ML17354A517
| ML17354A517 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1997 |
| From: | Croteau R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9706040317 | |
| Download: ML17354A517 (48) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES CLEAR REGULATORYCOMMI~N WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&0001 May 28,.1997 5o-2Q/~l LICENSEE:
Florida Power and Light Company FACILITY: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON HAY 6, 1997, REGARDING FIRE BARRIER MODIFICATIONS (TAC NOS. H85616 AND H85617)
On Hay 6, 1997, representatives of the Florida Power and Light Company, licensee for Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4, met with members of the staff to discuss the current plans to upgrade the Thermo-Lag fire barriers and other fire protection issues.
Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees.
Enclosure 2 contains copies of handouts distributed at the meeting.
The meeting was helpful in gaining an understanding of the licensee's plans to mitigate the consequences of a turbine related fire event.
The NRC staff had previously indicated that it considered the turbine building to be a
significant fire risk.
In its presentation, FPL indicated that one credible fire hazard had not been previously addressed.
The hazard involves a bearing failure at the low pressure turbine and/or generator.
This fire hazard will be addressed by numerous upgrades including additional automatic suppression and supply systems, fire main upgrades, and improvements in the fire resistive ratings for fire barrier systems used to protect post-fire safe shutdown functions.
The NRC agreed conceptually that the proposed sprinkler upgrades, improvements in combustible liquid spill control measures, and improvements, with appropriate safety margins, in fire barrier performance would improve the fire safety in the turbine area.
The Plant Systems Branch will be issuing a trip report which will provide additional details regarding its views of the licensee's proposed turbine building fire safety enhancements.
The licensee intends to submit an exemption request addressing the necessary items for this area in July 1997.
The staff indicated that certain electrical raceway fire barrier systems used to protect post-fire safe shutdown cables which are exposed to a lube oil pool fire may need to be upgraded to meet the high hazard fire curve or a three hour rating.
In other areas of the plant, the licensee has completed fire barrier upgrades in the Unit 3 containment and is currently upgrading fire barriers in several 97Q<QQQ3i7 5QQP25Q i7 97Q528 PDR ADOCK Q P
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- indoor areas.
The NRC staff indicated its plans in the containment and indoor areas.
measures in place for several years due to being upgraded now.
satisfaction with the progress and The licensee has had compensatory the degraded fire barriers that are Docket No. 50-250 and 50-251 original signed by R. C~otegq', -.-
Richard P. Croteau, Prospect Manager Project Directorate II-3 Division'f Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor =Regulation
Enclosures:
l.
Attendance List 2.
Handouts cc w/
Enclosures:
See next page
- Document Name:
G:
TURKEY MEETG.SUM Office PM: PDI I-3 LA:PDI I-3 PD: PDI I-3 SPLB 4@'ame Date Copy RCroteau 2
97 Yes No FHebdon BCl n
097 Yes/No Yes No OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 97 TMarsh Yes No 97
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indoor areas.
The NRC staff indicated its satisfaction with the progress and plans in the containment and indoor areas.
The licensee has had compensatory measures in place for several years due to the degraded fire barriers that are being upgraded now.
Docket No. 50-250 and 50-251 Richard P. Croteau, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Attendance List 2.
Handouts cc w/
Enclosures:
See next page
0 f
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON HAY 6,
- 1997, REGARDING FIRE BARRIER MODIFICATIONS (TAC NOS.
M85616 AND M85617)
Distributi on
~Hard Co
- -Docket--Fi-le--
'UBLIC Turkey Point Reading ACRS I
OGC R. Croteau E-Mail F. Hiraglia" (FJM)
R..Zimmerman (RPZ).
S.
Varga (SAV)
P.
Madden (PMH)
G. Tracy, (GHT)
S.'est (KSW)
', Fredrickson, RII(PEF)
L. Tran (LNT)
T. Harsh (LBM)
D.
Ross (SAH)
B. Clayton (BAC2)
H. Ornstein (HLO)
J.
York (JWY)
F, Hebdon (FJH)
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'lorida Power and Light Company CC:
M. S.
Ross, Attorney Florida Power 5 Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 John T. Butler, Esquire c+aal Poctor and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Mr. Robert J.
Hovey, Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Armando Vidal County Manager Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1 Street, 29th Floor Miami, Fl orida 33128 Senior Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
" P.O.
Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Mr. Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Mr. Kerry Landis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-0199 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW., Atlanta, GA 30303-3415 TURKEY POIN ANT UNITS 3 AND 4 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Mr. H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing 8 Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420 Mr. Gary E. Hollinger Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Mr. T. F. Plunkett President - Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
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FPL NRC Mee in
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ist of A endees arne Office R. Kundalkar T. Abbatiello C. Fisher J. York H. Ornstein G. Hollinger E. Thompson
- 0. Hanek V. Laudato D. Baker S.
West P.
Madden L. Batsch L. Tran R. Croteau T. Bushatz J.
Hanso FPL FPL FPL NRC/RII NRC/AEOD FPL FPL FPL FPL FPL
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NRC/NRR NRC/NRR FPL NRC/NRR NRC/NRR FPL FPL ENCLOSURE I
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0 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
. Turbine Building Presentation NRC Meeting 5.
Walkdown Florida Power 8c Light Turkey Point Plant May 6th 5. 7th, l997 ENCLOSURE 2
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+0 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
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FPL Atiendees Raj Kundalkar Gary Hollinger Liz Thompson Vince Laudato f
John Manso Olga Hanek Chuck Fisher Larry Batsch Vice President Engineering Licensing Manager Turkey Point Engineering Manager Turkey Point Fire Protection Supervisor Turkey Point Lead IVlechanical Engineer
.'icensing Engineer
'Fire Protection Engineer Turbine'Specialist CSI
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+Q TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
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Introduction
Purpose:
To discuss the fire barrier modifications and exemptions at Turkey Point Units 3 5 4 FPL wants to achieve resolution of the turbine area upgrades Once resolution is,achieved, FPL will pursue turbine area upgrades in parallel with indoor areas Progress since January 7, 1997 meeting Completed upgrades in Unit 3 containment Completed outage scope upgrades in Unit 3 West Penetration Room Other indoor area upgrades in progress Designing 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> upgrades in A switchgear 5 C/D loadcenter rooms Performed detailed review of turbine fire events Completed assessment of turbine fire scenario An extensive review and assessment of turbine fires was performed Risk of an event at Turkey Point is low 0
Fully integral rotor and other design features 0
Good operation, maintenance and testing practices Turbine fire scenario determined effects of fire and mitigating features needed 0
Event driven approach utilized 0
Knowledge from industry events incorporated 0
Results presented today Proposed upgrades assure that safe shutdown would be achieved and maintained following a postulated limiting turbine fire scenario I
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT Presentation Includes
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Analysis of industry events 0
0 0
0 Commonalities of Industry events Salem Unit 2 Fermi Unit 2 Narora Unit 1
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Turkey Point Turbine Fire Scenario Overview
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Proposed Turbine Building Upgrades
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Follow-up Items from January 1997 Meeting
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A review of over two dozen turbine building fire incidents, both domestic and abroad, was completed 0
Both nuclear and other generating facilities were reviewed 0
7 events involving nuclear plants 0
Events occurred between 1965 and 1994
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Review substantiates conclusions of Turbine Building Hazards at U.S. Light Water Reactors, presented at ANS 1993 Winter Meeting
+
Four areas identified requiring review are:
0 Damage to lube oil systems and hydrogen systems from turbine vibration or missiles from overspeed Potentially applicable to Turkey Point Considered in evaluation of potential fire hazards 0
Smoke dissipation from fires in enclosed turbine buildings Condition mitigated by Turkey Point open turbine building Most events describe accumulation of smoke on operating deck Evaluation of other potential fire hazards sufficient r
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
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Analysis of Industry Events - Continued 0
Turbine building flooding
'urbine building flooding formally evaluated for:
Condenser tube rupture Outlet piping expansion joint failure System and suppression system flooding Circulating Water Pump Total Developed Head not sufficient to overflow condenser or condenser pit System and suppression accumulation is not sufficient to cause a flooding concern Inlet piping expansion joint protected by suppression Collateral damage due to collapsing walls Open turbine building minimizes pote'ntial hazard Events reviewed primarily concerned with roof collapse Walls for the switchgear, loadcenter tk feedwater pump cubicles are substantial, seismic design and not readily susceptible to fire damage
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In summary, potential lube oil and hydrogen system leakage requires consideration
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Analysis of Industry Events - Continued
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Detailed review of three specific events, chosen based on:
0 Nuclear Power Plants 0,
Significant recent fire events
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The nuclear plants reviewed are:
0 Salem Unit 2 0
Fermi Unit 2 0
Narora Unit i I
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Analysis of Salem Event
+ Westinghouse turbine, General Electric generator
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Event Contributors 0
OPC/AST/ASB Solenoids Testing and Maintenance Salem did not test redundant valves independently Salem did not perform valve inspections Turkey Point performs maintenance and testing every refueling outage 0
Control Room communication during testing Salem did not'stablish communication between the front standard and the control room Turkey Point test prerequisite is to establish positive communication with the control room 0
Local tachometer Salem front standard tachometer out of service Turkey Point tachometer availability test prerequisite
>op TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
~Ogygg +~4 Analys!s of Salem Event - Continued 0
Rotor design Salem LP rotors are disc type Turkey Point rotors are fully integral design Fully integral design greatly reduces the probability of blade failure 0
Local trip indication Salem front standard not equipped with local trip indication Turkey Point local indication bypassed in test Turkey Point hydraulic control logic provides automatic overspeed response
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INFO SER 7-92, "Turbine Failure Caused by Overspeed"
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Westinghouse Customer Advisory Letter (CAL) 92-02 0
20 Preventive and Corrective Actions Identified Turkey Point Response to Westinghouse CAL 9 Recommended Actions Previously Addressed 2 Recommended Actions Incorporated 4 Recommended Actions Addressed by Alternate Methods 5 Recommended Actions Not Applicable - EHC Related
e 4
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT Analysis of Salem Event - Continued
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Resultant Failures 0
LP Blading 0
LP Exhaust Flow Guide 0
Hydrogen Seal Oil 0
Exciter Bearing Oil Return Lines Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed protection operation, maintenance and testing Fully integral rotor design
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Resultant Fire Hazards 0
Hydrogen Explosion 0
Hydrogen and Lube Oil Fire.at Both Ends of the Generator
'Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed protection operation, maintenance and testing Normally isolated hydrogen supply valve Augmented Suppression
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Resultant Damage 0
Condenser hotwell 0
Circulating Water tubing ruptures in two condenser hotwells 0
Remaining Exhaust Stage blading had visible tip damage Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed protection operation, maintenance and testing Similar impacts considered in Turkey Point scenario 0
g+0 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT Ana!ys!8 of Fermi Event
+ Turbine Generator Supplied by English Electric Co.
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Not Directly Applicable to Turkey Point
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Event Contributors - Potential Root Causes 0
Torsional Vibration Not verifiable without pre-event configuration Turkey Point validated analysis completed by Westinghouse Maximum stress 13% of stress which can cause cracking at critical frequency.
0 Steam Path Water Accumulation or Water Induction Results in either individual blade or rotor damage Turkey Point NDE inspections of the LP rotors have not revealed evidence of either.
I 0
Blade fatigue failure attributed to a specific blade Fermi eighth stage blade no. 9 trailing edge thickness was substantially reduced Turkey Point inspections have not identified a concern 0
Lacing Rods failure on both sides leave blade free standing Design feature of Fermi rotor Turkey Point LP rotors are a fully integral design Last three stages are free standing
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TURKEY POlNT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
'nalysis of Fermi Event - Continued 0
Lacing Rods failure on both sides leave blade free standing Design feature of Fermi rotor Turkey Point LP rotors are a fully integral design Last three stages are free standing 0
Steam/Water Chemistry in BWR's Higher oxygen levels than PWR's Can reduce fatigue strength of turbine blade materials Turkey Point maintains good secondary chemistry including low oxygen levels 0
Low Condenser Backpressure
'I Increases differential pressure across last stage blades Turkey Point Circulating Water temperatures do not approach equivalent winter temperatures
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Resultant Failures 0
Exciter separated from coupling to generator shaft 0
Condenser tubes damaged 0
Breaks in the Service Water, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water, Hydrogen, Seal Oil and Lubricating Oil Piping systems Turkey Point Applicability and Features Turbine Generator Supplier is English Electric Company.
Turkey Point T-G Set is supplied by Westinghouse.
Salem Event is Considered Representative.
In addition; Open turbine building with open floor drains precludes possibility that all inventory reaches condenser pit.
Intake Cooling Water (Service Water) is located outside turbine building.
Turbine Plant Cooling Water connection supported by turbine pedestal.
Seal Oil and Lube Oil are located within guard pipe.
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Resultant Fire Hazards 0
Hydrogen and Lube Oil Fires (Hydrogen was limited by.Supply Isolation Valve)
A Turkey Point Applicability and Features Augmented Suppression Normally Isolated Hydrogen Supply P
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clear V Analysis of Fermi Event - ContinUed
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Resultant Damage O.
Circulating water tubing rupture in condenser reactor water chemistry 0
Turbine building flooding overflowed radwaste hotwells affected drain system Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed Protection Maintenance and for tube rupture event.
Flooding Not Applicable to. Turkey potential evaluated.
Testing adequate Point.
Flooding J
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT 0
+eZear Analysis of Narora Event
+ Turbine-generator supplier Bharat Heavy Electricals, Ltd.
+
Not directly applicable to Turkey Point
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Event Contributors 0
Low to High Cycle fatigue of fifth (last) stage LP blades Turkey Point Applicability and Features Turkey Point fully integral LP Rotor design greatly reduces the probability of this type failure
+
Resultant Failures 0
Generator Hydrogen Seals 0
Lube Oil Piping Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed protection operation, maintenance and testing Lube oil piping is welded and protected by guard pipe
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Resultant Fire Hazards 0
Hydrogen Explosion 0
Hydrogen and Lube Oil Fire Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed protection operation, maintenance and testing Augmented suppression Normally isolated hydrogen supply valve
>op TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERINO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
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Analysis of Narora Event - Continued
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Resultant Damage 0
Turbine Generator 0
Bus Ducts and Excitation Panels 0
Cables, Cable Trays, Emergency Transfer Relay Panels, electrical Distribution Panels, Transformer Panels and Generator Panels Turkey Point Applicability and Features Overspeed Protection Operation, Maintenance and Testing and Fully Integral Rotor Design Augmented Fire Suppression and Normally Isolated Hydrogen Supply Fire Protection Features which Include:
- Suppression System
-,Fire Penetration Seals
- Flame Retardant or Protected Cable Insulation
- Protection of Redundant Circuits
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+ Applicability of event conditions collected 0
Based on industry event review 0
identified Potential Hazards 0
Postulated Fire Event Developed 0
Performed detailed analysis of postulated fire event I
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+Q pe Postulated Fire Hazards
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Postulated Fire Hazards Previously Addressed 0
Guarded Oil Pipe 0
Lube Oil Reservoir 0
AuxiliaryTransformer 0
Generator Hydrogen
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Postulated Fire Hazards Not Explicitly Addressed - Credible 0
Bearing Failure at the LP and/or Generator Results in Loss of Lube.Oil System integrity Results in Loss of Hydrogen Seal Integrity Results in Possible Ignition Source
+
Postulated Fire Hazards Not Explicitly Addressed - Not Credible 0
Guarded Oil Pipe Rupture Vibration Induced Failure Not Credible Below Concrete Operating Deck - Missile Damage Not Credible Lack of Ignition Source 0
Hydrogen Gas Supply Supply Normally Isolated Isolation Valve Located on Ground Floor 0
High Pressure Turbine Bearing Vibration induced failure at High Pressure turbine not likely 0
Control Oil Located in Guard Pipe Lack of Ignition Source Missile event above operating deck not considered significant
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT Turbine Building Fire Event Scenario Based on the low probability event of an LP blade failure, caused by either overspeed or material failure, the following event is postulated:
+
High vibrations experienced at the LP and/or Generator bearings
+
Bearing seal failure allows hydrogen and lube oil leakage
+
Seal rubs provide heat source for hydrogen ignition/explosion
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Lube oil continues to leak based on coast down of turbine
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Significant accumulations of ignited lube oil on the grade elevation (EL 18.0') and in the condenser pit J
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT
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Postulated Fire Hazard Analysis
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Mitigating Features and Passive and Active Fire Protection 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Full wet pipe suppression of the areas where lube oil will pool Other high hazard areas protected by fixed water spray Sprinkler density consistent with NFPA 13 requirements Improved sprinkler coverage of Thermo-Lag in Turbine Area Proposed sprinkler system enhancements provide cooling Open gratings or curbs at column line D prevent spread of oil Openings to lower elevation and outside allow for runoff Portions of the ceiling is open to the atmosphere Fire Brigade response
+
Analysis of the Fire 0
0 0
0 0
Fire actuates sprinklers in the area within minutes Sprinkler discharge cools fuel before fuel reaches the floor Sprinkler discharge causes spill pool diameter increase Activation of spray systems of diked hazards in the area Sprinkler discharge at the 18'0" elevation provides cooling and smothering Combustion efficiency reduced due to pool size
+
Results of Analysis Additional suppression provides complete coverage over all areas where pooling may occur Reduction in heat release due to mitigation from features and suppression systems Resulting temperatures beyond the D column line will remain below ASTM E-119 furnace temperatures at 25 minutes I
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$jyd Proposed Upgrades
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Additional Suppression 0
See drawings 5610 M-56F, 5610-M-58F 0
Unit 3 Ground Floor Elevation (EL 18.0')
Coverage From Col A to D, Between Col 23.1 and 25.1 Coverage From Col D to J, Between Col 22 and 29 0
Unit 3 Mezzanine Elevation (EL 30.0')
Coverage From Col D to J, Between Col 22 and 29 0
Unit 4 Ground Floor Elevation Coverage From Col A to D, Between Col 30.1 and 32.1 Coverage From Col D to J, Between Col 29 and 36 0
Unit 4 Mezzanine Elevation Coverage From Col D to J, Between Col 30 and 36
+
Fire Main Upgrades 0
Upgrade Fire Pumps and/or Additional System Cross-ties
+
Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Upgrades Upgrade to One Hour Fire Barriers in and above the Condensate Pump Pits Upgrade to One Hour Fire Barriers From Columns A to E
between Columns 22 and 36 on the Ground Floor and Mezzanine
+
Open grating or curbs installed along column line D at selected locations
+
Proposed upgrades provide assurance that safe shutdown capability would be achieved and maintained in the event of a limitingturbine fire
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TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERMO-LAG UPGRADE PROJECT Follow-up items from January 1997 Meeting
+
Indoor Circuit Analysis 0
19 of 22 Indoor Areas Assessments Determined Thermo-Lag Requirements could be Revised 0
Operations Review and Approval of Each Assessment 0
Thermo-Lag Removal Sustified by Redundant Capability. or Manual Aetio'ns 0
Summary of Manual Actions Added to Remove Thermo-Lag 6 Manual Actions Utilizing Existing Plant Procedures.
10 Existing Manual Actions Eliminated by Use of Plant Procedures.
34 Existing IVlanual Actions Utilized 4 New Manual Actions. 2 are for Cold Shutdown, 1 is to Replicate Action for its Counterpart Zone. Only 1 New Manual Action, Hot Shutdown Condition.
Use of High Head Safety'Injection Pumps Use of HHSI Pumps is justified based on; Per Section lll.G.3 of Appendix R, Alternative Shutdown Capability Involves Physical Modification to the Plant to Provide Safe Shutdown Capability Generic Letter 81-12 Identifies Sl Pumps along with Charging Pumps as Safe Shutdown Equipment.
Use of Charging and Safety Injection for Appendix R has been Accepted by the NRC at Prairie Island.
Generic Letter 86-10 Requires Equipment to be Used as Provided for by its Design.
HHSI Pumps are Designed to Provide Reactor Coolant Makeup and Reactivity Control and Used for Other Safe Shutdown functions for Design Basis Events.
Pop TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT THERIVlO-LAGUPGRADE PROJECT
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Follow-up Items from January 1997 Meeting - Cont
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Work Prioritization 0
Indoor Areas and Containments Prioritized First Technical Resolution Achieved Classical Appendix R Application, Enclosed Areas at Greater'Risk Contain a Preponderance of Safe Shutdown Equipment Implementation In Progress 0
Turbine Building and Outdoor Areas Areas of Unique Attributes (Open Areas)
Technical Resolution Difficult Initial Submittal in 1994 Latest Submittal Scheduled for July 1997 0
Breakdown of resources allocated to Thermo-Lag resolution unchanged since January 1997 meeting 0
Turbine area upgrades will be pursued upon scope resolution Resolution efforts have been in progress since 1992 Implementation will be pursued in parallel with indoor upgrades