
the self-assessment
process
and expectations
from
employees.
Line organization responsibilities
included individual
self-checking of work, independent verification by another
individual, supervisory observation of activity, post maintenance
testing,
management
tours,
and corrective action program
trending/reviews.
The
PNSC also contributed to line organization
self-assessment
activities.
The inspectors
attended
selected
PNSC meetings to observe
committee activities
and verify TS requirements
with respect
to
committee composition, duties,
and responsibilities.
Hinutes from
these
meetings
were also reviewed to verify accurate
documentation.
The inspector considered
the conduct
and
documentation of these
meetings to be satisfactory with good
discussion of the items presented.
During the July
21
PNSC
meeting,
the inadequate
testing of the emergency
bus undervoltage
logic circuitry was discussed.
Appropriate corrective actions
were assigned.
The regular monthly
PNSC meeting
was held
on
July 29, during which the reviews required
by TS 6.5.2.6 were
performed.
The plant general
manager
has set
an example for plant tour
expectations
by performing daily tours.
Area managers
tour plant
areas
weekly.
The operations
manager
was observed
in the control
room daily.
Plant management
continued to perform weekly
inspections of various plant areas.
The goal for these
inspections
was to include all areas within the powerblock
and the
emergency
emergency
diesel
generators,
and fuel
oi'1
storage
outside
areas
such that all areas
were toured
periodically.
The inspection
team consisted of the plant general
manager
and unit managers.
The results of several
of these
inspections
were reviewed.
Host of the findings were related to,
the general
cleanliness
and material condition of equipment.
This
type of managemen't
involvement
had
a positive effect on plant
housekeeping.
Supervisory
involvement
was evident during critical activities
involving TS equipment inoperability.
The infrequent activity
pre-evolution briefings require
management
involvement also. 'on-
critical supervisory
coaching of personnel
performance
was also
conducted.
Requirements
for the coaching
program were contained
in
a supervisory's
guide dated
February
26,
1991.
The inspector
reviewed the latest
annual
reports of coaching results
and several
of the individual observation
forms used to document
these
activities.
Observations
were conducted
at least yearly.
Comments
from these
observations
included round performance,
test/procedure
performance,
enforcement of procedural
compliance,
job skill enhancement,
deficiency identification, fire/safety
hazards,
self verification,
and communication.
The
ACR system
has
been, fully implemented.
Due to the lower
threshold for reporting problems
than the previous
system,
the
data
base has'rown
considerably,
which has
allowed more
meaningful
problem trending.
Self-identification of problems
was
considered
to be
a strength.
Adverse trends
were identified
involving valve mispositioning,
inappropriate parts/materials
issuance,
personnel
overtime,
work practices, fire barrier
inadequacy,
and tagging or labeling deficiencies.
10
c
~
Plant line orgapization
self-assessment
activities were considered
to be good which reinforced quality work and,the
safe operation of
the plant.
The
NSD Nuclear Plant Support Section
(NPSS)
no longer performs
the assessment
of the plants to the critical success
factors/performance'ndicators.
Instead,
plant personnel
assess
performance
compared to unit goals
and this information is
submitted to applicable corporate
organizations for review.
This
change discontinued
a comparison of the performance of the three
licensee
nuclear sites.
To compensate
for this; the licensee
is
developing corporate
standards
which will serve
as the unit goals
for all the licensee's
nuclear plants.
However,
NPSS personnel
provide corporate
support for generic plant programs
and perform
periodic observations
and reviews of plant activities.
The
assessments
performed
on plant activities was informal without
documentation
of review scope
or findings.
The inspectors
considered
that this assessment
process
could be strengthened
with
formal written expectations
of reviewers
and documentation
of
assessment
findings and the implementation of corporate
standards
for all sites.
~
~
~
7.
Preparations
for Refueling
(60705)
During this ins'pection period,
the licensee's
receipt
and inspection of
a new fuel shipment
was observed
on July 30,
1992.
Implementation of
applicable sections of the following procedures
was observed:
~ FHP-003
Unpacking
and Handling of New Fuel Assemblies,
Fuel Inserts
and
New Fuel Shipping Containers
~ FHP-004
New Fuel Handling Tool Operation
~ FHP-014
Fuel
and Insert Shuffle Sequence
~ FHP-020
Fuel Handling Operations
~ MMM-020
Operation,
Testing,
Maintenance
and Inspection of Cranes
and
Special Lifting Equipment
~ HPP-150
Receipt
and Surveillance of New Fuel
and Other Special
Nuclear Material
~ FMP-106
New Fuel Receipt
Inspection
The licensee
has received sixty fuel assemblies
for the next operating
cycle.
The inspector
observed
licensee
personnel
performing
a
reinspection of a fuel assembly'hich
was found to be slightly
scratched.
This damage
had
been
observed
during the inspection of a
previous fuel shipment.
This damage
was considered
to be negligible
and
use of the fuel assembly
was authorized.
The
new fuel inspectors
were
verified to be certified in accordance
with procedure
TI-109,
11
Refueling/Inspection
Team Training Program.
Receipt inspection
records
for the
new assemblies
were reviewed.
Licensee
personnel
identified
a
total of three fuel assemblies
with flaws that needed
to be evaluated.
The inspector
found that appropriate
devi ation reports
had
been
generated
to resolve these
issues.
It was determined that one assembly
had to be returned to the manufacturer for replacement.
The inspector
noted that attachments
from four different procedures
had
to be completed
by the operators
before fuel movement
was
commenced.
The senior reactor operator in charge of fuel movement
was very
knowledgeable
on the procedure
requirements
and performed the applicable
sections of the various procedures.
Although procedure utilization in
this case
was satisfactory,
the inspector felt that the procedures
could
be consolidated.
On the following day, the inspector discussed
the fuel movement
and
inspection with the senior reactor operator
who was in charge of the
fuel movement.
During this conversation
the inspector
was informed that
a fuel insert inspection
was also performed,
The operators
who
positioned
the
WABA for inspection, initially utilized a flexible strap
placed
around the"assembly
handling tool T-bar.
Operators later found
that it was quicker and easier to manually grasp
the insert
and withdraw
it the required
two feet for inspection.
The inspector questioned
whether this practice of insert withdrawal
was permissible
by plant
procedures.
Although operating
procedures
did not address
insert
movement,
procedure
FMP-106 was examined
and found to provide specific
guidance.
Section 6.3 of this procedure
specifies that the
WABAs be
handled
using the flexible strap
method.
Although little damage
could
incur from the operator's
hands-on
method of insert withdrawal, this
action
was not in accordance
with the licensee's
procedures
and is
considered
to be another
example of violation 400/92-15-01
discussed
in
paragraph
2.c of this report.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential
generic
impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as
they occurred to determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed
in accordance
with the current
a
0
(Closed)
LER 91-08:
This
LER reported that the high head safety
injection system
was inoperable
due to
a failure of the system's
alternate miniflow lines.
The
LER was previously closed
in
NRC
Inspection
Report 50-400/91-23.
During the current inspection
period additional followup action
was performed related to this
event.
The inspector
reviewed
emergency
operating
procedures
and
operator training concerning
the potential diversion of flow from
the safety injection system through the alternate miniflow lines.
The inspector
found that the licensee
had
made
a change to the
User's
Guide to alert the operators
to the potentiality for this
event
and appropriate corrective action to take if necessary
to
12
isolate the diverted flow.
The licensee
had conducted training on
this event in the licensed
operator requal training during
August
12 - September
9,
1991.
Real
time training on the
procedure
changes
was provided,
and the changes
were included in
the required reading
notebook for operators
in January
1992.
Several
operating shifts were interviewed to determine
how they
would respond to this event.
The inspectors
found that the
training and procedure
changes
should
be effective in identifying
the diverted flow.
(Open)
LER 92-06:
This
LER reported that excess
flow check valves
associated
with the
RAB hydrogen supply line and auxiliary steam
line were mispositioned.
This resulted
in the failure of the
systems
to meet design requirements
and capability of the systems
to fulfilltheir safety functions.
The licensee
has completed
procedure
changes
to properly check the position for these
valves
and issued night orders describing the event
and prohibiting
supply system operation
unless
under direct operator
.
control.
Additional action will include real-time training,
inclusion of this event in the operator training program,
and
an
evaluation of using
an excess
flow check valve for the
RCDT as
well
as other waste
gas lines which contain hydrogen.
The
LER
will remain
open pending the completion of the above, activities.
(Closed)
LER 92-07:
This
LER reported
a reactor trip which
occurred
due to the failure of a main condenser
boot seal.
This
event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/
92-13.
The licensee
completed
temporary repairs to the boot seal
which subsequently
failed again
on July 17,
1992.
The boot seals
were then replaced.
(Closed)
LER 92-08:
This
LER reported
a reactor trip which
occurred while the plant was in the hot standby condition with a
shutdown
bank of control rods withdrawn.
This event
was
previously discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-13.
The
trip was caused
by
a low steam generator
level signal
due to
inadequate
control of feedwater,
The licensee
has
completed
a
debrief of the involved operations
personnel
and re-emphasized
attention to detail.
In addition the licensee
plans to perform
real-time training on this event.
(Open)
LER 92-09:
This
LER reported
a manual reactor trip which
was initiated following the loss of the running main feedwater
pump.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-13.
The licensee
has
completed repairs to the
fan supply breaker
and revised appropriate
maintenance
procedures
to detect this type of breaker failure.
The
LER will remain
open
pending the completion of operator training on this event.
(Open)
LER 92-10:
This
LER reported
another reactor trip which
occurred
due to the failure of the main condenser
boot seal.
This
event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/
13
92-13.
The licensee
has replaced
both boot seals
and tested
the
main steam safety relief valve satisfactory.
The inspectors
observed this testing which showed that the safety valve was set
properly within setpoint tolerance.
Further review of post trip
data related to steam generator
pressures
revealed that manual
control of the steam generator
PORVs allowed steam pressure
to
increase
higher than normal
near the setpoint.
The inspectors
concluded that operator action to manually control
steam pressure
was inadequate
to prevent challenging the
safety
valve.
Considering the observations
made in NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/92-13
regarding
inadequate
operator control of steam
generator levels,
licensee
management
was encouraged
to provide
additional training/guidance
regarding plant operator
response
to
The
LER will remain
open pending the licensee's
investigation into other possible
boot seal failures.
g.
(Open)
LER 92-11:
This
LER reported that the emergency
bus
undervoltage logic circuitry was inadequately
tested.
Upon
reviewing
Inadequate
testing of
Emergency
Bus Undervoltage
Logic Circuitry, licensee
personnel
determined that the plant's
method for testing the undervoltage
circuitry was likewise deficient.
The test
method manually opened
the emergency
bus feed breakers
to simulate the low voltage
condition on the bus.
This method did not adequately verify that
the undervoltage circuitry would open the feed breakers
as
required.
When this situation
was identified, licensee
personnel
decided
that the surveillance
requirements
of TS 4.8. l. 1.2.f.4.(a)
were
not properly satisfied
and both emergency diesels
were declared
at 1:35 p.m.,
on July 21.
A test procedure
was created
to check the omitted logic circuitry.
This procedure
was
performed satisfactory
on both emergency
bus feed breakers
and the
diesels
were declared
by 2: 10 a.m.,
on July 22.
The
licensee
plans to revise the permanent test procedures
to correct
this deficiency.
The
LER will remain
open pending completion of
this additional action.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on August 21,
1992.
During this
meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed
in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation addressed
below.
The licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as
proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the
inspectors
during this inspection.
No dissenting
comments
from the
licensee
were received.
Item Number
400/92-15-01
10.
and Initialisms
Descri tion and Reference
VIO:
Failure to properly implement plant
procedures,
paragraphs
2.c.
and 7.
ACR
-
Adverse Condition Report
-
Emergency Oprating Procedure
KV
-
Kilovolt
IEC
-
Instrumentation
and Control
LER
-
Licensee
Event Report
-
Local
Leak Rate Test
NAD
-
Nuclear Assessment
Department
-
Non-Cited Violation
NPSS
-
Nuclear Plant Support Section
NRC
-
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
NSD
-
Nuclear Services
Department
-
Operational
Support Center
PH
-
Preventive
Haintenance
PNSC
-
.
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
-
Power Operated Relief Valve
-
Reactor Auxiliary Building
-
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
-
Residual
Heat
Removal
TS
-
Technical Specification
-
Violation
WABA
-
Wet Annular Burnable Absorber
Cl: