ML17347A249
| ML17347A249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1987 |
| From: | Woody C FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347A250 | List: |
| References | |
| L-87-21, NUDOCS 8701270260 | |
| Download: ML17347A249 (17) | |
Text
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REGULATOR NFORNATION DISTRIBUTION TEN. (R IDB)
ACCESSION NBR: 870}270260 DOC. DATE: 87/01/16 NOTARIZED:
YES DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Planti Unit 3i Florida Poeer and Light C
05000250 50-251 TurkeM Point Planti Unit 4i Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH.NANE, AUTHOR AFFILIATION Florida Poeer Sc Light Co.
REC IP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Record Services Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards application for amend to Licenses DPR-31 h DPR-4}>
changing refueling shutdown margin to raise associated effective multiplication factori Keffifrom 0. 90-0. 95. Approval requested bg 870307. Fee paid.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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i TITLE: OR, Submittal:
General Distribution NOTES:
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JANUARY 16 l987 L-87-2 I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Re:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-25 I Proposed License Amendment Reactor Subcritical Mar in In accordance with IO CFR 50.90, Florida Power Bc Light Company (FPL) requests that you amend Appendix A of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-3l and DPR-4l (Turkey Point Units 3
and 4 Technical Specifications) to allow a refueling shutdown margin of 5%
b, K/K. This change will raise the associated effective multiplication factor, Keff, from 0.90 to 0.95.
FPL requests your approval by March 7, l987 in order to utilize the amendment during the upcoming Unit 3 refueling outage.
The proposed changes are described below and shown on the accompanying Technical Specification pages.
Table I.I The reactivity condition for Mode 6 (refueling) was revised from a Keff of < 0.90 to
< 0.95.
The average coolant temperature criteria for Mode 5 (cold shutdown) was revised from
< 200 F to
< 200 F to be consistent with the Mode 4 requirements and the Standard Technical Specification definition of Modes.
Pa e 3.I0-4 Technical Specification 3. I0.8.a is revised to require a Keff of 0.95 or less.
Table 4. I8-I Table 4.I8-I is revised to reflect the change to Table I.I.
In addition, it is also revised to reflect six modes of operation (it currently only addresses the four modes of operation initiallydefined for Turkey Point).
~PB3.10-2 Bases Section B3. I 0.8 is revised to reflect the proposed changes discussed above.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L-87-2I Page two It has been determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a
significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92.
A no significant hazards consideration determination is attached.
ln accordance with 10 CFR 50.9I(b)(l), a copy of this proposed license amendment is being forwarded to the State Designee for the State of Florida.
In accordance with 10 CFR l70. l2(c), FPL Check No.
3656 for 9 l50.00 is at tached.
The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the Florida Power
& Light Company Nuclear Review Board.
Your draft of the Turkey Point Plant Upgraded Technical Specification should be revised to reflect these changes.
Very truly yours, C. O. Wood Group'Vic resident Nuclear Energy COW/TCG/gp Attachments cc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, NRC Region ll Mr. D. R. Brewer, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point Plant Mr. D. G. McDonald, NRC Project Manager Mr. Alan Schubert, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services TCG6/0 I 0/2
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STATE OF FLORIDA
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That he is a Grou Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements made in this document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and
- belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.
C. O. Wood Subscribed and sworn to before me this
,day, of
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~ NOTARY'PUBLIC, in and for the County of Palm Beach, State of Florida NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA NY CONNISSION EXP SEPT 18,1989 BONDED THRU GENERAL INS.
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TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 and 0 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT TITLE: REACTOR SUBCRITICALMARGIN DESCRIPTION:
Currently the Turkey Point Technical Specifications require 1950 ppm boron concentration or higher, sufficient to maintain the reactor subcritical by 10 percent
~.k/k during refueling.
Due to the large amount of excess reactivity installed at beginning of cycle for recent long fuel
- cycles, the required refueling boron concentration to maintain 10 percent shutdown margin is now well above 1950 ppm.
The proposed amendment modifies the technical specifications to allow a refueling shutdown margin of 5 percent 8 k/k.
This change will raise the associated effective multiplication factor, keff, from 0.90 to 0.95 as it appears in Table 1.1, Specification 3.10.8 and,B3.10.8 of Turkey Point Plant Technical Specifications.
Prior to 1973, general practice in the nuclear industry was to design fresh or spent fuel storage facilities for a maximum keff of about 0.90 (approximately the keff of a single isolated fuel assembly in water).
Calculations of keff were performed assuming fully flooded unborated conditions using methods then
- extant, without considering uncertainties in the calculated keff. At that time, it was believed that the safety margin in keff of 0.10 was more than sufficient to account for any uncertainties while still preventing criticality.
In August 1973, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) issued an industry standard designated as ANSI N18.2-1973, which recommended a design basis keff of 0.95 for storage of fresh or spent fuel assuming fully flooded unborated conditions.
The NRC essentially adopted the ANSI N18.2 recommendations when it issued Section 9.1.2 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (NUREG-75/087) in 1975.
The SRP was reissued in 1980 as NUREG-0800, with little substantive change in the criteria in Section 9.1.2.
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Part of the NRC (an industry) rationale for moving from i e pre-!973 keff practice of 0.90 to the higher limits in SRP Section 9.1.2 is the following:
Significant improvements have been made in calculational methods.
Additionally, calculational methods are verified against experimental data that represents, as nearly as possible, the system being evaluated.
In calculating keff in accordance with SRP Section 9.1.2, a total uncertainty factor is determined and added to the calculated keff to define the maximum possible keff.
SRP Section 9.1.2, entitled "Spent Fuel Storage," currently states that the NRC Staff willaccept storage racks for spent fuel assemblies if:
the center-to-center spacing between fuel assemblies and any strong fixed neutron absorbers in the storage racks is sufficient to maintain the array, when fully loaded and flooded with nonborated water, in a subcritical condition.
A keff not greater than 0.95 for this condition is acceptable.
Further definition and clarification of the NRC position were provided in an April 10, 1978 letter from Brian Grimes, transmitting the NRC "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," setting forth in greater detail the NRC acceptance criteria for spent fuel storage pools.
Section III.1.5 of this guidance emphasizes that the "neutron multiplication factor in spent fuel pools shall be less than or equal to 0.95, includin all uncertainties, under all conditions" (emphasis in original).
Therefore,
- industry, ANS and the NRC all recognize the advances in criticality calculational methods and have applied these advances to new and spent fuel pools designs.
Refueling shutdown requirements have also been adjusted to reflect the same advances.
The Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification Revision 5 (Draft) also show a shutdown keff requirement of 0.95.
To support this technical specification
- change, Westinghouse Electric Corporation reanalyzed the "Boron Dilution During Refueling Accident".
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The analy sis conc lu tha t:
l.
A refueling b
on concentration of 1950 ppm wi i provide the 5 percent hk/k shutdown mar gin; 2.Operator will have at least 30 minutes to terminate the dilution event before a
return to criticality occurs.
An evaluation performed by the Turkey Point Reactor Engineering Department listed the instrumentation, alarms, and annunicators that provide the control room operators indication of a dilution event and allows sufficient time to mitigate the event.
These indications are:
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM Source Range:
l.
Countrate meters on drawers and console.
2.
Countrate strip chart recorder on console.
3.
SUR indication on drawer and console.
0.
Audible countrate.
5.
6.
7.
High flux at shutdown alarm on drawers.
High flux at shutdown annunciator.
High countrate Rx trip alarm on drawers.
High countrate Rx trip annunciator.
Intermediate Range:
1.
Power indication on drawers and console.
2.
Power indication on strip chart on console.
3.
SUR indication on drawer and console.
0.
P6 alarm on drawers.
5.
P6 status light VPA.
6.
P6 annunciator.
FULL RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION Gammametrics 1.
Countrate meters on console.
2.
Power meters on console.
3.
High flux at shutdown annunciator.
Two additional changes ar'e being made, first, Table 0.18-1 is being revised in order to bring it into conformance with Table 1.1.
The revision constitutes an administrative change bringing the "Applicable Mode" information in line with 6 modes of operation identified in Table 1.1.
Table 0.18-1 presently addresses 0 modes of operation.
- Second, Table 1.1 is being changed in order to correct a typographical error.
The "Average Coolant Temperature" for Mode 5 is being revised to read as "less than or equal to", from "less than".
The correction of this typographical error willbring Table" 1.1 in conformance with the Standard Technical Specifications.
Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists 10 CFR 5092(c).
A proposed amendment to an operating license for the facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(I) involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
(1)
This amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The reanalysis of the Boron Dilution During Refueling Accident concluded that control room operators had more than 30 minutes to terminate the dilution.
Both the control room and containment require an audible count rate amplified over speaker systems to be operable for fuel movement.
A change in count rate would alert the operators of the dilution.
Control room instruments and alarms that monitor the reactor would provide additional indication of a dilution event and allow it's mitigation.
Therefore, this amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously analyzed.
Since no plant modifications are being made by the amendment, the consequences of an accident remain the same as previously analyzed.
(2)
This amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident previously analyzed since this change does not modify the configuration or mode of operation of the plant.
(3)
This change will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The reanalysis of the Boron Dilution Accident showed that more than 30 minutes were available to terminate the dilution by the control room operators.
It is concluded that the amendment would not likely involve a significant hazards consideration.
In addition, the Commission has provided guidance for the application of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 (as specified above) by providing examples of amendments that are not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.
This change is similar to example (IV) a relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from a
restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated.
As discussed the 10 percent hk/k shutdown requirement was the common practice in pre-1973 licensed reactors since acceptable modeling methods were not available before that time.
Therefore, on the basis of the above discussion, operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 and 0 in accordance with the proposed amendments would pose no threat to the public health and welfare, and would not involve a significant hazards consideration.
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