ML17345A366
| ML17345A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A365 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8809130354 | |
| Download: ML17345A366 (7) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 ENCLOSURE 1
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)
EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)
TURKEY POINT PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem ttuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system.
This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.
The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment.
Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.
In this
- case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigatiIln, the Comission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983
)
all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating
- license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.
This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by Florida Power 8
Light Company, the licensee for the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4 for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28.
The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.
Item 2. 1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all reactor trip system components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:
Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.
8809130354 880902 PDR ADOCK 05000250 P
- 2. 0 EVALUATION The licensee for the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4 responded
]o the require-ment~ of Item 2.1 (Part I) with submittals dated November 8, 1983 and April 17, 1987 The initial submittal stated that the licensee had determined that components required to trip the reactor were included in systems which were treated as safety-related.
The submittal also stated that equipment classifi-cation at the plants was limited to the system level but that a program to identify the items to the component level on the g-List was underway but no completion date was given.
The next submittal confirmed that all components required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related in documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities including maintenance work orders and parts replacement.
This submittal confirmed that the detailed component level g-List was implemented by December 1986.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on our review, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a program exists for identifying, classifying and treating components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function as safety related.
This program meets the requirements of Item 2. 1 (Part I) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.
4.0 REFERENCES
1.
NRC Letter, D.
G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction
- Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983 2.
Letter, J.
W.
Wi 1'1iams, Jr., Florida Power 8 Light Company to D.
G. Eisenhut,
- NRC, November 8, 1983.
3.
- Letter, C. 0.
Woody, Florida Power In Light Company, to NRC, April 17, 1987.
Dated:
September 2,
1988 Princi al Contributor:
D. Lasher
~.p,R REgy
+
0 Cy A
0 cA0
+~
gO 0y**4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR'EGULATORYCOMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 ENCLOSURE 2
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 2)
VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAM (RTS COMPONENTS)
TURKEY POINT PI.ANT., UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system.
This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.
The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of'he undervoltage trip attachment.
Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant,'n automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.
In this
- case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and repor t on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATMS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigati~n, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983
)
all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating
- license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATMS events.
This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Florida Power Light Company, the licensee for the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4 for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28.
The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.
Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to confirm that an interface has been established with the NSSS or with vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System which includes:
periodic communication between the licensee/applicant and the NSSS or the vendors of each of the components of the Reactor Trip System, and a system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee/
applicant of transmittals of vendor technical information.
- 2. 0 EVALUATION The licensee for the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4 responded tp the require-ments of Item 2.1 (Part 2) with a submittal dated November 8, 1983 The licensee stated in this submittal that Westinghouse is the NSSS for the Turkey Point
- Plant, Units 3 and 4, and that the RTS is included as part of the Westinghouse interface program established for this plant.
The response also confirmed that this interface program includes both periodic communication between Westinghouse and the licensee and positive feedback from the licensee in the form of signed receipts for technical information transmitted by Westinghouse.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on our review of their response, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function.
This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.
4.0 REFERENCES
1.
NRC Letter, D.
G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
2.
Florida Power and Light Company letter to NRC, J.
W. Williams to D.
G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, "Generic Letter 83-28,"
November 8, 1983.
Dated:
September 2, 1938 Princi al Contributor:
D. Lasher
4'
ENCLOSURE 2 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Functional Areas 1.
Management Involvement in Assuring equality.
N/A 2.
Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint.
Approach was direct and enabled verification of acceptability of their program.
Rating:
Category 2
3.
Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives.
Licensee described his program which met the requirements of this generic letter item.
Rating:
Category I 4.
Enforcement History.
N/A 5.
Operational and Construction Events.
N/A 6.
Staffing (including Management).
N/A 7.
Training and gualificat'ion Effectiveness.
N/A