ML18004A153

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Responds to Expressing Concern Re Util Request for Exemption from full-scale Emergency Evacuation Practice Prior to Plant Operation.Util Consulting W/Involved Offsite Response Organizations Re Scheduling of Exercises
ML18004A153
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/1986
From: Buckley B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Elliott B
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML18004A154 List:
References
NUDOCS 8606260082
Download: ML18004A153 (4)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 23, 1986 Ms. Betsey Elliott Route 2, Box 448 Pittsboro, North Carolina 27312

Dear Nr. Elliott:

I am pleased to respond to your letter to Hr. Denton which we received June 2, 1986, in which you expressed concern regarding Carolina Power and Light's (CP8L) exemption request from a "full scale emergency evacuation practice - or plan-prior to opening the Harris Nuclear Plant.

You also requested that the NRC "increase, not reduce, the evacuation area."

The regulations do not require a that a full scale emergency preparedness exercise be conducted prior to plant operation of up to 5X of rated power.

CP8L's exemption request was that they not be required to perform a full scale emergency preparedness prior to exceeding 5% of rated power.

By letter dated June 10,

1986, CP8I stated that they are now in the process of consulting with involved off-site response organizations on the scheduling of exercises for the Shearon Harris Plant.

Furthermore, CP8L requested that the NRC staff hold in abeyance active review of the exemption request and the request for a hearing until the consulting process has been completed.

At that point, CP8L will then provide additional information to the NRC staff for review.

Consequently, the NRC staff will not act on this matter until the above cited additional information has been provided.

Finally, with respect to your comment on increasing the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (Plume EPZ) around the plant, commercial nuclear poweI plants in the U.S.,

based upon requirements of the NRC, have two concentric emergency planning zones (EPZs).

EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident.

The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which must be performed to assure an adequate response.

In a particular emergency, protective actions might well be restricted to a small part of the planning zones.

On the other hand, for the worst possible accidents, protective actions might need to be taken outside the planning zones.

The first zone, called the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, is an area of about 10 miles in radius from the center of the plant.

The maior protective actions planned for this EPZ, evacuation and sheltering, would be employed to reduce fatalities and injuries from exposure to the radioactive plume from the most severe of the core-melt accidents and to limit unnecessary radiation exposures to the public from less severe accidents at nuclear power plants.

The second zone, called the Ingestion Pathway EPZ, is an area of about 50 miles in radius from the center of the plant.

The major protective actions planned for this zone, putting livestock on stored feed and controlling food and water, would be employed to reduce exposure to the public from ingestion of contaminated food and water.

The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ of 50 miles was selected because federal protective action guidelines would generally not be exceeded beyond 50 miles for a wide spectrum of hypothetical accidents.

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Ms. Elliott June 23, 1986 The response measures established within the 10-mile and 50-mile EPZs can',

and will be expanded if the conditions of a particular accident warrant it.

Also, although an EPZ is generally circular, the actual shape is determined based on local factors such as demography, topography, access

routes, and governmental jurisdictional boundaries at a particular site.

Smaller EPZs have been established for gas-cooled power reactors and smaller water-cooled power reactors.

The principal technical documents that describe the process of defining the size of the EPZs and the planning and protective measures to be taken within them are NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency

Response

Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants,"

December 1978 and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision I, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency

Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,"

November 1980.

The principal technical study upon which the sizes of the emergency planning zones were based is NUREG-75/014, "Reactor Safety Study:

An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," October

1975, WASH-1400.

I would also like to point out that the North Carolina State Emergency Plan in support of the Shearon Harris plant, CPIIL's Corporate Emergency

Plan, and the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan are all located at the local public document room at the Wake County Public Library, Fayetteville Street,
Raleigh, North Carolina.

I hope that the above discussion is responsive to your concerns.

Sincerely, Bart C. Buckley, Senior Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No.

2 Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION YT 869327 Doc et w sncomsng NRC PDR w/incoming HDenton TNovak LRubenstein BBuckley BBuckley DMiller DMatthews AJohnson (2)

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