ML17349A866

Forwards Rept on Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Plant from 920820-30.Rept Identifies Circumstances & Lessons Learned from Impact of Hurricane & Provides Basis for Necessary follow-on Actions

ML17349A866
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	05/19/1993
From:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Richardson J, Rossi C, Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9305280289
Download: ML17349A866 (13)

Text

ag AED

~c~

0 Docket Nos.

50-250 and 50-251 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 May 19, 1993 HEMORANDUH FOR:

James E. Richardson, Director Division of Engineering Ashok C. Thadani, Director Division of Systems Safety and Analysis I

Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Reactor'nspection and Licensee Performance Bruce A. Boger, Director Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors FROM:

SUBJECT:

Frank J.

Congel, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Anthony T. Gody Sr, Acting Director Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - I/II REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREW ON THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FROM AUGUST 20-30, 1992; GENERIC FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS:

YELLOW TICKET NO. 0930096 The enclosed black and white report (formal report as NUREG-1474 is expected soon) is the result of the joint NRC/Industry Team review of the effects of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point nuclear plant.

The report identifies circumstances and lessons learned from the impact of Hurricane Andrew and provides a basis for necessary follow-on actions.

The enclosed AEOD draft memorandum describes the proposed staff follow-on actions.

I have been asked to coordinate NRR comments on the draft AEOD memorandum.

Please review the report and the attached draft memorandum and action plan to ensure that the plan includes all the relevant issues addressed in the report, the proposed actions are -appropriate and consistent with the issues, the scope and extent'of the proposed actions are commensurate with the issues

involved, "LOOX5 9305280289 9305i9'DR ADOCK 05000250 P

PDR RRC 8(E C81iiPCP'FV

1 V

4

Addressees May 19, 1993 and the assignment of responsibilities (as annotated) for action items is correct.

Please attend a meeting to discuss your comments on Hay 21,

1993, Room 13B9, 10:30 a.m.,

and provide your ritten comments to L. Raghavan (EMail-LXR1, Hail Stop 14H22 or phone 4-1471)

OB 21, 1993.

Enclosures:

As stated QU Director en ga, Division of Reactor Projec

- I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

• See revious concurrence Distribution tDocket File"(50':250/251)j NRC 8 Local PDRs (w/incoming)

PDII-2 RF Yellow Ticket File (w/incoming)

J.

Partlow S.

Varga G. Lainas H. Berkow L. Raghavan (w/incoming)

E. Tana NRR Hail Room (YT¹0930096)

S. Little C. Norsworthy M. Sinkule, RII T. Hurley F. Hiragl i a W. Russell F.

Hebdon OFFICE NAME LA:PDI I-2 ETana*

PH:PDII-2 D: PDI I-2 LRa havan*

HBerkow*

TECH ED.

AD:RII GLainas*

DATE 5

/93 5/

/93 5/

/93 5/

/93 5/

/93 A:N D:DRP OFFICE JPa low NAME 5/

/9 DATE

/93 Document Name:

.TP0096.YEL

N D

rley

/93

j I

From: Michelle P. Smith (MPS1)

To:

ABJ,SAF,JCE,NLS1 Date:

Monday, May 17, 1993 9:22 am

Subject:

Staff'ctions from Hurricane Andre 4

Note to:

Tom-Nurleyg. NfN Eric Beckjord, RES Gerry Cranford, IRM Stew Ebneter, RII From:

Stuart Rubin, AEOD

Subject:

Staff Actions Resulting from the Effect of Hurricane Andrew Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant The. attached file contains the proposed staff actions (and associated trans-mittal memorandum) to address the lessons learned from the joint NRC/Industry Team's review of the impact of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station.

It is requested that your office review and provide comments on the proposed staff actions by noon, Friday, May 21, 1993.

Office comments should be provided to me at (FTS) 492-4147, via AEOD FAX 0 (301) 492-7142 or by E-mail (SDR1).

If you or your staff have any questions on this

request, please call me.

Stuart Rubin cc w/attach:

JPartlow, NRR

FCongel, NRR

TSpeis, RES

PKruzic, IRM EMerschoff, RII CC:

Files:

BACZ,MGC,SRY,LTM P:andrew.sdr

~g IIEcy+

P Op A

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Edward L. Jordan,

Director, AEOD Thomas E. Murley, Director, NRR Eric S. Beckjord, Director, RES Gerald F. Cranford, Director, IRM Thomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator, RI Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, RII A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, RIII James L. Milhoan, Regional Administrator, RIV John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, RV James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREM ON THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FROM AUGUST 20-30, 1992 A copy of the initial black and white version of the subject report was distributed to you by my memorandum to the Commission dated March 19, 1993.

The report compiles the results of the joint NRC/Industry Team's efforts in identifying the circumstances and lessons learned from the impact of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and forms the basis for several follow-on actions.

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and assign responsibility for generic follow-on actions resulting from the Team's review as documented in the report.

In this regard, you are requested to review the enclosure which specifies staff actions resulting from the review.

You are requested to determine the actions necessary to resolve each of the issues in your area of responsibility and, where appropriate, identify additional staff actions.

Nhen more than one office is indicated as responsible, the first office listed has lead responsibility.

I will monitor the resolution of each action item.

By June 4,

1993, please provide a written summary of the plans,

schedule, status, and point of contact for each item within your responsibility listed in the enclosure.

In addition, I request that you provide a written status report on the disposition of your items (and anticipated actions for uncompleted items) by the end of January each calendar year thereafter, until all items are resolved.

The Director, AEOD will document in the AEOD Annual Report the resolution status or disposition of each staff action and thus, the Director, AEOD should also be placed on distribution as to the resolution or disposition of each action item.

Where a significant policy question may be involved in the resolution of an action item, it is requested that I be notified so that the need for review by the Commission may be evaluated.

James H. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Staff Actions Resulting from the Report on the Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 29-30, 1992 cc/w enclosue:

J.

H. Sniezek, DEDR J.

L. Blaha, OEDO F. J.

Hebdon, NRR

The Director, AEOD will document in the AEOD Annual Report the resolution status or disposition of each staff action and thus, the Director, AEOD should also be placed on distribution as to the resolution or disposition of each action item.

Where a significant policy question may be involved in the resolution of an action item, it is requested that I be notified so that the need for review by the Commission may be evaluated.

James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Staff Actions Resulting from the Report on the Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 29-30, 1992 cc/w enclosure:

J.

H. Sniezek, DEDR J.

L. Blaha, OEDO F. J.

Hebdon, NRR Distribution w encl:

EDO R/F JHSniezek JBlaha AEOD R/F DFRoss RLSpessard SDRubin JMTayl or MTaylor FJHebdon ELJordan DOA R/F DEIIB R/F HABailey Ooc ent arne:

AND

.SD OFFICE:

NAME:

DATE:

OFFICE:

NAME:

DATE:

DEI IB:DOA SDRubin 05 93 D:AEOD ELJordan 05 93 D:DOA:AEOD RLS essard 05 93 EDO JHSniezek 05 93 NR F

bdon 05 93 JMTa lor 05 93 DD:AEOD DFRoss 05 93

Encl osure STAFF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM THE REVIEW OF THE EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREW ON THE TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l.

Issue:

Adequacy of Timing Plant Shutdown in Anticipation of a Hurricane

(

References:

Sections:

2, 3. I)

Turkey Point procedures concerning the timing of plant shutdown in anticipation of hurricane force winds required that the plant be in at least Mode 4 (i.e., shut down) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before the onset of hurricane force winds at the site.

The licensee estimated that it would take 8

hours to complete an orderly shutdown.

Accordingly, the licensee began an orderly shutdown of the units at 6:00 p.m.

on August 23.

This was about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before the predicted landfall of the hurricane.

As a result both units were in Mode 4 when Hurricane Andrew struck.

However, the licensee's commitments in response to the Station Blackout Rule only required the licensee to commence shutdown at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the onset of hurricane force winds.

Therefore the timing of an orderly plant shutdown strictly in accordance with the licensee's commitments could have resulted in the plant being in the midst of a dual unit shutdown evolution when offsite power was lost.'dditionally, at Turkey Point (and other commercial reactor facilities that may be susceptible to damage by a hurricane) important equipment (e.g.,

AFW) is located outside.

This equipment would likely not be accessible during a

hurricane if the equipment failed to function properly.

AC ON RESPONSIBLE OFF C

~CA F~GO g a.

Review the existing regulatory

guidance, related to timing of a plant shutdown in anticipation of hurricane force winds, and revise the guidance as may be needed.

b.

Review the commitments made by all affected licensees, related to timing of a facility shutdown in anticipation of hurricane force winds, and obtain revised commitments as may be needed.

NRR /WK Generic NRR WW Generic

2.

Issue:

Adequacy of Licensee Offsite Communications for Natural Disasters Within the Plant Design Basis

(

References:

Sections 2, 3.2, 3.5)

Although diverse and redundant communications equipment existed, offsite communications were lost during the storm due to a common vulnerability to wind damage.

Normal telephone service failed because the storm blew down the lines near the station.

The dedicated commercial telephone lines servicing the telephones installed in the control room, the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility, used to give initial notification and status to the state in an emergency, also failed.

The Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)-2000 lines used for the Emergency Notification System failed, cutting off normal communications with the NRC Operations Center.

The cellular telephone systems also did not function because the storm damaged the onsite antennas and the offsite repeating stations.

Except for the Security Department's one hand held radio for the company FM radio system, the licensee's radio systems did not function during and immediately following the storm.

Overall, all offsite communications were lost for about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during the storm, and reliable communications were not restored for about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the storm.

The NRC's temporary satellite communications system considerably aided recovery efforts and would have been more beneficial if it had been onsite before the storm.

'a ~

A~CTIO Review the existing regulatory guidance and requirements related to normal and backup offsite communications system design capabilities for hurricanes.

Based on this review consider the adequacy of the guidance for other external events.

Issue revised guidance or requirements as may be needed.

RESPONSIBLE OF C

) ~

+C ~GORY

~.

NRR/AEOD eneri c b.

Evaluate the need f r NRC to preposition a t'emp rary satellite communications system or other suitable communications at sites in advance of a hurricane.

Based on this review consider the applicability to other external events.

If appropriate, develop and implement such a capability.

AEOD/IRK Generic

3.

Issue:

Adequacy of Compensatory Measures for Equipment or Facilities Not Designed for a Hurricane

(

References:

Sections 2, 3.9, 3. 10, Appendix R and G)

A number of important systems, structures or facilities associated with

security, emergency

response, effluent monitoring, effluent pathway and low level waste storage were not designed for hurricane force winds, and either were, or could have

been, severely damaged during the storm.

In anticipation that these equipment and facilities could become inoperable, compensatory measures were taken or available either before or following the storm.

For example, after the storm, security officers were placed on roving patrols to compensate for the loss of the physical integrity of the protected area barriers.

Portable air-sampling equipment and dosimetry equipment were available at the site if needed to compensate for the air-sampling stations that were lost during the storm.

Although most of the emergency sirens were destroyed, city and county agencies are used to alert the public in the surrounding areas in lieu of sirens.

Before the storm, radioactive materials, including dry active waste, were secured in SeaLand containers and a high integrity container was used for solidified resins.

Thus, radioactive waste was adequately protected from the elements to prevent their spread during the storm.

The emergency plan considered these circumstances and contained contingency measures.

a ~

b.

c

~AC

~IO Reexamine the need for guidance for preplanned compensatory actions for important equipment and facilities not designed for a hurricane.

Issue guidance as appropriate.

Reexamine the need for guidance for preplanned compensatory actions for important equipment and facilities not designed for other severe external events.

Issue guidance as appropriate.

Consider the need for additional guidance or requirements to assure low level radwaste stored onsite is adequately protected from disposal by severe external events.

Issue revised guidance or requirements as may be needed.

RESPONSIBLE

~FFF I

+CTIG~O NRR ~M Gener ic

'RR

+E, Generic NRR/NNSS //~S5 Generic

4.

Issue:

Adequacy of NRC Guidance For Reviewing Licensee Preparation and

Response

to Natural Disasters and Industry Preplanned Support

(

References:

Sections 1, 2, 3.1, 3.4 and Appendix R)

The Turkey Point Plant benefited greatly from the prior hurricane experience of the plant staff and the extensive preplanning done in preparing and implementing the licensee's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 20106 for "Natural Emergencies."

The EPIP was also significantly expanded as a result of the insights gained in part from the Individual Plant Examination for Turkey Point.

These additional procedures, which dealt with preparations for a Category 5 hurricane, contributed significantly to the licensee's preparations.

In the aftermath of the hurricane the licensee had to take numerous extraordinary actions to establish a support services infrastructure which would allow the station staff to report to the plant each day.

Such circumstances could potentially be more extreme following other external events (e.g.,

severe earthquake) for which there was no warning to permit advance preparations including the evacuation of families of plant personnel.

The assistance provided by the St. Lucie plant in meeting Turkey Point's immediate and longer term needs such as personnel, spare parts and supplies, were helpful to the recovery.

a ~

b.

]LCC~O Consider the need for development of guidance for review of licensee preparations for a predicted hurricane.

Develop and issue staff guidance as appropriate.

Consider the need for development of guidance for review of licensee preplanning for response to other external events.

Develop and issue staff guidance as appropriate.

RESPONSIBLE OFFICE

+CQF~GOR NRR/Regions ~

Generic NRR/Regions

'DE Generic c ~

Coordinate with industry in consideration of preplanned measures to supplement individual utility resources to maintain adequate staffing and critical supplies

.immediately following a severe external event.

AEOD/NRR Generic

5.

Issue:

Adequacy of Examination of the Impact of Nonsafety Equipment on Important Equipment During External Events

(

References:

Sections 2, 3.3, 3.6 and Appendix 8)

During the storm nonsafety-grade equipment failure damaged certain important equipment (collapse of the high water tank onto the fire.water system) and threatened safety-related equipment (potential collapse of the damaged Unit 2 chimney onto the diesel generator building).

These interactions may not be fully anticipated and evaluated.

a ~

ACTION

Consider, as part of the IPE/IPEEE, the need for reexamination of the potential impact of nonsafety-grade equipment on safety-grade and other important equipment for severe external events.

RESPONSIBLE OFFICE RES CATEGORY Generic