ML18010A434
| ML18010A434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A432 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-91-21, NUDOCS 9111200027 | |
| Download: ML18010A434 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1991021
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 3M23
Report
Noe I
50-400/91-21
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Condu t
August 24 - September
28,
1991
Inspectors:
w,
endor Res>dent
nspector
ate
1gne
H.
Shannon.,
Resident
Inspector
Da
e
igned
Approved by:
. Chri st nsen,
Secti on Chi ef
Division of Reactor Projects
/vvI - 9-'F(
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was
conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant
operations,
radiological
controls,
security,
fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
licensee
event reports,
Plant
Nuclear
Safety
Committee activities,
main control
board
review,
and licensee
action
on previous
inspection
items.
Numerous facility
tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these
tours
and,
observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to properly establish
a procedure for
properly setting the blowdown rings
on Crosby relief valves
(paragraph 9.e).
9111~000P7
911009
ADOCI( 05000400
PDFI
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- P. Beane,
Manager, guality Control
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
- C. Hinnant,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
D. McCarthy, Manager, Site Engineering
- B. Meyer, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
- R. Morgan,
Manager,
Project Assessment
- T. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
C. Olexi k, Manager,
Regulatory Compliance
A. Powell, Manager,
Harris Training Unit
R. Richey, Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
H. Smith, Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
- F. Strehle,
Manager, guality Assurance
Engineering
- M. Wallace,
Sr. Specialist,
Regulatory Compliance
E. Willett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
W. Wilson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear Fuel
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
office,
operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms
used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant continued in power operation
(Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed
records
and discussed
various entries
with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance,. with
the
Technical
Specifications
(TS)
and
the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active
Clearance
Log; Jumper
and
Wire Removal
Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition,
the inspector
independently
verified
clearance
order tagouts.
The inspectors
found the
logs to
be readable,
well organized,
and
provided
sufficient
information
on
plant
status
and
events.
Clearance
tagouts
were
found
to
be
properly
implemented.
No
violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout
the inspection
period, facility tours
were. conducted.to
observe
operations,
surveillance,
and
maintenance
activities
in
progress.
Some
of these
observations
were
conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection
period,
licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management
activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the
following areas:
security perimeter
fence; control
room;
emergency
diesel
generator
building;
reactor
auxiliary building;
waste
processing
building;
turbine
building;
fuel
handling
building;
emergency
service
water
building;
battery
rooms;
electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
(I)
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating
status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
. lineup,
reactor
operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment
, operating
parameters
were
observed
to verify that indicated
parameters
were
in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors
verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room
operations
were
being
conducted
in
an
orderly
and
professional
manner.
In addition,
the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
status,
operational
problems,
and
other
pertinent
plant
information during these
turnovers.
(3)
Plant
Housekeeping
Conditions
-
Storage
of material
and
components,
and
cleanliness
conditions
of various
areas
throughout
the facility were
observed
to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(4)
Radiological
Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities
were
observed
routinely to verify that
these
activities
were in conformance
with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements..
The
inspectors
also
reviewed
selected
radiation
work permits
to
verify that controls
were adequate.
(5)
Security Control -
The
performance
of various shifts of the
security force was
observed
in the conduct of daily activities
which included:
protected
and vital
area
access
controls;
searching
of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and
compensatory'osts.
In addition,
the inspector
observed
the operational
status
of
Closed
Circuit Television
(CCTV) monitors,
the
Intrusion Detection
system
in the central
and
secondary
alarm
stations,
protected
area
lighting, protected
and vital area
and the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing
and
equipment
were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and
that fire alarms,
extinguishing
equipment,
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment, and.fire barriers
were operable.
The
inspectors
found
plant
housekeeping
and
component
material
condition to be quite 'good.
The licensee's
adherence
to radiological
controls,
security controls, fire protection
requirements,
and
TS
requirements
in these
areas
were satisfactory.
c.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse
Condition
Reports
(ACRs)
were
reviewed
to verify the
following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
as identified
in the reports
were
accomplished
or being
pursued for completion,
generic
items
were identified and reported,
and
items were reported
as required
by the TS.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Surveillance
tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being
used;
qualified personnel
were
conducting
the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment
operability;
calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
OST-1008
RHR Pump Operability
OST-1092
1B-SB Residual
Heat
Removal
Pump Operability
OST-1108
RHR Pump Operability
OST-1502
RHR Loop Suction
Remote Position Indicating and Timing Test
OST-1804
RHR Remote Position Indication and Timing Test
EPT-033
Emergency
Safeguards
Sequencer
System Test
EST-220
Type
C LLRT of Containment
Purge
Exhaust Penetration
(M-58)
The
performance
of these
procedures
was
found to
be satisfactory with
proper
use
of calibrated
test
equipment,
necessary
-communications
established,
notification/authorization
of control
room personnel,
and
knowledgeable
personnel
performing the tasks.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Naintenance
Observation
(62703)
The
inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance
activities
to verify that
correct
equipment
clearances
were
in effect;
work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as
required,
were
issued
and
being followed;
quality control
personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and,
TS requirements
were being followed.
Haintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following
maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
Replacement
of solenoid
in trip logic for the "8" emergency
diesel.
generator.
"A" chiller trip and subsequent
troubleshooting.
"8" containment
exhaust isolation valve leak repairs.
"8"
emergency
diesel
generator
sequencer
failure
and
subsequent
troubleshooting.
The inspectors
found the performance
of the above work to be satisfactory
with proper implementation of independent
verification requirements.
The
performance
of the time-dependent
maintenance
on the sequencer
was well
organized
and well executed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential
generic
impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as
they occurred to
determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance
with
the current
a ~
(Closed)
LER 90-08:
This
LER reported
a discrepancy
in the amperage
rating for a circuit breaker
providing overcurrent protection for an
electrical
containment
This matter
was
previously
discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-14.
The licensee
has
completed
a review of other circuits for similar discrepancies
and
,
has revised plant drawings accordingly.
b.
(Closed)
LER 90-17:
This
LER repor ted
the inoperability of an
essential
services chiller.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-14
and
was the subject of a licensee
identified violation
(NCV 400/90-14-01).
The licensee
has completed
identification tagging of the chiller valves
and installation of a
trough to help protect tubing and valves.
co
(Open)
LER 91-16:
This
LER reported
the lifting of several
component
cooling water relief valves
during
a
pump start.
This matter
was
previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/91-18
and
was
the subject of an unresolved
item (URI 400/91-18-01).
This event
was
also similar to an event which occurred in August 1990, during which
operation
of two
pumps
caused
component
cooling water
system
pressure
to increase
and
CCW system relief valves lifted and failed
to reset.
The licensee
is presently ,limiting system
pressure
to
approximately
95 psig
by initiating flow through
a residual
heat
removal
heat exchanger.
Procedural
guidance
and training have
been
provided to establish
proper relief valve settings.
The
blowdown
ring settings
of all
CCW system relief valves
were verified to be
properly set.
The
licensee
is
pursuing
plant modifications to
correct this recurrent
problem
and
is investigating
other plant
systems
with .similar relief valves.
.The
LER will remain
open pending
completion of this additional corrective action.
d.
(Open)
LER 91-17:
This
LER reported that
a composite
sample for a
secondary
waste
tank continuous
release
was not taken
as required
by
the
TS.
Since
no activity was
indicated
by in-line radiation
monitors
or isotopic analysis
of the water prior to release,
the
licensee
determined
that
no safety
consequences
resulted
from
this'vent.
The licensee's
corrective action will include counseling of
the
technician
who failed to initiate the
composite
sample
and
revising the applicable plant procedure to require
a signoff for this
action being completed.
The
LER will remain
open pending completion
of the corrective action.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Annual
Emergency Drill (71707)
On September
10,
1991,
the
annual
emergency drill was
conducted
by the
licensee
to verify the
effectiveness
of the
Radiological
Emergency
Response
Plan
and
implementing
procedures.
Details
of the drill,
including the results of critiques held,
are discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/91-24.
The inspectors
noticed
a slight delay
by the
licensee
when declaring
emergency classifications.
This tended to also delay the reporting of the
event to the State
and the
NRC.
In general,
however,
performance
during
the drill was considered
to
be excellent
and the scenario
was considered
to be challenging.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (40500)
The
inspectors
attended
selected'NSC
meetings
to
observe
committee
activities
and
verify
TS
requirements
with respect
to
committee
composition, duties,
and responsibilities.
Minutes from this meeting were
also
reviewed
to verify accurate
documentation.
Besides
the typical
monthly required topics, efforts to trend reactor coolant
pump oil leakage
and action to
be taken
on low oil reservoir level
were discussed.
The
trending
and action plan were created
by system engineers
but received
the
additional
review by the
PNSC for conservatism.
The inspector
considers
the
conduct of these
meetings
to
be
good
and that committee actions/
recommendations
enhance
the safe operation of the plant.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Main Control
Board Annunciator Review (71707)
Due to recent
industry events
involving loss of power to main control
board annunciator
systems,
a review of the plant annunciator
system
was
performed in accordance
with an
NRC memorandum
dated August 19,
1991.
The
Final Safety Analysis Report,
system description, electrical, drawings,
and
plant incident
reports
associated
with the
system
were
reviewed
during this effort.
A loss of power to the annunciator
system
was also discussed
with operating
personnel
to determine
what action they
would perform.
The annunciator
system is powered
by three internal annunciator
inverters
which, in turn, receive
power from primary and standby
power sources.
The
primary source of power's
from 120
VAC distribution panel
UPP-lA which
receives
power from an uninterruptible
power supply fed from non-safety
480
VAC motor control centers
MCC-1D21 and
MCC-1E21.
The standby
source
of power consists
of 125
VDC distribution panel
DP-1A-1 which receives
power from the station battery or associated
battery chargers.
Selection
of the primary or standby
power supply is via an automatic transfer relay
in the internal
inverter which senses
voltage degradation
on
the primary source
and automatically switches
to the standby
source.
The licensee's
emergency
action level flowpaths require the declaration of
an
ALERT if 50 percent
or more of the annunciators
lose
power for greater
than
10 minutes.
A SITE
AREA
EMERGENCY is declared if this loss is
coincident with a plant transient.
A previous event at Harris occurred in
August
1988
where
approximately
60~ percent of the 'main control
board
lost power.
The licensee
declared
an ALERT and power to the
system
was quickly restored.
In conclusion,
the inspector
found that the annunciator
system
had
a
reliable source of power, action required in case of loss of power to the
system
was appropriately
specified,
and operators
were
knowledgeable
of
the required action.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Licensee
Action" on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
5
92701)
a.
(Closed)
IFI 400/90-10-03:
Follow licensee's
activities to correct
linkage failure of emergency
service chiller return valves.
The licensee
plans to continue
using the present
"monoball" linkage
assemblies
for
these
valves.
The failure rate of this
type of
linkage
does
not appear
to
be excessive
and this action
was
deemed
appropriate.
b.
(Closed) Violation 400/90-21-04:
Failure to perform
a written safety
evaluation.
c ~
d.
e.
The
inspector
reviewed
and verified completion of the corrective
actions listed in the licensee's
response letter dated
December
28,
1990.
This matter
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/91-10.
The licensee
performed
a written safety evaluation of
the increase
in activity in the spent fuel pools
and determined that
although
an increase
in calculated
dose rates
would result during
a
potential
accident,
this
increase
was still well within allowed
limits.
An additional
review of the
design
basis
for the fuel
handling
building
and
supporting
systems
was
conducted
and
appropriate
procedure
revisions
were implemented.
(Closed) Violation 400/90-26-01:
Failure to maintain administrative
control of a high radiation area
key.
The
inspector
reviewed
and verified completion of the corrective
actions listed in the licensee's
response letter dated
March 1, 1991.
Appropriate plant procedures
and the corporate
Radiation Control
and
Protection
Manual
were revised to provide more prescriptive
guidance
for control of high radiation areas.
Further, the licensee
reviewed
this
event
and
the results
of an
independent
assessment
of .the
incident, with technicians
and supervisors.
(Closed)
IFI 400/91-06-01:
Review licensee's
corrective action to
close exterior doors during severe
stor'm warnings.
The
licensee
will revise
procedure
AP-301,
Adverse
Weather.
Operations,
to close
the exterior
doors
upon receipt of a severe
storm watch.
This action should
provide
enough
time to close the
doors
before actually experiencing
a severe
storm.
The licensee
is
also considering providing quick disconnects
on cables/hoses
that are
run through these
doors to facilitate rapid removal.
(Closed)
URI 400/91-18-01:
Improper
Crosby relief valve
blowdown
ring settings.
After further
review
by the
licensee, it was
determined
that
approximately
34
Crosby relief valves,'n
various
safety-related
systems
required verification of proper
blowdown ring settings.
All
of the valves that were checked
were found to be set improperly, from
a
few
notches
to
over
170
notches
from the
required
setting.
Detailed
procedures
or training
had
not
been
provided
and
the
maintenance
staff had not correctly implemented
the technical
manual
recommendations
which subsequently
resulted
in improper blowdown ring
settings.
An internal justification for continued
operation
is in effect for
three relief valves,
which if set improperly could adversely affect
system operation.
Precautions
are in place to limit system inventory
losses if these relief valves
open
and
do not reset.
The three
relief valves will be
checked for proper
blowdown ring settings
during the
next plant outage.
Fifteen additional
valves will be
checked
at
the
next available
system(s)
outage.
The licensee's
failure to provide the maintenance
staff with adequate
training and
procedures
for adjusting
the Crosby relief valve's
blowdown ring is
considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (400/91-21-01):
Failure to properly set the blowdown rings
on Crosby relief valves.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on September
28,
1991.
During this
meeting,
the
inspectors
summarized
the
scope
and
findings of the
inspection
as
they are detailed
in this report, with particular emphasis
on
the
Violation
addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
400/91-21-01
11.
and Initialisms
VIO:
Failure to properly set the blowdown rings
on Crosby relief valves.
(Paragraph
9.e.)
ACR
CFR
EPT
EST
IFI
LER
NRC
OST
Adverse Condition Report
Closed Circuit Television
Component Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Engineering
Performance
Test
Engineering Surveillance Test
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Licensee
Event Report
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance
Test
'I
PNSC
TS
VAC
VDC
WR/JO
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Pounds
per Square
Inch Gage
Residual
Heat Removal
Technical Specification
Unresolved
Item
Volt Alternating Current
Volts Direct Current
Violation
Work Request/Job
Order