ML17342B082
| ML17342B082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1988 |
| From: | Woody C FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, L-88-18, NUDOCS 8801200370 | |
| Download: ML17342B082 (19) | |
Text
ACCESSION NBR FACIL'0-250 AUTH. NAME WOODY'. O.
RECIP. NAME GRACEi J. N.
REGUL RY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM (RIDS) 8801200370 DOC. DATE: 88/Oi/14 NOTARIZED:
YES Turkey Point Planti Unit 3i Florida Power and Light C
AUTHOR AFFILIATION Florida Power 5 Light Co.
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Region 2i Ofc of the Director DOCKET 0 05000250
SUBJECT:
Forwards summary rept satisfying requirements of Item F of IE Bul1etin 85-03'Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE11D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Bulletin Response (50 DKT)
NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 LA McDONALDiD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
0 1
1 REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/EPB 02 RGN2 FILE 01 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 AEOD/DSP NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DOEA/GCB NRR/PMAS/ ILRB RES/DE/EIB EXTERNAL:
LPDR NSIC 1
1 1
NRC PDR TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 19 ENCL 18
P.
X 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 3340B 0420 JANUARY 1 4 1988 L-88-18 Dr. J.
Nelson Grace Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta St.,
N.W., Suite 2900
- Atlanta, GA 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
Re:
Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No. 50-250 IE Bulletin 85-03 The purpose of this letter is to provide a
summary report satisfying the requirements of Item f. of NRC IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings."
The report provides (1) a verification of completion of the requested
- program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjustments as a result of this
- bulletin, and (3) a summary of data in accordance with the NRC suggested Data Summary Format.
Completion of each specific requirement of IE Bulletin 85-03 is addressed individually for Turkey Point Unit 3.
A similar report will be submitted for Turkey Point Unit 4
upon completion of the remaining testing required.
This testing is scheduled to occur during the next refueling outage.
Should there be questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, C.
O.
ody Executive Vice President COW/SDF/gp Attachment cc Document Control Desk, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant SDF/014.IEB 880i200370 880ii4 PDR ADOCH, 05000250 6
(
4c i
STATE OF FLORlDA
)
)
ss.
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH )ff, d
That he is Director Nuclear Licensin of Florida Power & Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements made in this document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and
- belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.
J. K. H Subscribed an orn to before me this
/9 day of NOTARY PUBLIC, in and for the County of Palm Beach, State of Florida ROTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA HY COHHISSIOH EXP SEPT 18,1989 My Commission expires'
Page 1 of 6
NRC IE BULLETIN NO. 85-03 MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE COMMON MODE FAILURES DURING PLANT TRANSIENTS DUE TO IMPROPER SWITCH SETTINGS TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 SUl9fARY REPO This summary report is submitted to satisfy the requirements of Item f.
of NRC IE Bulletin 85-03.
This report provides (1) a verification of completion of the requested
- program, (2) a summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any adjustments as a result of this
- bulletin, and (3) a summary of data in accordance with the NRC Suggested Data Summary Format.
Completion of each specific requirement of IE Bulletin 85-03 will be addressed individually.
Item a.
Item a. of NRC IE Bulletin 85-03 required that the design basis for the operation of each motor-operated valve in the high pressure coolant injection and emergency feedwater systems that are required to be tested for operational readiness in accordance with 10CFR50.55a(g) be reviewed and documented.
This documentation was to include the maximum differential pressure expected during both opening and closing the valve for both normal and abnormal events.
The motor-operated valve design basis information to satisfy Item a.
for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 had been previously transmitted to the NRC via FPL letter L-86-226 dated May 28, 1986.
Also, included in this transmittal was a
description of the proposed program and the associated schedule to complete Items b., c.,
and d. of IE Bulletin 85-03.
Subsequent to the original FPL transmittal, the NRC submitted two Requests for Additional Information (RAI) concerning the proposed FPL program.
These two RAI's were formally addressed via FPL letters L 471 dated November 18, 1986 and L-87-386 dated September 17, 1987.
Note that two additional valves, 3-856A and 3-856B (safety injection pump recirculation to refueling water storage tank) were added to the scope of IE Bulletin 85-03.
These valves were originally air-operated valves but were modified to motor-operated valves to address the concerns of NRC IE Bulletin 86-03, "Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valves in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line".
These valves are included in the attached Suggested Data Summary Format table (Attachment 1) and associated notes.
I em b.
Item b. of IE Bulletin 85-03 required that correct switch settings be established for each motor-operated valve identified in Item a.
- Also, if a
valve was determined to be inoperable, an appropriate justification for continued operation in accordance with the applicable technical specifications was to be prepared.
FPL letter L-86-226 dated May 28, 1986 originally scheduled the completion of Item b. for October 17, 1986.
- However, due to late valve vendor responses, FPL letter L-86-408 dated October 10, 1986 subsequently rescheduled the completion of Item b. to January 30, 1987.
In order to address Item b. of IE Bulletin 85-03, FPL first transmitted the maximum differential pressures calculated in Item a.
to the appropriate valve vendors.
Each valve vendor was requested to provide the following information associated with each valve:
'a ~
b.
C ~
d 0 e.f.
Stem thrust required for operation.
Stem torque required for operation.
Maximum allowable stem thrust.
Maximum allowable stem torque.
Recommended motor-operator control logic Recommended torque bypass switch settings.
The information provided by each valve vendor was then transmitted to Limitorque for evaluation of each valve actuator.
Limitorque provided the maximum thrust and torque capability of each actuator along with any recommended hardware changes.
A review of all the vendor supplied information was then performed by FPL to determine the correct motor-operated valve (MOV) switch settings.
While some of the MOV switch settings were adjusted, the overall MOV control logic requirements (limit switch to open, torque switch to close, limit switch to close, etc.)
were not changed as a
result of IE Bulletin 85-03.
For simplicity, only one MOV switch setting policy was established for gate and globe valves.
The switch setting policy for IE Bulletin 85-03 gate and globe valves is as follows for each control switch.
a ~
Open Torque Switch All IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's utilize limit switch to open control logic.
Therefore, the purpose of the open torque switch is to provide backup in case the open limit switch fails to actuate.
The open torque switch will provide protection to ensure that the allowable thrust ratings for both the valve and actuator are not exceeded if the valve backseats or if mechanical binding occurs while the valve is in mid-stroke.
The open torque switches were set utilizing MOVATS signature analysis equipment.
The stem thrust at the open torque switch trip was measured using standard MOVATS stem thrust measurement techniques.
A range of acceptable thrust values for the open torque switch has been developed for each MOV.
The minimum thrust required to open the valve against maximum differential pressure has been calculated by the appropriate valve vendor.
The maximum allowable thrust value is based upon the limiting component, either the valve or the actuator.
Again the valve. vendor has determined the maximum allowable thrust for his valve while Limitorque has provided the maximum allowable thrust rating for the actuator.
Setting the open torque switch to trip at a value between the minimum and maximum allowable thrust values ensures both valve operability and eliminates the potential for overstressing either the valve or actuator components.
Note that the final target thrust values have considered published measurement equipment uncertainties.
Close Torque Switch Page 3 of 6
For those MOV's utilizing torque switch to close control logic, the close torque switch was again set utilizing MOVATS stem thrust measurement techniques.
A range of acceptable thrust values for the closing stroke has been developed for each MOV.
The minimum thrust value required to close the valve under maximum differen-tial pressure conditions has been determined by the appropriate valve vendor.
The maximum allowable
- thrust, values were again determined to ensure that neither the valve nor the actuator's allowable thrust rating is exceeded.
Setting the close torque switch to trip at a value between the minimum and maximum thrust value will ensure that leak-tight closure of the valve has been achieved and neither the valve nor actuator components are overstressed.
As for the open torque
- switch, the final target thrust values have considered published measurement equipment uncertainties.
Open Limit Switch The open limit switches were set to trip the actuator at a point which ensures the valve is fully open and to also prevent inadvertent backseating of the valve.
Due to the physical differences between the valves included in the IE Bulletin 85=03
- program, a specific setpoint for the open limit switches was difficult to establish.
However, if a valve did inadvertently backseat during opening due to contactor dropout time and/or
- inertia, MOVATS signature analysis techniques were utilized to ensure the maximum thrust limit of the valve and actuator was not exceeded.
Close Limit Switch For those MOV's utilizing limit switch to close control logic, in lieu of a torque switch, MOVATS stem thrust measurement techniques were again utilized to ensure that the thrust developed at limit switch trip fell within an acceptable thrust range.
This target thrust range was developed using the same methodology as for the close torque switch described above.
Verification of.the thrust achieved during close limit switch trip again ensures that tight shut-off of the valve has been achieved and valve or actuator thrust ratings have not been exceeded.
Close-to-Open Torque Bypass Limit Switch The close-to-open torque bypass limit switch is utilized to prevent inadvertent open torque switch actuation during the high loading condition present when the valve disc is lifted from the seat.
The close-to-open bypass switch, if selected and set properly, will ensure that the valve will perform its intended safety function even if the open torque switch is improperly set.
Each valve vendor was contacted to provide recommendations for setting of the close-to-open torque bypass switch.
Although several ranges of acceptable switch settings were provided, it was desirable to select one bypass switch setting that conservatively enveloped those recommended.
Page 4 of 6 Therefore, the close-to-open torque bypass limit switch was set to oPen during 20-254 of the valve opening stroke.
Industry testing Performed by MOVATS has shown that a
20-25% torque bypass switch setting ensures that the open torque switch is adequately bypassed during the high loading condition experienced under high differential pressure conditions for both gate and glove valves.
Note that a
20-254 close-to-open torque bypass switch setting could impact the closed position indicating lights.
Therefore, each Bulletin 85-03 MOV was reviewed to determine the impact of an increased bypass switch setting on position indication.
As a
- result, all IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's have been modified as necessary, to include a four-rotor limit switch and wire the close-to-open torque bypass switch and closed indicating light on separate rotors.
Note that this method for setting the close-to-open torque bypass switch and closed indicating lights eliminates the inaccurate position indication condition identified in NRC IE Information Notice 86-29 and INPO SOER 86-2.
go h.
Open-to-Close Torque Bypass Limit Switch High loading conditions are normally not experienced during the initial portion of the valve closing stroke.
Therefore, no specific requirements are specified for the open-to-close torque bypass limit switch.
Normally, the open-to-close torque bypass switch shares the same rotor as the open limit switch and open indicating light.
As a result, this switch was set to actuate at the same point as the open limit switch.
Open Indicating Light As stated above for item f., the open indicating light normally shares the same limit switch rotor as the open limit switch and open-to-close torque bypass switch.
This switch was therefore set to actuate at the same point as the open limit switch.
Closed Indicating Light If the MOV utilizes limit switch to close control logic then the closed indicating light was set to actuate at the same point as the close limit switch.
If the MOV utilizes torque switch to close control logic, hardware modifications were required to wire the close-to-open torque bypass switch and closed indicating light on separate rotors.
For these cases the closed indicating light limit switch was set to actuate at approximately 2-54 of valve travel from the fully closed position.
A procedure for sizing and selecting thermal overload heaters was also developed.
This procedure took into consideration vendor and industry recommendations to establish overload trip setpoints that avoid premature thermal overload trips.
Thermal overload heaters were subsequently specified for each IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV.
The controlled document containing all the above switch setting information was completed and issued on January 23, 1987.
Item c.
Page 5 of 6 Item c. of IE Bulletin 85-03 required that individual valve settings be
- changed, as appropriate, to those values established in Item b.
Item c.
also required that each valve be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the maximum differential pressure determined in Item a.
with the exception that testing motor-operated valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing the valve would not be required.
Justifications were to be provided for any cases where testing with the maximum differential pressure cannot be practicably performed.
In order to implement Item c. of IE Bulletin 85-03, a comprehensive MOV training program was first established.
Plant maintenance personnel received "hands-on" training on the design, operation, maintenance and troubleshooting of Limitorque actuators.
Next, electrical maintenance personnel were formally trained on the use of the MOVATS 2100 MOV signature analysis system.
This training program was scheduled and completed prior to the start of the IE Bulletin 85-03 test program.
Additionally, MOVATS field representatives assisted plant maintenance personnel in the implementation of the switch settings on several Turkey Point Unit 3 IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's.
The MOUATS 2100 System was utilized to implement all of the specified MOV switch settings for each IE Bulletin 85-03 valve.
Signature traces of spring pack displacement, limit switch and torque switch actuations, and motor current were obtained for each MOV to verify accurate limit switch settings.
The MOV torque switches were also set using MOVATS equipment to obtain the target thrusts determined in Item b.
In order to accomplish the differential pressure testing requirements of Item c.,
FPL established the following program.
First, all IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's were grouped to envelope all valve/actuator.
configurations and test conditions.
At least one valve out of each test group was then required to be differential pressure stroke tested.
MOVATS equipment was utilized to ensure that the remaining valves in each test group developed more thrust at torque switch trip than the test valve.
The actual stroke testing was performed under dynamic conditions (differential pressure plus flow) utilizing existing process pumps.
In order to maximize the differential pressures obtained during stroke
- testing, plant refueling outage conditions were required.
Note that the proposed FPL testing program to satisfy Item c. of IE Bulletin 85-03 had been informally discussed with the NRC staff via telecon and deemed adequate.
The attached Suggested Data Summary Format table (Attachment 1) provides the results of the differential pressure stroke testing program.
Also included as notes to the table are the appropriate justifications for partial differential pressure testing.
Note that if test pressures in excess of 95% of the design differential pressure were obtained, no justification is deemed necessary.
All MOV's that were differential pressure stroke tested operated satisfactorily.
The valves were verified to fully open and close by both local observation and remote position indicating lights.
No MOV failures were experienced at Turkey Point Unit 3.
Item f. of IE Bulletin 85-03 also required that a
summary of the findings as to valve operability prior to any MOV switch adjustments as a result of the bulletin be provided.
All IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's at Turkey Point Unit 3 met the operability requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code as required by plant technical specifications prior to the issue of the bulletin.
FPL developed what is considered a
conservative MOV switch setting policy for IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's to further enhance valve operability.
As a result of this conservative MOV switch setting policy, several MOV switch settings were adjusted.
However, these MOV switch adjustments should not be interpreted to mean that an MOV was inoperable prior to the implementation of the bulletin switch setting policy.
Full differential pressure testing of the MOV's prior to implementation of any Bulletin 85-03 switch adjustments is the only absolute method of determining whether a valve is inoperable.
This testing was not performed at Turkey Point Unit 3 as it was not a requirement of NRC IE Bulletin 85-03.
Item d Item d. of IE Bulletin 85-03 required that procedures be prepared or revised to ensure that correct switch settings are determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant.
Procedures for performing MOV testing on each bulletin valve have been developed.
All setpoints for 85-03 valves have been established and are contained in a controlled document.
To ensure that correct switch settings are maintained in the future following maintenance, existing maintenance procedures are being modified to require an electrical department retest evaluation when maintenance is performed on motor operated valves.
Additionally, an MCC load device has been purchased and is being evaluated for future use in determining the effects of maintenance on valve operability.
FP&L will continue to evaluate industry methods for maintaining MOV operability and will modify existing methods when deemed beneficial.
VL/NRC/PTP.RPT0003
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 AUXILIARYPEEDMATER SYSTEM Attachment 1
Page 1 of 8 S)e Ceayeeat li>
I~fecba~e
, awe) ~
Siee. Iatii Valse Val ra
~~leo Ihsetacheet,
- IMel, NIter MN, Qll Data Summar Ieslga ASiS ht Close Test it lose QsitA Seltiais F iaal Smitch trier to HQeaaeaas Settiais ia Ia-es a Iesslt ot Iolletio snoose lo baal<
Close l
MOV-3-1403~
Velan Globe P3-8472-N4*
4 inch 9008 Limitorque SMB-00 1900 rpm Steam Generator 3A Steam Isolation 1118 psid/
See MOV-3-14p4 1118 paid
& MOV-3-1405 1 1/2 /
1 1/2 2 1/2 /
2 1'/2 MOV-3-1404~
Velan Globe P3-8472-N4*
4 inch 9004 Limitorque SMB-500 1750 rpm Steam Generator 3B Steam Isolation ill/ paid/
lppO paid/
1118 Paid 89P paid (89X/80X of design)
See Note 1
1 1/2 /
1 1 3/4 /
1 3/4 MOV-3-1405~
Velan Globe P3-8472-N4*
4 inch 9008'imitorque SMB-00 1900 rpm Steam Generator 3C Steam Isolation 1118 paid/
1000 paid/
1118 paid 875 psid (89X/78X of design)
See Note 1
1 1I2 I 1 1'I2 3 / 2 1/2 Mov-4-1403 Vegan Globe P3-8472-N4*
4 inch 900f Limitorque SMB-00 1900 rpm Steam Generator 4A Steam Isolation 1118 paid/
1118 paid See Note 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 6 4 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM Attachment 1
page 2 of 8 h}e Cggyele>>t II>
$ Io, Iatial Valve Val ra QI>>ctie>>
Naseticheet,
@Nial, Notes N,
~gal 5yeN Data Summar resile IISia kt Qe>>~CI>>so Teat N QgalCloso aiba Sa~ti>>is trier to HJgat>>e>>ts os a les>>lt of I>>lleiia Close fi>>ol $eei1cl Settl>>IS iN Ne-syoaso to hallet Close MOV-4-1404 Velan Globe P3-8472"N4*
4 inch 900k Limitorque SMB-500 1750 rpm Steam Generator 4B Steam Isolation 1118 paid/
1118 paid See Note 2
MOV-4-1405 Velan'lobe P3-8472"N4*
4 inch 9008 Limitorque Steam Generator SMB-00 4C Steam 1900 rpm 'solation 1118 paid/
1118 paid See Note 2
MOV-6459A Gimpel Corp.
Globe NP-1794*
3II 900k Limitorque A-AFW Pump SHB"000 Trip and Throttle 1900 rpm Valve 1118 paid(
1118 paid MOV-6459C 1 1/2 /
2 1/2 1 /
1 1/3 MOV-6459B Gimpel Corp.
Globe NP-1794*
3ll 9008 Limitorque B"AFW Pump SMB"000 Trip and Throttle 1900 rpm Valve 1118 paid/
1118 paid MOV-6459C I
1 3/5 /
1 1/2
Attachment 1
Page 3 of 8 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 AUXILIARYFEEDMATER SYSTEM Sle Cegyeee@L li, SRINticCcote l~, ~le
$)ee, IILia Valse lal t
f~thea Naetac4eer,
- Ne4el, NeLet SN, OIIyeL Sped (NN)
Data Summar
~eslNI Iasls &
lest 4I CIOso
~olClaose Swill Settiols
~
F leal Smith Iriet te M~taeats Settles 4I %
as a Iesslt oi hslletia ayoase to Oslo Close I
MOV-6459C Gimpel Corp.
Globe NP"D94*
3ll 900k Limitorque C-AFW Pump SMB-000 Trip and 1900 rpm Throttle Valve 1118 paid/
1118 psid 1000 paid 1000 psid (89'/ of design)
See Note 1
2 / 2 3/4 2/112
- - Denotes drawing number
~ - As stated in the original FPL submittal, these valves were changed out during the last Turkey Point Unit 3 refueling outage.
Motor operators and differential pressures have not changed.
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Attachment 1
Page 4 of 8 hha
~~at lI, i aaelactwer.
litem ~le S It. Natty Valet Val ra f~alII Nsetac4eer, No&I~
Nalet N, SQN, Syee4 Data Summar Oesiea Iasis it
~blest fesC N
+~Close t'ai a~i)ass trier lo 1ijesteeats Settlers la It-as a Result of hslleiio syoaso to Oalltl Close Close 3-864A Anchor/Darling Gate 16x14xl6-S70 300f Limitorque Unit 3 RWST SMB-0 To HHSI 1750 rpm Pump Suction 25 paid/
25 paid 0 psid/
0 paid Static Test Only See Note 3
3 / 2 1/2 1 3/8 /
1 3/8 3-864B Anchor/Darling Gate 16xl4x16-S70 300f Limitorque SMB-0 1750 rpm Unit 3 RWST To HHSI Pump Suction 25 paid/
25 paid 0 psid/
0 psid Static Test Only See Note 3
1 1/2 /
1 1/2 1 1/4 /
1 3/8 4-864A Anchor/Darling Gate 16xl4x16"S70 300f Limitorque SMB-0 1750 rpm Unit 4 RWST To HHSI Pump Suction 25 psid/
25 psid See Note 2
4 "864B Anchor/Darling Gate 16x14xl6-S70 300f Limitorque Unit 4 RWST SMB-0 To HHSI 1750 rpm 'ump Suction 25 psid/
25 psid See Note 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Attachment 1
Page 5 of 8 She Ceayeaeat II>
IIIelacbsrtre l~, Noel,
$ It, Iatili Valet Val ra f~tioo Nawfac4eer.
Ih4elo Netor MN.
4tyet Speci 4'}
~eSiIa
~asis kf
~%~Clost hSt 0 i~i~lost Svitcl Sett ials trier to Iejsstaeoas as a Itsult of Iollelia Close E loal Sault'ettlois la It-s@ease to %mlitt Close 878 A Anchor/Darling Gate 4". No. S 200 9000 Limitorque SMB-00 1700 rpm Safety Injection Pump Cross-Connect 1452 psid/
1452 psid See 878 B
1 3/4 /
1 3/4 87& B Anchor/Darling Gate 4" No. S 200 900k Limitorque SMB-00 1750 rpm Safety Injection Pump Cross-Connect 1452 psid/
1505 psid/
1452 paid 1505 psid (104/ of design) 1 3/4 /
1 3/4 3-&43 A Anchor/Darling Gate 4" No.
S350 1500k'imitorque SMB-0 3400 rpm Safety Injection Pump Discharge Isolation to Unit 3 Cold Legs 2485 paid/
1548 psid 3-&43B 2 1/2 /
2 2 1/4 /
2 3-&43 B
Anchor/Darling Gate 4" No.
S350 15000 Limitorque SMB-0 3400 rpm Safety Injection Pump Discharge Isolation to Unit 3 Cold Legs 2485 psid/
1548 paid 1585 psid/
2 1/2 /
2 1585 psid (64/ 1'02/ of design)
St'.e Note 4
3/25/8
Q SayeeeaL II.
gaaefacC~r, Tea, Natl ~
sine, Iatlei Valse Vol ra f~eioe Naeifacheet, Noel ~
Nolan NN, 4tywL 5yeN
{NI}
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Data Summar
~NSiga crasis Test N Close l'~Close Attachment 1
Page 6 of 8 5 i+1 5ottiais ttior to Mjesteeats as a Iosslt of iolletia Close fiaal Qeitc1 Sottlais Ia Ie-syoase te allot Close 4-843 A
Anchor/Darling Gate 4'I No. S350 15001 Limitorque SMB-0 3400 rpm Safety Injection Pump Discharge Isolation to Unit 4 Cold Legs 2485 psid/
1548 paid See Note 2
4-843 B
Anchor/Darling Gate 4" No.
S350 1500$
Limitorque SMB-0 3400 rpm Safety Injection Pump Discharge Isolation to Unit 4 Cold Legs 2485 psid/
1548 psid See Note 2
3-856A Copes Vulcan 2" Globe 02-404-0223-24*
See Note 5
Limitorque SMB-000 Safety Injection Pump Recirculation to RWST 1548 paid/
1301 psid/
1548 psid 1301 psid (84% of design)
See Note 6
2 3/4 /
2 1/2 1 1/4 /
2 1/2 3-856B Limitorque Copes Vulcan SMB-000 2" Globe 02-404-0223-24*
See Note 5
Safety Injection Pump Recirculation to RWST ps 1548 psid See 3-856A
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 NRC IE BULLETIN NO. 85-03 DATA
SUMMARY
TABLE Attachment 1
Page 7 of 8 1 ~
The test differential pressure indicated represents the maximum steam pressure achievable during hot standby conditions.
Steam pressures in excess of this test value can only be achieved by placing the plant in an abnormal condition.
2 ~
This valve is located on Completion of Item c.
of IE valve is currently scheduled Point Unit 4 refueling outage.
will be completed at that time.
Turkey Point Unit 4.
Bulletin 85-03 for this for the upcoming Turkey The data summary table 3 ~
Valves 3-864A and 3-864B are the refueling water storage tank (RWST) isolation valves.
The piping and pump arrangement at Turkey Point is such that static differential pressure testing is only possible if the downstream piping is empty or a pipe break is simulated.
It would not be practical to drain the downstream portion of piping due to the large amount of water contained.
Also, Item c. of IE Bulletin 85-03 does not require valve testing under conditions simulating a pipe break.
4.
Valves 3-864A and 3-864B have a very low design basis differential pressure (25 psid) as compared to the remaining IE Bulletin 85-03 MOV's.
- However, the same conservative switch setting policy was established for these valves as for the high differential pressure MOV's to ensure valve operability.
The opening design basis differential pressure of 2485 psig for this valve assumes the buildup of RCS backpressure on the downstream side of the valve due to backleakage through the safety injection check valves.
This condition is not possible to simulate as RCS backleakage would have to occur through two check valves in series.
The MOV switch setting policy at Turkey Point has been established such that the open torque switch is bypassed up to 20-25% of the valve opening stroke to prevent inadvertent open torque switch actuation.
- Also, the open torque switch was set to actuate at a thrust value in excess of the minimum opening thrust specified by the valve vendor.
Note also that the valve did close satisfactorily when exposed to a differential pressure slightly in excess of the design basis closing differential pressure.
5.
6.
Attachment 1
Page 8 of 8 Valve 3-856A and 3-856B were added to the scope of IE Bulletin 85-03.
These valves were originally air-operated valves.
- However, in order to address NRC IE Bulletin 86-03 "Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valves in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line", these valves were modified to motor-operated valves during the last Turkey Point Unit 3 refueling outage.
As these valves were originally air
- operated, they were not included in the scope of IE Bulletin 85-03.
- However, the program was expanded to include these valves prior to implementation of the modification.
Note that a
similar modification is planned for Turkey Point Unit 4
during the upcoming refueling outage and those valves will be included in the IE Bulletin 85-03 program at that time.
The design basis differential pressure cannot be achieved without dead-heading the safety injection pumps.
An alternate minimum recirculation flow path was established during valve stroke testing to avoid the potential for damaging the safety injection pumps.
VL/TABLE.RPT0003
.0