ML17349A435
| ML17349A435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1992 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A434 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210270416 | |
| Download: ML17349A435 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARI ETTA STR E ET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 October 13, 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations FROM:
SUBJECT:
Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator REVIEW OF THE TURKEY POINT RESTART DECISION We reviewed Region II participation in the Turkey Point Unit 4 restart decision.
The enclosed report was prepared based on a review of the chronology of activities related to emergency preparedness readiness and discussions with the Region II staff.
The root cause of the premature decision, premature because the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was not consulted before the restart, was the omission of a requirement in the restart criteria to obtain FEMA input with regard to the status and continuing acce'ptability of offsite emergency preparedness.
A number of factors that contributed to the omission of the FEMA input were identified.
These ar'e poor communication/coordination, mindset with regard to offsite preparedness, perceived low priority of the
- restart, limited staff knowledge of the.FEMA role, and a low sensitivity to the importance of offsite preparedness.
We have addressed the specific Turkey Point problem and have reemphasized the
- importance of the FEMA role.
A pore extensive list of corrective actions will be provided by October 23, 1992.
.This will include the easily recogniz-able ones of training.and strengthening of internal interfaces, plus recommendations for more generic actions.
Stewart D. Ebneter
Enclosure:
Report of Turkey Point Restart Decision 92~02704>~
m>0ZO PDR ADDCK 05000250 F
PDR j
REVIEW OF DECISION TO CONCUR IN RESTART OF TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 INTRODUCTION The Region II staff in conjunction with other agency organizations concurred with the restart of the Turkey Point 'Nuclear Plant Unit 4 on September 28, 1992.
The decision was premature in that the Federal Energy Management Agency (FEMA) was *not consulted to determine if there "were any concerns related to off-site emergency preparedness.
Region II internally reviewed the decision and the decision process'sed.
Staff members who were part of the process or who should have been part of the process took part in the review.
The review was limited to Region II.
SUMMARY
Region II's internal review of the restart decision revealed that the root cause of the premature decision was the failure to incorporate in the restart criteria any off-site emergency preparedness review.
Factors contributing to this failure, and preventing further review during the restoration for restart were found to be:
BACKGROUND poor communication/coordination with internal and external interfaces a mindset that limited the scope of the restart concerns perceived low priority of Turkey Point restart limited knowledge of Agency external interfaces low sensitivity to the importance of offsite emergency preparedness Hurricane Andrew, one of the most severe hurricanes. ever to strike Florida, caused the shutdown of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4 on August 24, 1992. 'ubsequent to the passage of the storm, damage assessments and inspections were conducted by the Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) and the NRC.
- FP8L identified the items to be repaired,
- restored, retested, or addressed as a prerequisite to return to service of the units.
These were concurred in by the NRC and formed the basis for the restart criteria for restart of Unit 4.
Unit 3 was to enter a refueling outage before restart and thus was not part of the decision process.
THE PROBLEM The problem was that the NRC concurred in the restart of Turkey Point Unit 4 prior to consulting with FEHA to a'scertain if the offsite emergency plan remained adequate to support the FEHA "reasonable assurance" finding (44CFR 350).
ROOT CAUSE The root cause of the failure to consult FEHA was the incomplete restart criteria.
The restart criteria did not include the requirement to determine the adequacy of the offsite em'ergency preparedness.
Exhibit I is a simplified diagram of the proper restart decision process.
Note that it should have included a
FEHA input into the restart criteria.
Exhibit 2 is a simplified diagram of the restart decision process as it occurred.
Note that no FEHA input to'he restart criteria occurred.
Thus, all subsequent actions--
planning, restoration, inspection, verification and the concurrence in restart--did not include a request for review of the adequacy offsite emergency preparedness.
The factors that contributed to this are discussed below.
Further,'here was sufficient time to revise. the restart criteria during the restoration process but the contributing factors also caused the staff to not consult FEHA for input.
Exhibit 3 is a partial chronology of Hurricane Andrew restoration which indicates onsite emergency preparedness was reviewed and FPEL made interface contacts with local'nd state officials with regard to offiste preparedness.
Note that Region'I had no contact with FEHA IV with regard to Turkey Point Unit 4 restart either formally or informally prior to restart of the unit.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS The root cause of the premature decision was the incomplete restart criteria.
Several factors. were identified that contributed to the omission of the inclusion of a requirement for the review of the adequacy of the offsite emergency preparedness (OEP).
Poor Communication and Coordination Inadequate Region II communications, both internal and external, were a major factor in the failure to identify a need for OEP review.
Internal communications has two facets, both of which were inadequate.
Internal, to the Region II staff, the Division of Reactor Projects was assigned the lead for restart oversight.
Support was t'o be provided by the technical specialist division in which the. emergency preparedness expertise
- resides, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards,
.(DRSS).
There was limited participation in the briefings, status, reviews of Turkey Point activities by
'RSS.
The appropriate technical divisions provided staff support to complete inspection and verification activities but had little i'nput to the planning or analysis of restart needs.
Communication and coordination between Region II
.technical divisions and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) technical organization was also inadequate which probably contributed to the failure to provide FEHA headquarters with complete information with regard to the startup date of late September (the NRR technical organization is the
primary interface with FEMA headquarters).
Region II has a responsibility to assure timely'and complete information flows from technical divisions to the counterpart NRR technical division and this communication/coordination was inadequate.
Communication/coordination between the Regional projects office and the NRR projects office was handled well.
External communication, i.e., the Region II to FEHA IV interface, was inadequate.
The Region II RAC representative has an established communication channel with FEMA IV,,but'his interface was not exercised prior to the startup decision.'
Further, there should have been a sensitivity to offsite
'emergency preparedness on the'part of the RII manager's and specific members of the technical staff and the topic should ha've been addressed.
Once identified, the staff could have contacted the FEMA IV staff for input.
Mindset There appears to have developed a mindset that inhibited. the communication with FEMA.
Previous national i'ssues with emergency preparedness have clearly defined the scope of responsibility for the two agencies (NRC and FEMA) and this has led to a "not our job" mentality on the part of some NRC Region II staff members.
Thus, there is reluctance to step on "FEHA turf" by some.
The mindset i.s also fostered by emergency drills and exercises in which NRC participates.
Staff participation in these exerci'ses usually terminates when
.the unsafe condition scenario is brought under control and rarely does the Regional staff, interface with FEHA during these exercises and/or drills.that go beyond the accident into the restoration phase.
FEMA activities are primarily review of procedures and plans for offsite preparedness.
Region II staff focus is on-site activities, particularly safety of reactor systems which tends to cause NRC technical staff to develop a bias toward the hardware and develop a mi'ndset that the reactor safety is the onl consideration.
Low Priorit Although senior managers kept a high priority on the situation at Turkey Point and a single point of contact was assigned to assure all activities were coordinated, some complacency apparently set in and resulted in a lowering of the priority to Turkey Point activities.
This was probably. due to the good performance of FP8L during the s'torm and during the subsequent restoration activities.
The physical plant suffered little damage from the hurricane and there were no ma'jor 'obstacles to overcome during the restoration.
Thus, staff members pursued other activities, placed lower priority on and less attention to Turkey Point restart planning and reviews.
Inade uate Staff Trainin During the review of the restart decision more than a few staff members displayed a sur pr'ising lack of knowledge of, the FEHA role and responsibility for emergency preparedness.
It.was clear, either the training that was given over the years has not been effective, not periodically reinforced, or has not been provided to much of the staff.
Inspectors and managers alike commented
that they "did not know what FEHA's role was," or that they had not been exposed to the FEHA interface.
Restoration activities were performed quickly and effectively.
Thus,'with little 'knowledge of the importance of offsite emergency preparedness, or responsibility for it, it is easy to see how it could be overlooked as a restart item.
Sensitivit Clearly, there was a lack of staff sensitivity, i.e., low threshold of awareness of the importance of the FEHA role and o'ffsite emergency planning.
. This is probably an outgrowth of the inadequate training, infrequent contact
'ith external interfaces and the mindset that the NRC job is on-site reactor systems.
A lack of sensitivity leads to a dismissal or denial, of the importance of the offsite functi'ons and; therefore, little or no concern for "importance of obtaining diverse inputs in relation to startup activities.
Higher sensitivity would have led to a more pro-active stance on the part of Region II with regard to the FEHA interface.
EXHIBIT I FPS.L DAMAGE ASSESS RESTORATION NRC 0 SIRENS 0 COMMUNICATIONS 0 TEC 0 EOF OPHONES
~ CIRCUITS ORETC DAMAGE ASSESS 0
0 0
R E
S T
A R
T C
R I
T E
R I
A RESTART PLAN
INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY C,E RTIFY CONCUR f RIFY RESTART F) NDINCi FEMA DAMAGE ASSESS REVOKE REASONABLE ASSURANCE
..~ FINDING OR INPUT VIA RAC NEED TO REVIEW/CONFIRM REVIEWS TO
.ESTABLISH REASONABLE ASSURANCE PROPER DECISION PROCESS (S IHIP L I FI ED )
EXHIBIT 2 F PKL sAMAoe NRC
--+
Assess Rll NRR RESTAAT AITEAI FP8 L CERT IFY RESTORATION COMPLETE NRC
" + VERIFY INSP E CT ION BY AND INSPECTION VER IF ICATION ACTUAL IN RESTART RESTART DATE REGION CONTACTS FEMA IV
'TENTATIVE RESTART DATE STATE 4 LOCAL PLAN CONFIRMED BY FP&L DRP PROJECT ENGINEER ASKED FP&L PLANT MANAGER FEMA (Need To Review Never Communicated Between NRC 8 FEMA)
PLAN TO REVIEW REASONABLE ASSURANCE ACTUAL DECISION PROCESS (SIMPLIFIED)
FINDING NOT MRE
EXHIBIT 3 TURKEY POINT RESTART INFORMATIONTIIVIELINE October 13, 1992, 9:30 am OBJECTIVE:
The following is listing of communications which were applicable to the identification of a planned September 30, 1992, online date at Turkey.Point that could have prompted the need for an assessment of Emergency 'Preparedness.
Plant status is periodically listed to relate planned to actual startup dates.*
DATE 24 AUGUST 25 AUGUST 27 AUGUST 28 AUGUST 31 AUGUST 1
SEPTEMBER ACTIVITY EDO STAFF NOTE:
HURRICANE ANDREW HIT TURKEY POINT EDO STAFF NOTE EDO STAFF NOTE'EGION II ITEM OF INTEREST AND
'DO STAFF NOTE FPL DRAFT OF RECONSTRUCTION RESTART SCHEDULE RSLO DISCUSSION'ITH THE FEMA FCO COMMENT ON 24 AUGUST, AT 4:15 AM, REGION II ACTIVATED THE INCIDENT RESPONSE CENTER (IRC).
UNIT 3 IN MODE 4 AT 3:12 AM, UNIT 4 IN" MODE 4 AT 4:05 AM, OFFSITE POWER WAS LOST, AND COMMUNICATIONS WERE LOST AND REGAINED
.RII IRC REMAINS ACTIVATED.
TP UNITS STABLE IN HOT SHUTDOWN WITH NO OFFSITE POWER.
ACCESS ROAD TO SITE BEING CLEARED EXPECTED TO BE OPEN THIS MORNING.
TP UNITS IN COLD SHUTDOWN.
EQUIPMENT STATUS DISCUSSED.
REGIONAL AND RESIDENT INSPECTORS ONSITE FOR
.CONTINUED 24 HOUR COVERAGE.
RII ACTIVATED IRC ON 24 AUG AT 4:15 AM.
CONTAINED THREE PAGE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EFFECTS OF HURRICANE ANDREW ONSITE:
ESF EQUIP FUNCTIONED
- PROPERLY, COMMUNICATIONS LOST AND
- REGAINED, EQUIP DAMAGE, SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR ONSITE, 24 HOUR INSPECTION COVERAGE BEGAN, ETC.
RII IRC REMAINS ACTIVATED.
.FAXED TO REGION II AS A DRAFT WITH PROJECTED RETURN TO SERVICE OF 30 SEPTEMBER PRIOR TO LEAVING DISASTER FIELD OFFICE (DFO), MIAMI, THE REGION II STATE LIAISON OFFICER (RSLO)
DISCUSSED TP WITH FEMA FCO,ET.AL.
FEMA DID NOT DISCUSS OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS NOTE:
This is not a
complete chronological listing of all actions or information relative to Turkey Point recovery from Hurricane Andrew
DATE ACTIVITY COMMENT 2 SEPTEMBER EDO STAFF NOTE RII ASSURED FEMA THAT THERE WERE NO RADIOACTIVE RELEASES AT TP AND THAT RII INSPECTORS HAVE BEEN ONSITE CONTINUOUSLY DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE STORM MONITORING ACTIVITIES 2 SEPTEMBER 3
SEPTEMBER 7:00 AM 4 SEPTEMBER 5 SEPTEMBER 7
SEPTEMBER 10 SEPTEMBER 11 SEPTEMBER 17 SEPTEMBER 8:00 AM NRC INPUT TO FEMA S ITUATION
'EPORT'NO-I I-92-055C REGION II ITEM OF INTEREST AND, EDO STAFF NOTE TELECON BETWEEN SINKULE AND HIMES FEMA SITUATION REPORT 0'19 RSLO MET WITH JOHN
- HEARD, RAC CHAIRMAN ET. AL. TO DISCUSS FRP AND FRERP NRC (NRR AND RII ATTENDED) MEETING WITH FPL ONSITE.
EDO STAFF NOTE REGION II ITEM OF INTEREST FAX TO NRR PROJECTS FPL HAS NO PROJECTED DATE FOR UNIT 4 RESTART STATED - LICENSEE PROJECTING RESTART OF UNIT 4 IN APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS MEDIA INTEREST.
ON 1 SEPT, RII ASSURED FEMA THERE WERE NO RADIOACTIVE RELEASES.
ON 2 SEPT, RII PROVIDED STATEMENT TO BE USED FOR IN(UIRIES REGARDING TP/HURRICANE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND RESULTS OF RADIOACTIVE SURVEYS.
ON,4 SEPT, BOTH UNITS IN COLD SHUTDOWN, TWO SOURCES OF OFFSITE POWER
- RESTORED, AND DAMAGE TO FOSSIL UNIT EXHAUST STACK.
PROVIDED JOE HIMES (AEOD),
NRC CONTACT W/FEMA, THAT FPL PLANS UNIT 4 RESTART IN APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS FOR INPUT INTO FEMA SITUATION REPORT STATES:
FPL EXPECTS TO RESTART UNIT 4 IN APPROX 30 DAYS" DISCUSSED TP STATUS TO INCLUDE RESTART.
.NEITHER RESTART DATE, NOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WERE DISCUSSED MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS FOSSIL UNIT STACK INTEGRITY.
HANDOUT INCLUDED UNIT 4 RESTART SCHEDULE PROJECTING ON-LINE DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER ON 10 SEPT, RA AND NRR/AD MET WITH FPL AT. TP TO DISCUSS OVERALL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY ACTIONS FAXED THE SCHEDULE OF NRC INITIATIVES FOR UNIT 4 STARTUP WHICH IDENTIFIED 30 SEPTEMBER AS THE STARTUP DATE NOTE:
,This is not a
comPlete chronological listing of all actions or information relative to Turkey Point recovery from Hurricane Andrew
Exhibit 3 (Continued)
DATE 17 SEPTEMBER 18 SEPTEMBER ACTIVITY 10 SEPT MEETING
SUMMARY
ISSUED REGION II ITEM OF INTEREST COMMENT RELEASED TO',PUBLIC (PDR)
THE MTG
SUMMARY
OF 10 SEP MTG W/ FPL CONTAINING COPY OF RESTART SCHEDULE WHICH PROJECTED ON-LINE 30 SEPT BOTH UNITS IN MODE 5.
PLANNED RESTART OF UNIT 4 ON 30 SEPTEMBER.
SITE STATUS WAS GIVEN.
22 SEPTEMBER 'RC MEETING WITH FPL ONSITE DISCUSSED RECONSTRUCTION AND UNIT 4 RESTART PLAN PROJECTING ON-LINE DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 24 SEPTEMBER GUTAM BAGCHI MEMO TO J.
RICHARDSON ASSESSMENT OF TP UNIT 2 STACK INTEGRITY - ALSO STATED UNIT 4 ON-LINE DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 25 SEPTEMBER RII MEETING WITH RA REGION II MEETING WITH ALL TECHNICAL DIVISIONS WAS CONDUCTED TO BRIEF THE RA ON NRC EFFORTS TO VERIFY READINESS OF TP UNIT 4 TO RESTART 25 SEPTEMBER 25 SEPTEMBER 2:00 PM REYES MTG W/LAINAS AND PARTLOW 'IN HQ TELECON: R.
- SCHIN, RII TO W.
- PEARCE, TP PLANT MANAGER NO UNIT 4 RESTART CONCERNS WERE IDENTIFIED W.
PEARCE
. VERIFIED ACCURACY OF PNO-II-92-062 AND STATED THAT FPL HAD BEEN IN.FREQUENT CONTACT WITH STATE AND LOCAL COUNTIES AND THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS IN THAT AREA 25 SEPTEMBER PNO-II-92-062 MEDIA INTEREST IN TP STATUS AFTER HURRICANE ANDREW STATES ON-LINE DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 25 SEPTEMBER
, 27 SEPTEMBER REGION II ITEM OF INTEREST BEGAN 24-HOUR INSPECTION COVERAGE ONSITE MEDIA INTEREST.
UNIT 4 SCHEDULED TO BE ONLINE BY 30 SEPTEMBER.
TP EXITED UNUSUAL,EVENT AT 12:20 PM EDT N 22 SEPTEMBER WHEN METEOROLOGICAL TOWER REPAIRS COMPLETE AND SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS RE-ESTABLISHED.
EQUIPMENT STATUS WAS DESCRIBED RESIDENT INSPECTOR 24-HOUR COVERAGE BEGAN IN 8 HOUR SHIFTS COMMENCING ON DAY SHIFT NOTE:
This is not a
comPlete chronological listing of all actions or information relative to Turkey Point recovery from Hurricane Andrew
Exhibit 3 (Continued) 0 DATE ACTIVITY COMMENT 28 SEPTEMBER TIA ISSUED TO.HQ TIA STATED UNDERSTANDING THAT NRR WAS FROM MERSCHOFF TO SATISFIED, WITH THE EVALUATION OF FIRE LAINAS PROTECTION AND UNIT 2 STACK INTEGRITY 28 SEPTEMBER 3:30 PM 29 SEPTEMBER 1:18 AM 29 SEPTEMBER':00 PM, 2:20 PM, 3:50 PM 29 SEPTEMBER 9:00 AM CONFERENCE CALL WITH NRR/RII/FPL UNIT 4 IN MODE 2 RII RAC. COMMITTEE MBR,R. TROJANOWSKI, TELECON WITH FEMA, REGION IV,.
'NO-II-92-063 DISCUSSED FPL PREPARATIONS FOR RESTART OF UNIT. 4 - NO CONCERNS WERE IDENTIFIED TO PREVENT START UP REACTOR CRITICAL AT 1:33 AM JOHN HEARD, FEMA RAC.CHAIRMAN WHICH OVERSEES OFFSITE PREPAREDNESS, INFORMED RII THAT STATE AND COUNTY CAN IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY PLAN.
MEDIA INTEREST IN TP STATUS AFTER
. HURRICANE ANDREW - STATED NRC REVIEWED AND CONCURRED IN UNIT 4 RESTART 29 SEPTEMBER BRIEF OF SENATOR GRAHAM STAFFER 4:30 PM BRIEFED DAN BERKOWITZ ON NRC ACTIONS TO VERIFY READINESS FOR UNIT 4 RESTART 29 SEPTEMBER 4:25 PM'NIT 4 WAS RETURNED AUTO AFW ACTUATION AND TWO MISSED TO MODE 3 SURVEILLANCES FOUND (NON-RELATED)
LICENSEE EN 24335 30 SEPTEMBER EDO STAFF NOTE ON 29 SEPT, RII BRIEFED SEN.
GRAHAM STAFFER ON NRC INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AT TP.
EXTENSIVE NEWS MEDIA INTEREST 30 SEPTEMBER 30 SEPTEMBER V
1 OCTOBER MORNING REPORT 2-92-0109 UNIT 4 STARTUP RECOMMENCED UNIT 4 STARTUP CONTINUED UNIT 4 SHUT DOMN DUE TO MISSING TWO SURVEILLANCES (VENTING THE ECCS AND RUNNING STDBY FW SYSTEM IN RECIRC)
AND ACTUATION OF AFM WHEN CONDENSATE POLISHER CAUSED LOSS OF MAIN FW ON LOW SUCTION PRESS MODE 2 AT 2:00 AM, REACTOR CRITICAL AT 2:17 AM,
'ODE 1 AT 2:10 N, GENERATOR PLACED ON-LINE AT 3:52 N," INCREASED POMER TO 30X FOR CHEMISTRY HOLD NOTE:
This is not a
complete chronological listing of all actions or information relative to Turkey Point recovery from Hurricane Andrew
Exhibit 3 (Continued)
DATE
= 1 OCTOBER 8:55 AM 1
OCTOBER 9:05 AH 1
OCTOBER 1
OCTOBER 7:15 PM 1
OCTOBER 11:00 PH 2 OCTOBER ACTIVITY RSLO ADVISES FEMA, STATE AND DADE COUNTY OF NRC PRESS CONFERENCE AT TP ON 2 OCTOBER FEHA (HEARD,,
WOODARD AND KOHL)
CONTACTS RII ORA AND RSLO NRC REQUESTS FPL TO SHUT DOWN UNIT 4 FROM 30X POWER UNIT 4 SHUT DOWN BEGAN SECURED 24 HOUR INSPECTION COVERAGE REGION II ITEN OF INTEREST 'AND EDO STAFF NOTE COMMENT DADE COUNTY DEPUTY DIRECTOR REITERATED TO RSLO THAT COUNTY PLAN CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT ANY CHANGES FENA ADVISES RII THAT FEHA MUST PERFORM ASSESSMENT OF REASONABLE ASSURANCE NRC/FEHA/FPL DISCUSS EVACUATION
.CAPABILITY-FEHA INSPECTION REQUIRED LASTING APPROX 2
WEEKS MODE 2 AT 8:24 PH NODE 3 AT 8:36 PH SECURED ON PEAK SHIFT FOLLOWING OBSERVING ENTRANCE INTO MODE 3 AND COOL DOWN INITIATED ON 29 SEPT, RII BRIEFED SEN.
GRAHAM STAFFER ON RII INSPECTION ACTIVITIES "AT TP.
ON 2 OCT, NRC PRESS CONFERENCE AT TP SITE TO DISCUSS DELAY OF UNIT 4 OPERATION FOR APPROX 2 WEEKS TO ASSESS OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
RII DIRECTOR ORSS AND STATE LIAISON OFFICER AT DISASTER FIELD OFFICE IN MIAMI OBSERVING FEHA'S ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES PERIODIC DISCUSSIONS AT THE DRP 8:15 HORNING MEETING (NRR PARTICIPATES)
PROVIDED THE STATUS OF TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 PREPARATIONS AND PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING THE SEPTEMBER 30 PLANNED ONLINE DATE.
NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED, WITH NRR PROJECTS AND REGION II PROJECTS TO VERIFY THAT PLANNED INSPECTIONS AND ASSESSMENTS WOULD BE COMPLETED AND THAT, STARTUP CONCERNS WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE PLANNED UNIT 4 ONLINE DATE OF SEPTEMBER 30.
NOTE:
This is not a
compl.ete chronological listing of all actions or information relative to Turkey Point recovery from Hurricane Andrew