ML17346A964
| ML17346A964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1985 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Williams J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, TAC-52810, TAC-52811, NUDOCS 8504300214 | |
| Download: ML17346A964 (12) | |
Text
April 16, 1985
'ocket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 Mr. J.
W. Williams, Jr., Vice President Nuclear Energy Department Florida Power and Light Company Post Office Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408
Dear Mr. Williams:
Reference:
TAC Numbers 52810 and 52811 Distribution CPR ORB¹1 RDG L PDR ORB¹1 Gray file HThompson OELD EJordan BGrimes JPartlow DMcDonald CParrish
- DShum, DHFS
SUBJECT:
DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION, GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 1. 1, (POST TRIP REVIEW)
By letter dated November 8, 1983, you responded to Generic Letter (GL) 83-28 with regard to required actions based on the generic implication of Salem ATWS events.
We have enclosed our draft Safety Evaluation (SE) for GL 83-28, Item 1. 1 "Program Description and Procedure".
The SE is based on input from our technical assistance contractor, Science Applications Intern'ational Corporation.
R We have noted, in Section'II of our SE, that you have not addressed the methods and'criterRia" for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior. 'e request that you provide additional informationto address our concerns and recommendations in Sections III.C and E -of the SE.
We request that the -information be provided within 30 days.from receipt of,this, letter,to allow us to meet our current review schedule.
,If additional information in relation to our concerns is necessary, please make the arrangements through the Turkey Point Project
- Manager, Mr. Daniel McDonald on (310) 492-7363.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, 85043002l4 8504l6 PDR ADOCK 05000250 I
P PDR
Enclosure:
As stated
/s/SAVarga Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch ¹1 Division of Licensing cc w/enclosure:
See next page ORB¹1: D CParrish 04/ P/85 ORB¹1:
L DMcDonald/ts ar 04/f(p/85 04/
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Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 April 16, 1985 Mr. J.
W. Williams, Jr., Vice President Nuclear Energy Department Florida Power and Light Company Post Office Box 14000 Juno Beach,- Florida 33408
Dear Mr. Williams:
Reference:
TAC Numbers 52810 and 52811
SUBJECT:
DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION, GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 1.1, (POST TRIP REVIEW)
By letter dated November 8, 1983, you responded to Generic Letter (GL) 83-28 with regard to required actions based on the generic implication of Salem ATWS events.
We have enclosed our draft Safety Evaluation (SE) for GL 83-28, Item 1. 1 "Program Description and Procedure".
The SE is based on input from our technical assistance contractor, Science Applications International Corporation.
We have rioted in Section III of our SE, that you have not addressed the methods and criteria for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior.
We request that you provide additional information to address our concerns and recommendations in Sections III.C and E of the SE.
We request that the information be provided within 30 days from receipt of this letter to allow us to meet our current review schedule.
If additional information in relation to our concerns is necessary, please. make the arrangements through the Turkey Point Project.
Manager; Mr. Daniel McDonald on (310) 492-7363.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, Operating Reactors Division of Licens
'ef ranch 81
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page
J.
W. Williams, Jr.
Florida Power and Light Company cc:
Harold F. Reis, Esquire'ewman and Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Jack Shreve Office of the Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Norman A. Coll, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Fl orida 33131-2398 Mr.
Ken N.
Harris, Vice Pres ident Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102 Mr. M. R. Stierheim County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County Miami, Florida 33130 Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Post Office Box 57-1185 Miami, Florida 33257-1185 Mr.'llan Schubert, Manager Public Health Physicist Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Intergovernmental Coordination and Review Office of Planning 8 Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. J.
Nelson Grace Regional Administrator, Region II U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street
- Atlanta, GA 30303 Martin H. Hodder, Esquire 1131 N.E. 86th Street Miami, Florida 33138 Joette Lorion 7269 SW 54 Avenue Miami, Florida 33143 Mr. Chris J. Baker, Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 029100 Miami, Florida 33102 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR GENERIC LE TER
- 8, EM 1.
S -TRIP REVIEW PR GR M
SCRIP I
N ND R
C UR URK Y
IN PL N
UN S
ND D
CKE N S.:
50-51 Enclosure 1
I.
INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system.
This incident occurred during the plant start-up and the react'or was tripped manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.
The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the sticking of the under voltage trip attachment.
Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.
In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the.Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to certain generic concerns.
These concerns are categorized into four areas:
(1)
Post-Trip Review, (2)
Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface, (3)
Post-Maintenance
- Testing, and (4)
Reactor Trip System Reliability Improvements.
The first action.item, Post-Trip Review, consists of Action Item 1.1, "Program Description and Procedure" and Action Item 1.2.
"Data and Information Capability."
This safety evaluation report (SER) addresses Action Item 1. 1 only.
II.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The following review guidelines were developed after initial evaluation of the various utility responses to Item 1. I of Generic Letter 83-28 and incorporate the best features of these submittals.
As such, these review guidelines in effect represent a "good practices" approach to post-trip review.
We have reviewed the licensee's response to Item 1. 1 against these guidelines:
A.
The licensee or applicant should have systematic safety assessment procedures established that will ensure that the following restart criteria are met before restart is authorized.
The post-trip review team has determined the root cause and sequence of events resulting in the plant trip.
Near term corrective actions have been taken to remedy the cause of the trip.
The 'post-trip review team has performed an analysis and determined that the major safety systems responded to the event within specified limits of the primary system parameters.
The post-trip review has not resulted in the discovery of a potential safety concern (e.g.,
the root cause of the event occurs with a frequency significantly larger than expected).
If any of the above restart criteria are not met, then an independent assessment of the event is performed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), or another designated group with similar authority and experience.
B.
The responsibilities and authorities of the personnel who will perform the review and analysis should be well defined.
The post-trip review team leader should be a member of plant management at the shift supervisor level or above and should hold or should have held an SRO license on the plant.
The team leader should be charged with overall responsibility for directing the post-trip review, including data gathering and data assessment and he/she should have the necessary authority to obtain all personnel and data needed for the post-trip review.
A second person on the review team should be an STA or should hold a relevant engineering degree with special transient analysis training.
The team leader and the STA (Engineer) should be responsible to concur on a decision/recommendation to restart the plant.
A nonconcurrence from either of these persons should be sufficient to prevent restart until the trip has been reviewed by the PORC or equivalent organization.
C.
The licensee or applicant should indicate that the plant response to the trip event will be evaluated and a determination made as to whether the plant response was within acceptable limits.
The evaluation should include:
A verification of the proper operation of plant systems and equipment by comparison of the pertinent data obtained during the post-trip review to the applicable data provided in the FSAR.
An analysis of the sequence of events to verify the proper functioning of safety related and other important equipment.
Where
- possible, comparisons with previous similar events should be made.
-4 D.
The licensee or applicant should have procedures to ensure that all physical evidence necessary for an independent assessment is preserved.
E.
Each licensee or applicant should provide in its submittal, copies of the plant procedures which contain the information required in Items A
through D.
As a minimum, these should include the following:
The criteria for determining the acceptability of restart The qualifications, responsibilities and authorities of key personnel involved in the post-trip review process The methods and criteria for determining whether the plant variables and system responses were within the limits as described in the FSAR The criteria for determining the need for an independent review.
III.
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION By letter dated November 8, 1983, the licensee of Turkey Point Plant, Units 3
and 4, provided information regarding its Post-Trip Review Program and Procedures.
We have evaluated the licensee's program and procedures again'st the review guidelines developed as described in Section II.
A brief description of the licensee's response and the staff's evaluation of the response against each of the review guidelines is provided below:
A.
The licensee has established the criteria in the Off-Normal Operating Procedure for determining the acceptability of restart.
We find that the licensee's criteria conform with the guidelines as described in the above Section II.A and, therefore, are acceptable.
B.
The qualifications, responsibilities and authorities of the personnel who will perform the review and analysis have been clearly bescribed.
The licensee indicated that the Plant Supervisor-Nuclear, who bases his decision on the above cited restart acceptability criteria, shall have the final authority to grant or deny authorization of plant restart.
We have reviewed the licensee's chain of command for responsibility for post-trip review and evaluation, and find it acceptable.
C.
The licensee has not addressed the methods and criteria for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior.
We recommend that the pertinent data obtained during the post-trip review be compared to the applicable data provided in the FSAR to verify proper operation of the systems or equipment.
Where possible, comparisons with previous similar events should be made.
D.
With regard to the criteria for determining the need for independent assessment of an event, the licensee has indicated that if the cause of the trip cannot be determined, or if any safety considerations are not
- resolved, the Operations Superintendent, Plant Manager or site Manager shall be contacted and concur prior to authorizing plant start-up.
Additional support, including Plant Nuclear Safety Committee review will be provided.
In addition, the licensee has established procedures to ensure that all physical evidence necessary for an independent assessment is preserved.
We find that these actions to be taken by the licensee conform to the guidelines as described in the above Sections II.A. and D.
E.
The licensee has provided for our review a systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips.
We recommend that this program be revised to include methods for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior as described in Section III.C above.
~
~
' Based on our review, we conclude that, subject to successful implementation of the above cited recommendations, the licensee's Post-Trip Renew Program and Procedures for Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, are acceptable.
Priaci 1 Contributnr D. Shum, DHFS