ML18004A245

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Responds to Re Exemption from full-scale Emergency Evacuation Practice.Util Submitting Addl Info Prior to NRC Decision.Evacuation Radius Discussed
ML18004A245
Person / Time
Site: Harris 
Issue date: 06/24/1986
From: Buckley B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Broswell E
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
NUDOCS 8607010016
Download: ML18004A245 (3)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 24, 1986 Edward L. Braswell, Jr.

Janice Lumpkin Route 66, Box 108A Cullowhee, North Carolina 28723 Dear Mr. Braswell and Ms. Lumpkin:

I am pleased to respond to your letter to Mr. Denton which we received June ll, 1986, in which you expressed certain concerns about the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant.

Specifically, you "urged

[NRCj to refuse any exemption from the full scale emergency evacuation practice for the Shearon Harris reactor...."

and that the NRC "insure that the evacuation area....NOT be reduced and instead be increased to at least 25 miles."

Regarding a possible exemption from the requirement to conduct an exercise within one year prior to full power authorization, CPSL has stated by letter dated June 10, 1986, that they are now in the process of consulting with involved off-site response organizations on the scheduling of exercises for the Shearon Harris Plant.

Furthermore, CP8L requested that the NRC staff hold in abeyance active review of the exemption request and the request for a hearing until the consulting process has been completed.

At that point, CP8L will then provide additional information to the NRC staff for review.

Consequently, the NRC staff will not act on this matter until the above cited additional information has been provided.

To respond to your comment on the reduction in the evacuation

radius, there has been such request received by the NRC from CPSL to reduce the evacuation radius.

With respect to your comment on increasing the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergen+

Planning Zone (Plume EPZ) to 25 miles around the plant, commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S.,

based upon of the NRC, have two concentric emergency planning zones (EPZs).

EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident.

The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which must be performed to assure an adequate response.

In a particular emergency, protective actions might well be restricted to a small part of the planning zones.

On the other hand, for the worst possible accidents, protective actions might need to be taken outside the planning zones.

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0 Mr. Braswell and Ms. Lumpkin June 24, 1986 The first zone, called the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, is an area of about 10 miles in radius from the center of the plant.

The major protective actions planned for this EPZ, evacuation and sheltering, would be employed to reduce fatalities and injuries from exposure to the radioactive plume from the most severe of the core-melt accidents and to limit unnecessary radiation exposures to the public from less severe accidents at nuclear power plants.

The second zone, called the Ingestion Pathway EPZ, is an area of about 50 miles in radius from the center of the plant.

The major protective actions planned for this zone, putting livestock on stored feed and controlling food and water, would be employed to reduce exposure to the public from ingestion of contaminated food and water.

The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ of 50 miles was selected because federal protective action guidelines would generally not be exceeded beyond 50 miles for a wide spectrum of hypothetical accidents.

The response measures established within the 10-mile and 50-mile EPZs can and will be expanded if the conditions of a particular accident warrant it.

Also, although an EPZ is generally circular, the actual shape is determined based on local factors such as demography, topography, access

routes, and governmental jurisdictional boundaries at a particular site.

Smaller EPZs have been established for gas-cooled power reactors and smaller water-cooled power reactors.

The principal technical documents that describe the process of defining the size of the EPZs and the planning and protective measures to be taken within them are NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency

Response

Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants,"

December 1978 and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency

Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,"

November 1980.

The principal technical study upon which the sizes of the emergency planning zones were based is NUREG-75/014, "Reactor Safety Study:

An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," October

1975, WASH-1400.

I would also like to point out that the North Carolina State Emergency Plan in support of the Shearon Harris plant, CP8Ls Corporate Emergency Plan, and the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan are all located at the local public document room at the Wake County Public Library, Fayetteville Street,

Raleigh, North Carolina.

I hope that the above discussion is responsive to your concerns.

Sincerely,

/s/

Bart C. Buckley, Senior Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No.

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