ML17353A364
| ML17353A364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1995 |
| From: | Matthews D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17353A365 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9509210363 | |
| Download: ML17353A364 (82) | |
Text
7590-01 UN S AT S NUC AR R
GU ATORY COMM S
F 0 DA POW R AND IGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNIT 4
~C.
-5 NVIRONM TA ASSESSM NT AND FIND NG 0 NO SIGN FICANT IMPACT The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from Facility Operating License No. DPR-41, issued to Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee),
for operation of Turkey Point Unit 4 located in Dade County, Florida.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Identification of the Pro osed Action:
This Environmental Assessment has been prepared to address potential 4
environmental issues related to the licensee's application of August 8,
- 1995, and revised by letter dated September 6,
1995.
The proposed action would exempt the licensee from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Paragraph III.D.1.(a), to the extent that a one-time interval extension for the Type A test (containment integrated leak rate test) by one refueling outage from the March 1996 refueling outage to the October 1997 refueling outage would be granted.
The Need for the Pro osed ction:
The proposed action is needed to permit the licensee to defer the Type A
test from the March 1996 refueling outage to the October 1997 refueling outage.
The exemption would permit a more flexible schedule for containment leak rate testing than provided for under the current regulations and result in significant cost-savings.
95092i03b3 9509i9'.
PDR ADOCK 0500025i P
Environment 1
Im c
s of the Pro osed Action:
The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that the proposed one-time exemption would not increase the probabil,ity or consequences of accidents previously analyzed and the proposed one-time exemption would not affect facility radiation levels or facility radiological effluents.
The licensee will continue to be required to conduct the Type B and C local leak rate tests which historically have been shown to be the principal means of detecting containment leakage paths with the Type A tests confirming the Type B and C test results.
It is also noted that the
- licensee, as a condition of the proposed exemption, will perform the visual containment inspection although it is only required by Appendix J to be conducted in conjunction with Type A tests.
The NRC staff considers that these inspections, though limited in scope, provide an important added level of confidence in the continued integrity of the containment boundary.
The change wi.ll not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released
- offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological
- impacts, the proposed action does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alter ative t th ro se Action:
Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed
- action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental. impact need not be evaluated.
As an alternative to the proposed
- action, the NRC staff considered denial of the proposed action.
Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts'.
Alte n t've Use eso ces:
This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final'nvironmental Statement dated July 1972 for Turkey Point Unit 4.
A encies a
d erson C
ed.
In accordance with its stated policy, on May 16, 1995 the NRC staff consulted with the Florida State official, Dr. Lyle Jerrett of the
~St te Office of Radi tio ont
, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action.
The State official had no comments.
FINDING OF NO SIGN FICAN IMPACT Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letters dated August 8,
- 1995, and September 6,
1995, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
- Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
0
document room located at the Florida International University, Uni,versity Park, Hiami, Florida 33199.
Dated at Rockville, Haryland, this 19th day of September 1995.
FOR, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION David B. Hatthews,. Director Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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LICENSE AUTHOItlTY FILE COPY OU NQT
. August 20, 1992
~~. ly'W + dl~~-W/
Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251
'r.
J.
H. Goldberg President-Nuclear
- Division, Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE:
DEGRADED VOLTAGE PROTECTION SCHEME (TAC NOS.
M83248 AND M83249)
These amendments permit the addition of one definite time delay relay per channel in the existing. non-safety injection degraded voltage protection scheme for safety-related load centers, and eliminate the reference in the Technical Specifications to a specific type of relay used in the degraded voltage protection scheme.
A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.
The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal
~Re ister notice.
Sincerely, (Original Signed By J. Norris for)
L. Raghavan, Acting Project Hanager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
l.
Amendment No.152 to DPR-31 2.
Amendment No.147 to DPR-41 3.
Safety Evaluation The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 152 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-31 and: Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-4l,for the Turkey Point, Plant, Units Nos.
3 and 4, respectively.
The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by l'etter dated April 21,
- 1992, as supplemented May 19, June 2 and July 29, 1992.
cc w/enclosures:
See next page Document Name - TP83248.AMD s
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Mr. J. H.,Goldberg Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Plant CC Harold F. Reis, Esquire Newman and Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.-
Washington, DC 20036 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 John T. Butler, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Mr. Thomas F. Plunkett, Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102
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Joaquin Avino
- County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1st Street, 29th Floor Miami, Florida 33128 Senior Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Mr. Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of'ealth and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Mr. Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Adm> nistrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Mar'ietta,Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102 Mr. R.
E. Grazio Director, Nuclear Licensing Florida Power and. Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
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~~a 0O UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0
)f~*~4 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2065S FLORIDA POWER AND L GHT COMPANY DOCKET NO, 50- 50 TURK Y POINT P ANT UNIT NO.
3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OP RATING LICENS Amendment No. 152 License No.
DPR-31 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the. Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated April 21,
- 1992, as supplemented Hay 19, June 2 and July 29,
- 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
"There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 152, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The Environmental Protection 'Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the license. 'he licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION erbert N. Berk
, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
August 20, 1992
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. O.C. 20666 LORIDA POWER AND IGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-51 TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO.
4 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.
147 License No.
DPR-41 1;
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated April 21,
- 1992, as supplemented May 19, June 2 and July 29,
- 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by
.this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E..
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No.,DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B)
Technical S ecifications and nviro ment rotect on a
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. ~47, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of i'ssuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance; August 20, 1992
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ATTACHMENT TO C
NSE AM N M
T M
S NO P
M NOM T NO. 147 FAC ITY OP RA NG S
'NO OCKET NOS.
50-250 AND 50-51
,Revise Appendix A as follows:
Remove a es 3/4 3-19 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-33a nsert a es 3/4 3-19 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-"28 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-33a
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TABLE 3. 3-2 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION FUNCTIONAl UNIT TOTAL NO.
OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP HINIHUH CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES ACTION Auxiliary Feedwater¹¹¹ (Continued) b.
Stm.
Gen. Mater Level 3/steam Low-Low generator 1, 2, 3
c.
Safety Injection 1, 2, 3
d.
Bus Stripping 1/bus 2/steam 2/steam 15 generator generator sn any steam generator See Item 1.
above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.
1/bus 1/bus 23 e.
Trip of All Hain Feed-water Pumps Breakers 1/breaker 7.
Loss of Power 5
1/breaker )
(1/breaker) 1, 2
operating
/operating pump pump 23 a.
4.16 kV Busses A and B
2/bus (Loss of Voltage) 2/bus 2/bus 1, 2, 3, 4 18 b.
480 V Load Centers 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D Degraded Voltage Coincident with:
Safety Injection 2 per load center 2 on any 2 per load 1, 2, 3, 4 18 load center center See Item l. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements
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TABLE 3.3-2 Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS OF CHANNELS TO TRIP HINIMLjM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES ACTMN C.
d.
e.
Containment Radio-activity-High Containment.Isolation Hanual Phase A or Hanual Phase B
Control Room Air Intake Radiation Level 7.
Loss of Power (Continued) c.
480 V Load Centers 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 4A, 4B, 4C 4D Degraded Voltage 8.
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks a.
Pressurizer Pressure b
Tav Low Contyol Loom Ventilation Isolation a.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.
Safety Injection 2 per load center 2 on any 2 per load 1, 2, 3, 4 18 load center center 1,2,3 1, 2, 3
19 19 1, 2, 3, 4,6*" 16 All 24 See Item 1.
above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.
2 1
1 1, 2, 3, 4,6~~ 16 1,2,3,4 17
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C7 CD TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM
~FUNCTIONAL UNIT
~l.
Loss of Power (Continued) b.
480V Load Centers Degraded Voltage Load Center ALLOWANCE TA Z
S TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 3A 3B 3C 3D 4A 4B 4C 4D Coincident with:
Safety Injection and Diesel Generator Breaker Open Vl
]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
see item 1 1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
1 sec delay)[ ]
See Item 1.
above for all Safet:
Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.
N.A.
= N.A.
[ ] [ ]
430V~SV (10 sec ~
[ ] [ ]
438Vi5V (10 sec i
[
] [ ]
434V+5V (10 sec+
[
] [ ]
434Vi5V (10 sec i
[ ] [
]
'35Vi5V (10 sec i
[ ] [ ]
434Vi5V (10 sec f
[ ] [ ]
434V+5V (10 sec
+
[ ] [ ]
430Vi5V (10 sec
+
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~ FUNCTIONAL UNIT Igl.
Loss of Power (Continued) c.
480V Load Centers c
Degraded Voltage Load Center TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH ALLOWANCE TA Z
S TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 3A 3B 3C 3D 4A 4C Coincident with:
Diesel Generator Breaker Open E
3 H.A.
[][]
['][
3
[]E 3
[3[]
[3[
3 3[ ]
[]f 3 E ]E
]
H.A. N.A 424V+5V(60 sec delay) 427Vt5V(60 sec delay) 437Vt5V(60 sec delay) 435V+5V(60 sec delay) 430V15V(60 sec delay) 436VX5V(60 sec delay) 434Vi5V(60 sec delay) 434V%5V(60 sec delay)
H.A.
sec i30 [ ]
sec i30 [ ]
[ ]
sec
%30 f 3
sec i30
[ ]
sec i30 [ ]
sec a30 f
3 sec 130
[ ]
N.A.
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C TABLE 4. 3-2 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CD C
C/i CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION 6.
Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)
TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE FOR WHICH OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE TEST TEST LOGIC TEST¹ IS RE HIRER c.
Safety Injection d.
Bus Stripping N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3
See Item l. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.
e.. Trip of All Hain Feedwater Pump Breakers.
7.
Loss of Power a.
4.16 kV Busses A
an'd B (Loss of Voltage) b.
480V Load Centers 3A,3B,3C,3D and 4A,4B,4C,4D Degraded Voltage N.A.
N;A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2
1, 2, 3, 4 Coincident with:
Safety Injection c.
480V Load Centers 3A,3B,3C,3D and 4A,4B,4C,4D Degraded Voltage See Item 1.
above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.
S R
N.A.
H(l)
N.A.
1, 2, 3, 4
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t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D C 20%6 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR R GULATION RELAT 0 TO AMENDMENT NO; 152 TO FACILITY OP RATING ICENS NO.
P -3 AND AMENDMENT NO.
147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNIT NOS.
3 AND 4 DOCKET NO. 50-250 AND 50-251
- 1. 0 INTRODUCT ION By application dated April 21,
- 1992, as supplemented May 19, June 2 and July 29, 1992, Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) requested revisions to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The proposed changes involve design modifications to the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation for detecting degraded voltage at the class 1E 480 V load centers (LCs).
Presently, the 480 V LC has two degraded voltage protection schemes.
One scheme is utilized when the safe'ty injection (SI) actuation signal is present, and the other scheme is used during normal station operation (described in the licensee's letter as "non-safety injection degraded voltage protection, scheme").
The licen'see proposes to modify the degraded voltage protection scheme which is used during normal station operation.
No design modification is proposed for the scheme that detects degraded voltages while'he SI signal is present.
The protection scheme used during normal power operation includes GE-IAV type inverse time voltage relays.
Based on. its operational experience, the licensee indicates that the settings of these relays may drift in a non-conservative direction such that on low voltages, the relays either would trip after an additional time delay or would not trip at all.
To improve repeatability and to reduce potential harmful.effects due to,setpoint drifts of existing voltage relays on the degraded voltage detection and protection circuit, the licensee proposes to install additional voltage relays of definite time delay type and bypass switches to the existing voltage relays.
The bypass switches would allow these circuits to be placed in the trip mode during tests and calibration.
The licensee plans to implement the proposed modi.fications for Unit 3 during its Cycle 13 refueling outage and for Unit 4 during its Cycle 14 refueling outage.
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On July 9 and July 15, 1992, the staff held telephone conversations with the licensee to discuss the proposed changes and. requested additional information.
By letters dated June 2 and July 29,
- 1992, the licensee provided additional information.
These letters provided supplemental information that did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 BACKGROUND
Induction motors run as a constant Kilo Volt Amperes (KVA) device.
This means the motor current increases with a decrease in motor terminal voltage.
This is valid unti,l the terminal voltage is reduced to a "stall voltage,"
when the motor. can no longer develop sufficient torque to drive the attached load and the motor begins to stall.
When operating below the stall voltage, the motor will act as a constant impedance device and will draw current consistent with its terminal voltage.
Operation of the motors at a lower voltage and a
consequent increase in motor current and heat generation at the motor windings could cause winding short circuits, insulation
- damage, ground faults, etc.
and subsequently could lead to motor damage.
The extent of motor damage will depend on the duratioh of its operation at reduced voltage, and on the magnitude of motor current.
To prevent motor damage while operating at sustained low voltages, the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 design includes a
degraded voltage sensing and protection scheme.
Each unit has four class 1E 480 V
LC buses A, B, C,
and D.
Buses
'A and C are assigned to the train A power division, and buses B and D are assigned to the train B power division.
Each bus is provided with two separate protection schemes to protect the motors of connected loads against sustained degraded voltage condition.
This protection scheme detects a degraded voltage condition on any of the 480 V class 1E LC buses and, in response to a significant degraded voltage condition, trips and initiates a division level signal to transfer source of power from the offsite source to an onsite source.
One scheme is utilized during presence of the SI actuation signal, and the other scheme is used during normal station operation.
The licensee proposes to modify the degraded voltage protection scheme which is used during normal station operation.
No design modification has been proposed for the protection scheme that detects degraded voltages while the SI signal is present.
Therefore, the discussion in this Safety Evaluation (SE) is limited to the degraded voltage protection scheme which is used during normal station operation.
Each of the 480 V class 1E LC buses 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D degraded vol,tage protection
- scheme, which is used during normal station operation, include two trip-logic channels.
The protection logic will generate a trip-and-transfer signal only if both channels of any LC concurrently sense a degraded voltage condition (two-out-of-two logic).
The protection circuit of each channel of each LC bus consists of a set of one General Electric (GE)
IAV-55C type inverse time voltage relay connected across a potential transformer of the LC, and one auxiliary relay connected to the IAV relay,.
Upon detecting a
degraded voltage condition, contacts from the IAV-55C undervoltage relay close to energize its auxiliary relay.
A circuit containing the set of contacts
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from each of these two auxiliary relays wired in,series (two-out-of-two logic) would initiate the trip-and-transfer signal.
Therefore, to initiate the trip-and-transfer signal for any'of the four LCs, the associated channel I and channel 2 IAV-55C relays with their respective auxiliary relays for that LC must change state.
The existing IAV relays tend to drift from 'the required undervoltage settings specified in the TS.
Furthermore, the existing logic does not detect a failed coil in any auxiliary relays, and does not allow the circuit to be placed in the trip mode without an external shorting bar.
Because of these
- problems, the licensee plans to implement design modifications.
The proposed design modifications for 'Unit 3 would be implemented during its Cycle 13 refuelin'g outage and for Unit 4 during its Cycle 14 refueling outage.
3.0 PROPOSED DESIGN MODIFICATIONS The proposed modifications to the existing degraded voltage scheme would:
l.
add two ITE-27N definite time delay type undervoltage relays (one in each logic channel) to the, existing two IAV,-55C (one in each logic channel) undervoltage relays; 2.
delete the auxiliary relays from trip circuit; 3.
interconnect contacts from two existing IAV relays and two new ITE relays for each LC in a "one-out-of-two-taken twice" logic, This logic will generate a trip signal if degraded voltage is detected by either the IAV-55C or ITE-27N (one-out-of-two) relays in the logic channel I, concurrently with detection of degraded voltage by either IAV-55C or (one-out-of-two)
ITE-27N relays in the logic channel 2.
Therefore, both channels of any LC must generate a trip signal concurrently for a transfer to occur.
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add a bypass switch which would be used to place one undervoltage relay channel in the trip mode when one or both of the relays of that channel are removed from the logic circuitry for testing or calibration.
Nith the addition of the bypass switch, the IAV relay's shorting bar, which at present is used to place the relay channel in a trip mode, would be disconnected.
5.
add two new GE HGAlll type auxiliary relays to the protection scheme.
These relays would be normally de-energized, and would be used only to actuate the control room annunciator window. They would not control the trip circuit logic.
6.
replace the existing three-position test switch by a -five-position test switch to enable the operator to test either the IAV or 'the ITE relay of either channel.
The test switch would include two indicating lights (white and amber).
The white light would be used to indicate normal operation while the amber light would indicate a successful relay test.
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7.
install the new ITE-27N relays, GE-HGA auxiliary relays, bypass
- switch, test switch, and indicating lights in a new class 1E, seismically qua1ified subpanel which will be located across from each of the 480V LCs..
8.
modify the engraving on the existing annunciator window F35, which at present reads "UNDER VOLTAGE SCHEME TEST", to.read "UNDER VOLTAGE TEST/BYPASS".
4.0
~EVA UAT10N The staff reviewed and evaluated the licensee's proposed design modification to verify that:
(I) the modification would not defeat the original design objective of the protection circuit, (2) the modified circuit would trip and separate the distribution system from offsite power befor'e equipment either is damaged from the effects of sustained low voltage or rendered inoperable by the operation of other protective devices, and (3) would not degrade safety
- systems, c'ompromise the safety of the plant, or introduce any new failure modes that were not,previously analyzed and have not been compensated for.
The licensee's proposal does not include any design modification to the protection scheme that detects degraded voltages while the SI signal is present.
However, for consistency with the proposed TS wording change to the protection scheme during normal operation, the licensee proposes to revise the TS Table 3.3-2 item 7b to delete the phrase "2 instantaneous relays per load center " and TS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3.2, item 7b to delete the phrase "Instantaneous Relays".
These changes are administrative in nature and are acceptable.
The licensee proposes to modify the degraded voltage protection scheme which is used during normal station operation.
The proposed modifications involve new ITE relays which would protect the 480 V alternating current (AC) system from the adverse effects of a sustained degraded voltage condition while the existing IAV relays would protect from the adverse effects of a brief large voltage transient.
Adding another undervoltage relay enhances the existing degraded voltage protection scheme by addressing the repeatability concerns since the new ITE-27N undervoltage relays have greater repeatability in the undervoltage range where the existing IAV-55C relays tend to drift.
In
- addition, by removing the auxiliary relays from the trip circuit, the potential of rendering the trip circuit inoperable due to failure of an auxiliary relay is eliminated.
Also, the modified test circuit enables testing for failures of trip-actuating relays.
- 4. 1 n ine rin C lc ation for De raded Volta e Rela et The licensee performed engineering calculation 21701-523-E-01 to determine setpoints for the new ITE relays and for existing IAV relays.
The calculation was based on low voltage settings described in TS Table 3.3-3 Section 7.c for the existing inverse time relays for 480 V LC.
The TS table settings were assigned to the new ITE relays, because these relays have a greater
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repeatability in the undervoltage range where the existing IAV-55C relays tend to drift.
The IAV rel'ays have been assigned settings lower than that for the ITE relays.
The calculations verified that. the settings agreed with the voltage values for steady-state and transient conditions as described in report. FLO 53-20.5004, "Emergency Power System Enhancement
- Project, Relay Coordination Study," Revision Il.
The (2)
(3) staff noted the following in the calculations:
The settings are within the TS described ranges.
The TS settings are:
106 V + 1.25 V (60 + 30 seconds delay) for LC 3A, 106.75 V +
1.25 V (60 + 30 seconds 'delay) for LC 38, 109.25 V + 1.25 V (60 + 30 seconds delay) for LC 3C, and 108.75 V + 1.25 V (60 + 30 seconds delay) for LC 3D, respectively.
The IAV relay settings are lower than the ITE relay settings.
Therefore, the IAV relays should not operate before the ITE relays.
Therefore, at the TS trip voltages, only the new ITE relays are involved.
During a voltage transient lower than the setting of the ITE relay; the-ITE relay will operate but its contacts will not close until after at least 53.5 seconds (60 + seconds setting minus 6.5 seconds uncertainty).
The calculations also verified that the relays would not operate at the steady-state voltage at the bus.
The actual steady-state and transient voltages were determined by engineering calculation EC-
- 145, "PSB-I Voltage Analysis for Electrical'uxiliary System,"
Revision 5.
The minimum value of steady-state voltage on the bus has been used to calculate minimum motor terminal voltage of the class IE loads.
(4)
(5)
The calculations were performed using measuring and test equipment (HKTE) accuracy provided by the plant maintenance staff.
Therefore, results of this setpoint calculation apply only if the HETE accuracy is controlled to the values used in the calculation.
At present, the licensee does not have any procedure to track and control the H&TE accuracy per the above requirement, but the licensee has committed to implement such a procedure before the;modification is declared operational.
The calculations use cable resistance at 55 degrees C.
Contact resistance was accounted for by increasing the cable lengths by IOX.
The staff finds this reasonable.
Except for the setting tolerance, all components of uncertainty were added using the "square root of the sum of the squares" method to obtain the value of the total uncertainty.
The allowance for the setting tolerance was add'ed algebraically.
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(6)
The setpoint calculation indicates that the steady-state and transient voltages include a margin of -1.00 volt to account for drifting of the IAV relays.
The setting calculation did not use this value to arrive at the minimum steady-state and transient voltages.
,The calculation does not indicate the time duration for this drift and source of this data.
The calculation for the ITE relay setting also does not address the allowance for the relay drift.
During a July 9, 1992 telephone conversation, the licensee indicated that the -1.00 volt referenced in its calculation was not used as a
design input to the calculation but is used to provide an arbitrary margin for field verification of voltages to check relay curves, and relay trip settings.
The licensee further stated that the drift values for the IAV and ITE relays were not available from vendors.
The licensee could not use historical. data for the existing IAV relays because with new settings, these rel'ays would be operating at different curves.
Therefore, the licensee acquired historical drift data for both the IAV and ITf relays from operational experience of other nuclear utilities'ased on the above data, the licensee concluded that the worst-case drift is insignificant compared to the available margin between the relay settings and allowable values, and therefore, could be neglected.
The licensee has committed to revise the calculation to indicate the above basis for neglecting the allowances for relay drift.
4.2 Calculation for Coordination Between Undervolta e and Overcurrent Protection The licensee performed calculation, 21701-523-E-02 to demonstrate
.that the settings of the ITE and IAV undervoltage relays as determined by calculation 21701-523-E-01 were adequate to ensure the operability of the safety-related equipment connected to the 4. 16 KV vital switchgear, 480 V LCs and 480 V motor control centers (MCCs).
The calculation also demonstrated that, during a
condition of sustained low voltage, the relays will trip and isolate the onsite distribution system from the offsite source before the equipment either is damaged from the effects of the reduced voltages or is rendered inoperable because other protective devices misoperated and isolated the equipment from the system.
The calculation verified that:
(1)
During the sustained low-voltage condition, the minimum voltage on the motor terminals, considering all voltage drops, will be higher than the stall voltage of the motor.
This would ensure that the motor will not stall before the degraded voltage protection scheme generates' trip.
(2)
During the.sustained low-voltage condition, the minimum voltage on the contactors, considering all voltage drops, is more than the
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contactor dropout voltage'.
This would ensure that the MCC contactors would not drop before a trip signal is 'generated by the degraded voltage protection scheme.
(3)
During the sustained low-voltage condition,- the highest motor current caused by the lowest terminal voltage will always be below the thermal damage curve of the ESF load motors.
This high current will not damage the motors during the time the undervoltage relay trips, which could be a maximum of 90 seconds (considering a
30 second margin allowed by the TS over.and above the fixed delay of 60 seconds).
(4)
During a sustained low-voltage condition, the highest motor current caused by the low voltage would not be enough to cause the feeder overcurrent (0/C) protection device to trip.
This would ensure that the motor would.not be rendered'noperable by an inadvertent trip of
.the feeder protection device before the degraded voltage protection'cheme generates a trip.
The calculation did not evaluate the effects of low-voltage operation for the motor-operated valves (HOVs) and dampers, battery chargers and resistive loads on the basis that their short duration of operation would not cause damage or tripping by over current devices.
This is acceptable for the reasons described below.
The HOVs and dampers, being intermittent loads, will probably not be operating during the degraded voltage transient.
In addition, the design, application
,and 0/C protection for MOVs allow for the extended over'load or for the stalled conditions.
The licensee verified this through the vendor-supplied data for
- motors, 0/C protection devices and the calculations for establishing the values and duration of transient voltages.
Battery chargers and resistive loads would become inoperable during a transient if the low voltage during the transient is less than the rated voltage of these devices.'hese loads will not overheat and will not draw the current needed to actuate the 0/C devices.
Resistive loads draw currents proportional to their terminal voltage, and therefore, the current through these devices will be low.
The licensee verified these facts through the vendor-supplied data for these
- loads, settings of its 0/C protection devices and the calculation for establishing the values and duration of transient voltages.
The licensee performed these calculations using the following assumptions:
(1) If the values for the stall torque of a specific motor was not available, the licensee used equivalent values from NEMA standard MG-1 Section MG-1-12-39.
(2) If the licensee did not have thermal damage curves for a specific motor, it assumed that the existing setting curves of the. feeder protection devices would be adequate to protect motors from thermal damage.
The licensee obtained damage curves from vendors for all
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large class 1E motors.
For low horsepower
- motors, the licensee.
verified the existing settings of the feeder protection devices for these small motors using multiple values of the motor full load currents and then compared the voltage relay setting to verify that the relay trips before the feeder protection device.
(3)
The licensee evaluated each motor for the effects of undervoltage-induced higher currents until the motor terminal voltage reached its stall value.
The staff finds this acceptable since when. operating below the stall voltage, the motor will not act as a constant KVA load but will act as a constant impedance load.
Therefore, after the voltage drops below the stall voltage, the motor current will be reduced in proportion to the reduction in the terminal voltage of the motor.
(4)
To determine if the voltage relays adequately protect the safety-related motors, the licensee'took the following actions:
(a)
Determined motor currents corresponding to various voltages on the voltage relay characteristic curves.
(b)
Plotted the resulting motor currents, which were correlated to voltage and operating times of the voltage relays, along with the response time curves for the 0/C.protection device for the motor and feeder, and thermal damage curves of the motors where available.
The calculation accounted for voltage drops across the bus and across the individual feeder circuits.
(c)
'Examined composite plots, plotted as described in item (b)
- above, to verify that on sustained low voltage operation, the voltage relay would trip before the motor either was damaged by overcurrents or was isolated by the 0/C trip device.
(d) If the motor damage curves were not available, the licensee evaluated the composite plots to verify that during sustained low voltage conditions, the relay trip signal will. occur before the motor and feeder 0/C device trips.
These calculations indicate that during operation at the sustained low
- voltages, ESFAS load motors are adequately protected against thermal damage and their feeder 0/C protection devices properly coordinated.
However, the emergency containment cooler, emergency containment filter fans and containment spray pump motors, and the feeder 0/C device settings failed to coordinate.
The l.icensee had.used proper guidelines when it had previously performed calculations for the selection and setting of feeder 0/C devices for these motors.
The licensee's discussion with the motor vendors indicate that the thermal damage curves are based on the time and currents which would cause the motor to reach 215',
and this temperature level may be an indication of accelerated thermal aging rather than a catastrophic failure.
Furthermore, the vendor prepared these curves assuming no heat transfer from the motor and
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no cooling effects of the vane-axial fan of the motor.
The l.icensee informed the staff that the motor protective device would trip the motor before the temperature rises to 215 C,
and based on conservatism used by the vendor in their thermal damage calculation, the licensee concluded that these motors would not lose any part of their qualified life during operation at sustained
low-voltage condition before the voltage relay actuates a transfer of power.
The staff finds this acceptable.
However, the coordination calculation indicated that the breakers of the above three motors were not coordinated.
In response to the staff's question regarding coordination calculation for other breakers in the plant, the licensee reviewed all coordination calculations and verified that these three breakers are an isolated case and that this problem does not exist throughout the plant.
4.3 Failure Nodes (I)
The existing degraded voltage protection scheme'tilizes voltage sensing relays and auxiliary relays to actuate the sequencer trip circuit.
The modification includes only voltage-sensing
- relays, and therefore, eliminates the possibility that a failed.auxiliary relay could prevent the degraded voltage trip circuit from functioning.
The auxiliary relays adde'd by this modification in another circuit are used only for annunciation, and are normally de-energized.
Therefore, this modification adds no new failure modes.
(2)
A bypass switch is added by this modification which will enable one of the two voltage-sensing logic channels to be placed in the bypass mode while one, or both relays in one channel are removed for test or for calibration.
The existing design includes a shorting bar instead of a bypass switch to place the relay in the trip mode.
Installing a bypass switch removes the chance of operator errors in using the shorting bar.
The switch is key locked with the key removable in all positions.
(3)
The modification maintains
.the "two-out-of-two" relay actuation logic to initiate the trip and transfer action.
Therefore, no new failures modes are added in this area.
The ability to place the channel in the bypass mode during relay testing and calibration reduces the potential for any single component failure to cause inadvertent. actuation of the sequencer trip logic.
Therefore, implementing the modification will not increase the. probability of spurious sequencer actuation and.inadvertent transfer to the onsite emergency power source.
By implementing these modifications,'o new failure modes are created that could impact safety.
The modification will not increase the probability of occurrence and consequences of previously analyzed failures.
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0 The staff has reviewed the data provided by the licensee, the licensee's calculations and methodologies.
-The staff also reviewed the l,icensee's conclusion.
Based upon our review, we conclude that the licensee's
- data, methodologies, and conclusions are correct and that the amendments will not endanger the health and safety of.the public.
4.4 vironmental uglification Equipment associated with this modification has been qualified for a mild environment since it, is located in the Unit 3 480 V LC rooms and the control room, which are designated mild environment areas.
The licensee procured all components to safety-related, quality level I requirements.
The components are qualified for their intended application and have been seismically qualified by the equipment vendor.
This modification removes one test switch, two indicator lights and three auxiliary relays from each of the LCs 3A, 3B, 3C, and 30.
The total mass to be removed is insignificant (approximately 0.6X) when compared to the total. mass of each LC and thus will not affect the structural'dequacy and seismic qualification of these LCs.
4.5 odi ication Oesi n
Im lementation The staff reviewed the licensee's design package for the modification and verified that the licensee completed the following:
II (I)
Verified that all supports are seismically qualified.
(2)
Considered and corrected all seismic category II over I situations.
(3)
Included alarms or other means to detect possible failures.
(4)
Analyzed possible single failures and or common mode failures and incorporated protection against failures.
(5)
Established procedures to revise all controlled copies of the control room reference documents to show the modified configuration, before the modification is declared operational.
(6)
Verified the adequacy of class IE batteries using, the battery sizing calculations.
(7)
Revised the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) calculations for all areas to contain additional heat loading due to the design modification.
(8)
Evaluated the effect of this modification on the fire protection.
system.
In designing and implementing the modification, the licensee has analyzed the existing fire protection requirements'and ensured that all equipment and cables added by this modification would be installed inside the same fire-area where the connected LCs are located.
The licensee previously has analyzed these fire areas
0 ili ggi for safe shutdown capability, and the modification does not effect the existing analysis.
Therefore, implementing this modification will not adversely affect the station fire protection program and fire fighting strategies.
(9)
Trained the station operators for the following aspects of the modification:
operation, surveillance,
- testing, maintenance,
- EOP, and any operating limitations imposed by the design on existing.sys-tems and components.
Implementing this modification alters the operation of annunciator window F35 in the control room and requires the operator to take new actions during off-normal or emergency condition.
The modification does not alter any equipment on the alternate shutdown panel.
(10) Reviewed all new installations for relays,
- cables, switches and related wiring to ensure that the new installations do not in any way adversely affect the ability of other nearby safety systems and components.
(11) Included proper isolation for signal and power connections between class lE and nonclass 1E circuits and'etween redundant class lE circuits and components.
(12) Verified that the modification does not affect the radioactive, waste treatment or radioactive monitoring systems, and does n'ot create any new sources of radioactive contamination or radiation.
(13) Verified that the emergency diesel generators have sufficient capacity to supply the additional 2 volt ampere (VA) loading resulting from this modification.
(14) Analyzed the short circuit rating of the fuses of relay circuits and found that the fuse rating was adequate.
5.0
SUMMARY
Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds the instrumentation and control design modification of the degraded voltage protection system at the Turkey Point Station Units 3 and 4 acceptable.
6.0
~T T 0 Based upon the written notice of the proposed amendments, the Florida State official had no comments.
7.0 NV R
NM N C
N D
A 0
These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as 'defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no
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ili ik, significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any,effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a pi oposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards'consideration and there'has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 24669).
Accordingly, these amendments
~
meet the eligibility criteria for 'categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
8.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
- above, that:
(1") there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, (2) such activities will 'be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
S.
V. Athavale L. Raghavan Date:
August 20, 1992
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l30 NO I REl'"'0"E February 7,
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Docket Nos.
50-250
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and 50-251
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H. Goldberg President-Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
Dear Hr. Goldberg:
DISTRIBUTION See attached sheet fos7 837 g 8'ides 7 gyP-O<t
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 -,'SSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE:
M81774 AND H81775)
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. ]51 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-31 and'mendment No. 146 to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-41'or the Turkey Point Plant, Units Nos.
3 and 4,.respectively.
The amendments consist of changes to the Technical'pecifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated September 17, 1991.
These, amendments make line-item improvements to the Turkey Point, Unit 3 and'nit 4 Technical Specifications in accordance with Generic Letter 90-09, "Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions."
Please note that in accordance with Note 1 of Table 4.,7-1, the results from the previous inspection performed under the old Technical Specification can be used to determine the next inspection interval..
t A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.
The Notice of Issuance will be inc1nded in the Commission's biweekly Federal
~ke ister notice.
Enclosures:
l.
Amendment No. 151 to DPR-31 2.
Amendment No. 146 to DPR-41 3.
Safety Evaluation cc. w/enclosures:
See next page 0
Sincerely,
/s/ by Jan Norris for:
Rajender Auluck, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation er:
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H. Goldberg lorida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Plant CC:
Harold F. Reis, Esquire Newman and Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature ill West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John T. Butler, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Mr. Thomas.F. Plunkett, Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power,and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 oaquin Avino ounty Manager of Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1st Street, 29th Floor Miami, Florida 33102 Senior Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Mr. Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
. Mr. Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs t
2640 Centerview Drive allahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102 Mr. R.
E. Grazio Director, Nuclear Licensing Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 FLORIDA POW R AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-250 TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO.
3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 151 License No.
DPR-31 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated September 17,
- 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of.the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will oper ate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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2.
Accordingly, the license is amended'y changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of. Facility Operating License No.
DPR-31 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 151, are, hereby incorporated in the license.
The Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the 'license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in,accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental, Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
and shall be implemented, within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR EGULATORY, COMMISSION
,/
erber
. Berkow, Director Propre directorate II-2 Di.visi of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
February 7
. 1992
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UNITED STATES NUCL'EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-251 TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NO.
4 AMENDMENT TO.FACILITY OPERATING LICENS Amendment No. 146 License No.
DPR-41 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) dated September 17,
- 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility wil.l operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted
~
in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The. issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
41
~i IS>
.Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and.paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating.L'icense No.
DPR-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(B)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical 'Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 146
, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B is hereby incorporated into the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical, Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
Ik 3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR EGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Herbe
. Berkow, Director Projec irectorate II-2 Divisio of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:
February 7,
1992
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT N0.151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-31 MENDMENT N0.146 TO FACILITY OPERATING ICENS NO.
DPR-41 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251
'Revise Appendix A. as follows:
3/4 7-18 3/4 7-19 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18a 3/4 7-18b 3/4 7-19.
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0
PLANT SYSTEMS t
3/4.7.6 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.
The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
MODES 5 and-6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.
ACTION:
Mith one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or re-store the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering eval-uation.per Specification 4.7.6f.
on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and fol.low the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.7.6 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program in addition to the require-t ments of Specification 4.0.5.
a.
Ins ection T
es As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.
b.
'Visual Ins ections Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation.
Each of these categories (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule determined by Table 4.7-1.
The visual inspection interval for each type of snubber shall be determined based upon the criteria provided in Table 4.7-1 and the first inspection inter'val determined using this criteria shall be based. upon the previous inspection interval as established by the requirements in effect before Amendment 151 Pnd 146, C.
Visual Ins ection Acce tance Criteria Visual inspections shall verify that:
(j.) the snubber has no visible indi-l cations of damage or.impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are secure.
Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8( 4 3/4 7"18 AMENDMENT NOS.],5I AND I46
il~
TABLE 4. 7-1 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE'NUBBERS Populati.on or Category (Notes 1 and 2)
Column A Extended Interval (Notes 3 and 6)
Column B Repeat Interval (Notes 4 and 6)
Column C
Reduce Interval (Notes 5 and 6) 80 100 150 200 300 400 500 750 1000 or greater 12 20 29 12 18 24 40 13 25 36 48 78 109 Note 1:
Note 2:
Note 3:
Note 4:
Note 5:
The next visual inspection interval for a snubber population or category size shall be determined based upon the previous inspection interval and the number of unacceptable snubbers found during that interval.
Snubbers may be categorized, based upon their accessibility during power operation, as accessible or inaccessible.
These categories may be examined separately or )ointly.
- However, the licensee must make and document that decision before any inspection and shall use that decision as the basis upon.which to determine the next inspection interval for that category..
Interpolation between population or category sizes and the number of unacceptable snubbers is permissible.
Use next lower integer for the value of the limit for Columns A, B, or C if that integer includes a fractional value of unacceptable snubbers as determined by interpolation.
If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less that the number in Column A, the next inspection interval may be twice the previous interval but not greater that 48 months.
If the number of. unacceptable snubbers is equal to or less than the number. in Column B but greater than the number in Column A, the next inspection interval shall be the same as the previous interval.
If the number of unacceptable snubbers is equal to or greater than the number in Column C, the next inspection interval shall be two-thirds of the previous interval.
However, if the number of TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 3/4 7-18a AMENDMENT NOS. I5I AND ] 46
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Note 6:
unacceptable snubbers is less than the number in Column C but greater than the number in Column B, the next interval.shall be reduced proportionally by interpolation, that is, the, previous interval shall be reduced by a. factor that.is one-third of the ratio of -the difference between the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the previous interval and the number in Column B to the difference in the numbers in Columns B and C.,
The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable for all inspection intervals up to and including 48 months.
TURKEY POINT.UNITS 3 AND 4 3/4 7-18b
'AMENDMENT. NOS. 151
'AND 146
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PLANT SYSTEMS t
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS'Continued) inspections shall be classified as unacceptable and may be reclassi-fied acceptable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that:
(1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.6e.
All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraul'ic fluid reservoir shall be counted as unacceptable for determining the next inspection interval.
A review and evaluation shall be performed to justify continued operation with an unacceptable snubber.
If continued operation cannot be justified, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION requirements shall be met.
d.
Functional Tests For each unit during refuel.ing shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using the following sample plan:
1)
At least 10K of the total number of safety related snubbers for the respective unit identified by site records shal,l be func-tionally tested either in-place or in a bench test.
For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test accep-tance criteria of Specification 4.7.6e, an additional 10K of that type of-snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of,that type have been functionally tested; 2)
The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments and the range of size and capacity of snubbers.
At least 25K of the snubbers in the representative sample shall include snubbers from the.following categories; A.
Snubbers within 5 feet of heavy equipment (ex. valves, pumps, turbines, motors, etc.)
B.
Snubbers within 10 feet of the discharge from a safety relief valve.
3)
Snubbers identified by site.records as "Especially Difficultto Remove" or in "High Radiation Zones During Shutdown" shall also be included in the representative sample."
"Permanent or other exemptions from functional testing for individual snubbers in these categories may be granted by the Commission only if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and/or snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber OPERABILITY for all design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4 3/4 7"19.
AMENDMENT NOS. 151 AND 146
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REL'ATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-31 AND AMENDMENT NO 146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNIT NOS.
3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 17, 1991, Florida Power and Light Company (FPL, the licensee) proposed to amend Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, respectively.
These amendments would remove the present surveillance requirements for snubbers in the Technical Specifications (TS) for both units and replace them with the alternative requirements contained in Generic Letter 90-09, "Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions."
- 2. 0 EVALUATION 0
The snubber visual examination schedule in the existing TS is based on the permissible number of inoperable snubbers found during the 'visual examination.
Because the existing snubber visual examination schedule is based only on the absolute number of inoperable snubbers found during the visual examinations irrespective of the total population of snubbers, licensees with a large snubber population find the visual examination schedule excessively restrictive.
The purpose of the alternative visual examination schedule is to allow the licensee to perform visual examinations and corrective actions during plant outages without reduction of the confidence level provided by the existing visual examination schedule.
The new visual examination schedule specifies the permissible number of inoperable snubbers for various snubber populations.
The basic examination interval is the normal fuel cycle, up to 24 months.
This interval may be extended to as long as twice the fuel cycle, or reduced to as small as two-thirds of the fuel cycle, depending on the number of unacceptable snubbers found during the visual examination.
The examination interval also may vary by +25 percent to cbincide with the actual outage.
In the event one or more snubbers are found inoperable during a visual examination, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) in the present TS require the licensee to restore or replace the inoperable snubber(s) to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate action statement for that system.
This.LCO will remain
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in the TS.
- However, the permissible number of inoperable snubber(s) and the subsequent visual examination interval will now be determi'ned in accordance with the new visual examination schedule (Table 4.7-2 of Generic Letter 90-09 dated December ll, 1990).
As noted in the guidance for this line-item TS improvement, certain corrective actions may have to be performed depending on the number of inoperable snubbers found.
All requirements for corrective actions and evaluations associated with the use of the visual examination schedule and stated in the footnotes 1 through 6 (Table 4.7-2 of Generic Letter 90-09) shall be included in the TS.
The licensee has proposed changes to Specification 3/4.7.6 for Units 3 and 4
that are consistent with the guidance provided in, Generic Letter 90-09 for the replacement of the snubber visual examination schedule with Table 4.7-2 (including footnotes 1 through 6) of Generic Letter 90-09.
For that reason, and also because the alternative requirements will result in a reduced occupational radiological exposure to the plant personnel, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
Based upon the written,notice of the.proposed amendments, the Florida State official,had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments change surveillance requirements.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released
- offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a
proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 55947).
Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
- 5. 0 CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
- above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public wi.ll not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
R. Auluck Date:
February 7,
1992
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